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The program is discussed which was initiated to formulate standard silicon solar cell and cover specifications. The program includes (1) compilation of solar cell and cover specifications, both past and present (2) elicitation of inputs from major users and suppliers and (3) establishment of tentative standardized solar cell and cover specifications.
The present work describes briefly the goals of the recently organized Standardized Space Power Systems Office and its program for developing low-cost, standard power system components for spacecraft. The first step is the development of standard specifications for solar cells and covers. These include: (1) physical dimensions, materials of construction, appearance and integrity of solar cell and coverglass; (2) electrical performance characteristics of solar cell and optical characteristics of coverglass; and (3) sampling, inspection, and electrical and environmental tests needed to demonstrate compliance with the above specifications.
Comparisons are made between the NP series and the NX series of hydrogen masers. A field operable hydrogen maser (NR series) is also described. Atomic hydrogen primary frequency standards are in development stages. Standards are being developed for a hydrogen beam frequency standard and for a concertina hydrogen maser.
The application of software safety practices on the LCS project resulted in the successful implementation of the NASA Software Safety Standard NASA-STD-8719.138 and CxP software safety requirements. The GOP-GEN-GSW-011 Hazard Report was the first report developed at KSC to identify software hazard causes and their controls. This approach can be applied to similar large software - intensive systems where loss of control can lead to a hazard.
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While the NASA Human Research Program (HRP) utilizes a Crew Health and Performance (CHP) System to represent all the Agency’s efforts to ensure the health and performance of NASA astronauts, there is no shared mental model of a CHP system at NASA. Some groups may consider a CHP system to be only a medical kit, while others may not be using the concept at all. To facilitate the integration of functions and capabilities to ensure astronaut health and performance during vehicle development, HRP has proposed a CHP Shared Mental Model derived from the NASA Human Health, Medical, and Performance Spaceflight Standards (NASA-STD-3001 Vol.1/Vol.2). [1] Even though many vehicle, ground, and communication systems as well as mission operations are modeled for the Artemis Campaigns, no mission level CHP system model was created to achieve the intent of the HRP CHP Shared Mental Model. The lack of this model renders it difficult to visualize and understand how the many programs work together to provide the necessary cross program functions and capabilities to ensure the health and performance of the crew throughout an Artemis mission. For this purpose, the Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) element of HRP developed a CHP system model for the Artemis III and IV missions to provide a view of how each program contributes to and interacts with the overall CHP system. To develop the 2023 Artemis CHP system model, ExMC leveraged existing data and models from the Moon to Mars Program Office, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) and the Orion, Gateway, Extravehicular Activity and Human Surface Mobility (EHP) and Human Landing System (HLS) programs. By using a Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) approach, existing requirements, functions, and concepts of operations were combined to create a single system model focused on representing CHP from the launch to the return to Earth segments of the Artemis III and IV missions. Additionally, by incorporating the HRP Systems Platform for Aggregating and Relating Capabilities, or SPARC tool, the data from the programs was also related back to the 2nd volume of the NASA Human Health, Medical, and Performance Spaceflight Standard (NASA-STD-3001, Vol.2) and the human system risks identified by the Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The first version of the 2023 Artemis CHP system model was baselined in Fall of 2023 after the model was demonstrated to be a potentially useful tool for systems engineers integrating CHP capabilities in vehicle development as well as members of the Health and Medical Technical Authority providing oversight of those programs. The model may also be useful to any stakeholder of astronaut health and performance by providing insights on how an Artemis mission satisfies the NASA Human Health, Medical, and Performance Spaceflight Standards as well as how they mitigate the HSRB Human System Risks. This presentation highlights how the model was developed and the possible benefits of the model. [1] NASA HRP (2022), Crew Health and Performance System Whitepaper
While the NASA Human Research Program (HRP) utilizes a Crew Health and Performance (CHP) System to represent all the Agency’s efforts to ensure the health and performance of NASA astronauts, there is no shared mental model of a CHP system at NASA. Some groups may consider a CHP system to be only a medical kit, while others may not be using the concept at all. To facilitate the integration of functions and capabilities to ensure astronaut health and performance during vehicle development, HRP has proposed a CHP Shared Mental Model derived from the NASA Human Health, Medical, and Performance Spaceflight Standards (NASA-STD-3001 Vol.1/Vol.2). [1] Even though many vehicle, ground, and communication systems as well as mission operations are modeled for the Artemis Campaigns, no mission level CHP system model was created to achieve the intent of the HRP CHP Shared Mental Model. The lack of this model renders it difficult to visualize and understand how the many programs work together to provide the necessary cross program functions and capabilities to ensure the health and performance of the crew throughout an Artemis mission. For this purpose, the Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) element of HRP developed a CHP system model for the Artemis III and IV missions to provide a view of how each program contributes to and interacts with the overall CHP system. To develop the 2023 Artemis CHP system model, ExMC leveraged existing data and models from the Moon to Mars Program Office, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) and the Orion, Gateway, Extravehicular Activity and Human Surface Mobility (EHP) and Human Landing System (HLS) programs. By using a Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) approach, existing requirements, functions, and concepts of operations were combined to create a single system model focused on representing CHP from the launch to the return to Earth segments of the Artemis III and IV missions. Additionally, by incorporating the HRP Systems Platform for Aggregating and Relating Capabilities, or SPARC tool, the data from the programs was also related back to the 2nd volume of the NASA Human Health, Medical, and Performance Spaceflight Standard (NASA-STD-3001, Vol.2) and the human system risks identified by the Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The first version of the 2023 Artemis CHP system model was baselined in Fall of 2023 after the model was demonstrated to be a potentially useful tool for systems engineers integrating CHP capabilities in vehicle development as well as members of the Health and Medical Technical Authority providing oversight of those programs. The model may also be useful to any stakeholder of astronaut health and performance by providing insights on how an Artemis mission satisfies the NASA Human Health, Medical, and Performance Spaceflight Standards as well as how they mitigate the HSRB Human System Risks. This presentation highlights how the model was developed and the possible benefits of the model. [1] NASA HRP (2022), Crew Health and Performance System Whitepaper
This NASA Technical Standard is directed toward materials and processes (M&P) used in the design, fabrication, and testing of space program flight hardware for NASA, including but not limited to crewed, uncrewed, robotic, launch vehicle, lander, in-space and surface systems, and spacecraft program/project hardware elements. All spaceflight hardware is covered by the M&P requirements of this document, including vendor-designed, off-the-shelf, and vendor-furnished items. M&P used in interfacing ground support equipment (GSE), test equipment, hardware processing equipment, hardware packaging, and hardware shipment is covered by the M&P requirements of this NASA Technical Standard only to the extent required to prevent damage to or contamination of spaceflight hardware (see section 4). M&P used in NASA aircraft and aircraft operations are not covered by the M&P requirements of this document.
