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Impacts of an additional exhaust shaft on WIPP performance - 15170

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located in southeastern New Mexico, has been developed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for the geologic (deep underground) disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste. WIPP performance assessment (PA) demonstrates repository performance from facility closure to 10,000 years after closure. The recent radiological release event at the WIPP site has temporarily halted waste emplacement activities at the facility. A modified ventilation system is envisioned that will provide sufficient airflow necessary for the resumption of full-rate disposal operations in the future. A primary component of the modified ventilation system is an additional exhaust shaft in the north end of the repository. There are four shafts currently in the repository north end, namely a salt handling shaft, an exhaust shaft, a waste shaft, and an air intake shaft. These shafts are combined into a single composite shaft in WIPP PA that captures the combined impacts of all of them. The proposed additional exhaust shaft is combined with the four existing shafts in the repository model to determine its impacts on long-term repository performance. Moreover, mined volume in the repository north end is modified in the repository representation so as to include additional drifts created to access the new shaft. Computed gas and brine flow behaviors corresponding to the repository with the additional exhaust shaft are compared to those obtained in the PA executed for the 2014 Compliance Re-certification Application (the CRA-2014 PA). Results show that the repository with an additional exhaust shaft and drifts yields brine and gas flow behaviors similar to the current repository configuration. It is concluded that WIPP continues to satisfy regulatory compliance limits with the addition of an exhaust shaft and its access drifts, with compliance curves like those found in the CRA-2014 PA for total normalized releases. (authors)

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Project Plan: Salt in Situ Heater Test

This project plan gives a high-level description of the US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD) campaign in situ borehole heater test project planned for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site, titled the Brine Availability Test in Salt (BATS). BATS is the first stage in a planned sequence of tests to bolster the technical basis for disposal of heat generating waste in salt. This plan provides an overview of the schedule and responsibilities of the parties involved. This project is a collaborative effort by Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratories to execute a series of small-diameter borehole heater tests in salt for the DOE-NE SFWD campaign. Design of a heater test in salt at WIPP has evolved over several years. The experiment has begun in January 2020 and the first phase will continue for several months with the possibility for follow on testing. BATS comprises a suite of modular tests, which consist of a group of adjacent horizontal boreholes in the wall of drifts at WIPP. Each test is centered around a packer-isolated heated borehole (12.2 cm [4.81 diameter) containing equipment for water-vapor collection and borehole closure monitoring, surrounded by smaller-diameter (up to 5.3 cm [2.11 diameter) satellite observation boreholes. Observation boreholes contain grouted-in temperature sensors, electrical resistivity tomography (ERT) sensors, and fiber optics; packer-isolated tracer release and sampling intervals; and acoustic emission (AE) piezoelectric sensors. A larger-diameter (12.2 cm [4.81) satellite borehole includes sorel and salt cement plugs, as part of an engineered barrier sealing test. The first two tests, to be implemented in parallel, are heated (target borehole wall temperature of 120 °C) and unheated, with similar arrays of observation borehole monitoring changes. Follow-on tests will be designed using information gathered from the first two tests, and may be conducted at other borehole wall temperatures, use multiple observation boreholes, and may include different measurement types and test designs. This 2020 update of the original 2018 project plan satisfies DOE-NE Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) milestone M3SF-205N010303034, as part of the SNL "Salt Disposal R&D" work package.

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Example of a Risk-Based Disposal Approval: Solidification of Hanford Site Transuranic Waste

The Hanford Site requested, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 10 approved, a Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA) risk-based disposal approval (RBDA) for solidifying approximately four cubic meters of waste from a specific area of one of the K East Basin: the North Loadout Pit (NLOP). The NLOP waste is a highly radioactive sludge that contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) regulated under TSCA. The prescribed disposal method for liquid PCB waste under TSCA regulations is either thermal treatment or decontamination. Due to the radioactive nature of the waste, however, neither thermal treatment nor decontamination was a viable option. As a result, the proposed treatment consisted of solidifying the material to comply with waste acceptance criteria at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico, or possibly the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility at the Hanford Site, depending on the resulting transuranic (TRU) content of the stabilized waste. The RBDA evaluated environmental risks associated with potential airborne PCBs. In addition, the RBDA made use of waste management controls already in place at the treatment unit. The treatment unit, the T Plant Complex, is a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)-permitted facility used for storing and treating radioactive waste. The EPA found that the proposed activities did not pose an unreasonable risk to human health or the environment. Treatment took place from October 26, 2005 to June 9, 2006, and 332 208-liter (55-gallon) containers of solidified waste were produced. All treated drums assayed to date are TRU and will be disposed at WIPP. (authors)

