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Determine the most probable root cause of the LaSalle fuel rod failure, distinguish primary failure mechanisms from post-failure degradation, and assess whether the condition is isolated or indicative of a broader issue affecting similar rods or assemblies. Results will support decisions related to core operation, fuel management, and corrective actions.
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The BayoTech hydrogen generation system has been evaluated in terms of safety considerations at the NM Gas site. The consequence of a leak in different components in the system was evaluated in terms of plume dispersion and overpressure. Additionally, the likelihood of a leak scenario for different hydrogen components was identified. The worst-case plume dispersion cases, full-bore leaks, resulted in relatively large plumes. However, these cases were noted to be far less likely than the partial break cases that were evaluated. The partial break cases resulted in nearly negligible plume lengths. Similarly, the overpressure analysis of the full-bore break scenarios resulted in much larger overpressures than the partial break cases (which resulted in negligible overpressure at the lot line). There were several cases evaluated in the analysis that represented leak scenarios from both hydrogen and natural gas sources. Generally, the natural gas leak scenarios resulted in a smaller horizontal impact than that of hydrogen leaks. The worst-case consequence from a hydrogen leak resulted from the compressors, storage pods, or dispensing system. To consider the safety features that may isolate the leak, the consequence was evaluated at different times after the leak event to show the reduction of pressure. After 2 seconds, the plume dispersion from this event is contained within the perimeter of the site. The worst-case consequences show that the plume may disperse to adjacent facilities and to the street. When considering both likelihood and consequence, the risk may be considered low because the maximum frequency of a full-bore leak from any component within the hydrogen compound is 8.2 E-5/yr. This means that a full-bore leak is expected to occur less than once every 10,000 years. The risk can be further reduced by implementing mitigative countermeasures, such as CMU walls along the sides of the equipment compound. This would reduce the overall consequence of the worst-case dispersion scenarios (horizontal impact of plume). In terms of siting and safety analysis, the NFPA 2 code was used to provide a high-level evaluation of the current site plan. The most limiting equipment in terms of set-back distance are the compressors/storage units because of the high-pressure hydrogen. The site layout was evaluated for an acceptable location for the compression/storage unit based on NFPA 2 set-back distances. It is important to note that the NFPA 2 set-back distances consider both likelihood and consequence. This is important because the worst-case results evaluated herein also represent the least likely leak scenario. Other site-specific considerations were evaluated, including the parking shade structure with photovoltaic cells and refueling vehicles. These issues were dispositioned and determined to not present a safety risk.
Until recently, the simultaneous detection and evaluation of multiple Space Transportation System (STS) element compartments for propellant leakage was not possible during the External Tank (ET) pre-pressurization (pre-press) phase of propellant loading; late in the loading sequence (T-3 min to T-0). There exist launch commit criteria (LCCS) designed to protect against leaks resulting in flammable mixtures in the intertank during the functional life of the ET; start of propellant loading through ET-Orbiter separation. However thus far, leak protection had relied on the premise that if a propellant supply system leak were to exist, it would be a leak of fixed area present at the start of propellant loading (dumb leak mode) and such a leak could be detected earlier in the loading sequence than the pre-press phase. No measures had ever been implemented which would protect against leaks potentially developing late in the loading sequence (smart leak mode), The STS community had baselined this situation as an accepted risk their decision supported by exhaustive hardware acceptance criteria and a history of many successful launches. With the recent development of improvements to the hazardous gas detection system (HGDS), an opportunity arose to monitor the intertank compartment for hazardous gas concentrations beyond the T-3 minute mark. In this timeframe the propellant supply system is pressurized for flight and protection was sought against potential leaks generated by this pressurization process. The challenge at hand was to develop LCCs in this timeframe that were not too conservative to unnecessarily prohibit a launch, yet not too liberal to endanger crew safety and mission success. Since essentially no measurement history existed in this timeframe, the LCCs would have to rely on analysis alone. At NASA's direction, Lockheed Martin Michoud Space Systems (LMMSS) developed requirements that would protect against a smart leak during pre-press. A smart leak protection strategy is noteworthy from an STS main propulsion system (NWS) community perspective. This paper presents the resultant requirements as well as the technical and program issues involved with establishing hazardous gas LCCs for the ET intertank compartment.
