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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 415 records · Page 23
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1977

A failure effects simulation of a low authority flight control augmentation system on a UH-1H helicopter

A two-pilot moving base simulator experiment was conducted to assess the effects of servo failures of a flight control system on the transient dynamics of a Bell UH-1H helicopter. The flight control hardware considered was part of the V/STOLAND system built with control authorities of from 20-40%. Servo hardover and oscillatory failures were simulated in each control axis. Measurements were made to determine the adequacy of the failure monitoring system time delay and the servo center and lock time constant, the pilot reaction times, and the altitude and attitude excursions of the helicopter at hover and 60 knots. Safe recoveries were made from all failures under VFR conditions. Pilot reaction times were from 0.5 to 0.75 sec. Reduction of monitor delay times below these values resulted in significantly reduced excursion envelopes. A subsequent flight test was conducted on a UH-1H helicopter with the V/STOLAND system installed. Series servo hardovers were introduced in hover and at 60 knots straight and level. Data from these tests are included for comparison.

Corliss, L. D.↗
NASA NTRS1980

Modified aerospace reliability and quality assurance method for wind turbines

The safety, reliability, and quality assurance (SR&QA) approach developed for the first large wind turbine generator project is described. The SR&QA approach was used to assure that the machine would not be hazardous to the public or operating personnel, would operate unattended on a utility grid, would demonstrate reliable operation and would help establish the quality assurance and maintainability requirements for future wind turbine projects. A modified failure modes and effects analysis during the design phase, minimal hardware inspections during parts fabrication, and three simple documents to control activities during machine construction and operation were presented.

Klein, W. E.↗
NASA NTRS1981

Reliability and quality assurance on the MOD 2 wind system

The Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance (R&QA) approach developed for the largest wind turbine generator, the Mod 2, is described. The R&QA approach assures that the machine is not hazardous to the public or to the operating personnel, is operated unattended on a utility grid, demonstrates reliable operation, and helps establish the quality assurance and maintainability requirements for future wind turbine projects. The significant guideline consisted of a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) during the design phase, hardware inspections during parts fabrication, and three simple documents to control activities during machine construction and operation.

Mason, W. E. B.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Investigation of air transportation technology at Princeton University, 1988-1989

The Air Transportation Technology Program at Princeton University, a program emphasizing graduate and undergraduate student research, proceeded along several avenues during the past year. A study of optimal trajectories for penetration of microbursts when encounter is unavoidable was conducted. The emphasis of current wind shear research is on developing an expert system for wind shear avoidance. A knowledge-based reconfigurable flight control system that is implemented with the Pascal programming language using parallel microprocessors was developed. This expert system could be considered a prototype for a failure-tolerant control system that can be constructed using existing hardware. Development of a real-time cockpit simulator continued during the year. The simulator provides a single-person crew station with both conventional and advanced control devices; it currently is programmed to simulate the Navion single-engine general aviation airplane. Alternatives for the air traffic control system giving particular attention to the institutional structure of the FAA are analyzed. A simple numerical procedure for estimating the stochastic robustness of control systems is being investigated. The revitalization of the general aviation industry is also discussed.

Stengel, Robert F.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Development of a 12-Thrust Chamber Kerosene /Oxygen Primary Rocket Sub-System for an Early (1964) Air-Augmented Rocket Ground-Test System

Airbreathing/Rocket combined-cycle, and specifically rocket-based combined- cycle (RBCC), propulsion systems, typically employ an internal engine flow-path installed primary rocket subsystem. To achieve acceptably short mixing lengths in effecting the "air augmentation" process, a large rocket-exhaust/air interfacial mixing surface is needed. This leads, in some engine design concepts, to a "cluster" of small rocket units, suitably arrayed in the flowpath. To support an early (1964) subscale ground-test of a specific RBCC concept, such a 12-rocket cluster was developed by NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). The small primary rockets used in the cluster assembly were modified versions of an existing small kerosene/oxygen water-cooled rocket engine unit routinely tested at MSFC. Following individual thrust-chamber tests and overall subsystem qualification testing, the cluster assembly was installed at the U. S. Air Force's Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC) for RBCC systems testing. (The results of the special air-augmented rocket testing are not covered here.) While this project was eventually successfully completed, a number of hardware integration problems were met, leading to catastrophic thrust chamber failures. The principal "lessons learned" in conducting this early primary rocket subsystem experimental effort are documented here as a basic knowledge-base contribution for the benefit of today's RBCC research and development community.

