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NASA NTRS2016

Tethered Space Satellite-1 (TSS-1): Wound About a Bolt

In the early 1990's US and Italian scientists collaborated to study the electrodynamics on a long tether between two satellites as it moved through the electrically charged portion of Earth's atmosphere called the ionosphere. Potential uses for the electrical current induced in the long wire include power and thrust generation for a satellite, momentum exchange, artificial gravity, deployment of sensors or antennas, and gravity-gradient stabilization. The Tethered Space Satellite (TSS) was a first-of-its-kind experiment with long tethers in space. It consisted of a satellite with science experiments attached to a 12.5 mile long, very thin (0.10 inch diameter) copper wire assembly wound around a spool in the deployer reel mechanism. The whole mechanism sits on a pallet that is installed into the Shuttle bay. At an altitude of 160 nautical miles above earth, the satellite would be deplodeployed from the Shuttle bay by raising it on a boom facing away from Earth. Once cleared of the bay, the deployer mechanism would slowly feed out the 12-plus miles of tether. Scientific data would be collected throughout the operation, after which the satellite would be reeled back in. A receiver spool to catch the 12.5 mile tether as it was being unwound by the deployer reel mechanism was set up to do the system-level test of deployer real mechanism prior to installing the loaded pallet into the Shuttle bay. The system level tests were required before the pallet could be installed into the Space Shuttle cargo bay. A few months before flight, the system level tests, including unreeling and reeling the tether, were completed at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and the TSS payload was installed onto the Spacelab pallet. Some of this testing equipment was then shipped back to the contractor, Martin Marietta. Integration with the Shuttle began. Systems-level load analyses, which cannot be run until all information about each payload is finalized, was run in parallel with the physical integration of the hardware into the Shuttle payload bay. An analysis, called Coupled loads analysis, incorporates any updates to the model due to system level tests of all the different payloads, and any changes that were found during integration. Engineering analysis examines the worst case scenarios for the loads the hardware will see. The two times during the mission where the dynamic loads are the worst were 1) the first 10-second portion of Shuttle lift off, and 2) a 2-second time during landing when the landing gears hit the ground. The coupled loads analysis using the final verification loads showed that a single bolt attaching the deployer reel mechanism to the support structure had a "negative margin" - which is an indication that it might fail - during touch down. Hardware certification rules do not allow for hardware to fly with negative margins. A structural failure of one payload could have serious or catastrophic consequences to other payloads, or may significantly damage the Orbiter. The issue had to be resolved before the flight.

O'Connor, Brian↗

NASA NTRS2010

Failure Analysis of Space Shuttle Orbiter Valve Poppet

The poppet failed during STS-126 due to fatigue cracking that most likely was initiated during MDC ground-testing. This failure ultimately led to the discovery that the cracking problem was a generic issue effecting numerous poppets throughout the Shuttle program's history. This presentation has focused on the laboratory analysis of the failed hardware, but this analysis was only one aspect of a comprehensive failure investigation. One critical aspect of the overall investigation was modeling of the fluid flow through this valve to determine the possible sources of cyclic loading. This work has led to the conclusion that the poppets are failing due to flow-induced vibration.

Russell, Rick↗

NASA NTRS2004

Risk Assessment and Control through Countermeasure System Iplementation for Long-term Crew Exposure to Microgravity

Experience with the International Space Station (ISS) program demonstrates the degree to which engineering design and operational solutions must protect crewmembers from health risks due to long-term exposure to the microgravity environment. Risks to safety and health due to degradation in the microgravity environment include crew inability to complete emergency or nominal activities, increased risk of injury, and inability to complete safe return to the ground due to reduced strength or embrittled bones. These risks without controls slowly increase in probability for the length of the mission and become more significant for increasing mission durations. Countermeasures to microgravity include hardware systems that place a crewmember s body under elevated stress to produce an effect similar to daily exposure to gravity. The ISS countermeasure system is predominately composed of customized exercise machines. Historical treatment of microgravity countermeasure systems as medical research experiments unintentionally reduced the foreseen importance and therefore the capability of the systems to function in a long-term operational role. Long-term hazardous effects and steadily increasing operational risks due to non-functional countermeasure equipment require a more rigorous design approach and incorporation of redundancy into seemingly non- mission-critical hardware systems. Variations in the rate of health degradation and responsiveness to countermeasures among the crew population drastically increase the challenge for design requirements development and verification of the appropriate risk control strategy. The long-term nature of the hazards and severe limits on logistical re-supply mass, volume and frequency complicates assessment of hardware availability and verification of an adequate maintenance and sparing plan. Design achievement of medically defined performance requirements by microgravity countermeasure systems and incorporation of adequate failure tolerance significantly reduces these risks. Future implementation of on-site monitoring hardware for critical health parameters such as bone mineral density would allow greater responsiveness, efficiency, and optimized design of the countermeasures system.