NASA has a critical need for the development of Agency standards for the certification of additively manufactured (AM) components. This is necessary since the current version of NASA standards for manned and noncrewed spaceflight hardware do not contain sufficient detail and the development of documents by the international standards organizations are not mature enough for implementation. AM parts are currently flying or in development for nearly all NASA flight programs. To bridge the gap prior to the release of Agency standards MSFC released two documents, MSFC-STD-3716 and MSFC-SPEC-3717. These documents were written specifically for laser power fusion of metallic powder, but the principles defined were used for tailoring requirements for current NASA manned missions. In 2018 a team of Agency AM experts was assembled and development of standards for the certification of additively manufactured components. These standards are design for use by all NASA programs and a broader spectrum of mature materials and processes. Four documents are being planned; NASA-STD-6030 (add title), NASA-STD-6032 (add title), NASA-STD-6033 (add title) and NASA-HNBK-6034 (add title). Two of these documents, NASA-STD-6030 and NASA-STD-6033, are being finalized for release in late 2020. These standards contain requirements that address part classification, metallurgical process control, material property development, part process control, part inspection and acceptance, equipment process control and vendor process control. This paper will present a summary of the status of each document and provide an overview of the content of NASA-STD-6030.
A matrix format developed at JPL places the national education standards in a format that can be navigated intuitively by teachers seeking to integrate NASA materials into the structure of standards based education.
A reentry analysis of the Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer (EUVE) spacecraft was performed using the Object Reentry Survival Analysis Tool (ORSAT) - Version 5.0. The analysis was done in response to a request by NASA Headquarters and Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) after a preliminary assessment using the NASA Johnson Space Center Debris Assessment Software (DAS) - Version 1.0 had shown that the EUVE reentry may produce a debris area greater than the limit set within the NASA Safety Standard 1740.14 guidelines. DAS predicted that an uncontrolled reentry of the EUVE spacecraft would result in a total casualty area of 12.41 sq m, which exceeds the 8 sq m limit set in the NASA standards and implies a potential human casualty risk of approximately 1 in 5300. The ORSAT model enabled a higher fidelity thermal analysis of the EUVE spacecraft, utilizing sophisticated material and thermal properties such as emissivity, heat of oxidation, thermal conductivity, and material thickness inputs, which provided a foundation for a more in depth analysis of the reentering objects. Due to the conservative nature of the DAS study, it was reasonable to run ORSAT for only the ten objects shown to survive in the original DAS analysis. The result of the ORSAT study was a reduced casualty area of only 5.95 sq m, well within NASA safety limits. With the risk to human life now acceptably low, NASA can avoid having to take mitigation measures and allow EUVE to reenter the Earth's atmosphere uncontrolled.
The microgravity of the space environment has profound effects on humans and, consequently, on the design requirements for subsystems and components with which humans interact. There are changes in the anthropometry, vision, the perception of orientation, posture, and the ways in which we exert energy. The design requirements for proper human engineering must reflect each of the changes that results, and this is especially true in the exercise of control over remote and teleoperated systems where the operator is removed from any direct sense of control. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has recently completed the first NASA-wide human factors standard for microgravity. The Man-Systems Integration Standard, NASA-STD-3000, contains considerable information on the appropriate design criteria for microgravity, and there is information that is useful in the design for teleoperated systems. There is not, however, a dedicated collection of data which pertains directly to the special cases of remote and robotic operations. The design considerations for human-system interaction in the control of remote systems in space are discussed, with brief details on the information to be found in the NASA-STD-3000, and arguments for a dedicated section within the Standard which deals with robotic, teleoperated and remote systems and the design requirements for effective human control of these systems in the space environment, and from the space environment.
This document is a quick reference guide with an overview of the processes required to certify safety-critical and mission-critical flight software at selected NASA centers and the FAA. Researchers and software developers can use this guide to jumpstart their understanding of how to get new or enhanced software onboard an aircraft or spacecraft. The introduction contains aerospace industry definitions of safety and safety-critical software, as well as, the current rationale for certification of safety-critical software. The Standards for Safety-Critical Aerospace Software section lists and describes current standards including NASA standards and RTCA DO-178B. The Mission-Critical versus Safety-Critical software section explains the difference between two important classes of software: safety-critical software involving the potential for loss of life due to software failure and mission-critical software involving the potential for aborting a mission due to software failure. The DO-178B Safety-critical Certification Requirements section describes special processes and methods required to obtain a safety-critical certification for aerospace software flying on vehicles under auspices of the FAA. The final two sections give an overview of the certification process used at Dryden Flight Research Center and the approval process at the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL).