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At least 415 records · Page 23

MULTI-MODAL CHALLENGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (THE ONLY INTERESTING PARTS OF A SYSTEM ARE THE INTERFACES.)

Transportation of nuclear and radioactive material exposes these materials to the most risk for malicious acts. Unlike physical facilities, securing radioactive and nuclear materials during transport requires that many different organizations including operators, regulatory agencies, and security agencies work together to ensure the security of the cargo. A major security challenge for international movement of nuclear and radioactive material is the need to use multiple transport modes. Ensuring security of these cargos as they move through intermodal facilities, some of which may take multiple hours, or days, depending on operational constraints at the yards, ports, or other facilities, is a major operational and regulatory challenge. Especially in the international context, ensuring the security of material in transport through in-transit countries and coordinating transport activities across jurisdictions can lead to challenges as to whose security plan controls, whose transport regulations are to be followed, and how might plans need to be adjusted to adapt to in-transit conditions and ultimately how to ensure cargo security. This paper introduces and highlights selected challenges in the multi-modal movement of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. While the paper will address selected challenges in coordination of stakeholders and resources, activities at intermodal facilities, and other selected issues, this does not address all the challenges, rather it brings issues forward and suggests solutions and strategies for enhancing the security of nuclear and radioactive material transported internationally.

Singley, Paul↗

The future of scientific workflows

Today’s computational, experimental, and observational sciences rely on computations that involve many related tasks. The success of a scientific mission often hinges on the computer automation of these workflows. In April 2015, the US Department of Energy (DOE) invited a diverse group of domain and computer scientists from national laboratories supported by the Office of Science, the National Nuclear Security Administration, from industry, and from academia to review the workflow requirements of DOE’s science and national security missions, to assess the current state of the art in science workflows, to understand the impact of emerging extreme-scale computing systems on those workflows, and to develop requirements for automated workflow management in future and existing environments. Here, this paper is a summary of the opinions of over 50 leading researchers attending this workshop. We highlight use cases, computing systems, workflow needs and conclude by summarizing the remaining challenges this community sees that inhibit large-scale scientific workflows from becoming a mainstream tool for extreme-scale science.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Lemnos Interoperable Security Program

The manner in which the control systems are being designed and operated in the energy sector is undergoing some of the most significant changes in history due to the evolution of technology and the increasing number of interconnections to other system. With these changes however come two significant challenges that the energy sector must face; 1) Cyber security is more important than ever before, and 2) Cyber security is more complicated than ever before. A key requirement in helping utilities and vendors alike in meeting these challenges is interoperability. While interoperability has been present in much of the discussions relating to technology utilized within the energy sector and especially the Smart Grid, it has been absent in the context of cyber security. The Lemnos project addresses these challenges by focusing on the interoperability of devices utilized within utility control systems which support critical cyber security functions. In theory, interoperability is possible with many of the cyber security solutions available to utilities today. The reality is that the effort required to achieve cyber security interoperability is often a barrier for utilities. For example, consider IPSec, a widely-used Internet Protocol to define Virtual Private Networks, or tunnels , to communicate securely through untrusted public and private networks. The IPSec protocol suite has a significant number of configuration options and encryption parameters to choose from, which must be agreed upon and adopted by both parties establishing the tunnel. The exercise in getting software or devices from different vendors to interoperate is labor intensive and requires a significant amount of security expertise by the end user. Scale this effort to a significant number of devices operating over a large geographical area and the challenge becomes so overwhelming that it often leads utilities to pursue solutions from a single vendor. These single vendor solutions may inadvertently lock utilities into proprietary and closed systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Enabling Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Physical Security Using EMRALD and MAAP (Presentation)

