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409 records · Page 23

Second passage of chronic wasting disease of mule deer to sheep by intracranial inoculation compared to classical scrapie

The origin of chronic wasting disease (CWD) in cervids is unclear. One hypothesis suggests that CWD originated from scrapie in sheep. We compared the disease phenotype of sheep-adapted CWD to classical scrapie in sheep. We inoculated sheep intracranially with brain homogenate from first-passage mule deer CWD in sheep (sCWD md ). The attack rate in second-passage sheep was 100% (12 of 12). Sheep had prominent lymphoid accumulations of PrP Sc reminiscent of classical scrapie. The pattern and distribution of PrP Sc in the brains of sheep with CWD md was similar to scrapie strain 13-7 but different from scrapie strain x124. The western blot glycoprofiles of sCWD md were indistinguishable from scrapie strain 13-7; however, independent of sheep genotype, glycoprofiles of sCWD md were different than x124. When sheep genotypes were evaluated individually, there was considerable overlap in the glycoprofiles that precluded significant discrimination between sheep CWD and scrapie strains. Our data suggest that the phenotype of CWD in sheep is indistinguishable from some strains of scrapie in sheep. Given our results, current detection techniques would be unlikely to distinguish CWD in sheep from scrapie in sheep if cross-species transmission occurred naturally. It is unknown if sheep are naturally vulnerable to CWD; however, the susceptibility of sheep after intracranial inoculation and lymphoid accumulation indicates that the species barrier is not absolute.

Cassmann, Eric D.↗

Systematic Evaluation of Backdoor Data Poisoning Attacks on Image Classifiers

Backdoor data poisoning attacks have recently been demonstrated in computer vision research as a potential safety risk for machine learning (ML) systems. Traditional data poisoning attacks manipulate training data to induce unreliability of an ML model, whereas backdoor data poisoning attacks maintain system performance unless the MLmodel is presented with an input containing an embedded“trigger” that provides a predetermined response advantageous to the adversary. Our work builds upon prior back-door data-poisoning research for ML image classifiers and systematically assesses different experimental conditions including types of trigger patterns, persistence of trigger patterns during retraining, poisoning strategies, architectures (ResNet-50, NasNet, NasNet-Mobile), datasets (Flowers, CIFAR-10), and potential defensive regularization techniques (Contrastive Loss, Logit Squeezing, Manifold Mixup,Soft-Nearest-Neighbors Loss). Experiments yield four key findings. First, the success rate of backdoor poisoning at-tacks varies widely, depending on several factors, including model architecture, trigger pattern and regularization technique. Second, we find that poisoned models are hard to detect through performance inspection alone. Third, regularization typically reduces backdoor success rate, although it can have no effect or even slightly increase it, depending on the form of regularization. Finally, backdoors inserted through data poisoning can be rendered ineffective after just a few epochs of additional training on a small set of clean data without affecting the model’s performance.

Truong, Loc T.↗

Quantum Key Distribution for Critical Infrastructures: Towards Cyber-Physical Security for Hydropower and Dams

Hydropower facilities are often remotely monitored or controlled from a centralized remote control room. Additionally, major component manufacturers monitor the performance of installed components, increasingly via public communication infrastructures. While these communications enable efficiencies and increased reliability, they also expand the cyber-attack surface. Communications may use the internet to remote control a facility’s control systems, or it may involve sending control commands over a network from a control room to a machine. The content could be encrypted and decrypted using a public key to protect the communicated information. These cryptographic encoding and decoding schemes become vulnerable as more advances are made in computer technologies, such as quantum computing. In contrast, quantum key distribution (QKD) and other quantum cryptographic protocols are not based upon a computational problem, and offer an alternative to symmetric cryptography in some scenarios. Although the underlying mechanism of quantum cryptogrpahic protocols such as QKD ensure that any attempt by an adversary to observe the quantum part of the protocol will result in a detectable signature as an increased error rate, potentially even preventing key generation, it serves as a warning for further investigation. In QKD, when the error rate is low enough and enough photons have been detected, a shared private key can be generated known only to the sender and receiver. We describe how this novel technology and its several modalities could benefit the critical infrastructures of dams or hydropower facilities. The presented discussions may be viewed as a precursor to a quantum cybersecurity roadmap for the identification of relevant threats and mitigation.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Molecular Iodine Interactions with Fe, Ni, Cr, and Stainless Steel Alloys