Pryor, D.↗
NASA NTRS1980

Equipment Failure Analysis

Tennessee Eastman uses NASTRAN to minimize lost production by pinpointing the causes of equipment failures and preventing recurrences. An example of the program's utility involves a large centrifugal fan which developed cracks during start-ups and shutdowns. This information prompted redesign of the fan. Tennessee Eastman has made extensive use of NASTRAN, both as failure analysis tool and as an aid in redesigning production hardware.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2005

CRYOGENIC UPPER STAGE SYSTEM SAFETY

NASA s Exploration Initiative will require development of many new systems or systems of systems. One specific example is that safe, affordable, and reliable upper stage systems to place cargo and crew in stable low earth orbit are urgently required. In this paper, we examine the failure history of previous upper stages with liquid oxygen (LOX)/liquid hydrogen (LH2) propulsion systems. Launch data from 1964 until midyear 2005 are analyzed and presented. This data analysis covers upper stage systems from the Ariane, Centaur, H-IIA, Saturn, and Atlas in addition to other vehicles. Upper stage propulsion system elements have the highest impact on reliability. This paper discusses failure occurrence in all aspects of the operational phases (Le., initial burn, coast, restarts, and trends in failure rates over time). In an effort to understand the likelihood of future failures in flight, we present timelines of engine system failures relevant to initial flight histories. Some evidence suggests that propulsion system failures as a result of design problems occur shortly after initial development of the propulsion system; whereas failures because of manufacturing or assembly processing errors may occur during any phase of the system builds process, This paper also explores the detectability of historical failures. Observations from this review are used to ascertain the potential for increased upper stage reliability given investments in integrated system health management. Based on a clear understanding of the failure and success history of previous efforts by multiple space hardware development groups, the paper will investigate potential improvements that can be realized through application of system safety principles.

Smith, R. Kenneth↗
NASA NTRS2005

Force Limited Vibration Testing

This slide presentation reviews the concept and applications of Force Limited Vibration Testing. The goal of vibration testing of aerospace hardware is to identify problems that would result in flight failures. The commonly used aerospace vibration tests uses artificially high shaker forces and responses at the resonance frequencies of the test item. It has become common to limit the acceleration responses in the test to those predicted for the flight. This requires an analysis of the acceleration response, and requires placing accelerometers on the test item. With the advent of piezoelectric gages it has become possible to improve vibration testing. The basic equations have are reviewed. Force limits are analogous and complementary to the acceleration specifications used in conventional vibration testing. Just as the acceleration specification is the frequency spectrum envelope of the in-flight acceleration at the interface between the test item and flight mounting structure, the force limit is the envelope of the in-flight force at the interface . In force limited vibration tests, both the acceleration and force specifications are needed, and the force specification is generally based on and proportional to the acceleration specification. Therefore, force limiting does not compensate for errors in the development of the acceleration specification, e.g., too much conservatism or the lack thereof. These errors will carry over into the force specification. Since in-flight vibratory force data are scarce, force limits are often derived from coupled system analyses and impedance information obtained from measurements or finite element models (FEM). Fortunately, data on the interface forces between systems and components are now available from system acoustic and vibration tests of development test models and from a few flight experiments. Semi-empirical methods of predicting force limits are currently being developed on the basis of the limited flight and system test data. A simple two degree of freedom system is shown and the governing equations for basic force limiting results for this system are reviewed. The design and results of the shuttle vibration forces (SVF) experiments are reviewed. The Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE) also was used to validate force limiting. Test instrumentation and supporting equipment are reviewed including piezo-electric force transducers, signal processing and conditioning systems, test fixtures, and vibration controller systems. Several examples of force limited vibration testing are presented with some results.

random vibration testing↗
NASA NTRS2011

Crew Quarters (CQ) and Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Measurement Facility Combined Impedance Study

This report documents an investigation into observed failures associated with conducted susceptibility testing of Crew Quarters (CQ) hardware in the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Measurement Facility, and the work accomplished to identify the source of the observed behavior. Investigation led to the conclusion that the hardware power input impedance was interacting with the facility power impedance leading to instability at the observed frequencies of susceptibility. Testing performed in other facilities did not show this same behavior, pointing back to the EMI Measurement Facility power as the potential root cause. A LISN emulating the Station power bus impedance was inserted into the power circuit, and the susceptibility was eliminated from the measurements.