Gernand, Jeremy M.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Space Transportation System Availability Relationships to Life Cycle Cost

Future space transportation architectures and designs must be affordable. Consequently, their Life Cycle Cost (LCC) must be controlled. For the LCC to be controlled, it is necessary to identify all the requirements and elements of the architecture at the beginning of the concept phase. Controlling LCC requires the establishment of the major operational cost drivers. Two of these major cost drivers are reliability and maintainability, in other words, the system's availability (responsiveness). Potential reasons that may drive the inherent availability requirement are the need to control the number of unique parts and the spare parts required to support the transportation system's operation. For more typical space transportation systems used to place satellites in space, the productivity of the system will drive the launch cost. This system productivity is the resultant output of the system availability. Availability is equal to the mean uptime divided by the sum of the mean uptime plus the mean downtime. Since many operational factors cannot be projected early in the definition phase, the focus will be on inherent availability which is equal to the mean time between a failure (MTBF) divided by the MTBF plus the mean time to repair (MTTR) the system. The MTBF is a function of reliability or the expected frequency of failures. When the system experiences failures the result is added operational flow time, parts consumption, and increased labor with an impact to responsiveness resulting in increased LCC. The other function of availability is the MTTR, or maintainability. In other words, how accessible is the failed hardware that requires replacement and what operational functions are required before and after change-out to make the system operable. This paper will describe how the MTTR can be equated to additional labor, additional operational flow time, and additional structural access capability, all of which drive up the LCC. A methodology will be presented that provides the decision makers with the understanding necessary to place constraints on the design definition. This methodology for the major drivers will determine the inherent availability, safety, reliability, maintainability, and the life cycle cost of the fielded system. This methodology will focus on the achievement of an affordable, responsive space transportation system. It is the intent of this paper to not only provide the visibility of the relationships of these major attribute drivers (variables) to each other and the resultant system inherent availability, but also to provide the capability to bound the variables, thus providing the insight required to control the system's engineering solution. An example of this visibility is the need to provide integration of similar discipline functions to allow control of the total parts count of the space transportation system. Also, selecting a reliability requirement will place a constraint on parts count to achieve a given inherent availability requirement, or require accepting a larger parts count with the resulting higher individual part reliability requirements. This paper will provide an understanding of the relationship of mean repair time (mean downtime) to maintainability (accessibility for repair), and both mean time between failure (reliability of hardware) and the system inherent availability.

Rhodes, Russel E.↗

NASA NTRS1974

Similarity constraints in testing of cooled engine parts

A study is made of the effect of testing cooled parts of current and advanced gas turbine engines at the reduced temperature and pressure conditions which maintain similarity with the engine environment. Some of the problems facing the experimentalist in evaluating heat transfer and aerodynamic performance when hardware is tested at conditions other than the actual engine environment are considered. Low temperature and pressure test environments can simulate the performance of actual size prototype engine hardware within the tolerance of experimental accuracy if appropriate similarity conditions are satisfied. Failure to adhere to these similarity constraints because of test facility limitations or other reasons, can result in a number of serious errors in projecting the performance of test hardware to engine conditions.

Colladay, R. S.↗

NASA NTRS1983

Data acquisition for stall/spin flight research

A special purpose digital data acquisition system is built for stall/spin flight research. A Schweizer 2-32 sailplane is used as the test vehicle. Computer hardware and its architecture are described. Concepts of system failure detection are considered in the design. Special instrumentation developed for the high angle of attack flight is presented. A representative flight time history of a maneuver also is shown. The flight data will be used for the identification of aerodynamic parameters.

Srijayantha, M.↗

NASA NTRS1994

Instrumentation for In-Flight SSME Rocket Engine Plume Spectroscopy

This paper describes instrumentation that is under development for an in-flight demonstration of a plume spectroscopy system on the space shuttle main engine. The instrumentation consists of a nozzle mounted optical probe for observation of the plume, and a spectrometer for identification and quantification of plume content. This instrumentation, which is intended for use as a diagnostic tool to detect wear and incipient failure in rocket engines, will be validated by a hardware demonstration on the Technology Test Bed engine at the Marshall Space Flight Center.