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EXAMPLE OF A RISK BASED DISPOSAL APPROVAL SOLIDIFICATION OF HANFORD SITE TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE

The Hanford Site requested, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 10 approved, a Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA) risk-based disposal approval (RBDA) for solidifying approximately four cubic meters of waste from a specific area of one of the K East Basin: the North Loadout Pit (NLOP). The NLOP waste is a highly radioactive sludge that contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) regulated under TSCA. The prescribed disposal method for liquid PCB waste under TSCA regulations is either thermal treatment or decontamination. Due to the radioactive nature of the waste, however, neither thermal treatment nor decontamination was a viable option. As a result, the proposed treatment consisted of solidifying the material to comply with waste acceptance criteria at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico, or possibly the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility at the Hanford Site, depending on the resulting transuranic (TRU) content of the stabilized waste. The RBDA evaluated environmental risks associated with potential airborne PCBs. In addition, the RBDA made use of waste management controls already in place at the treatment unit. The treatment unit, the T Plant Complex, is a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)-permitted facility used for storing and treating radioactive waste. The EPA found that the proposed activities did not pose an unreasonable risk to human health or the environment. Treatment took place from October 26,2005 to June 9,2006, and 332 208-liter (55-gallon) containers of solidified waste were produced. All treated drums assayed to date are TRU and will be disposed at WIPP.

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Salt disposal of heat-generating nuclear waste.

This report summarizes the state of salt repository science, reviews many of the technical issues pertaining to disposal of heat-generating nuclear waste in salt, and proposes several avenues for future science-based activities to further the technical basis for disposal in salt. There are extensive salt formations in the forty-eight contiguous states, and many of them may be worthy of consideration for nuclear waste disposal. The United States has extensive experience in salt repository sciences, including an operating facility for disposal of transuranic wastes. The scientific background for salt disposal including laboratory and field tests at ambient and elevated temperature, principles of salt behavior, potential for fracture damage and its mitigation, seal systems, chemical conditions, advanced modeling capabilities and near-future developments, performance assessment processes, and international collaboration are all discussed. The discussion of salt disposal issues is brought current, including a summary of recent international workshops dedicated to high-level waste disposal in salt. Lessons learned from Sandia National Laboratories' experience on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and the Yucca Mountain Project as well as related salt experience with the Strategic Petroleum Reserve are applied in this assessment. Disposal of heat-generating nuclear waste in a suitable salt formation is attractive because the material is essentially impermeable, self-sealing, and thermally conductive. Conditions are chemically beneficial, and a significant experience base exists in understanding this environment. Within the period of institutional control, overburden pressure will seal fractures and provide a repository setting that limits radionuclide movement. A salt repository could potentially achieve total containment, with no releases to the environment in undisturbed scenarios for as long as the region is geologically stable. Much of the experience gained from United States repository development, such as seal system design, coupled process simulation, and application of performance assessment methodology, helps define a clear strategy for a heat-generating nuclear waste repository in salt.

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Technical Basis for the Removal of Unremediated Nitrate Salt Sampling (UNS) to Support LANL Treatment Studies

The sampling of unremediated nitrate salts (UNS) was originally proposed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and Los Alamos National Security, LLC (LANS) (collectively, the Permittees) as a means to ensure adequate understanding and characterization of the problematic waste stream created when the Permittees remediated these nitrate salts-bearing waste with an organic absorbent. The proposal to sample the UNS was driven by a lack of understanding with respect to the radioactive contamination release that occurred within the underground repository at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in February 14, 2014, as well as recommendations made by a Peer Review Team. As discussed, the Permittees believe that current knowledge and understanding of the waste has sufficiently matured such that this additional sampling is not required. Perhaps more importantly, the risk of both chemical and radiological exposure to the workers sampling the UNS drum material is unwarranted. This memo provides the technical justification and rationale for excluding the UNS sampling from the treatment studies.

