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At least 415 records · Page 23

Final Report for the Testing of the Y-12 Criticality Accident Alarm System Detectors at the Godiva IV Burst Reactor (IER-443)

This report documents the experimental conditions and final results for the performance testing of the Y-12 Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) detectors at the Godiva IV Burst Reactor at the National Criticality Experimental Research Center (NCERC) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The testing followed a previously issued test plan and was conducted during the week of July 17, 2017, with completion on Thursday July 20. The test subjected CAAS detectors supplied by Y-12 to very intense and short duration mixed neutron and gamma radiation fields to establish compliance to maximum radiation and minimum pulse width requirements. ANSI/ANS- 8.3.1997 states that the “system shall be sufficiently robust as to actuate an alarm signal when exposed to the maximum radiation expected”, which has been defined at Y-12, in Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs), to be a dose rate of 10 Rad/s. ANSI/ANS-8.3.1997 further states that “alarm actuation shall occur as a result of a minimum duration transient” which may be assumed to be 1 msec. The pulse widths and dose rates provided by each burst during the test exceeded those requirements. The CAAS detectors all provided an immediate alarm signal and remained operable after the bursts establishing compliance to the requirements and fitness for re-deployment at Y-12.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain Hydrostratigraphic Framework Model-Prime Model Model Development Process and Model Description, Revision 0

This document presents the results of revisions to the Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM) hydrostratigraphic framework model (HFM) that was constructed for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain. The revised HFM is described as the “RM/SM HFM-Prime” and serves as the base HFM. The modeling efforts and the revisions described in this report have been performed as part of the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity that was initiated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) to assess and evaluate the effects of the underground nuclear tests on groundwater at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and vicinity. This document builds on the content of the internal Hydrostratigraphic Framework Model of the Rainier Mesa Area Phase I' - Base Model: Model Development Process & Data Package Description (N-I, 2014a) and specific document review comments from the UGTA RM/SM CAU Preemptive Review members (Zavarin, 2015). This document provides, where necessary, the justifications and rationale for interpretations and revisions to the hydrostratigraphic framework of the RM/SM CAU. The fundamental objective of the effort described in this report was to revise the RM/SM HFM, particularly in the areas and vicinity of the sub-CAU models, in order to incorporate some of the higher-resolution hydrogeologic interpretations used to construct several of the sub-CAU scale flow and transport models.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

KRUSTY Test Results

Testing of the Kilopower Reactor Using Stirling Technology (KRUSTY) was conducted in 4 phases over 5 months: from November 2017 to March 2018, at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). This report contains a summary of test results.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Cygnus Performance on Vega

The Cygnus Dual Beam Radiographic Facility consists of two identical radiographic sources, Cygnus 1 and Cygnus 2, each with the following specifications: 4-Rad dose at 1 m, 1-mm spot size, 50-ns pulse length, and 2.25-MeV endpoint energy. Cygnus 1 and 2 have been used for radiography of subcritical experiments at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) since 2004. The Cygnus Facility is located in an underground tunnel complex named U1a. The Cygnus sources were developed as a primary diagnostic for these experiments. The first subcritical experiment to utilize Cygnus, Armando, was executed on May 25, 2004. Since Armando, several other subcritical experiments have been executed in front of Cygnus, as well as physics experiments and plutonium calibration tests.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

3rd Quarter Transportation Report FY2018

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) in Area 5. This report summarizes the following types of shipments during the 3rd quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2018: Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLW), Mixed Low-Level Radioactive Waste (MLLW), Classified Non-Radioactive Waste (CNR,) and Classified Non-Radioactive Hazardous Waste (CNRH).

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Investigation of Archived Gamma Data to Report Minimum Detectable Activities for Gamma-Emitting Radionuclides in Groundwater Samples

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has performed gamma analyses on ground water samples from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (previously known as the Nevada Test Site or NTS) for the last 50 years. During that time, LANL has reported all of the detected radionuclides in various reports, letters and publications. However, until recently, no minimum detectable activities (MDAs) for undetected radionuclides of interest have been reported. In fact, most gamma emitting radionuclides were not detected in groundwater samples above their respective MDAs, and the MDAs can be used to define upper -bound activities for these radionuclides in the groundwater samples.

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Underground Test Area October 1, 2015, to December 31, 2016 Quality Assurance Report Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This report is required by the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) (NNSA/NFO, 2015) and identifies the UGTA quality assurance (QA) activities from October 1, 2015, through December 31, 2016 (hereafter, called “the reporting period”). This expanded reporting period allows this report to be converted to a calendar-year (CY) reporting cycle. This change is being made to better align this report with the annual UGTA sampling and the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) environmental reports. All UGTA organizations—U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program; Desert Research Institute (DRI); Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL); Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec); Navarro Research and Engineering, Inc. (Navarro); and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)—conducted QA activities in the reporting period. The activities included conducting oversight assessments for QAP compliance, identifying findings and completing corrective actions, evaluating laboratory performance, reviewing technical work, and publishing documents.