The optimization of physical security in nuclear power plants requires sophisticated methodologies that integrate operator actions and plant behavior through advanced simulation tools. Idaho National Laboratory has developed the Modeling and Analysis for Safety and Security using the Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF) methodology, an approach that integrates force-on-force simulations, dynamic probabilistic risk assessment, and thermal hydraulics modeling to enhance security planning while reducing costs. A reduced order model for thermal hydraulic simulations performed by the Modular Accident Analysis Program (MAAP) was developed to evaluate reactor core behavior during attack scenarios. MAAP simulations are computationally intensive and must be run in a secure environment, complicating analysis and validation. By pre-computed scenario outcomes for a small number of modified parameters, the reduced order model significantly decreases the computational cost and enables offsite review of the results.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Underground Test Area Calendar Year 2017 Quality Assurance Report Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This report is required by the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) (NNSA/NFO, 2015) and identifies the UGTA quality assurance (QA) activities for calendar year (CY) 2017 (January 1, 2017, through December 31, 2017). UGTA organizations—U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program conduct QA activities throughout the CY. The activities include conducting oversight assessments (OAs) for UGTA Activity QAP compliance, identifying findings and completing corrective actions, evaluating laboratory performance, reviewing technical work, and publishing documents.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Underground Test Area: Calendar Year 2022 Quality Assurance Report, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This report is required by the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity QAP and identifies the UGTA QA activities for CY 2022. The QA activities included conducting assessments for UGTA Activity QAP compliance, identifying findings and completing corrective actions, evaluating laboratory performance, reviewing technical work, and publishing documents. DRI; LANL; and MSTS did not conduct QA activities for the UGTA Activity in 2022.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Quantum money with classical verification

We propose and construct a quantum money scheme that allows verification through classical communication with a bank. This is the first demonstration that a secure quantum money scheme exists that does not require quantum communication for coin verification. Our scheme is secure against adaptive adversaries - this property is not directly related to the possibility of classical verification, nevertheless none of the earlier quantum money constructions is known to possess it.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Sentinel

Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are commonplace in network security but they frequently employ algorithms that are computational demanding requiring hardware and software with significant power requirements. Two examples of such resource-intensive algorithms used for network security are regular expression matching and broader signature pattern matching which are commonly used in deep packet inspection (DPI). Network security algorithms that have large power requirements may be a challenge for low-power internet-of-things (IoT) environments, which generally lack the power resources to implement complex security measures like computationally expensive DPI at the edge. Furthermore, IoT environments incorporating 5G standalone networks have network latency constraints beyond just power that make DPI at the edge even more difficult. Programmable logic is ideally suited for machine learning inference for DPI because of its deep instruction level parallelism and single-cycle memory access. Machine learning approaches for DPI have been explored before using the programmable logic of field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) as a potential solution for NIDS approaches that would be power-suitable for IoT. However, those previous programmable logic NIDS approaches utilize either a supervised or unsupervised learning model. Sentinel utilizes the ensemble of these two machine learning approaches known as a semi-supervised approach which has shown promise in NIDS implementations. Sentinel provides a programmable logic implementation of a semi-supervised approach for DPI which operates at much lower power and latency than a GPU implementation with negligible loss of accuracy due to quantization through a logistic regressor.

Anderson, MatthewW [Idaho National Laboratory (INL↗

Credit Enhancements and Capital Markets to Fund Solar Deployment: Leveraging Public Funds to Open Private Sector Investment

Credit enhancements represent a variety of financial support structures that are designed to reduce risk to those holding the debt, including debt raised via a securitization process, and thus lower the required yield associated with the security. The purpose of all forms of credit enhancement is to increase the collateral against which notes are secured (Lin,1999). The following section evaluates is not guaranteed. Perceived risks of the solar asset class--including those related to technology, offtaker creditworthiness, and regulatory policy--can increase the required yield, increase probability of investor loss of interest and/or principal, or both. In many cases, this is a cyclical phenomenon: risk perception is fed by lack of historical knowledge, which is in turn fed by risk perception. Therefore, successful access to capital market investment in order to spur low-cost solar deployment depends on the success of this initial fledgling period.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Enabling Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Physical Security Using EMRALD and MAAP