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Development of Magnesium Oxysulfate Formulation for SRPPF Aqueous Recovery Liquid Solidification

The liquid effluent from the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) Aqueous Recovery Processes will be solidified into a stable form that is acceptable by Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. The current Aqueous Recovery flow sheet proposes to solidify the liquid effluent using a grout formula that was developed and tested for the former Waste Solidification Building process. This Portland cement based mixture results in a high pH (~13) leachate from the solidified waste form which is not acceptable to WIPP in the large quantities expected from production at SRPPF. Various cementitious materials were previously evaluated as alternative grout formulations to Portland cement and a MgO-based mix was identified as a promising alternative. A magnesium oxysulfate (MOS) cement formulation comprised of reactive magnesium oxide (MgO), anhydrous magnesium sulfate (MgSO 4 ), and sand, as a non-reactive heat sink provided good mixability, similar density to the original Portland-cement based mix, and a leachate pH of 9.4, within the assumed WIPP brine pH range. However, the MOS formulation exhibited an appreciable amount of heat generation, which resulted in premature setting of a large-scale test.

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Development of a Comprehensive and Centralized Waste Management System - 19412

Information Systems Laboratories (ISL) has designed a new single, integrated, waste management and control system to administer all aspects of nuclear waste management. The overriding goal of the initiative is to provide federal, state, and local agencies with operational awareness, management, and programmatic support for all functions related to nuclear waste management. Over decades of waste management federal agencies have sponsored or directly paid for the development, operation, and control of multiple systems to track and control its waste - with varied success. Multiple contractors have generated disparate control systems/databases and literally mountains of data. Past approaches have not provided a single, integrated, real time data management system. ISL's analysis of past failed efforts has reveal four common symptoms: - Control/management systems that are not compatible; - Programmatic costs that increase with systems use and re-work; - Systems focused on specific sets of data; - Inaccurate or outdated data sets. An integrated waste management and control system that collects and displays real-time, accurate inventory, waste container certification, transportation certification, emplacement, and shipment related data improve operational awareness and overcomes these limitations. Using its vast knowledge and experience in developing numerous waste tracking and management systems, ISL has leveraged its own in-house knowledge and gathered requests from stakeholders all across the industry to design a system that meets the needs of users at all levels of the nuclear waste management process. Using the highly successful and widely used Waste Data System (WDS) designed for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant as a core component, ISL has designed a system that greatly expands on the functionality of the WDS to exceed its current focus of management of Transuranic Waste shipments. The new system is designed to provide the ability to track a wide range of waste types from Transuranic, High Level, Low Level, Mixed, and any nuclear related material. The main focus of the system is to provide federal regulators a comprehensive and real-time oversight into the handling of all nuclear waste materials. Oversight activities include, but are not limited to, strategy development, projections, metrics, incentive development, tracking, budget review, government cost estimating, and integrated schedules. The major components of the system are summarized below: - The Centralized Waste Management System (CWMS), which will include assimilating and validating known sources of data into the CWMS. - The programmatic reporting support component, which will handle queries from regulators, track compliance with regulatory requirements, and maintain the dashboard for federal management. - Both the CWMS and the programmatic reporting support component will use a standard set of business rules that govern system operations and allow site and program specific needs and limits for all waste programs and types to be captured and maintained. This presentation will provide details of each component of the system detailing its use, interfaces with other components, and value to stakeholders. (authors)

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WIPP Safety Significant Confinement Ventilation System (SSCVS) HEPA Filtration System - 20165

