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How to Handle the Conflict between Safety and Security - 18564

The purpose of safety and security for nuclear activities are the same. They are both necessary measures to protect people and the environment from radioactive material. There are many measures that enhance both the safety and the security but there are also measures serving one area that are in direct conflict with the other. How information is handled is maybe the best example to demonstrate this conflict between interests. In the security field, information is handled on a need-to-know basis, preventing valuable details to fall into hands of antagonists, terrorists etc. The safety culture, on the contrary, is based on knowledge and transparency and it encourages the sharing of information and experience to improve the safety. There is little guidance on how to manage the conflicts between safety and security for a transport system moving nuclear fuel and radioactive waste and especially when there are conflicts between different legislation areas, for example the Act on Nuclear Activities and Safety of Life at Sea. The Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co, SKB, transports all Swedish spent fuel and operational waste from the Nuclear Power Plants to the central storage facilities in Sweden. To manage the transport system, SKB owns a fleet of packages, road vehicles and an INF 3 ship. For the shipments of nuclear material, the security focus has increased rapidly over the years after the 9/11 attack, followed by regulatory requirements on enhanced security. SKB is currently running a project to further strengthen the transport security, an activity that requires a careful balance between safety and security. This paper describes the methods used and the challenges experienced trying to manage the conflicts between safety and security for the Swedish nuclear transport system. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Circumvention of safety related equipment at nuclear fuel services, Inc. - 14570

On June 17, 2014, at Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS), an employee was observed improperly operating two (2) spring return (i.e., spring closed) valves identified as Safety Related Equipment (SRE). These valves were also identified as Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS). The valves were important for both Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) and Chemical Safety purposes. The valves were observed to be 'propped' in the open position, thereby circumventing the intended safety function of the valves. The event was reported to the NRC Operations Center on June 18, 2014 (Event no. 50208); and, NFS' investigation concluded that the cause (of the event) was due to a willful act by a Nuclear Process Operator. In addition, when reviewing the event for NRC reportability, there was an organizational focus on NCS accident sequences with limited consideration of other aspects of the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA). In other words, when determining reportability, the performance requirements for NCS accident sequences were reviewed and determined to be satisfied; however, the chemical safety accident sequences had not been considered during this review. The initial event and the reportability issues were entered into NFS' Corrective Action Program (CAP) and investigated. The investigation also included human performance and safety culture implications. This paper summarizes the circumstances surrounding the event and discusses the lessons learned as a result of the event investigation and review. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

An Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology for Generation IV Nuclear Systems

The Generation IV International Forum (GIF) Risk and Safety Working Group (RSWG) was created to develop an effective approach for the safety of Generation IV advanced nuclear energy systems. Early work of the RSWG focused on defining a safety philosophy founded on lessons learned from current and prior generations of nuclear technologies, and on identifying technology characteristics that may help achieve Generation IV safety goals. More recent RSWG work has focused on the definition of an integrated safety assessment methodology for evaluating the safety of Generation IV systems. The methodology, tentatively called ISAM, is an integrated “toolkit” consisting of analytical techniques that are available and matched to appropriate stages of Generation IV system concept development. The integrated methodology is intended to yield safety-related insights that help actively drive the evolving design throughout the technology development cycle, potentially resulting in enhanced safety, reduced costs, and shortened development time.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program: Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) Advanced Test Reactor Demonstration Case Study

Safety is central to the design, licensing, operation, and economics of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). Consequently, the ability to better characterize and quantify safety margin holds the key to improved decision making about LWR design, operation, and plant life extension. A systematic approach to characterization of safety margins and the subsequent margins management options represents a vital input to the licensee and regulatory analysis and decision making that will be involved. The purpose of the RISMC Pathway R&D is to support plant decisions for risk-informed margins management with the aim to improve economics, reliability, and sustain safety of current NPPs. Goals of the RISMC Pathway are twofold: (1) Develop and demonstrate a risk-assessment method coupled to safety margin quantification that can be used by NPP decision makers as part of their margin recovery strategies. (2) Create an advanced “RISMC toolkit” that enables more accurate representation of NPP safety margin. This report describes the RISMC methodology demonstration where the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) was used as a test-bed for purposes of determining safety margins. As part of the demonstration, we describe how both the thermal-hydraulics and probabilistic safety calculations are integrated and used to quantify margin management strategies.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Draft Prototype Microreactor Transportation Safety Program

