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The requirements for the safety training program are reported for KSC including transportation, inspection, checkout operations, maintenance of launch vehicles, spacecraft, ground support equipment, and launch teams. The responsibilities and mechanics for implementing the program are outlined.
For abstract, see N75-13016.
The most significant hazards identified on manned space flight programs are listed. This summary is of special value to system safety engineers in developing safety checklists and otherwise tailoring safety tasks to specific systems and subsystems.
Reports describing various types of communication problems are presented along with summaries dealing with judgment and decision making. Concerns relating to the ground proximity warning system are summarized and several examples of true terrain proximity warnings are provided. An analytic study of reports relating to profile descents was performed. Problems were found to be associated with charting and graphic presentation of the descents, with lack of uniformity of the descent procedures among facilities using them, and with the flight crew workload engendered by profile descents, particularly when additional requirements are interposed by air traffic control during the execution of the profiles. A selection of alert bulletins and responses to them were reviewed.
A decline in reports concerning small aircraft was noted; more reports involved transport aircraft, professional pilots, instrument meteorological conditions, and weather problems. A study of 136 reports of operational problems in terminal radar service areas was made. Pilot, controller, and system factors were found to be associated with these occurrences. Information transfer difficulties were prominent. Misunderstandings by pilots, and in some cases by controllers, of the policies and limitations of terminal radar programs were observed.
An analytical study of reports relating to cockpit altitude alert systems was performed. A recent change in the Federal Air Regulation permits the system to be modified so that the alerting signal approaching altitude has only a visual component; the auditory signal would continue to be heard if a deviation from an assigned altitude occurred. Failure to observe altitude alert signals and failure to reset the system were the commonest cause of altitude deviations related to this system. Cockpit crew distraction was the most frequent reason for these failures. It was noted by numerous reporters that the presence of altitude alert system made them less aware of altitude; this lack of altitude awareness is discussed. Failures of crew coordination were also noted. It is suggested that although modification of the altitude alert system may be highly desirable in short-haul aircraft, it may not be desirable for long-haul aircraft in which cockpit workloads are much lower for long periods of time. In these cockpits, the aural alert approaching altitudes is perceived as useful and helpful. If the systems are to be modified, it appears that additional emphasis on altitude awareness during recurrent training will be necessary; it is also possible that flight crew operating procedures during climb and descent may need examination with respect to monitoring responsibilities. A selection of alert bulletins and responses to them is presented.
A sample of reports relating to operations during winter weather is presented. Several reports involving problems of judgment and decisionmaking have been selected from the numerous reports representative of this area. Problems related to aeronautical charts are discussed in a number of reports. An analytic study of reports involving potential conflicts in the immediate vicinity of uncontrolled airports was performed; the results are discussed in this report. It was found that in three-fourths of 127 such conflicts, neither pilot, or only one of the pilots, was communicating position and intentions on the appropriate frequency. The importance of providing aural transfer of information, as a backup to the visual see and avoid mode of information transfer is discussed. It was also found that a large fraction of pilots involved in potential conflicts on final approach had executed straight-in approaches, rather than the recommended traffic pattern entries, prior to the conflicts. A selection of alert bulletins and responses to them by various segments of the aviation community is presented.
The study deals with 165 inadvertent operations on or into inappropriate portions of the aircraft areas at controlled airports. Pilot-initiated and controller-initiated incursions are described and discussed. It was found that a majority of the pilot-initiated occurrences involved operation without a clearance; controller-initiated occurrences usually involved failure to maintain assured separation. The factors associated with these occurrences are analyzed. It appears that a major problem in these occurrences is inadequate coordination among the various system participants. Reasons for this, and some possible solutions to various aspects of the problem, are discussed. A sample of reports from pilots and controllers is presented. These relate to undesired occurrences in air transport, general aviation, and air traffic control operations; to ATC coordination problems; and to a recurrent problem in ASRS reports, parachuting operations. A sample of alert bulletins and responses to them is presented.
This handbook provides the payload developer with a uniform description and interpretation of the potential hazards which may be caused by or associated with a payload element, operation, or interface with other payloads or with the STS. It also includes guidelines describing design or operational safety measures which suggest means of alleviating a particular hazard or group of hazards, thereby improving payload safety.
Knowledge of limitations of the Air Traffic Control system in conflict avoidance capabilities is discussed. Assumptions and expectations held by by airmen regarding the capabilities of the system are presented. Limitations related to communication are described and problems associated with visual approaches, airspace configurations, and airport layouts are discussed. A number of pilot and controller reports illustrative of three typical problem types: occurrences involving pilots who have limited experience; reports describing inflight calls for assistance; and flights in which pilots have declined to use available radar services are presented. Examples of Alert Bulletins and the FAA responses to them are included.
A comprehensive study of near midair collisions in terminal airspace, derived from the ASRS database is presented. A selection of controller and pilot reports on airport perimeter security, unauthorized takeoffs and landings, and on winter operations is presented. A sampling of typical Alert Bulletins and their responses is presented.
Robot turned off if acceleration exceeds preset value. Signals from accelerometer on robot arm pass through filter and amplifier, eliminating high-frequency noise and hydraulic-pump pulsations. Data digitized and processed in computer. Unit controls other machines that perform repetitive movements, including rotary tables, tracked vehicles, conveyor lines, and elevators.
Knowledge Management is a proactive pursuit for the future success of any large organization faced with the imminent possibility that their senior managers/engineers with gained experiences and lessons learned plan to retire in the near term. Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) is proactively pursuing unique mechanism to ensure knowledge learned is retained and lessons learned captured and documented. Knowledge Capture Event/Activities/Management helps to provide a gateway between future retirees and our next generation of managers/engineers. S&MA hosted two Knowledge Capture Events during 2005 featuring three of its retiring fellows (Axel Larsen, Dave Whittle and Gary Johnson). The first Knowledge Capture Event February 24, 2005 focused on two Safety and Mission Assurance Safety Panels (Space Shuttle System Safety Review Panel (SSRP); Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) and the latter event December 15, 2005 featured lessons learned during Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle which could be applicable in the newly created Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV)/Constellation development program. Gemini, Apollo, Skylab and the Space Shuttle promised and delivered exciting human advances in space and benefits of space in people s everyday lives on earth. Johnson Space Center's Safety & Mission Assurance team work over the last 20 years has been mostly focused on operations we are now beginning the Exploration development program. S&MA will promote an atmosphere of knowledge sharing in its formal and informal cultures and work processes, and reward the open dissemination and sharing of information; we are asking "Why embrace relearning the "lessons learned" in the past?" On the Exploration program the focus will be on Design, Development, Test, & Evaluation (DDT&E); therefore, it is critical to understand the lessons from these past programs during the DDT&E phase.
The presentation reviews the dependability and safety effort of NASA's Independent Verification and Validation Facility. Topics include: safety engineering process, applications to non-space environment, Phase I overview, process creation, sample SRM artifact, Phase I end result, Phase II model transformation, fault management, and applying Phase II to individual projects.
Loss of control remains one of the largest contributors to fatal aircraft accidents worldwide. Aircraft loss-of-control accidents are complex, resulting from numerous causal and contributing factors acting alone or more often in combination. Hence, there is no single intervention strategy to prevent these accidents. This paper summarizes recent analysis results in identifying worst-case combinations of loss-of-control accident precursors and their time sequences, a holistic approach to preventing loss-of-control accidents in the future, and key requirements for validating the associated technologies.
No abstract available
This presentation gives a brief introduction on the topic of safety for ODM applications.