Ground crew veterans at Kennedy Space Center still talk about what they call "the summer of hydrogen"-the long, frustrating months in 1990 when the shuttle fleet was grounded by an elusive hydrogen leak that foiled our efforts to fill the orbiter's external fuel tank. Columbia (STS-35) was on Launch Pad A for a scheduled May 30 launch when we discovered the hydrogen leak during - tanking. The external fuel tank is loaded through the orbiter. Liquid hydrogen flows through a 17-inch umbilical between the orbiter and the tank. During fueling, we purge the aft fuselage with gaseous nitrogen to reduce the risk of fire, and we have a leak-detection system in the mobile launch platform, which samples (via tygon tubing) the atmosphere in and around the vehicle, drawing it down to a mass spectrometer that analyzes its composition. When we progressed to the stage of tanking where liquid hydrogen flows through the vehicle, the concentration of hydrogen approached four percent-the limit above which it would be dangerously flammable. We had a leak. We did everything we could think of to find it, and the contractor who supplied the flight hardware was there every day, working alongside us. We did tanking tests, which involved instrumenting the suspected leak sources, and cryo-loaded the external tank to try to isolate precisely where the leak originated. We switched out umbilicals; we replaced the seals between the umbilical and the orbiter. We inspected the seals microscopically and found no flaws. We replaced the recirculation pumps, and we found and replaced a damaged teflon seal in a main propulsion system detent cover, which holds the prevalve-the main valve supplying hydrogen to Space Shuttle Main Engine 3 -in the open position. The seal passed leak tests at ambient temperature but leaked when cryogenic temperatures were applied. We added new leak sensors-up to twenty at a time and tried to be methodical in our placements to narrow down the possible sources of the problem. We even switched orbiters, sending Columbia back to the Vehicle Assembly Building and bringing out Atlantis, scheduled to fly as STS-38. Two shuttles on their mobile launchers passing in the night was a majestic sight, but not one you want to see if you're trying to get an orbiter launched. None of this told us where the leak was, or if we were dealing with more than one leak source.
Tritium confinement is performed using different barriers to minimize releases to the environment. Primary confinement is usually performed by process piping and components, secondary confinement typically by inerted gloveboxes connected to a continuously operating tritium stripper system. Some facility designs employ tertiary tritium confinement by using process room confinement with a tritium stripper system activated after an accident to further mitigate tritium releases to the environment. Secondary confinement of some tritium systems such as radiation-hardened or shielded-cell enclosures are not easily achieved using designs for inerted glovebox. These enclosures can be challenging to seal for secondary tritium confinement due to heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) needs for temperature control, as well as feedthroughs for equipment and instrumentation, are potential pathways for tritium leaks or loses. Additional tritium leak paths can be created in secondary confinement enclosures due to a Design Basis Accident (DBA) seismic event. These new, larger tritium leak rates from the DBA event are usually not part of the stripper system design basis so all tritium released to the secondary confinement enclosure is assumed released to the environment. Detritiation strategies for shielded enclosures and/or gloveboxes with significant leak rates are necessary to minimize off-site radiological dose consequences. To address this, the relationship between the confinement system leak rate and stripper system (recirculating) flow rate was evaluated to meet prescribed maximum allowable environmental tritium emissions from the event. The simple analysis described assumes a constant leak rate from the confinement system (i.e. shielded enclosure or glovebox) while a recirculating stripper system strips tritium from the system– a competition between tritium release and tritium recovery. At a high level, the resulting expression summarizes the relationship between system leak rate (F L ) and stripper flow rate (F S ) relative to allowable tritium release (Q A ) and initial tritium release (Q 0 ): $\frac{F_L}{F_s}$ ≈ $\frac{Q_A}{Q_0}$. This report derives the relationship between these parameters, examines the impact of finite stripping times followed by purging of the stripped volume. The analysis provides example results for up to 30 gram tritium releases: the maximum tritium inventory of a Hazard Category III (Department of Energy) Nuclear Facility. The detritiation model presented represents a high-level analysis of tritium recovery versus losses for “leaky” confinement enclosures such as shielded cells after large tritium releases. Key parameters for doing the analyses are the system leak rate, stripper flow rate, initial tritium release, and allowable tritium release values. The analyses show a proportional decrease in releases with reduction in initial tritium release but a non-linear increase in tritium recovery with increased stripper flow rate or reduced leak-rate. The analyses also apply to glovebox confinement systems which could have significant increases in leak rates after a DBA. The analysis recognizes but does not include tritium absorption followed by re-emission from the walls of the confinement volume – an analysis which could be pursued in future studies.
