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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 415 records · Page 23
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Enhancing Reliability of Classified Shipments Between the Nuclear Security Enterprise

The extent of this project, as related to by the Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE), is related to the current shipping and logistical issues and optimization opportunities between several different NSE sites that are the basis of the enterprise. This current scope is part of every site’s, described as Design Agency (DA) and Production Agency (PA), normal operation to meet the needs and mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The NSE has a broad mission scope encompassing several differing DA and PA sites to meet the NNSA’s mission. These sites require frequent interaction and shipments of material and items between one another in order to meet the mission needs of the enterprise. Currently, there is no methodology that integrates schedules, standards, orders, processes, and best practices to optimize transfers between the differing sites. A centralized location and standard shipping process will optimize and improve the systems behavior, reducing lag time and increasing throughput at sites today. Ultimately this project proposes a central logistical platform, tiered escalation process, and standardized shipping forms to reduce taxpayer costs to meet the NSE’s mission more efficiently. This increase in processing logistics and process accuracy of shipments will save the NSE, not only from a monetary value, but it will reduce the frustrations of individuals working these outdated and over processed systems to improve their quality of life.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Machine Learning Using Open Data Sources for Detection of Nuclear Proliferation Activities (U)

In FY2020, Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) in collaboration with the Sanghani Center for Artificial Intelligence and Data Analytics (SCAIDA) at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (VT) and funded by the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development, began developing a demonstration prototype system that uses multiple machine learning and data analytic methods on large-scale open data sources to identify new, developing, and/or undeclared nuclear programs. Using the announcement in May 2018 of the proposed Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) as a test subject, the goal of this 2-year project is to forecast the SRPPF using only data prior to May 2018. The project work is split into a preliminary prototype development for the first year with an initial evaluation of viability followed by the second year of development to create an integrated prototype system and more extensive performance evaluation. This report documents the results of the preliminary-phase tasks.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Workshop Report for Next-Gen AI for Proliferation Detection: Accelerating the Development and Use of Explainability Methods to Design AI Systems Suitable for Nonproliferation Mission Applications

Artificial intelligence (AI) promises powerful new capabilities in an expansive array of applications. One area is proliferation detection, where AI can provide transformative tools to achieve objectives currently inaccessible using conventional methods. In particular, AI affords the opportunity to use new indicators and process massive amounts of heterogeneous data that can increase sensitivity to proliferant activities and push proliferation detection to the earliest possible stages. However, existing AI tools are not ready to achieve such potential, falling short in regard to some important considerations involved in proliferation detection. One crucial aspect that requires improvement is the explainability of the most powerful AI algorithms (i.e., understanding how the algorithms actually arrive at their conclusions)-the lack of which prevents widespread adoption in national security missions. The Data Science and AI portfolio within the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development is driving the development of next-generation AI for proliferation detection through the expertise and work of the national laboratories and partners in academia. The "Next-Gen AI for Proliferation Detection: Accelerating the Development and Use of Explainability Methods to Design AI Systems Suitable for Nonproliferation Mission Applications" workshop aimed to further this objective. The meeting was held virtually on Sept. 15-16, 2020 and included more than 170 participants, primarily from the national laboratories with additional contributions from university researchers and mission partners. Each day included a keynote presentation, four technical presentations about cutting-edge research in explainability, and a panel to explore considerations in applying explainability and developing AI systems that can accelerate the transition of emerging AI technologies among partners and end users to solve critical mission questions. This report summarizes the Next-Gen AI for Proliferation Detection workshop's content and findings.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Guidelines for Broadband Seismometer Testing

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty mandates the four verification technologies to be used by the International Monitoring System (IMS) to monitor compliance to the Treaty. These technologies are seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide. Operational manuals for each of these technologies specify the requirements that equipment installed at IMS stations must meet for data from said stations to be accepted by the International Data Center. Following a model in which a revised set of infrasound sensor specifications and accompanying test procedures were developed in an international collaboration overseen by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the same process was recently followed for seismometers potentially of use by the IMS. This document, a product of that collaboration, defines key concepts and recommends test procedures to be followed to characterize broadband seismometers in a consistent and standardized way. Results from these test procedures can be used to verify that a seismometer meets the manufacturers stated specifications and IMS requirements. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The writers of this document would like to acknowledge Charles R. Hutt, John R. Evans, Fred Followill, Robert L. Nigbor, and Erhard Wielandt, the authors of the 2009 Guidelines for Standardized Testing of Broadband Seismometers and Accelerometers funded by the U.S. Department of Interior, on which this document is based. Although this document is limited in scope to seismometers and much of the document has been updated, the structure remains essentially the same.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Development of a Nitrogen and Magnesium Oxide based Class A, B & D Suffocating Fire System (SFSS) for Gloveboxes