The adsorption behavior of molecular iodine is important for understanding the spread of radioiodine in a nuclear accident. Prior experiments indicate that, in addition to the interaction with Fe, molecular iodine [i.e., I 2(g) ] also interacts with the next most abundant components of austenitic stainless steel (i.e., Ni, and Cr) at room temperature. Here, we investigate iodine adsorption on Fe, Ni, and Cr while focusing on understanding the variables affecting adsorption as well as the iodine compounds that are formed during adsorption. Scanning electron microscopy and energy-dispersive X-ray spectroscopy were used to characterize the surfaces of exposed metal particles and aid in the understanding of the morphology and chemistry of iodine interactions with the substrates. Inductively coupled plasma optical emission spectroscopy was used to detect low levels of metal iodides and X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy was used to confirm the formation of the metal iodides. The role of environmental factors (e.g., humidity and oxygen content) for iodine adsorption on metal substrates is addressed. The individual metals demonstrated formation of metal iodides for Fe and Ni particles from interaction with I 2(g) . The formation of metal iodides may indicate the affinity of iodine for the respective metal. In this study, the iodine affinities ranked Fe > Ni > Cr as determined by the quantity of chemisorbed iodine. This trend is also supported by the distributions and proportions of metals in the corrosion product of the stainless steels. The exposures without oxygen and humidity indicate the potential of a multistep iodine adsorption process where iodine first attacks the oxide layer and then chemisorbs to the exposed metal.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

A holistic cyber-physical security protocol for authenticating the provenance and integrity of structural health monitoring imagery data

Modern infrastructure systems, such as bridges, dams, power generation stations, and buildings increasingly have an intrinsic cyber-physical nature to them. Infrastructure now commonly, includes actuators, network connections, sensors, control systems, and computational resources. It is of increasing concern that modern infrastructure is vulnerable to cyber-attacks that can damage both the cyber and physical nature of the infrastructure. To date, the physical and cyber health of infrastructure has been considered separately. However, the increasing concerns associated with the cyber-physical security of infrastructure coupled with the emergence of 5G networks made using components that are not universally considered trustworthy, and the emergence of techniques for creating deepfakes and adversarial examples suggests the time has come to begin considering cyber health and structural health with a more holistic approach. In this work, a protocol is developed for ensuring the imagery data captured by a structural health monitoring system can be unambiguously attributed to legitimate sensors associated with the structural health monitoring system. A computer vision approach based on the idea of mutual information is then presented to detect damage in an image. This work presents the protocol for authenticating the provenance of imager data and demonstrates that this protocol does not have overly adverse effects when used with the mutual information-based technique for detecting damage in the resulting imagery data.

Jung, HweeKwon↗

Natural gas odorants: A scoping review of health effects

Organosulfur compounds are intentionally added to natural gas as malodorants with the intent of short-term nasal inhalation to aid in leak detection. Regulatory exposure limits have not been established for all commonly used natural gas odorants, and recent community-level exposure events and growing evidence of indoor natural gas leakage have raised concerns associated with natural gas odorant exposures. We conducted a scoping review of peer-reviewed scientific publications on human exposures and animal toxicological studies of natural gas odorants to assess toxicological profiles, exposure potential, health effects and regulatory guidelines associated with commonly used natural gas odorants. We identified only 22 studies which met inclusion criteria for full review. Overall, there is limited evidence of both transient nonspecific health symptoms and clinically diagnosed causative neurotoxic effects associated with prolonged odorant exposures. Across seven community-level exposure events and two occupational case reports, consistent symptom patterns included: headache, ocular irritation, nose and throat irritation, respiratory complaints such as shortness of breath and asthma attacks, and skin irritation and rash. Of these, respiratory inflammation and asthma exacerbations are the most debilitating, whereas the high prevalence of ocular and dermatologic symptoms suggest a non-inhalation route of exposure. The limited evidence available raises the possibility that organosulfur odorants may pose health risks at exposures much lower than presently understood, though additional dose-response studies are needed to disentangle specific toxicologic effects from nonspecific responses to noxious organosulfur odors. Numerous recommendations are provided including more transparent and prescriptive natural gas odorant use practices.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗

The Design and Evaluation of Zero Trust Architecture for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure: EVs @ Scale Series on EV Charging Station Cybersecurity

Implementing a zero trust architecture can significantly bolster the security of electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure. EV charging infrastructure includes numerous networked interfaces, each of which can present potential vulnerabilities. When these vulnerabilities are exploited, they can compromise the entire system, leading to severe operational and security risks. Zero trust is a security model that operates on the principle of "never trust, always verify," which helps manage the attack surface and limit the scope of any potential compromises. Fundamentally, this model ensures that no entity, whether inside or outside the network, is trusted by default. The design principles of zero trust include continuous verification, strict deny-by-default access controls, and micro-segmentation. Continuous verification ensures that every request is thoroughly checked, regardless of its origin. Strict access controls enforce the principle of least privilege, allowing users and devices only the minimum necessary access to perform their functions. Micro-segmentation involves dividing the network into smaller, isolated segments to prevent lateral movement in case of a breach. In the context of EV charging infrastructure, zero trust can be implemented through various strategies. For example, multi-factor authentication (MFA) can be required for engineers to access the management interfaces and control systems of charging stations. Real-time monitoring and analysis of network traffic can help detect and respond to anomalies. Systems that do not need to communicate with each other can be micro-segmented to enhance security. All communications should adhere to predefined policies to be permitted. Additionally, encrypting communications can protect sensitive information exchanged between chargers and management systems. This paper presents a zero trust architecture specifically designed for EV charging infrastructure. Implementing zero trust not only mitigates risks but also builds a resilient infrastructure capable of withstanding and quickly recovering from cyber threats. The architecture addresses six defined security objectives. A comprehensive test plan is developed to assess the architecture against these objectives, and the results of the evaluation are reported. This approach is essential for maintaining the reliability and integrity of EV charging services in an increasingly interconnected and vulnerable digital landscape. This is the first in a planned series of papers exploring the implementation of zero trust in EV charging infrastructure. Each paper will delve into different aspects and applications of zero trust, highlighting how various work processes and requirements can lead to distinct architectural designs. These architectures will be tailored to address specific security challenges and operational needs within the EV charging ecosystem, ensuring a robust and adaptable security framework.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Field test of continuous-variable quantum key distribution with a true local oscillator

A continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV QKD) using a true local (located at the receiver) oscillator (LO) has been proposed to remove any possibility of side-channel attacks associated with transmission of the LO as well as reduce the cross-pulse contamination. Here we report an implementation of true LO-CV QKD using “off-the-shelf” components and conduct QKD experiments using the fiber optical network at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. A phase reference and quantum signal are time multiplexed and then wavelength division multiplexed with the classical communications that “coexist” with each other on a single optical network fiber. Importantly, this is the first demonstration of CV QKD with a receiver-based true LO over a deployed fiber network, a crucial step for its application in real-world situations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Transfer Learning using Denoising Auto-Encoders for Cellular-Level Annotation of Tumor in Pathology Slides