Underground storage tanks at the Hanford Site, in southeastern Washington State, hold radioactive waste generated from four decades of plutonium production. The 149 single-shell tanks and the 28 double-shell tanks have all exceeded their initial design life of approximately 25 years. At least 67 tanks are assumed to have leaked in the past, resulting in radioactive releases into the vadose zone. Gamma ray logging within dry monitoring wells is currently the primary method for tracking the migration of leaked tank waste through the vadose zone. While this approach provides an accurate assessment of radioactive contamination, that information is only provided near (within ~1m) the borehole, leaving most of the vadose zone unmonitored, particularly the important region directly beneath the tank. This report describes a numerical study that investigates the feasibility and performance of time-lapse 3D electrical resistivity tomography (ERT) for long-term monitoring of a hypothetical tank waste location and migration through the vadose zone. ERT is a method of remotely imaging the bulk electrical conductivity (EC) of the subsurface, which is significantly impacted by the presence of conductive solid and liquid tank waste. The release of liquid tank wastes increases subsurface fluid conductivity and saturation over time, creating a target to use time-lapse ERT for long-term monitoring. Although the presence of metallic infrastructure can cause ERT interference, recent advancements in ERT data processing enable the deleterious effects of buried metallic infrastructure (e.g. pipes, wellbore casings, tanks) to be removed to better determine the liquid tank waste migration over time. Three hypothetical realistic scenarios were simulated in the ERT evaluation. The first two scenarios assume the same leak amount and rate (i.e., between 1/1/1951 and 12/31/1951 at the rate of 347 m 3 per year) but different leaky tanks. Scenario 1 assumes leaks under tank B-102, which is located on the edge of the B-tank farm and surrounded by a few metallic infrastructure including cased pipes/wells/tanks. Scenario 2 assumes leaks under tank B-108, which is located near the center of the B-tank farm and surrounded by larger amount of metallic infrastructure than B-102. Scenario 3 assumes the same metallic infrastructure as B-102, with a more recent contaminant leak that was simulated to have occurred between 1/1/2018 and 12/31/2023 at a rate of 1.89 m 3 per year. The leak time in Scenarios 1 and 2 corresponds to a historical overfill event in 1951 and Scenario 3 corresponds to a recent found tank leak in 2019. In each scenario, a “true” bulk EC model vs. time reflecting contaminant migration was generated. ERT data was simulated from these “true” bulk EC models and a time-lapse ERT inversion produced “imaged” bulk EC vs. time. Three electrode configurations in two, four and eight boreholes surrounding the leak tank were used in the ERT simulations in each scenario. These borehole configurations were considered logistically feasible and cost-effective for monitoring. The hypothetical ERT boreholes are assumed to have non-metallic casing. By comparing the “imaged” bulk EC with the “true” bulk EC, it was demonstrated that the three configurations of wells used (two, four, and eight wells) were able to successfully monitor the migration of tank leaks through the vadose zone, with bulk EC resolution increasing with the number of down borehole ERT arrays for all scenarios. Therefore, the use of eight boreholes to perform ERT monitoring beneath the tanks provided the best spatiotemporal information.