Madzsar, George C.↗

NASA NTRS2000

The Controlled Re-Entry of the Compton Gamma Ray Observatory

On June 3, 2000, the Compton Gamma Ray Observatory (CGRO) successfully entered the Earth's atmosphere over the targeted Pacific Ocean. This is the first time NASA has conducted a controlled reentry of an unmanned spacecraft from Low Earth Orbit (LEO). The criticality of this operation was enhanced due to the large mass of the spacecraft, 14000 kg ( 15.5 tons) post final burn, and the loss of the primary propulsion system. This paper will present a brief mission history from launch, through in-orbit failures, from a spacecraft level systems perspective. A general hardware description is also included for clarity. The critical decision of re-entering the CGRO is covered, as well as key events through the mission design. Attitude Control System performance simulations used in the mission design and ground team training are compared to flight data results.

Mangus, David J.↗

NASA NTRS1994

The MGS Avionics System Architecture: Exploring the Limits of Inheritance

Mars Global Surveyor (MGS) avionics system architecture comprises much of the electronics on board the spacecraft: electrical power, attitude and articulation control, command and data handling, telecommunications, and flight software. Schedule and cost constraints dictated a mix of new and inherited designs, especially hardware upgrades based on findings of the Mars Observer failure review boards.

Mars Global Surveyor MGS↗

NASA NTRS2009

NASA's Evolutionary Xenon Thruster (NEXT) Component Verification Testing

Component testing is a critical facet of the comprehensive thruster life validation strategy devised by the NASA s Evolutionary Xenon Thruster (NEXT) program. Component testing to-date has consisted of long-duration high voltage propellant isolator and high-cycle heater life validation testing. The high voltage propellant isolator, a heritage design, will be operated under different environmental condition in the NEXT ion thruster requiring verification testing. The life test of two NEXT isolators was initiated with comparable voltage and pressure conditions with a higher temperature than measured for the NEXT prototype-model thruster. To date the NEXT isolators have accumulated 18,300 h of operation. Measurements indicate a negligible increase in leakage current over the testing duration to date. NEXT 1/2 in. heaters, whose manufacturing and control processes have heritage, were selected for verification testing based upon the change in physical dimensions resulting in a higher operating voltage as well as potential differences in thermal environment. The heater fabrication processes, developed for the International Space Station (ISS) plasma contactor hollow cathode assembly, were utilized with modification of heater dimensions to accommodate a larger cathode. Cyclic testing of five 1/22 in. diameter heaters was initiated to validate these modified fabrication processes while retaining high reliability heaters. To date two of the heaters have been cycled to 10,000 cycles and suspended to preserve hardware. Three of the heaters have been cycled to failure giving a B10 life of 12,615 cycles, approximately 6,000 more cycles than the established qualification B10 life of the ISS plasma contactor heaters.

Herman, Daniel A.↗

NASA NTRS1981

Design and verification of a multiple fault tolerant control system for STS applications using computer simulation

General Dynamics/Convair is under NASA contract to integrate the Centaur upper stage into the space transportation system for future planetary missions. This requires that control of all safety critical functions be two-failure tolerant. The control system developed consists of five asynchronous computers, each contributing at their outputs to a 3-out-of-5 voting plane. Subsystem control is based on an end function redundancy management scheme. Analysis of multiple component failures and worst-case time-phase asynchrony among the computers is performed by a real-time computer simulation. The simulation emulates the hardware and subsystem interfaces, wire by wire, providing assessibility to any component for the insertion of preprogrammed failures. Observability is provided via a graphics system and diagnostic software. The simulation provides an engineering tool where the integrity of control system hardware and imbedded software can be demonstrated.