Microreactors are compact reactors capable of producing less than 50 megawatts of electrical energy. Typically, these reactors are factory-fabricated and designed to be easily transportable by truck, rail, vessel, or air. Microreactor designs often assume that the unit can be transported containing either unirradiated or irradiated fuel. The interest in microreactors is driven by several factors, including the need to generate power on at remote locations, at military installations, at facilities such as data centers, and in areas recovering from natural disasters. The U.S. Department of Defense is actively pursuing the microreactor concept to meet the increasing energy demands of military operations that require portable and dense power sources. Commercial vendors are also exploring microreactor concepts. The report Microreactor Transportation Emergency Planning Challenges (Maheras et al. 2024) outlined the emergency planning challenges associated with the transportation of microreactors by road, rail, and by barge/ship. The successful commercial deployment and redeployment of microreactors will also require the development of microreactor transportation safety programs. The elements in these safety programs are not specific to microreactors; however, the transport of microreactors may pose unique challenges in these areas. This report builds on the report Microreactor Transportation Emergency Planning Challenges (Maheras et al. 2024) and develops the elements of a prototype microreactor transportation safety program that describes the elements that should be contained vendor-developed microreactor transportation safety programs, identifying the unique elements associated with microreactor transport. This will provide vendors and their transportation contractors a basis for their transportation planning and will accelerate the commercial deployment and redeployment of microreactors by identifying those issues unique to microreactor transport. The emphasis of this report is on highway transport of microreactors. This is based on a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission transportation package approval strategy of crawl-walk-run, where transport by highway is evaluated first (Coles et al. 2021, 2024, Maheras et al. 2021), then other surface modes (rail and barge/ship), and finally air transport. Evaluation of maritime transport of microreactors was recently initiated (Rigato et al. 2024, Maheras et al. 2025). The report first discusses microreactors in general and microreactor transportation safety program planning assumptions. The report then provides a description of the transportation safety planning process and provides an extensive discussion of the elements of transportation safety programs. Specific elements examined included transportation roles and responsibilities, transportation planning, transportation mode and route selection, carrier selection, transportation packaging, advance notification of shipments, public information and communications, emergency response plans and procedures, inspections, security, safe parking, shipment tracking, weather and road conditions, medical preparedness, training and exercises, and program evaluation. The report then identifies the unique elements of a transportation safety program associated with microreactor transport. These unique elements were in the areas of: the unusual nature of microreactor designs, compensatory measures, increased radiation dose rates in the vicinity of microreactors, transportation package approval versus 10 CFR 50.59, and the use of a risk-informed transportation package approval process.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Industry Initiated Core Safety Attributes for Human Spaceflight for the 7th IAASS Conference

Now that the NASA Commercial Crew Program (CCP) is beginning its full certification contract for crew transportation to the International Space Station (ISS), is it time for industry to embrace a minimum set of core safety attributes? Those attributes can then be evolved into an industry-led set of basic safety standards and requirements. After 50 years of human space travel sponsored by governments, there are two basic conditions that now exist within the international space industry. The first, there is enough of a space-faring history to encourage the space industry to design, develop and operate human spaceflight systems without government contracts for anything other than services. Second, industry is capable of defining and enforcing a set of industry-based safety attributes and standards for human spaceflight to low-Earth orbit (LEO). This paper will explore both of these basic conditions with a focus on the safety attributes and standards. In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is now starting to dialogue with industry about the basic safety principles and attributes needed for potential future regulatory oversight. This process is not yet formalized and will take a number of years once approval is given to move forward. Therefore, throughout the next few years, it is an excellent time and opportunity for industry to collaborate together and develop the core set of attributes and standards. As industry engages and embraces a common set of safety attributes, then government agencies, like the FAA and NASA can use that industry-based product to strengthen their efforts on a safe commercial spaceflight foundation for the future. As the commercial space industry takes the lead role in establishing core safety attributes, and then enforcing those attributes, the entire planet can move away from governmental control of design and development and let industry expand safe and successful space operations in LEO. At that point the governmental agencies can focus on oversight of the industries' defined standards and enforcement for common welfare of the space-faring populous and overall public safety.