Construction and major equipment fabrication are underway for a new ventilation exhaust system at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The new system will provide continuous High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filtration of the exhaust from the WIPP underground while meeting the ventilation demands for expanded waste emplacement and mining operations over the next 40 years. The integrated system design provides for reducing the salt, clay and diesel particulates from the exhaust airflow from the mine, prior to full filtration using Nuclear Safety Significant HEPA filters. The SSCVS design and equipment provides for continuous HEPA filtration over a wide range of operating and environmental conditions. The new exhaust system connects to the existing underground exhaust shaft, and the exhaust air flows from the underground through Salt Reduction Units (SRUs) to protect the final filter banks from excessive moisture and rapid salt/dust buildup. Each of the six (6) SRUs consists of a demister to remove entrained moisture, a dry salt remover unit to filter approximately 90% of the entrained salt/dust, and an automated water treatment system to periodically clean the demisters and to remove salt from the SRU filters. At the maximum expected exhaust flowrate of 540,000 Cubic Feet per Minute (CFM) / 255 Cubic Meters per Second (m{sup 3}/s), five (5) salt removal units will be in operation with one unit in standby or maintenance. An in-line variable frequency drive booster fan will offset pressure losses through each SRU and reduce the relative humidity of the air exiting the SRUs. In the event of a high radiation alarm from the underground Continuous Air Monitors (CAMs), the SRUs will be automatically bypassed, which places the SRS and building outside of the Safety Significant confinement boundary. From the SRUs, the exhaust is directed to the HEPA filter banks located in the New Filter Building. The exhaust system is designed to provide continuous HEPA filtration prior to release to the exhaust stack. There are 22 HEPA filter banks rated at 27,000 CFM / 12.75 m{sup 3}/s each. Each filter bank has two stages of pre-filters and two stages of HEPA filters. The filtered air from each of the 22 filter banks discharges into a common concrete plenum, which is maintained under a negative pressure by the main exhaust fans. Six 1,000 HP variable frequency drive exhaust fans are provided on the south side of the plenum. At the maximum expected exhaust flow of 540,000 CFM, four exhaust fans and twenty filter banks will be in operation. The fans discharge vertically to a separate concrete exhaust plenum. The filtered exhaust is routed from the exhaust plenum to a 125-foot-tall exhaust stack via a 13-foot diameter duct. (authors)

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K-Basins Sludge Treatment and Packaging at the Hanford Site - 13585

Highly radioactive sludge resulting from the storage of degraded spent nuclear fuel has been consolidated in Engineered Containers (ECs) in the 105-K West Storage Basin located on the Hanford site near the Columbia River in Washington State. CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) is proceeding with a project to retrieve the sludge, place it in Sludge Transport and Storage Containers (STSCs) and store those filled containers within the T Plant Canyon facility on the Hanford Site Central Plateau (Phase 1). Retrieval and transfer of the sludge material will enable removal of the 105-K West Basin and allow remediation of the subsurface contamination plumes under the basin. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) plans to treat and dispose of this K Basins sludge (Phase 2) as Remote Handled Transuranic Waste (RH TRU) at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) located in New Mexico. The K Basin sludge currently contains uranium metal which reacts with water present in the stored slurry, generating hydrogen and other byproducts. The established transportation and disposal requirements require the transformation of the K Basins sludge to a chemically stable, liquid-free, packaged waste form. The Treatment and Packaging Project includes removal of the containerised sludge from T Plant, the treatment of the sludge as required, and packaging of all the sludge into a form that is certifiable for transportation to and disposal at WIPP. Completion of this scope will require construction and operation of a Sludge Treatment and Packaging Facility (STPF), which could be either a completely new facility or a modification of an existing Hanford Site facility. A Technology Evaluation and Alternatives Analysis (TEAA) for the STP Phase 2 was completed in 2011. A Request for Technology Information (RFI) had been issued in October 2009 to solicit candidate technologies for use in Phase 2. The RFI also included a preliminary definition of Phase 2 functions and requirements. Potentially applicable technologies were identified through a commercial procurement process, technical workshops, and review of the numerous previous sludge treatment technology studies. The identified technology approaches were screened using the criteria established in the Decision Plan, and focused bench top feasibility testing was conducted. Engineering evaluations of the costs, schedules, and technical maturity were developed and evaluated. Recommendations were developed based on technical evaluations. The criteria used in the evaluation process were as follows: (1) Safety, (2) Regulatory/stakeholder acceptance, (3) Technical maturity, (4) Operability and maintainability, (5) Life cycle cost and schedule, (6) Potential for beneficial integration with ongoing STP-Phase 1 activities, and (7) Integration with Site-wide RH-TRU processing/packaging, planning, schedule, and approach. The TEAA recommended Warm Water Oxidation (WWO) as the baseline treatment technology and two risk reduction enhancement options for further consideration during development of the process - size reduction and chemical oxidation (Fenton's reagent). The enhancement options would potentially allow a useful reduction in the total operating time required to process the K Basins sludge. The U.S. Department of Energy's Richland Field Office (DOE-RL) has approved this recommended technical approach. The baseline process can be broken down into the following main process steps: (1) STSC transfer from T Plant to the Sludge Treatment and Packaging Facility (STPF). (2) Retrieval of sludge from the STSCs and transfer to the Receipt and Reaction Tank (RRT). (3) Preparation for immobilization by oxidation using heated water (i.e., WWO) for those batches that require it and concentration by evaporating water at about atmospheric pressure in the RRT. (4) Immobilization by using additives to eliminate free liquids and packaging of the treated sludge into drums. (5) Inspection and handling of the filled drums prior to transfer to a separate storage and shipping facility. (6) Handling of vapor, condensate, and other waste streams generated by the process. Each of these steps is discussed in the paper, together with the current state of progress in developing the technology and requirements for continued development. A schematic of the recommended baseline WWO treatment process is given below. (authors)