Szatkowski, G. P.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Intelligent Hardware-Enabled Sensor and Software Safety and Health Management for Autonomous UAS

Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) can only be deployed if they can effectively complete their mission and respond to failures and uncertain environmental conditions while maintaining safety with respect to other aircraft as well as humans and property on the ground. We propose to design a real-time, onboard system health management (SHM) capability to continuously monitor essential system components such as sensors, software, and hardware systems for detection and diagnosis of failures and violations of safety or performance rules during the ight of a UAS. Our approach to SHM is three-pronged, providing: (1) real-time monitoring of sensor and software signals; (2) signal analysis, preprocessing, and advanced on-the- y temporal and Bayesian probabilistic fault diagnosis; (3) an unobtrusive, lightweight, read-only, low-power hardware realization using Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) in order to avoid overburdening limited computing resources or costly re-certi cation of ight software due to instrumentation. No currently available SHM capabilities (or combinations of currently existing SHM capabilities) come anywhere close to satisfying these three criteria yet NASA will require such intelligent, hardwareenabled sensor and software safety and health management for introducing autonomous UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS). We propose a novel approach of creating modular building blocks for combining responsive runtime monitoring of temporal logic system safety requirements with model-based diagnosis and Bayesian network-based probabilistic analysis. Our proposed research program includes both developing this novel approach and demonstrating its capabilities using the NASA Swift UAS as a demonstration platform.

Robotics↗

NASA NTRS2013

Towards Real-time, On-board, Hardware-Supported Sensor and Software Health Management for Unmanned Aerial Systems

Unmanned aerial systems (UASs) can only be deployed if they can effectively complete their missions and respond to failures and uncertain environmental conditions while maintaining safety with respect to other aircraft as well as humans and property on the ground. In this paper, we design a real-time, on-board system health management (SHM) capability to continuously monitor sensors, software, and hardware components for detection and diagnosis of failures and violations of safety or performance rules during the flight of a UAS. Our approach to SHM is three-pronged, providing: (1) real-time monitoring of sensor and/or software signals; (2) signal analysis, preprocessing, and advanced on the- fly temporal and Bayesian probabilistic fault diagnosis; (3) an unobtrusive, lightweight, read-only, low-power realization using Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) that avoids overburdening limited computing resources or costly re-certification of flight software due to instrumentation. Our implementation provides a novel approach of combining modular building blocks, integrating responsive runtime monitoring of temporal logic system safety requirements with model-based diagnosis and Bayesian network-based probabilistic analysis. We demonstrate this approach using actual data from the NASA Swift UAS, an experimental all-electric aircraft.

System & Software Health Management↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

MIP: the First ISRU Flight Experiment

The Mars ISPP Precursor, “MIP”, was a flight experiment on the 2001 Mars Surveyor Lander that was designed to demonstrate In-situ Propellant Production-- ISPP-- for the first time on Mars. The experiment was designed to show that it was possible to produce oxygen from the carbon dioxide atmosphere, and to demonstrate the individual technology components that would go into a full-scale production plant. The aimpoint of the oxygen production was to showcase the possibility of producing oxygen for use as rocket fuel, ultimately as an enabling technology for a future human expedition to Mars. The MIP team built and qualified flight hardware for the experiment to fly on the Surveyor-2001 lander, but following the failure of the 1999 Mars Polar Lander spacecraft, the Surveyor-2001 lander mission was cancelled, and the MIP experiment was never flown. The experience in building and testing the hardware did show that the carbon dioxide electrolysis process was feasible, and led to incorporation of in-situ propellant production into the NASA reference plans for human Mars missions. Twenty years later, the technology is flying to Mars in the form of the MOXIE experiment on the Perseverance rover.

Geoffrey A Landis↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Results from Two Full-Scale Hawker 4000 Fuselage Drop Tests

In the spring of 2022, NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) conducted two full-scale drop tests on a Hawker 4000 partial fuselage structure for the evaluation of composite material response under dynamic impact loading conditions. The specific objectives of the tests were to induce dynamic composite damage initiation and progression and in primary structure and to understand the nature of the failure modes. The tests were conducted via dividing the fuselage hardware into three smaller sections. Dynamic drop tests were conducted on the forward and aft portions of the fuselage under different dynamic loading conditions, while the middle section was reserved for materials testing. Both tests were conducted by dropping the test articles from a height of 14 feet with significant amounts of pitch, which was added to initiate damage in specific regions of the structure. The test articles were ballasted then instrumented with accelerometers at various locations and speckle-coated on both exterior sides with a black and white stochastic pattern for use with three-dimensional digital image correlation (3D-DIC). In addition, the interior belly portion of the forward section test article was also speckle-coated, which was intended to capture deformations on the belly of the test article from the interior at impact. The interior of the aft section test article was not speckle-coated. Prior to testing, bow-tie markers were applied at various locations for use in marker tracking, to measure impact conditions such as vertical impact velocity and pitch. In this report, a partial summary of the data collected from the tests is presented. The data was primarily in the form of accelerometers to measure impact acceleration and 3D-DIC to measure deformation and failure onset and propagation. Post-test inspections revealed the primary damage mechanism was fiber cracking and delamination primarily in and around the area that contacted the impact surface. Acceleration pulse shapesin the ballast locations were trapezoidal in nature and ranged between 10 g and 40 g, depending on the location and test.