crew transportation↗

Querying Safety Cases

Querying a safety case to show how the various stakeholders' concerns about system safety are addressed has been put forth as one of the benefits of argument-based assurance (in a recent study by the Health Foundation, UK, which reviewed the use of safety cases in safety-critical industries). However, neither the literature nor current practice offer much guidance on querying mechanisms appropriate for, or available within, a safety case paradigm. This paper presents a preliminary approach that uses a formal basis for querying safety cases, specifically Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) argument structures. Our approach semantically enriches GSN arguments with domain-specific metadata that the query language leverages, along with its inherent structure, to produce views. We have implemented the approach in our toolset AdvoCATE, and illustrate it by application to a fragment of the safety argument for an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) being developed at NASA Ames. We also discuss the potential practical utility of our query mechanism within the context of the existing framework for UAS safety assurance.

Safety Case↗

Technology and Tool Development to Support Safety and Mission Assurance

The Assurance Case approach is being adopted in a number of safety-mission-critical application domains in the U.S., e.g., medical devices, defense aviation, automotive systems, and, lately, civil aviation. This paradigm refocuses traditional, process-based approaches to assurance on demonstrating explicitly stated assurance goals, emphasizing the use of structured rationale, and concrete product-based evidence as the means for providing justified confidence that systems and software are fit for purpose in safely achieving mission objectives. NASA has also been embracing assurance cases through the concepts of Risk Informed Safety Cases (RISCs), as documented in the NASA System Safety Handbook, and Objective Hierarchies (OHs) as put forth by the Agency's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA). This talk will give an overview of the work being performed by the SGT team located at NASA Ames Research Center, in developing technologies and tools to engineer and apply assurance cases in customer projects pertaining to aviation safety. We elaborate how our Assurance Case Automation Toolset (AdvoCATE) has not only extended the state-of-the-art in assurance case research, but also demonstrated its practical utility. We have successfully developed safety assurance cases for a number of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) operations, which underwent, and passed, scrutiny both by the aviation regulator, i.e., the FAA, as well as the applicable NASA boards for airworthiness and flight safety, flight readiness, and mission readiness. We discuss our efforts in expanding AdvoCATE capabilities to support RISCs and OHs under a project recently funded by OSMA under its Software Assurance Research Program. Finally, we speculate on the applicability of our innovations beyond aviation safety to such endeavors as robotic, and human spaceflight.

Mission Assuranc↗

Identification of Safety Metrics for Airport Surface Operations

A large fraction of safety incidents occurs on the ground during airport surface operations. Although these incidents are mostly non-fatal with a few exceptions, they are high profile incidents that remain a source of concern for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), major airlines, and other stakeholders of the National Airspace System (NAS). These incidents have historically been mitigated by implementing changes to regulations, policies, and procedures over time. This approach has minimized but not eliminated the risk of occurrences. It is thus important to develop integrated techniques to assess, model, and prevent these incidents by analyzing the risk and likelihood of occurrence and communicating results of the analysis to decision-making personnel who can mitigate and prevent incidents in real time. The research presented in this report builds on prior work of researchers at the NASA Ames Research Center who developed an automated framework, Real-Time Safety Monitoring (RTSM), to enable monitoring and prediction of the safety of the NAS. In the RTSM framework, hazards to flight are translated to safety metrics such as wake vortex encounters or loss of separation, that can be modeled and analyzed offline and also predicted and monitored in real time (online). The intent of this report is to integrate predictable incidents that occur during surface and ground operations into the safety portfolio of the RTSM project by (i) identifying suitable information sources from which ground incidents can be studied, (ii) developing safety metrics correlated with surface operations, and (iii) recommending suitable data sources that can be quantified and used for the computation of pertinent safety metrics.