Scully, Robert C.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Qualification of Engineering Camera for Long-Duration Deep Space Missions

Qualification and verification of advanced electronic packaging and interconnect technologies, and various other types of hardware elements for the Mars Exploration Rover s Spirit and Opportunity (MER)/Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) flight projects, has been performed to enhance the mission assurance. The qualification of hardware (engineering camera) under extreme cold temperatures has been performed with reference to various Mars-related project requirements. The flight-like packages, sensors, and subassemblies have been selected for the study to survive three times the total number of expected diurnal temperature cycles resulting from all environmental and operational exposures occurring over the life of the flight hardware, including all relevant manufacturing, ground operations, and mission phases. Qualification has been performed by subjecting above flight-like hardware to the environmental temperature extremes, and assessing any structural failures or degradation in electrical performance due to either overstress or thermal cycle fatigue. Engineering camera packaging designs, charge-coupled devices (CCDs), and temperature sensors were successfully qualified for MER and MSL per JPL design principles. Package failures were observed during qualification processes and the package redesigns were then made to enhance the reliability and subsequent mission assurance. These results show the technology certainly is promising for MSL, and especially for longterm extreme temperature missions to the extreme temperature conditions. The engineering camera has been completely qualified for the MSL project, with the proven ability to survive on Mars for 2010 sols, or 670 sols times three. Finally, the camera continued to be functional, even after 2010 thermal cycles.

Ramesham, Rajeshuni↗
NASA NTRS2010

Reliability and Qualification of Hardware to Enhance the Mission Assurance of JPL/NASA Projects

Packaging Qualification and Verification (PQV) and life testing of advanced electronic packaging, mechanical assemblies (motors/actuators), and interconnect technologies (flip-chip), platinum temperature thermometer attachment processes, and various other types of hardware for Mars Exploration Rover (MER)/Mars Science Laboratory (MSL), and JUNO flight projects was performed to enhance the mission assurance. The qualification of hardware under extreme cold to hot temperatures was performed with reference to various project requirements. The flight like packages, assemblies, test coupons, and subassemblies were selected for the study to survive three times the total number of expected temperature cycles resulting from all environmental and operational exposures occurring over the life of the flight hardware including all relevant manufacturing, ground operations, and mission phases. Qualification/life testing was performed by subjecting flight-like qualification hardware to the environmental temperature extremes and assessing any structural failures, mechanical failures or degradation in electrical performance due to either overstress or thermal cycle fatigue. Experimental flight qualification test results will be described in this presentation.

PRTs↗
NASA NTRS1996

Defect Detection and Prevention

As NASA continues to impement its Faster, Better, Cheaper philosophy, new approaches for implementing Mission Assurance activities are being developed.

faster↗
NASA NTRS2014

Investigation of HZETRN 2010 as a Tool for Single Event Effect Qualification of Avionics Systems

NASA's future missions are focused on long-duration deep space missions for human exploration which offers no options for a quick emergency return to Earth. The combination of long mission duration with no quick emergency return option leads to unprecedented spacecraft system safety and reliability requirements. It is important that spacecraft avionics systems for human deep space missions are not susceptible to Single Event Effect (SEE) failures caused by space radiation (primarily the continuous galactic cosmic ray background and the occasional solar particle event) interactions with electronic components and systems. SEE effects are typically managed during the design, development, and test (DD&T) phase of spacecraft development by using heritage hardware (if possible) and through extensive component level testing, followed by system level failure analysis tasks that are both time consuming and costly. The ultimate product of the SEE DD&T program is a prediction of spacecraft avionics reliability in the flight environment produced using various nuclear reaction and transport codes in combination with the component and subsystem level radiation test data. Previous work by Koontz, et al.1 utilized FLUKA, a Monte Carlo nuclear reaction and transport code, to calculate SEE and single event upset (SEU) rates. This code was then validated against in-flight data for a variety of spacecraft and space flight environments. However, FLUKA has a long run-time (on the order of days). CREME962, an easy to use deterministic code offering short run times, was also compared with FLUKA predictions and in-flight data. CREME96, though fast and easy to use, has not been updated in several years and underestimates secondary particle shower effects in spacecraft structural shielding mass. Thus, this paper will investigate the use of HZETRN 20103, a fast and easy to use deterministic transport code, similar to CREME96, that was developed at NASA Langley Research Center primarily for flight crew ionizing radiation dose assessments. HZETRN 2010 includes updates to address secondary particle shower effects more accurately, and might be used as another tool to verify spacecraft avionics system reliability in space flight SEE environments.

Rojdev, Kristina↗
NASA NTRS1985

SSME failure detection

During ground testing of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), there have been twenty-six major incidents resulting in substantial hardware damage and loss. Historical characteristics, advances in detection technology, and advances in computing technology led to plans for study of an advanced real time SSME test stand failure detection system which would reduce damage and preserve evidence when a failure with major incident potential occurs. This detection system will speed recognition of dangerous engine operation, and quicken the shutdown decision. The scope of this study, SSME characteristics, SSME test history, the problem definition, and some technical issues will be addressed herein.