Three prototypes the ORNL-SFC-W-1 special form capsules (SFCs) of the same design were evaluated to determine if the requirements of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 173.469, Tests for Special Form Class 7 (Radioactive) Materials, were met. The results of the special form tests are documented in this test report. This report describes the special form testing activities performed on the three ORNL-SFC-W-1 capsules. The test units were designated as TU-1, TU-2 and TU-3. TU-1 was subjected to leak testing, impact testing and percussion testing. TU-1 was leak tested using the leak rate test specified in 49 CFR 173.469(a)(4)(i). The impact test was conducted according to the requirements in 49 CFR 173.469 (b)(1). The percussion test that was carried out on TU-1 was conducted in accordance with 49 CFR 173.469 (b)(2). Both TU-2 and TU-3 were subjected to a leak rate test as specified in 173.469(a)(4)(i) and a heat test as specified in 49 CFR 173.469(b)(4). Each test unit was leak tested before and after these respective tests. The leak rate tests performed were helium back-pressure tests and bubble tests as specified in American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N14.5-2014.The measured leak rates were converted to standard condition leak rates as specified in American Society for Testing and Measurement (ASTM) E 493. The determined standardized leak rates obtained from the test and the calculations for all the test units met the requirements for special form certification. The testing was performed under the direction of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Package Testing Program (PTP).
Two prototypes the welded ISOTEK-SFC-W-3 special form capsules (SFCs) of the same design were evaluated to determine if the requirements of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 173.469, Tests for Special Form Class 7 (Radioactive) Materials, were met. The results of the special form tests are documented in this test report. This report describes the special form testing activities performed on the two welded ISOTEK-SFC-W-3 capsules. The test units were designated as TU-1 and TU-2. TU-1 was subjected to leak testing, percussion testing, and impact testing. TU-1 was leak tested using the leak rate test specified in 49 CFR 173.469(a)(4)(i). The impact test on TU-1 was conducted according to the requirements in 49 CFR 173.469 (b)(1). The percussion test that was carried out on TU-1 was conducted in accordance with 49 CFR 173.469 (b)(2). TU-2 was subjected to a leak rate test as specified in 173.469(a)(4)(i) and a heat test as specified in 49 CFR 173.469(b)(4). Each test unit was leak tested before and after these respective tests. The leak rate tests performed were helium back-pressure tests and bubble tests, as specified in American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N14.5-2014. The measured leak rates were converted to standard condition leak rates as specified in American Society for Testing and Measurement (ASTM) E 493. The determined standardized leak rates obtained from the test and the calculations for all the test units met the requirements for special form certification. The testing was performed under the direction of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Package Testing Program (PTP).
One of the biggest risks to safety on offshore platform safety is the ignition of high-pressure natural gas streams. Currently, the size and number of fugitive emissions on offshore platforms is unknown and methods used to detect fugitives have significant shortcomings. To investigate the frequency, size, and potential impact of fugitives, a data collection exercise was conducted using incidents reported, leak survey data, and independent measurements. The size and number of fugitives on offshore facilities were simulated to investigate likely areas of safety concern. Incident reports indicate in 2021 there were 113 reports of gas leaks on 1119 offshore facilities, suggesting 0.02 fugitives per Type 1 facility (older, shallow-water platforms) and 0.31 fugitives per Type 2 facility (larger deeper-water facilities). Leak survey data report 12 fugitives per Type 1 facility (average emission 0.6 kg CH 4 h −1 leak −1 ) and 15 fugitives per Type 2 facility (average emission 1.5 kg CH 4 h −1 leak −1 ). Reconciliation of direct measurements with a bottom-up model suggests that the number of fugitive emissions generated from the leak report data is an underestimate for Type 1 platforms (44 fugitives facility −1 ; average emission 0.6 kg CH 4 h −1 leak −1 ) and in general agreement for the Type 2 platforms (15 fugitives facility −1 ; average emission 1.5 kg CH 4 h −1 leak −1 ). Analysis of the fugitive emission rates on an offshore platform suggests that gas will not collect to explosive concentration if any air movement is present (>0.36 mph); however, large volumes of air (~600 m 3 ) near representative leaks on the working deck could become explosive in hour-long zero-wind conditions. We suggest that wearable technology could be employed to indicate gas build up, safety regulations amended to consider low-wind conditions and real-world experiments are conducted to test assumptions of air mixing on the working deck.