The optimization of physical security in nuclear power plants requires sophisticated methodologies that integrate operator actions and plant behavior through advanced simulation tools. To address this, Idaho National Laboratory [JL2.1]has developed the Modeling and Analysis for Safety and Security using the Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF) methodology, an approach that integrates force-on-force simulations, dynamic probabilistic risk assessment, and thermal-hydraulics modeling [JL3.1]to enhance security planning while reducing costs. We developed a tool that produces reduced order models using thermal hydraulic simulations from the Modular Accident Analysis Program (MAAP) [1]. These models can quickly evaluate reactor core behavior during attack simulations, and in so doing, address two barriers of traditional methods: (1) MAAP simulations are computationally intensive, and (2) attack scenarios must be run in a secure environment, which complicates analysis and validation. By precomputing scenario outcomes for a small number of modified parameters, the reduced order model significantly decreases the computational cost and enables offsite review of the results.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Onshore U.S. Carbon Pipeline Deployment: Siting, Safety, and Regulation

Carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) technology has significant potential to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and mitigate the impact of climate change, particularly in hard to decarbonize industrial and commercial sectors. CCUS involves capturing carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) from industrial processes or power generation and utilizing it for other purposes, such as enhanced oil recovery (EOR), or storing the captured CO 2 underground. CCUS technology can reduce the environmental impact of continued fossil fuel use while smoothing the transition to a low-carbon economy. CCUS can create new economic opportunities, such as the development of new industries and job creation, and can enhance energy security by diversifying energy sources. For these reasons, enabling CCUS has become a key objective of the Biden-Harris administration’s clean energy policy and has received bipartisan support. Despite its environmental and economic potential, CCUS faces multiple barriers to widespread deployment. One of the main challenges is the high cost and technical difficulty of implementing and operating large-scale CCUS infrastructure. CCUS remains a relatively expensive way to reduce carbon emissions (e.g., compared to solar photovoltaic technology’s displacement of coal generation). Additionally, financial incentives and supportive policies like those enacted to support solar photovoltaic development, especially at the state level, are inconsistent or nonexistent, which can discourage investment in CCUS projects. There are also technical challenges associated with safe and secure underground CO 2 storage and the development of new carbon utilization technologies. Public opposition to various aspects of CCUS technologies, ranging from concerns that CCUS will extend reliance on fossil fuels to CCUS infrastructure being sited in disadvantaged communities, is a growing challenge. This paper focuses on another significant barrier to broad CCUS deployment: the need for considerable expansion of the dedicated land-based CO 2 pipeline network in the United States to meet CCUS goals and the unique regulatory challenges to its development. To reach carbon emissions targets in the United States by 2050, CCUS technology will need to be supported by tens of thousands of miles of CO 2 pipelines. Estimates range from a minimum of roughly 29,000 pipeline miles (according to a 2020 Great Plains Institute study) to 66,000 pipeline miles (as per a 2021 Princeton University–led study). As of October 2022, however, the U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT) reports fewer than 5,400 miles of U.S. pipelines carrying CO 2 . This deficit—and what it means for the prospect of moving substantially larger quantities of CO 2 from source to use or storage—threatens to stifle the development of CCUS projects and technologies identified as an important tool to meet emissions targets. The current regulatory landscape facing CO 2 pipeline development can best be described as uncertain. At the federal level, the U.S. DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) oversees safety regulation of pipelines transporting hazardous materials, including CO 2 upon