ground operations↗

Real-Time Monitoring and Prediction of Airspace Safety

The U.S. National Airspace System (NAS) has reached an extremely high level of safety in recent years. However, it will only become more difficult to maintain the current level of safety with the forecasted increase in operations, and so the FAA has been making revolutionary changes to the NAS to both expand capacity and ensure safety. Our work complements these efforts by developing a novel model-based framework for real-time monitoring and prediction of the safety of the NAS. Our framework is divided into two parts: (offline) safety analysis and modeling part, and a real-time (online) monitoring and prediction of safety. The goal of the safety analysis task is to identify hazards to flight (distilled from several national databases) and to codify these hazards within our framework such that we can monitor and predict them. From these we define safety metrics that can be monitored and predicted using dynamic models of airspace operations, aircraft, and weather, along with a rigorous, mathematical treatment of uncertainty. We demonstrate our overall approach and highlight the advantages of this approach over the current state-of-the-art through simulated scenarios.

safety metrics↗

Assessment of Some IASMS-relevant Data Sources for Aviation Safety

An In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) [1,2] is a set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) necessary for monitoring known hazards and emergent risks, assessing safety data for anomalies, precursors, and trends, mitigating hazards that reach safety thresholds, and assuring efficacy of controls in mitigating hazards. An IASMS will continually monitor the NAS to collect data on the status of aircraft, air traffic management systems, weather, and airports. Within the NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) System-Wide Safety (SWS) project’s technical challenge called In-time Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS) for Commercial Aviation Operations, which we often refer to as Technical Challenge 6 (TC-6), we have performed an assessment of several aviation data sources we have found that are relevant to assessing the safety of the National Airspace System (NAS) in the context of an IASMS. This assessment includes understanding the nature of the data themselves and using some data analytics tools on these data to show how they can be used to identify potential safety issues. We also describe how the data and analytics are part of a system that can allow for other data and analytics to be performed and for the results to be visualized for use by appropriate operators to identify potential safety issues and develop mitigations. This report is a step toward the ultimate goal of TC-6, which is to develop a prototype IASMS system that demonstrates the potential of an IASMS and inspire operators to build analogous systems to make the best possible use of the significant investments that they make in collecting, storing, and managingdata related to their operations.

aviation safety↗

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Reactor Safety Technologies Pathway Technical Program Plan