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FY16 Summary Report: Participation in the KOSINA Project

Salt formations represent a promising host for disposal of nuclear waste in the United States and Germany. Together, these countries provided fully developed safety cases for bedded salt and domal salt, respectively. Today, Germany and the United States find themselves in similar positions with respect to salt formations serving as repositories for heat-generating nuclear waste. German research centers are evaluating bedded and pillow salt formations to contrast with their previous safety case made for the Gorleben dome. Sandia National Laboratories is collaborating on this effort as an Associate Partner, and this report summarizes that teamwork. Sandia and German research groups have a long-standing cooperative approach to repository science, engineering, operations, safety assessment, testing, modeling and other elements comprising the basis for salt disposal. Germany and the United States hold annual bilateral workshops, which cover a spectrum of issues surrounding the viability of salt formations. Notably, recent efforts include development of a database for features, events, and processes applying broadly and generically to bedded and domal salt. Another international teaming activity evaluates salt constitutive models, including hundreds of new experiments conducted on bedded salt from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. These extensive collaborations continue to build the scientific basis for salt disposal. Repository deliberations in the United States are revisiting bedded and domal salt for housing a nuclear waste repository. By agreeing to collaborate with German peers, our nation stands to benefit by assurance of scientific position, exchange of operational concepts, and approach to elements of the safety case, all reflecting cost and time efficiency.

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Summary Report for the NEPA Impact Analysis. Revision 1

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located in southeastern New Mexico, has been developed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for the geologic (deep underground) disposal of defense-related transuranic (TRU) waste. Containment of TRU waste at the WIPP facility is derived from standards set forth in Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 191. The DOE assesses compliance with the containment standards according to the Certification Criteria in Title 40 CFR Part 194 by means of Performance Assessment (PA) calculations performed by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). WIPP PA calculations estimate the probability of radionuclide releases from the repository to the accessible environment for a regulatory period of 10,000 years after facility closure. The DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) has initiated a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) action for a proposal to excavate and use additional transuranic (TRU) waste disposal panels at the WIPP facility. This report documents an analysis undertaken as part of an effort to evaluate the potential environmental consequences of the proposed action. Although not explicitly required for a NEPA analysis, evaluations of a dose indicator to hypothetical members of the public after final facility closure are presented in this report. The analysis is carried out in two stages: first, Performance Assessment (PA) calculations quantify the potential releases to the accessible environment over a 10,000-year post-closure period. Second, dose was evaluated for three hypothetical exposure pathways using the conservative radionuclide concentrations assumed to be released to the accessible environment.