commencement of operation. However, PHMSA’s definition of CO 2 as “a fluid consisting of more than 90 percent CO 2 molecules compressed to a supercritical state” has not been updated since its 1991 addition to the Federal Register. Because CO 2 can be transported in a gaseous, liquid, or supercritical state (indeed, the physical state of CO 2 can fluctuate within a single pipeline due to environmental changes), doubts persist about the extent of PHMSA’s purview—and raise questions about what, if anything, states should do to address this apparent gap. PHMSA has begun a major revision of its existing rules, but the agency does not expect a first draft before 2024. Economic oversight of CO 2 pipelines is even less clear. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and Surface Transportation Board (STB)—which regulate the rates of interstate oil/natural gas and non-energy pipelines, respectively—have both declined jurisdiction over interstate CO 2 pipelines. This presumably leaves economic regulation to state and/or local governments, but few if any states have the laws or resources in place to oversee just and reasonable rates. Further, the interstate nature of CO 2 pipeline development creates questions around how different states should align their rate-making decisions. Onshore U.S. Carbon Pipeline Deployment: Siting, Safety, and Regulation Currently, regulatory responsibilities regarding CO 2 pipeline siting and permitting fall to state and local governments. The variety of laws and regulations across the country, however, creates a maze of requirements for pipeline developers to navigate. To secure necessary permits, most states require pipeline companies to be “common carriers” that provide transport service to the public at uniform rates. However, the specific definition of that term varies. Some states require clear evidence that a pipeline services the public, while others automatically deem any pipeline company transporting energy products or hazardous materials to be a “common carrier”—with little consideration for accessibility to third parties. Other states have eschewed common-carrier terminology entirely, placing private and publicly accessible pipelines on equal footing. Much like the variation in common-carrier requirements, laws governing eminent domain authority to secure rights-of-way (ROW) to commence construction on a planned pipeline route differ by state. Several states have no laws or rules governing CO 2 pipelines. In addition to creating questions about whether long-standing rules for other pipelines (e.g., natural gas or petroleum products) apply to CO 2 , this policy vacuum leaves local governments as the sole authority over sections of pipe within their boundaries. With dozens of counties along a given route, the probability of inconsistent regulation of the same pipeline is significant. Even in states with CO 2 pipeline laws in place, local regulatory attempts to address rising concerns over pipeline routing and safety have triggered lawsuits by pipeline companies seeking to delimit areas of federal, state, and local government responsibility. Meanwhile, legislators across the country have introduced bills to restrict the application of eminent domain to CO 2 pipeline projects, which could threaten a key means of securing ROW that companies cannot secure through negotiation with landowners. Taken separately, any of these regulatory issues—the narrow federal definition of CO 2 , FERC’s and STB’s decisions that CO 2 pipelines are not within their jurisdiction, and the considerable variation in state and local governments’ laws regulating CO 2 pipeline technologies—are extremely difficult to resolve. Adding the required scale of CO 2 pipeline expansion and the currently identified narrow window of time in which to reach climate target goals, the task becomes even more difficult—and raises a host of urgent questions for regulators. How should CO 2 be defined in federal regulations to ensure consistent safety standards across the country? What is the potential impact radius of a CO 2 pipeline rupture, and how should that inform local emergency response? In the absence of centralized federal oversight, what should state legislatures do to increase alignment for interstate CO 2 pipeline projects? This paper intends to serve as a primer for regulators and stakeholders who seek to better understand the regulatory challenges and opportunities facing this critical infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Cyber-physical security framework for Photovoltaic Farms