In the aftermath of the March 2011 multi-unit accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (Fukushima), the nuclear community has been reassessing certain safety assumptions about nuclear reactor plant design, operations and emergency actions, particularly with respect to extreme events that might occur and that are beyond each plant’s current design basis. Because of our significant domestic investment in nuclear reactor technology (99 operating reactors in the fleet of commercial LWRs with five under construction), the United States has been a major leader internationally in these activities. The U.S. nuclear industry is voluntarily pursuing a number of additional safety initiatives. The NRC continues to evaluate and, where deemed appropriate, establish new requirements for ensuring adequate protection of public health and safety in the occurrence of low probability events at nuclear plants; (e.g., mitigation strategies for beyond design basis events initiated by external events like seismic or flooding initiators). The DOE has also played a major role in the U.S. response to the Fukushima accident. Initially, DOE worked with the Japanese and the international community to help develop a more complete understanding of the Fukushima accident progression and its consequences, and to respond to various safety concerns emerging from uncertainties about the nature of and the effects from the accident. DOE R&D activities are focused on providing scientific and technical insights, data, analyses methods that ultimately support industry efforts to enhance safety. These activities are expected to further enhance the safety performance of currently operating U.S. nuclear power plants as well as better characterize the safety performance of future U.S. plants. In pursuing this area of R&D, DOE recognizes that the commercial nuclear industry is ultimately responsible for the safe operation of licensed nuclear facilities. As such, industry is considered the primary “end user” of the results from this DOE-sponsored work. The response to the Fukushima accident has been global, and there is a continuing multinational interest in collaborations to better quantify accident consequences and to incorporate lessons learned from the accident. DOE will continue to seek opportunities to facilitate collaborations that are of value to the U.S. industry, particularly where the collaboration provides access to vital data from the accident or otherwise supports or leverages other important R&D work. The purpose of the Reactor Safety Technology R&D is to improve understanding of beyond design basis events and reduce uncertainty in severe accident progression, phenomenology, and outcomes using existing analytical codes and information gleaned from severe accidents, in particular the Fukushima Daiichi events. This information will be used to aid in developing mitigating strategies and improving severe accident management guidelines for the current light water reactor fleet.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Fuel Safety Research Plan for Accident Tolerant Fuels

This document outlines a strategic plan for a safety research program for accident tolerant fuels. Accident tolerant fuels (ATFs) are nuclear fuel materials and designs for existing and future light water reactors. This effort is under the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy’s Nuclear Technology Research and Development Advanced Fuels Campaign. The development of ATF is an industry lead initiative with fuel designs being championed by Westinghouse, Framatome, and General Electric. Industry goals for ATF deployment include implementing the first batch reloads of coated cladding and doped fuel designs into commercial reactors by 2023 and having the first batch reloads of more advanced designs into commercial reactors by 2026. Follow on goals include implementing the first full cores of coated cladding and doped fuel designs into commercial reactors by 2026 and implementing full cores of more advanced designs by 2030. The objectives of the national laboratory research programs within the Advanced Fuels Campaign related to ATF are: 1. Develop and maintain of unique nuclear testing infrastructure, which includes test reactors, hot cell PIE equipment, and unique out of pile separate effects testing facilities. 2. Respond directly to industry requests for support by partnering with the ATF vendors and executing experiments and/or analysis on their behalf. 3. Conduct independent scientific investigations into the performance of the different ATF concepts that are relevant to Industry designs. To achieve these objectives, the safety research program will execute transient irradiation experiments at the TREAT facility at Idaho National Laboratory with the aim of identifying the relevant transient fuel behaviors for each fuel design in order to establish appropriate fuel safety criteria and thresholds. Two test series are described in this plan, (1) an Integral Test Series, and (2) a Focused Effects Test Series. In fulfillment of the first objective for the safety research program, Integral Effects Tests will be developed and demonstrated using standard UO2 Zircaloy fuel designs in both the fresh and previously irradiated case. The Integral Test Series will consist of three campaigns to evaluate transient fuel performance in Reactivity Initiated Accidents, Loss of Coolant Accidents, and in generalized Power Cooling Mismatch scenarios. Development of these test programs also enables the safety research program to fulfill its second objective by making these three test programs available to each industry team. Initially, priority will be given in the integral test series to the coated cladding and doped fuel concepts as their deployment schedule is the most aggressive. To fulfill the third objective of the safety research program, a Focused Effects Test Series is also being developed which will examine specific transient fuel behaviors that are of general interest to all the ATF designs under development. These tests look at transient fuel behavior related to pellet cladding mechanical interaction, coated cladding swelling, rupture, and time at temperature behavior, non oxide fuel melting and mechanical interaction with Silicon Carbide cladding, UO2 and doped UO2 fuel fragmentation and transient fission gas release, and finally fuel coolant interaction. This document provides a general overview of the objectives of the safety research program as well as providing background into how programs like this have been used in the past to develop the criteria necessary for the safe operation of the present fuel designs. An overview of the materials and methods used for safety testing is presented. Finally the Integral and Focused Effects tests series are introduced and described. This document will be maintained as a “living” document with annual updates to reflect evolving requirements and needs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Enhancing Worker Safety During Off-Site Construction of Energy-Efficient, Low-Carbon Exterior Envelope