Leaks on the Space Shuttle while on the Launch Pad have generated interest in hydrogen leak monitoring technology. An effective leak monitoring system requires reliable hydrogen sensors, hardware, and software to monitor the sensors. The system should process the sensor outputs and provide real-time leak monitoring information to the operator. This paper discusses the progress in developing such a complete leak monitoring system. Advanced microfabricated hydrogen sensors are being fabricated at Case Western Reserve University (CWRU) and tested at NASA Lewis Research Center (LeRC) and Gencorp Aerojet (Aerojet). Changes in the hydrogen concentrations are detected using a PdAg on silicon Schottky diode structure. Sensor temperature control is achieved with a temperature sensor and heater fabricated onto the sensor chip. Results of the characterization of these sensors are presented. These sensors can detect low concentrations of hydrogen in inert environments with high sensitivity and quick response time. Aerojet is developing the hardware and software for a multipoint leak monitoring system designed to provide leak source and magnitude information in real time. The monitoring system processes data from the hydrogen sensors and presents the operator with a visual indication of the leak location and magnitude. Work has commenced on integrating the NASA LeRC-CWRU hydrogen sensors with the Aerojet designed monitoring system. Although the leak monitoring system was designed for hydrogen propulsion systems, the possible applications of this monitoring system are wide ranged. Possible commercialization of the system will also be discussed.
Leak rates of methane (CH 4 ) from the natural gas supply chain result in lost profit from unsold product, public safety and property concerns due to potential explosion hazards, and a potentially large source of economic damages from legal liabilities. Yet large measurement challenges exist in identifying and quantifying CH 4 leak rates along the vast number and type of components in the natural gas supply chain. This is particularly true of the “midstream” components involved in the gathering, processing, compression, transmission, and storage of natural gas. This project developed and deployed new advances in chirped laser dispersion spectroscopy (CLaDS) to detect methane leaks from pipelines, compressor stations, and other midstream infrastructure from a remote position (standoff detection). The system was deployed from a van to measure fugitive methane leaks from a local compressor station as a proof-of-concept. The technique was validated through mobile laboratory measurements with in-situ sensors as well as controlled releases of methane. The system also mapped a plume from a controlled release of methane by tracking a small unmanned aerial system (sUAS) that carried a corner cube retroreflector which reflected the beam back to the instrument. The drone-based system quantified a leak rate to within 30% of the actual rate and localized the emission location within 5 m of the actual release location at standoff distances of 25-45 m. This sUAS-reflector tracking approach has benefits for mapping leak locations remotely using small drones flying around a facility. Benefits of a commercial sensor with these capabilities include reductions of leaks for pipeline operators (more profit), earlier detection of leaks to avoid catastrophic explosion hazards for public health and to mitigate property damage, and reduced methane emissions to the atmosphere (improving air quality).