Testing related to the development and performance of a “Proof of Concept” Nitrogen/Magnesium Oxide Suffocating Fire System (SFSS) was conducted at Fire and Pump Service Group (FPSG) located in Rancho Dominguez, California. The SFSS Engineering Team (SFSSET), consisting of FPSG and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) personnel researched, developed a prototype, and conducted testing to determine effective means to deliver magnesium oxide (MgO) sand into a glovebox (GB) in a class D fire event. The prototypes development also established the effective coverage area of a magnesium oxide suppression system as well as demonstrated that the GB inert atmosphere could be maintained during and after the release of the MgO sand to control Class A, B and D fires. Previous testing conducted on nitrogen based SFSS provided evidence that the nitrogen based SFSS controlled Class A and B fires (Ralph Clayton, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Brandon Troc and Frank Broidy, Fire and Pump Service Group 2020).Final testing was conducted within a mock GB capable of simulating an inert glovebox atmosphere. Testing demonstrated that the inert atmosphere can be maintained during and after discharge of the MgO sand over a coverage area.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Compilation of Historical Data on Hagan Drop Testing with Results

The Hagan nuclear material storage container was designed in the late 1990’s to provide a robust container for daily use, safe transport within the plutonium facility PF-4, and storage of nuclear material for up to twenty years. There are currently >3000 loaded Hagan containers in use at TA-55. The majority of these are in the TA-55 vault, but they are also used in safes and in floor locations on the main floor of PF-4. The original design criteria are given below

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

24.1.3.1 - Verification of Spent Fuel Inside Dry Storage Casks by Fast/Epi-thermal Neutron Mapping

Development of a spent-fuel verification method based upon positional measurement of fast neutrons emitted from the top surface of the dry storage casks. A proof-of-principle field test on a partially loaded spent-fuel cask will be conducted by measuring the fast neutron flux on the top of the cask as a function of position using a single detector. If a useful verification signature is demonstrated, a multi-detector scanning array will be built and tested in FY2021 to demonstrate a practical rapid verification system in FY2022.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Magnetic Microcalorimeter Gamma Detectors with Ultra-High Energy Resolution (FY2021 Q2 Report)

For a follow-up project, we are currently funded by NA-241 to build a decay energy spectrometer based on the MMC technology developed in this LCP. The IAEA is specifically interested in accurate isotope analysis of small particles that decay energy (Q) spectroscopy is well-suited for. We have established an SP-1 collaboration with the IAEA that is expected to continue beyond FY20.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Misuse Detection for a Generalized SFR Test Reactor

Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors (SFRs) present unique challenges for international safeguards. SFRs possess neutron physics characteristics that if configured appropriately could produce more fissile material than consumed. An adversary state may choose to build an SFR, justified by a lack of domestic natural uranium and limited access or interest to procuring uranium from international markets. Once constructed, the state may choose to misuse the SFR for the purpose of diverting fissile plutonium from declared operation. This work shows that a demonstration SFR does not need to be configured as a plutonium breeder to create one Significant Quantity (SQ) of plutonium in a short amount of time (e.g., one to few years). However, such an extreme case of misuse would change the core reactivity in such a way as to be easily indicated by deviations of control rod position compared to declared operation. In this work a contrived SFR demonstration reactor was modeled for the purpose of exploring proliferation scenarios and how such misuse could be detected using the SFR's Reactor Data Acquisition System (RDAS). Typically, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not have access to the control rod position, power, thermal, pressure sensing and indicating systems of nuclear power plants. However, this work shows that such data streams can be compared against a parallel detailed simulation model (a Digital Twin) to detect possible misuse.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