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Expert System for Building TRU Waste Payloads - 13554

The process for grouping TRU waste drums into payloads for shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal is a very complex process. Transportation and regulatory requirements must be met, along with striving for the goals of shipment efficiency: maximize the number of waste drums in a shipment and minimize the use of empty drums which take up precious underground storage space. The restrictions on payloads range from weight restrictions, to limitations on flammable gas in the headspace, to minimum TRU alpha activity concentration requirements. The Overpack and Payload Assistant Tool (OPAT) has been developed as a mixed-initiative intelligent system within the WIPP Waste Data System (WDS) to guide the construction of multiple acceptable payloads. OPAT saves the user time while at the same time maximizes the efficiency of shipments for the given drum population. The tool provides the user with the flexibility to tune critical factors that guide OPAT's operation based on real-time feedback concerning the results of the execution. This feedback complements the user's external knowledge of the drum population (such as location of drums, known challenges, internal shipment goals). This work demonstrates how software can be utilized to complement the unique domain knowledge of the users. The mixed-initiative approach combines the insight and intuition of the human expert with the proficiency of automated computational algorithms. The result is the ability to thoroughly and efficiently explore the search space of possible solutions and derive the best waste management decision. (authors)

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Chemical Reactivity and Recommended Remediation Strategy for Los Alamos Remediated Nitrate Salt (RNS) Wastes

Nitrate salt wastes were generated during historical processing operations to recover and purify plutonium at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). These nitrate salts have the potential to behave as oxidizers, and to contain entrained liquids, both of which are prohibited in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). A process was developed to remediate nitrate salts by mixing salts with an inorganic zeolite pet litter to absorb free liquids, and remove the oxidizing characteristic of the wastes. Process changes introduced instead an organic wheat-­-based pet litter along with organic neutralizers, generating a new waste form referred to as Remediated Nitrate Salt (RNS) waste. The February 2014 radiological release at the WIPP site was traced to a LANL RNS waste drum number 68660. Experimental and modeling studies performed at LANL indicate that mixtures of metal nitrate salts (oxidizer) with Swheat organic kitty litter (fuel) create the potential for exothermic chemical reactions. Even in the presence of triethanol-­-ammonium nitrate (TEAN) created during neutralization, relatively high temperatures, greater than approximately 160 °C (320 °F), are required for runaway exothermic reactions. Evaluation of Drum 68660 characteristics coupled with extensive chemical testing indicate that, in addition to the nitrate salt/Swheat organic kitty litter mixture, an additional trigger mechanism (or mechanisms) is likely required to raise the internal drum temperature high enough to initiate the nitrate salt/Swheat organic kitty litter reaction. A combination of chemical conditions were identified that may lower the temperature for reaction, including initial high acid concentration of free liquids; significant quantities (> 1 gal) of neutralized, absorbed free liquids; the presence of reactive or catalytic metals like magnesium, iron, or lead; the presence of bismuth containing glovebox gloves; and the presence of natural biological activity. Complex surrogate nitrate salt mixtures prepared to simulate wastes, particularly those containing iron and magnesium, can generate NOx gases that partially nitrate the organic Swheat kitty litter and form a more energetic fuel. These complex surrogate salt mixtures display exothermic behavior at temperatures as low as 60 °C (140 °F) which is still well above the ambient temperature conditions experience by a drum. Neutralization of free liquids, and sorption onto Swheat establishes conditions (moisture) with near-neutral pH) that will support natural biological activity. Spontaneous self-heating generated by low-level chemical reactions and/or the respiration of bacteria, molds, and microorganisms is potentially important in the early stages and may be sufficient to raise the temperature as high as 60 °C (140 °F), where the other exothermic chemical reactions can take place. Additional studies are being conducted to evaluate the role biological activity may have played in initiating the event. The use of Swheat absorbent in the processing of nitrate salt wastes can be pinpointed as the critical processing decision that led to the failure of drum 68660, regardless of the ii details of the thermal processes that enabled the drum to achieve temperatures sufficient to initiate the chemical reactions.

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2020 NEPA Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB) Risk Assessment

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility is a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) operating repository 654 m below the surface in a thick salt formation in southeastern New Mexico. The DOE disposes transuranic (TRU) waste produced from atomic energy defense activities at the WIPP facility. A portion of the waste shipped to the WIPP facility contains TRU radionuclides co-mingled with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), which fall under U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations implementing the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). This report documents the risks of PCBs co-mingled with TRU waste (hereafter designated as PCB/TRU waste) designated for disposal at the WIPP facility. This analysis is input to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) assessment by the DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) for the proposed increase of the WIPP facility disposal area to include additional waste panels (but not to increase the legislated WIPP volume). This analysis is not a compliance calculation to support a certification renewal nor does it support a planned change request (PCR) or planned change notice (PCN) to be submitted to the EPA.