With the evolution of PV converters, a growing number of vulnerabilities in PV farms are exposing to cyber threats. To mitigate the influence of cyber-attack on PV farms, it is necessary to study attacks' impact and propose detection methods. To meet this requirement, a cyber-physical security framework is proposed for PV farms. Data integrity attacks (DIAs) are studied on different control loops. As μPMU is gaining in popularity, a lower sampling rate of μPMU data is applied to develop a detection algorithm. We have evaluated two data-driven methods, which are support vector machine (SVM) and long short-term memory (LSTM). Lastly, the data-driven methods verify the feasibility of μPMU data in attack detection.

Attack Impact Analysis↗

Hydrologic and Agricultural Earth Observations and Modeling for the Water-Food Nexus

In a globalizing and rapidly-developing world, reliable, sustainable access to water and food are inextricably linked to each other and basic human rights. Achieving security and sustainability in both requires recognition of these linkages, as well as continued innovations in both science and policy. We present case studies of how Earth observations are being used in applications at the nexus of water and food security: crop monitoring in support of G20 global market assessments, water stress early warning for USAID, soil moisture monitoring for USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service, and identifying food security vulnerabilities for climate change assessments for the UN and the UK international development agency. These case studies demonstrate that Earth observations are essential for providing the data and scalability to monitor relevant indicators across space and time, as well as understanding agriculture, the hydrological cycle, and the water-food nexus. The described projects follow the guidelines for co-developing useable knowledge for sustainable development policy. We show how working closely with stakeholders is essential for transforming NASA Earth observations into accurate, timely, and relevant information for water-food nexus decision support. We conclude with recommendations for continued efforts in using Earth observations for addressing the water-food nexus and the need to incorporate the role of energy for improved food and water security assessments

Food Security↗

How the NDA Provides Transparency and Visibility of the Technical Deliverability of the R and D Programme - 13303

The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) was created under the UK Energy Act 2004 to ensure the UK historic civil public sector nuclear legacy sites are decommissioned safely, securely, cost effectively and in ways that protect the environment. The delivery will involve carrying out many unique projects within a high hazard environment requiring the very highest standards in safety, security and environmental management. Unique problems require unique solutions and there is a substantial amount of research and development required for each project. The NDA's R and D strategic objective is to ensure that delivery of the NDA's mission is technically underpinned by sufficient and appropriate research and development. This drives a requirement to provide transparency and visibility of the technical deliverability of the programme through the technical baseline and accompanying research and development requirements. The NDA need to have confidence in the technical deliverability of the Site License Companies (SLCs) plans, provide overall visibility of R and D across the NDA Estate and ensure that appropriate R and D is being carried out in a timely manner. They need to identify where coordinated R and D programmes may be advantageous as a result of common needs, risks and opportunities and ensure key R and D needs across NDA are identified, prioritised and work programmes are costed and scheduled in the Lifetime Plans for individual sites and SLCs. Evidence of the Site License Company's approach and their corresponding technical underpinning programmes is achieved through submission of a number of outputs collectively known as TBuRDs (Technical Baseline and Underpinning Research and Development Requirements). This paper is a summary of the information generated by an independent review of those TBuRDs. It highlights some of the key messages, synergies and common R and D activities across the estate. It demonstrates the value of a consistent approach to collecting R and D data across multiple Sites with a view to enhancing knowledge transfer and improving delivery efficiency. It will be of interest to all who are running R and D programmes where other programmes may be carrying out similar activities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of a leading simulator/trailing simulator methodology as part of an integrated safety-security analysis for nuclear power plants

Nuclear power plant (NPP) risk assessment is broadly separated into disciplines of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards. Different analysis methods and computer models have been constructed to analyze each of these as separate disciplines. However, due to the complexity of NPP systems, there are risks that can span all these disciplines and require consideration of safety-security (2S) interactions which allows a more complete understanding of the relationship among these risks. In this work, a novel leading simulator/trailing simulator (LS/TS) method is introduced to integrate multiple generic safety and security computer models into a single, holistic 2S analysis. A case study is performed using this novel method to determine its effectiveness. The case study shows that the LS/TS method avoided introducing errors in simulation, compared to the same scenario performed without the LS/TS method. A second case study is then used to illustrate an integrated 2S analysis which shows that different levels of damage to vital equipment from sabotage at a NPP can affect accident evolution by several hours.

42 ENGINEERING↗

An Evaluation of The Dynamic Physical Security Risk Assessment Methodology for Fleet-Wide Applications

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This integrated process for physical security analysis is named Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF). This document provides an update on the progress in applying the MASS-DEF process to an operating commercial nuclear power plant as well as additional industry feedback regarding use of the tool for other physical security risk-informed topics. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, and integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5 or MAAP. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report is an update the progress of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report also provides an update to the procedural guidance for the MASS-DEF process and an overview of the generic models available for use by utilities. This report does not contain any plant’s sensitive information and/or safeguards information. This study’s purpose was to verify that the results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