Following the Challenger tragedy, an evaluation of the integrated main propulsion system flight data revealed a premature decay in the hydrogen external tank ullage pressure. A reconstruction of predicted ullage pressure versus time indicated an inconsistency between predicted and measured ullage pressure starting at approximately 65.5 seconds into the flight and reaching a maximum value between 72 and 72.9 seconds. This discrepancy could have been caused by a hydrogen gas leak or by a liquied hydrogen leak that occurred either in the pressurization system or in the external tank. The corresponding leak rates over the time interval from 65.5 to 72.9 seconds were estimated to range from 0.28 kg/s (0.62 lbm/s) + or - 41 percent to between 0.43 and 0.51kg/s (0.94 and 1.12lbs/s) + or - 1 percent for a gas leak and from 72.9 kg/s (160.5 lbs/s) + or - 41 percent to between 111.6 and 133.2 kg/s (245.8 and 293.3 lbs/s) + or - 1 percent for a liquid leak. No speculation is made to ascertain whether the leak is liquid or gas, as this cannot be determined from the analysis performed. Four structural failures in the hydrogen external tank were considered to explain the leak rates. A break in the 5-cm (2 in) pressurization line, in the 13-cm (5 in) vent line, or in the 43-cm (17 in) feedline is not likely. A break in the 10-cm (4 in) recirculation line with a larger structural failure occurring in the 72 to 73-second time period, the time of the visibly identified premature pressure decay, does seem plausible and the most likely of the four modes considered. These modes are not all-inclusive and do not preclude the possibility of a leak elsewhere in the tank.
Working with the Department of Energy's National Energy Technology Laboratory, Southwest Research Institute® (SwRI®) developed a system to identify methane leaks reliably, accurately, and autonomously at critical midstream sections of the natural gas distribution network in real- time for the purpose of mitigating methane emissions using Optical Gas Imaging (OGI) cameras. SwRI's Smart Leak Detection – Methane (SLED/M) adds a high degree of automation to the process of methane leak detection to minimize sources of human error, minimize response time to a leak event, and maximize midstream visibility. Furthermore, SwRI has been working towards integrating Quantitative OGI (QOGI) capabilities into this existing technology. By leveraging Deep Learning, SwRI now has the capability to estimate fugitive emission leak rates quickly and reliably, which allows operators to detect emissions, quantify leak rate, prioritize repairs, and validate the repairs in a single instrument. The next generation QOGI technology leverages the same cameras used in Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR) programs, with improvements in safety and speed for traditional quantification-based repairs, ultimately leading to less overhead cost for the operators.
Working with the Department of Energy's National Energy Technology Laboratory, Southwest Research Institute® (SwRI®) developed a system to identify methane leaks reliably, accurately, and autonomously at critical midstream sections of the natural gas distribution network in real-time for the purpose of mitigating methane emissions using Optical Gas Imaging (OGI) cameras. SwRI's Smart Leak Detection – Methane (SLED/M) adds a high degree of automation to the process of methane leak detection to minimize sources of human error, minimize response time to a leak event, and maximize midstream visibility. Furthermore, SwRI has been working towards integrating Quantitative OGI (QOGI) capabilities into this existing technology. By leveraging Deep Learning, SwRI now has the capability to estimate fugitive emission leak rates quickly and reliably, which allows operators to detect emissions, quantify leak rate, prioritize repairs, and validate the repairs in a single instrument. The next generation QOGI technology leverages the same cameras used in Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR) programs, with improvements in safety and speed for traditional quantification-based repairs, ultimately leading to less overhead cost for the operators. The goals for this research were to develop two types of models with the following goals: Run in real-time on the edge (≥ 12 Hz), Classification: Achieve less than 5% false positive detection, Classification: Achieve ≥ 95% methane plume detection rate, Regression: achieve ≤ 10 standard cubic feet per hour (scfh) prediction > 70% of the time. In order to achieve these results, multiple infrared (IR) and other sensors were investigated in tandem with the midwave IR (MWIR) OGI to provide additional information to train the underlying models. Information on atmospheric conditions including humidity, temperature, pressure, and solar radiation was provided by a weather station. Several machine learning and deep learning architectures and methods, including looking at quantized classification networks and regressions networks, were explored. As further data was collected, curated, and labeled, it allowed for more refined regressive networks to be adequately trained, leading to better insight into the true flow rates being observed. An important valuable deliverable of this research effort was the development of an advanced network which underwent multiple iterations capable of giving a continuous output. The current network has a predicted mean average percentage error (MAPE) of 12.3% just outside our target goal of 10.00%, but an accuracy of 97.78% at ±50 scfh, well within the overall goal for the Department of Energy (DOE) program. Upon closer inspection, it was observed that more than 10% of datapoints contributing to the MAPE predictions were the result of low flow rate predictions and are beyond the sensitivity of instrument measurement as a result of normal operational variation and noise.