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Response to External Peer Review Team Report for Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada, Revision 1

The Underground Test Area (UGTA) Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 97, Yucca Flat/Climax Mine (YF/CM), in the northeast part of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) requires environmental corrective action activities to assess contamination resulting from underground nuclear testing. These activities are necessary to comply with the UGTA corrective action strategy defined in Appendix VI, Revision No. 4, of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). The Phase I Flow and Transport Model Document for Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (N-I, 2013a) was developed and subjected to an external peer review as required by the corrective action investigation (CAI) stage of the UGTA strategy. The YF/CM Peer Review Committee (PRC) raised a number of questions and provided recommendations for supplemental analyses (in the External Peer Review Team Report for Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada [N-I, 2015]). The purpose of this document is to provide responses to the PRC recommendations addressing the uncertainties identified by the PRC so that sufficient confidence in the contaminant boundary forecasts is established to advance to the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Corrective Action Plan (CAP) stage and initiate model evaluations. The PRC summarized their concerns and recommendations, and presented discussions of each of these uncertainties in their report (N-I, 2015). The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) responses are summarized in Table ES-1.

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Case Study Analyses of Radionuclide Transport in Variably Saturated Media at Rainier Mesa

This document presents a series of six case study analyses of groundwater flow and contaminant transport in the subsurface formations underlying the Rainier Mesa (RM) testing area at the NNSS. The analyses are designed to assess the potential over a 1,000-year period for radionuclide contamination derived from underground nuclear tests at RM to enter and migrate in saturated groundwater underlying the testing areas. The radionuclide source zones at RM consist of individual test centers corresponding to 62 unique detonations conducted in 2 shafts and 11 tunnel complexes; the E-, N-, and T-Tunnel pond systems that captured contaminated water discharged from these tunnel complexes (and continue to do so in the case of E-Tunnel); and the contaminated N- and T-Tunnel “reservoirs” that formed behind plugs installed between 1992 and 1994 to block subsequent contaminant losses into the N- and T-Tunnel ponds.

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Module 10 Hand-Stacking and Remote Approach to Critical Using the Planet Assembly

This talk serves as a training module associated with the hand-stacking and remote approach to critical using the Planet assembly which is part of the criticality safety “hands on” training to be performed at the National Critical Experiments Research Center (NCERC) at the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) located at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the Nevada National Security Site Uranium Powder at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Uranium Powder (Normal, depleted uranium [DU], low-enriched uranium [LEU]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site.

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Nevada National Security Site Radiological Control Manual

This manual contains the radiological control requirements to be used for all radiological activities conducted by programs under the purview of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO). (Activities conducted under the purview of the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management Nevada[(EM Nevada] may require additional approval authorities as described in the EM Nevada Prime Contractor’s implementation plan.) Compliance with these requirements will ensure compliance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835, “Occupational Radiation Protection.” This manual represents policies, guidelines, and best practices for implementing the DOE/NV/03624--0082, “Nevada National Security Site Radiation Protection Program,” (NNSS RPP) according to the requirements of 10 CFR 835.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Data summary for the evaluation of potential surface collapse at the BRISTOL underground nuclear event

This report provides data for the evaluation of potential surface collapse above an underground nuclear event executed in Yucca Flat back in 1991. This work is being done in support of the Source Physics Experiment Program. Safety decisions must be made before a potential surface crater area can be reentered for any work. Our statements on cavity collapse and surface crater formation are provided as input into the safety decision process. They also do not address possible radiation dangers that may be present. LLNL subject matter experts who have been active in the underground testing program at NNSS (formerly NTS) reviewed these data. Both classified and unclassified data are available for review; various amounts of information are accessible, depending on the age of the test. Lack of data can hamper evaluation and introduce uncertainty; we make no attempt to quantify this uncertainty.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Aqueduct Mesa Photos

These photos document geophysical field work conducted on top of Aqueduct Mesa at the Nevada National Security Site during the weeks of October 14-20 and October 28 –Nov 3, 2018. Field personnel were Charlotte Rowe and Dea Musa, of Los Alamos National Laboratory’s Earth and Environmental Sciences Division (EES). 320 gravity sites were surveyed during the work, with positions obtained via Trimbullhand-held GPS, and gravity measurements made using a LaCoste & Romberg model G gravity meter. During the field work, some archaeological artifacts (stone circle, chirt shards, pottery shard and arrowhead) were noted and photographed with the GPS unit (for which a photographic permit was obtained), which provides latitude and longitude coordinates. On a few occasions the field party was augmented by wild horses. NNSS geologists assisted with navigation and synchronized readings of two gravity meters to tie the survey into a previous gravity survey conducted throughout the P-Tunnel, beneath Aqueduct Mesa, during June 2018.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Regional 3-D Geophysical Characterization of the Nevada National Security Site

We perform a joint inversion of absolute and differential P and S body waves, gravity measurements, and surface wave dispersion curves for the 3-D P- and S-wave velocity structure of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and vicinity. Data from earthquakes, past nuclear tests, and other active source chemical explosive experiments, such as the Source Physics Experiments (SPE), are combined with surface wave phase and group speed measurements from ambient noise, source interferometry, and active source experiments to construct a 3-D velocity model of the site with resolvable structures as fine as 6 km horizontal and 2 km vertically. Results compare favorably with previous studies and expand and extend the knowledge of the 3-D structure of the region.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Unreviewed Disposal Evaluation Question: Disposal of the Idaho National Laboratory Waste Associated with the Unirradiated Light Water Breeder Reactor at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Waste Associated with the Unirradiated Light Water Breeder Reactor (LWBR) waste stream (INL167203QR1, Revision 1 [INL 2017]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS).

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Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the West Valley Demonstration Project Contaminated Concrete and General Debris at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Contaminated Concrete and General Debris (WVDP000000013, Revision 12 [WVDP 2017]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the WVDP Contaminated Concrete and General Debris waste stream meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999). The WVDP Contaminated Concrete and General Debris is recommended for acceptance with the condition that the total radium-226 (226Ra) activity not exceed 8.1E9 becquerels (Bq).

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