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Ethical Considerations for Developing Repository Warning Messages to the Future - 16152

One topic being addressed internationally through the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency initiative on the Preservation of Records, Knowledge and Memory is the nature of messages to be sent into the distant future, and the means whereby to send them. The U.S. Department of Energy Carlsbad Field Office is the owner of a mined geologic repository, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. By regulation, this office must implement, prior to the repository being closed, 'passive institutional controls' that last as long as practicable. In the case of this specific repository, all the waste is government generated (defense programs) hence all funding is public money. As such, the preliminary vision for this message conveyance is a somewhat elaborate system that includes records rooms, monoliths, and inscriptions in seven different languages. As the time for repository closure approaches, this aspect of the repository investment will incur a considerable portion of the closure funds appropriated by the U.S. Congress. An ethical question that arises concerns the effects of the public investment to be made on the generations paying for it, and the risk-avoidance benefit to be expected for the generations going into the far future. This is an especially pressing question where taxpayer (public) money is involved, although it does not make sense to waste money collected from any source. This paper explores the ethical dimensions of creating a substantial and sophisticated system of warnings that communicates into the future and concludes that the repository warning system needs to be practicable from a technical point of view, reasonable from an investment point of view, and ethical from an inter-generational equity point of view. (authors)

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Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (IWTU) Input Coal Analyses and Off-Gass Filter (OGF) Content Analyses

A full engineering scale Fluidized Bed Steam Reformer (FBSR) system is being used at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) to stabilize acidic Low Activity Waste (LAW) known as Sodium Bearing Waste (SBW). The INTEC facility, known as the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (IWTU), underwent an Operational Readiness Review (ORR) and a Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) in March 2014. The IWTU began non-radioactive simulant processing in late 2014 and by January, 2015 ; the IWTU had processed 62,000 gallons of simulant. The facility is currently in a planned outage for inspection of the equipment and will resume processing simulated waste feed before commencing to process 900,000 gallons of radioactive SBW. The SBW acidic waste will be made into a granular FBSR product (carbonate based) for disposal in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).

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The Application of Performance Assessment to Make Regulatory and Operational Changes in an Operating Nuclear Waste Repository

This paper describes how performance assessment (PA) is used to support changes to the regulatory basis of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The WIPP, located near Carlsbad, New Mexico is operated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) as the nation's only deep geologic repository for the disposal of transuranic nuclear waste. In 1998, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) certified that the WIPP met the performance requirements of 40 CFR Part 191, Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes. A PA analysis of long term (10,000 year) repository performance successfully demonstrated that the probability and consequences of potential long-term releases of radionuclides to the accessible environment would be well below the established limits. These results were key in obtaining WIPP's initial certification, allowing the first shipment and disposal of nuclear waste in March of 1999. As disposal operations have taken place over the last eight years, changes have been identified in the regulatory and operational realms of the facility that would enhance waste disposal efficiency. Such changes, however, cannot be made without prior consent of the EPA. Therefore, changes planned by the DOE must be thoroughly described and supported by varying degrees of the same type of analyses that were conducted to demonstrate the WIPP's containment capabilities as presented in the initial compliance application submitted to EPA in 1996. Such analyses are used to identify the impacts or benefits of implementing the planned change. The DOE has successfully used performance assessment analyses for the approval of changes such as: 1) the disposal of super-compacted waste forms, and; 2) the adoption of new parameters and modeling assumptions In some cases the planned changes are simpler in nature than those listed above, and therefore only require targeted or simplified PA analyses to demonstrate the effect on performance. Targeted analyses have been used to successfully gain approval of the following: 1) a reduction in the amount of magnesium oxide (MgO) chemical buffer backfill that must be emplaced in the repository 2) a change in the repository mining/disposal horizon In addition to these approved changes, the DOE has used PA analyses to support the following planned change requests that await EPA's approval: 1) panel closure redesign 2) further reduction in the MgO-to-waste ratio Finally, this paper will discuss some of the changes that the DOE is currently preparing and plans to submit to the EPA for approval in the near future. This paper will describe how a set of analytical tools initially used to open the WIPP continues to have a role in making the repository more efficient and adaptable as variations in waste streams, operational demands, and other dynamic forces change the operating environment over time. (authors)

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