Working with the Department of Energy’s National Energy Technology Laboratory, Southwest Research Institute® (SwRI®) developed a system to identify methane leaks reliably, accurately, and autonomously at critical midstream sections of the natural gas distribution network in real- time for the purpose of mitigating methane emissions using Optical Gas Imaging (OGI) cameras. SwRI’s Smart Leak Detection – Methane (SLED/M) adds a high degree of automation to the process of methane leak detection to minimize sources of human error, minimize response time to a leak event, and maximize midstream visibility. Furthermore, SwRI has been working towards integrating Quantitative OGI (QOGI) capabilities into this existing technology. By leveraging Deep Learning, SwRI now has the capability to estimate fugitive emission leak rates quickly and reliably, which allows operators to detect emissions, quantify leak rate, prioritize repairs, and validate the repairs in a single instrument. The next generation QOGI technology leverages the same cameras used in Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR) programs, with improvements in safety and speed for traditional quantification-based repairs, ultimately leading to less overhead cost for the operators. The goals for this research were to develop two types of models with the following goals: 1. Run in real-time on the edge (≥ 12 Hz) 2. Classification: Achieve less than 5% false positive detection 3. Classification: Achieve ≥ 95% methane plume detection rate 4. Regression: achieve ≤ 10 standard cubic feet per hour (scfh) prediction > 70% of the time In order to achieve these results, multiple infrared (IR) and other sensors were investigated in tandem with the midwave IR (MWIR) OGI to provide additional information to train the underlying models. Information on atmospheric conditions including humidity, temperature, pressure, and solar radiation was provided by a weather station. Several machine learning and deep learning architectures and methods, including looking at quantized classification networks and regressions networks, were explored. As further data was collected, curated, and labeled, it allowed for more refined regressive networks to be adequately trained, leading to better insight into the true flow rates being observed. An important valuable deliverable of this research effort was the development of an advanced network which underwent multiple iterations capable of giving a continuous output. The current network has a predicted mean average percentage error (MAPE) of 12.3% just outside our target goal of 10.00%, but an accuracy of 97.78% at ±50 scfh, well within the overall goal for the Department of Energy (DOE) program. Upon closer inspection, it was observed that more than 10% of datapoints contributing to the MAPE predictions were the result of low flow rate predictions and are beyond the sensitivity of instrument measurement as a result of normal operational variation and noise.
Recent technological advances in methane detection have improved leak detection and repair. However, current methods to reliably measure methane concentrations rely on expensive instruments or demand significant labor input. There is interest in using affordable methane sensors that are responsive to ppmv level changes in methane concentrations in both urban and rural environments for monitoring underground natural gas pipeline leaks. This is especially relevant for situations where potentially significant leaks cannot be repaired immediately or smaller leaks that require long-term monitoring and further evaluation. In this work, a low-cost sensor unit, equipped with a metal oxide sensor, was designed, built, and calibrated over a wide range of methane concentrations and environmental conditions in preparation for field application. A network of these sensors was then installed at the test site and used to measure methane concentrations at ground level above known sub-surface natural gas emissions which emulated underground gas pipeline leaks. This low-cost sensor network measured over 4 days total for the two different known leakage rates. Results demonstrate that the sensors can continuously measure relative methane variability for extended periods but require calibration for a wide range of temperature and humidity conditions to properly determine absolute gas (i.e., methane) concentrations. Furthermore, when a regression analysis was conducted to evaluate the effects of meteorological parameters on methane concentration, air temperature and wind speed have strong impacts on the concentration. Overall, the network approach allows improved identification of leak location and monitoring of underground natural gas leaks.