The construction industry is not doing enough to embrace off-site modular construction. It is a missed opportunity for optimized energy efficiency because prefabricated exterior wall envelopes are lower in cost and faster and easier to install. Factory off-site construction offers improved safety for construction workers because work is done in a controlled environment, but lack of intent, understanding, and data is also a missed opportunity for enhancing worker safety. This research looks specifically at the prefabricated wall exterior envelope in the context of safety. The research question is "off-site factories build with ease of energy efficiency and lowered carbon emissions, but is the process safer?" This research was funded by NREL Student Training in Applied Research (STAR) program, University Partnerships Program, and Wells Fargo Bank. Key finding is that modular and prefabricated construction are perceived to be safer, but the accident rates are much higher than in the general construction and manufacturing industries. Proposed solutions to decrease accidents in off-site prefabricated construction includes safety training for workers, provide movable kiosks with PPE at workstations, ensure tools are well-maintained and place safety posters in visible locations. Future work includes improving worker safety to increase worker productivity, perform pilot demonstration, work with factory designers for new modular layout for worker safety, i.e., easy access to PPE kiosks, and work closely with OSHA so that they take notice of this safety niche.

drywall↗

The criticality safety program of the Swedish nuclear fuel and waste management Co (SKB)

SKB is co-owned by the owners of the Swedish nuclear power plants (NPP) and is responsible for the back-end of all Swedish spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste from the Swedish nuclear program. The responsibility starts from when the fuel leaves the NPP and ends at the planned final repository. That means that SKB has the responsible for the safety at the intermediate pool storage (Clab), the encapsulation plant (Clink), the Spent Fuel Repository and the transportation between these sites. In March 2011 SKB applied to the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) for a permit to build a final repository for spent fuel and an encapsulation plant (Clink). The application contained a criticality safety analysis for the canisters to be used in Clink and the copper canister to be used in the final repository. In 2012 SSM requested several complements to the criticality safety analysis in the application and about the same time they also required Clab to modernise the Safety Analysis Report. Our owners (the NPPs) had also requested SKB to take care of higher enrichments and higher burnup fuel. A prerequisite to meet this was extended Burnable Absorber credit (peak reactivity) and Burn-up credit. Up to this stage SKB had relied heavily on consultants to do criticality safety analysis and had no specific criticality safety program or methodology. However it was now evident to SKB that we needed to take an overall view on the criticality safety area and not only lift the quality of the actual criticality analysis but also to handle organisational and competence issues. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

UK regulatory review of the double contingency principle in criticality safety - 14379

The UK's regulatory regime is based on Licence Conditions (LCs) attached to a Nuclear Site Licence (NSL) and is non-prescriptive in nature. The law requires licensees to reduce health and safety risks to workers and the public 'so far as is reasonability practicable' (SFAIRP), and this framework provides licensees with flexibility to achieve this. Guidance for inspectors on the assessment of nuclear safety cases has been published in Office for Nuclear Regulation's (ONR) Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs) and supporting Technical Assessment Guides (TAGs). These guidance documents have recently been reviewed in the light of the Fukushima accident. The opportunity has also been taken to reconsider the use of the Double Contingency Principle used in criticality safety cases, an approach commonly regarded as the preferred means of criticality control internationally and featured in the SAPs and TAGs. Licensees in the UK have adopted several approaches in nuclear criticality safety cases based upon a combination of deterministic and probabilistic safety cases using the Double Contingency Principle and Design Basis Analysis. ONR has developed a targeted intervention to sample a number of nuclear safety cases in order to test the adequacy of methodologies used to secure nuclear criticality safety. This paper reports the results of this intervention and considers the need to review the advice currently given by the UK nuclear regulator, including on use of the Double Contingency Principle. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