Cikanek, H. A., III↗
NASA NTRS2009

Environmental Control and Life Support Integration Strategy for 6-Crew Operations

The International Space Station (ISS) crew compliment will be increasing in size from 3 to 6 crew members in the summer of 2009. In order to support this increase in crew on ISS, the United States on-orbit Segment (USOS) has been outfitted with a suite of regenerative Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) hardware including an Oxygen Generation System(OGS), Waste and Hygiene Compartment (WHC), and a Water Recovery System (WRS). The WRS includes the Urine Processor Assembly (UPA) and the Water Processor Assembly (WPA). A critical step in advancing to a 6Crew support capability on ISS is a full checkedout and verification of the Regenerative ECLS hardware. With a successful checkout, the ISS will achieve full redundancy in its onorbit life support system between the USOS and Russian Segment (RS). The additional redundancy created by the Regenerative ECLS hardware creates the opportunity for independent support capabilities between segments, and for the first time since the start of ISS, the necessity to revise Life Support strategy agreements. Independent operating strategies coupled with the loss of the Space Shuttle supply and return capabilities in 2010 offers additional challenges. These challenges create the need for a higher level of onorbit consumables reserve to ensure crewmember life support during a system failure. This paper will discuss the evolution of the ISS Life Support hardware strategy in support of 6Crew on ISS, as well as the continued work which will be necessary to ensure the support of crew and ISS Program objectives through the life of station.

FROM↗
NASA NTRS2013

Morpheus 1.5A Lander Failure Investigation Results

On August 9th, 2012, the Morpheus 1.5 Vertical Testbed (VTB) crashed during Free Flight 2 (FF2) at KSC SLF, resulting in the loss of 1.5 VTB hardware. JSC/KSC Morpheus team immediately executed the pre‐rehearsed Emergency Action Plan to protect personnel and property, so damage was limited to 1.5 VTB hardware. JSC/KSC Morpheus team secured data and mapped & recovered debris. Project had pre‐declared loss of VTB to be a test failure, not a mishap.

Munday, Steve↗
NASA NTRS2007

CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) Connectors in Space Flight Applications

This report documents the current status of CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors in GSFC spaceflight applications. To the extent the information is known, this report summarizes to what component quality level each NASA contractor (referred to as OEM in this report) procured the parts, and what board level and system level testing was performed. The report also provides the current status of the reliability assessment for each GSFC project based on the results of testing and FMEA (Failure Mode Effects Analysis). This report addresses how the CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors came into existence, and how these became the connector style chosen by many designers of space flight hardware. It identifies the design philosophy and the lack of robustness which has led to several known failure modes. These failure modes include fretting of connector pins during vibration, shock and thermal cycling, exposure of underplating, and increased resistance, including brief excursions to very high resistance. Each of these are signs of aging, which becomes an increasing concern for long duration orbiting space flight applications. This report addresses the mitigation strategy to replace CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors with space qualified Hypertronics 2mm cPCI connectors. The Hypertronics 2mm cPCI connectors are pin-to-pin compatible with the CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors and meet all of the same technical requirements, except the ability to hot mate, and to mate directly with a CompactPCI of the opposite gender. A detailed comparison of the CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connector and the Hypertronics 2mm cPCI connector is provided to describe the ruggedness of Hypertronics connector for space flight applications. Finally, this report makes recommendations for flight hardware for the future missions where the hardware is yet to be built, as well as for the hardware which has already been built with CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors.

Williams, Richard↗
NASA NTRS2015

Failure Analysis Results and Corrective Actions Implemented for the Extravehicular Mobility Unit 3011 Water in the Helmet Mishap

Water entered the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) helmet during extravehicular activity (EVA) no. 23 aboard the International Space Station on July 16, 2013, resulting in the termination of the EVA approximately 1 hour after it began. It was estimated that 1.5 liters of water had migrated up the ventilation loop into the helmet, adversely impacting the astronaut's hearing, vision, and verbal communication. Subsequent on-board testing and ground-based test, tear-down, and evaluation of the affected EMU hardware components determined that the proximate cause of the mishap was blockage of all water separator drum holes with a mixture of silica and silicates. The blockages caused a failure of the water separator degassing function, which resulted in EMU cooling water spilling into the ventilation loop, migrating around the circulating fan, and ultimately pushing into the helmet. The root cause of the failure was determined to be ground-processing shortcomings of the Airlock Cooling Loop Recovery (ALCLR) Ion Filter Beds, which led to various levels of contaminants being introduced into the filters before they left the ground. Those contaminants were thereafter introduced into the EMU hardware on-orbit during ALCLR scrubbing operations. This paper summarizes the failure analysis results along with identified process, hardware, and operational corrective actions that were implemented as a result of findings from this investigation.

Steele, John↗