full scale testing↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Results from Two Full-Scale Hawker 4000 Fuselage Drop Tests

full scale testing↗

NASA NTRS2010

Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV): Developing Flight Rationale for the Space Shuttle Program

Introducing composite vessels into the Space Shuttle Program represented a significant technical achievement. Each Orbiter vehicle contains 24 (nominally) Kevlar tanks for storage of pressurized helium (for propulsion) and nitrogen (for life support). The use of composite cylinders saved 752 pounds per Orbiter vehicle compared with all-metal tanks. The weight savings is significant considering each Shuttle flight can deliver 54,000 pounds of payload to the International Space Station. In the wake of the Columbia accident and the ensuing Return to Flight activities, the Space Shuttle Program, in 2005, re-examined COPV hardware certification. Incorporating COPV data that had been generated over the last 30 years and recognizing differences between initial Shuttle Program requirements and current operation, a new failure mode was identified, as composite stress rupture was deemed credible. The Orbiter Project undertook a comprehensive investigation to quantify and mitigate this risk. First, the engineering team considered and later deemed as unfeasible the option to replace existing all flight tanks. Second, operational improvements to flight procedures were instituted to reduce the flight risk and the danger to personnel. Third, an Orbiter reliability model was developed to quantify flight risk. Laser profilometry inspection of several flight COPVs identified deep (up to 20 mil) depressions on the tank interior. A comprehensive analysis was performed and it confirmed that these observed depressions were far less than the criterion which was established as necessary to lead to liner buckling. Existing fleet vessels were exonerated from this failure mechanism. Because full validation of the Orbiter Reliability Model was not possible given limited hardware resources, an Accelerated Stress Rupture Test of a flown flight vessel was performed to provide increased confidence. A Bayesian statistical approach was developed to evaluate possible test results with respect to the model credibility and thus flight rationale for continued operation of the Space Shuttle with existing flight hardware. A non-destructive evaluation (NDE) technique utilizing Raman Spectroscopy was developed to directly measure the overwrap residual stress state. Preliminary results provide optimistic results that patterns of fluctuation in fiber elastic strains over the outside vessel surface could be directly correlated with increased fiber stress ratios and thus reduced reliability.

Kezirian, Michael T.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Fracture Control for Additively Manufactured Spacecraft Structures

This paper describes how the intent of current NASA fracture control requirements may be applied to “fracture critical” additively manufactured spacecraft hardware. Fracture control is a multi-discipline design and certification methodology that is applied in order to mitigate catastrophic failure of structures resulting from growth of an undetected crack-like defect. The methodology is defined in existing NASA standards and is required on all human-rated space structures. As legacy spacecraft structures have been built using primarily metallic and composite materials manufactured using well established methods, guidance for application of fracture control to parts composed of these material types has been established and is documented in several NASA requirements. Additive manufactured structures offer advantages in design flexibility and manufacturing efficiency and as a result are expected to continue to be used more and more in the future. Recently, relevant guidance has been published by NASA to define materials and processes requirements for certain additive manufactured hardware, but procedures for fracture control are not addressed yet in any requirements or guidance document. While use of additive manufactured parts in non-critical scenarios may be of relatively low concern in current structural certification processes, there is a need for new fracture control guidance in order to use and certify additively manufacture hardware that is “fracture critical” where failure of the part may result in loss of life or loss of vehicle. Assurance of damage tolerance, i.e., that as-built flaws in a given part either do not exist or will not grow to become catastrophic, is of particular interest to the fracture control community. This poses a challenge due to the fact that damage tolerance behavior is not well understood in additive manufactured parts compared to legacy material types and manufacturing techniques. The discussion contained herein is necessary at this time as new guidance in this area should be founded collaboratively by the technical community at large. Different hardware types (e.g., pressure vessel, structural member) are described to highlight specific challenges and solutions for each. The discussion concludes with considering specific disciplines within fracture control (non-destructive evaluation, materials & processes, fracture mechanics, and structural certification) in a proposed extension of existing fracture control requirements to additive manufactured parts.

McElroy, Mark↗