UK Regulatory experience with the criticality safety of transport package applications - 14519

The UK Government has created the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) as an independent public body to ensure effective and efficient regulation of the nuclear industry in the UK. ONR brings together for the first time in the UK the regulation of nuclear safety, civil nuclear security, nuclear safeguards and the transport of radioactive substances within a single organization. Applications requesting approval to transport packages containing fissile material through the UK have been received for many decades from numerous organisations across the world. Each application is treated equally with the judgement of safety based on the information provided in the design safety report. In recent years, the ONR has questioned a number of criticality safety related assumptions; some of which have been held for many decades. The outcome from these discussions will be examined. Uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) has been transported across the world for many years, carried in 30B steel cylinders within a variety of overpacks. For simplicity, some criticality safety cases have not claimed for the presence of the overpack. However, it shall be shown that these safety cases will have difficulty in justifying the criticality safety of transporting uranium hexafluoride if credit for the overpack is not claimed. In addition, the applications that have been submitted for Competent Authority approval have made various assumptions regarding the shell thickness of the 30B cylinder, the distribution of the hydrogen fluoride (HF) impurity and the potential for the uranium hexafluoride residues to hydrolyse. The adequacy of these assumptions will be discussed in turn along with the need for the applicant to demonstrate compliance with any certificate restriction on the mass of heel (residue) allowed within the package. Uranium oxide (UO{sub 2}) powder is regularly transported around the world. For most designs, it is assumed that water will enter the package under accident conditions of transport. Under these conditions, a common assumption is that the grains of uranium oxide powder will evenly distribute within the water and internal volume of the package. The validity of this assumption from a realistic and pessimistic perspective will be challenged. It will then be shown that if instead the powder grains of uranium oxide are agglomerated together into larger sized groups, an increase in the k{sub eff} of the system of up to 2,000 pcm can occur. As packages are commonly loaded up to the criticality safety limit, an increase in k{sub eff} such as this is likely to be problematic. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear criticality safety in the United Kingdom - Work In progress

Full text of publication follows: This commentary presents a brief overview of the recent and future challenges and opportunities presented by the UK nuclear industry. To give just a pure overview would lead perhaps to a rather dry and superficial review, so I have mixed in with this my own thoughts and coloured it with some of my opinions and observations from involvement in the field of Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) over the last 26 years. A brief overview of industry status and developments in the UK will, however, be highlighted, in order to give a background to what I hope would be an interesting personal commentary on the subject. The creation of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) in 2004 have (on behalf of the UK governments Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC)) pursued the mission to 'deliver safe and sustainable solutions to the challenge of nuclear clean-up and waste management'. NDA have responsibilities for 17 of the civil nuclear facilities in the UK. This has meant for the UK nuclear industry, and in turn UK Criticality Safety, the significant focus toward safe, efficient and effective clean-up. With this mission, integrated with the ongoing commercial ventures at many of the UK licensed sites, a great variety of challenges are presented. For non-commercial activities, criticality safety has and will continue to have a significant future part to play. The UK government's commitment to a continued nuclear defense capacity ensures a major investment in the future and will continue to demand significant capability from criticality safety to support the existing commitments and future needs. Meeting these challenges demands a holistic approach to criticality safety if it is to succeed in supporting the continued safety of the industry. Technical solutions to the challenges are only part of the solution. Maintaining a technical competency, working as part of an integrated team with other safety disciplines, along with the design teams and operations management etc. are other important aspects. Working collaboratively within these teams and beyond, both nationally and internationally, is a necessary part of achieving success. Nuclear criticality safety as a discipline in the UK has always been conscious of isolation and stagnation in development given the relatively small number of personnel in the criticality field. With this concern, it benefits immensely from national and international collaboration, and this must be encouraged to continue. (author)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