Adversarial examples can produce altered classifications using only seemingly innocuous, imperceptible perturbations to the original image. The imperceptibility of adversarial perturbations suggests that the corresponding classifiers use decision criteria different than those of a human. In a medical setting, inexplicable decision criteria confound a pathologist’s willingness to trust machine-generated annotations. Here, we analyze denoising tumor detection models to see if they are robust to imperceptible adversarial perturbations. Moreover, to be more fully trusted by pathologists, we require tumor detectors that generate interpretable annotations which segment pathology slides into tumorous and normal regions at the cellular level. We therefore compare transfer learning based on two different autoencoder architectures, one derived from a deep denoising bottleneck autoencoder and one from an over-complete sparse autoencoder. Both autoencoders were first trained in an unsupervised manner on a set of pathology slides drawn from the Camelyon16 dataset. The latent representations produced by each autoencoder were then passed to separate neural networks that were trained in a supervised manner on binary tumor-normal masks generated by pathologists at cellular resolution. Both tumor detectors supported better than 90% AUC PR as measured by the area under the precision/recall curve on a held-out pathology slide. To assess the underlying decision criteria used by both tumor detectors, we constructed imperceptible adversarial examples which reduced the AUC PR of both models to less than 70%. Random noise of the same amplitude had almost no effect on the AUC PR of either model. Additionally, each tumor detector was resistant to adversarial “transfer” attacks targeting the other. The adversarial perturbations showed strong characteristic differences: the deep denoising models perturbations were a very diffuse, seemingly unrecognizable pattern while the sparse coding models perturbations showed traces of tissue cells.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

White-tailed deer responses to acoustic predator cues are contingent upon past land use and contemporary fire regime

Prey can assess the immediate risk of predation by detecting cues of predator presence, and it is expected that prey should invest in costly antipredator behaviors when a cue of predator presence is detected. Features of the habitat in which the cue is detected, such as vegetative concealment, serve as indirect cues of risk and can mediate how prey respond to direct cues of predator presence. Past agricultural land use and contemporary fire regimes are common disturbances that may modify prey perceptions of risk and could, therefore, alter prey responses to direct cues of predator presence. Here we examined whether the overlap of these two disturbances affected white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus) responses to cues of predator presence by measuring deer vigilance and foraging bout duration in response to coyote (Canis latrans) vocalizations across 20 woodlands that varied in past land use and contemporary fire regime. Frequent fire regimes consistently increased deer visibility to predators across both land-use history contexts. Deer exhibited no behavioral response to the predator cue in habitats containing infrequent fire regimes or agricultural legacies. Deer responded to the cue in frequently burned woodlands without agricultural legacies through increased vigilance and time spent at a foraging location. These findings reveal that land-use legacies and contemporary fire regimes can mediate how prey respond to direct cues of risk. They also suggest that prey may balance the uncertainty associated with cues of predation risk with the urgency of responding to a potential attack by being vigilant and remaining in place.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

PRISTINE: An Emulation Platform for PCB-Level Hardware Trojans

Printed circuit Boards (PCBs) are becoming increasingly vulnerable to malicious design alteration, also known as Trojan attacks, due to a distributed business model that often involves various untrusted parties. Such attacks can be mounted at various stages in the PCB life cycle. The relative ease of alteration of PCB hardware even after fabrication (due to physical access to surface-mounted critical components and traces) makes them attractive for an adversary to manipulate their functional/physical behavior for malicious intent. There is a growing need to explore viable Trojan attacks in a PCB, analyze their functional and physical characteristics (e.g., impact on power or delay), and study the effectiveness of countermeasures against these attacks. While simulation-based approaches for PCB Trojan insertion are effective at creating a large population of possible Trojans, they fail to provide functional feasibility analysis with a realistic workload for a trigger circuit. Also, they cannot estimate a Trojan’s side-channel footprint due to the unavailability of physical models of diverse PCB components. To address these deficiencies, in this paper, we present PRISTINE, a PCB-level emulation system for any integrity or physical tampering issues, specifically, hardware Trojan insertion. The need for building such an emulation platform to resolve PCB trust issues in the supply chain is also surveyed and discussed. Both custom Hardware Hacking (HaHa) boards and multiple commercial PCBs are then used to test the ability of the proposed system to emulate various hardware Trojans specially designed to exploit board-specific hardware characteristics. Experimental results on emulated board-level Trojans show that a wide range of Trojans can be successfully activated, thus enabling the expected payload effects on both types of boards to be studied and quantified. The resulting data are further analyzed to create PCB-level Trojan benchmarks. In particular, a comparative evaluation of the experimental results is used to propose a risk level metric that quantifies the probability of detection and degree of payload impact of each Trojan on a given commercial PCB.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Enhancing grid reliability and resilience through novel DER control, total situational awareness and integrated distribution-transmission representation

High penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) can lead to overvoltage and thermal violations, miscoordination of protection devices and potential adverse control interactions. The challenges are exacerbated by a lack of operator situational awareness of behind-the-meter DERs, and T&D interactions. Furthermore, the large attack surface of a DER environment creates significant cyber security challenges. The motivation is to address these barriers. The main goal is to enable extreme levels of DERs in distribution systems while simultaneously enhancing their reliability and resiliency. This is achieved by a data-driven approach for operation, planning and control of distribution systems with total situational awareness and real-time DER control enabled by a network of edge intelligent devices, a cloud-based analytical platform, and secure communications.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

A Cybersecurity Threat Profile for a Connected Lighting System

In anticipation of improved energy performance and cost savings, cities and building owners are increasingly considering “smart lighting initiatives” that aim to convert their collection of simple luminaires (i.e., lighting fixtures) into an intelligent connected lighting system (CLS) capable of remotely monitoring energy consumption and fault conditions, and possibly implementing adaptive lighting schemes. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has set an national goal of tripling the energy efficiency and demand flexibility of the buildings sector by 2030, relative to 2020 levels 1. It is forecast that connected lighting systems can contribute to that goal by delivering 125 TWh of annual energy savings by 2035 2, equivalent to the annual output of 50 typical (500 MW) power plants. However, these energy savings and the DOE goal are put at significant risk if connected technologies are not adopted due to real or perceived cybersecurity concerns. Connected IoT devices such as these have historically been rife with vulnerabilities which sometimes put security considerations secondary to functionality and operability. What are the cybersecurity threats that will impact these systems, as formerly banal luminaires transition into intelligent connected devices that collect information about themselves, their surrounding environment, and possibly us? In this paper we analyze a threat profile performed on a fault-detection use case for streetlights. A threat profile establishes security requirements, justifies security measures, yields actionable controls, and effectively communicates risk to stakeholders. This effort provides critical information for making threat-based decisions to increase security at a reasonable cost, and can effectively be used by development teams, software architects, and managers to make cybersecurity a part of their ongoing culture of awareness, training, and prevention. This leads to more secure systems and better-understood security. On-premise, cloud, and hybrid architectures with different authentication mechanisms were modeled and later categorized using the Microsoft STRIDE framework. An analysis of the recommended controls for each threat was performed to determine which controls could and should be put in place by manufacturers or third-party suppliers, and which controls need to be left up the end-user to implement. Fifty-seven threats were identified. Among our key findings: (1) 65% (37/57) of the threats did not involve the luminaires, but rather the other components needed to communicate with and manage them; (2) 63% (36/57) of the threats could have been mitigated through manufacturer-implemented defensive techniques or “controls”; and (3) 23% (13/57) of the threats were dependent on the network configuration. Recommendations based on the results of this work are made to key stakeholder groups. Notably, lighting technology developers are advised to address all threats that can be reasonably controlled with baked-in technology solutions (e.g., encryption or authentication controls), and employ some form of secure supply chain management and tracking where other parts (e.g., sensors, microprocessors) of a luminaire must also be built and manufactured with the proper security controls in place. Developers should also review threats involving assets not developed in-house to understand how connectivity with other devices will affect their product during system operation and determine if a compensating control for a defense-in-depth strategy will be needed. Finally, those interested in deploying CLS should compare the differences between cloud and on-premise models to determine which is more suitable for their needs and the abilities of their security team.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