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At least 397 records · Page 22

Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the Idaho National Laboratory Repackaged Uranium Metal and Oxide at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation assesses whether the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Repackaged Uranium Metal and Oxide is suitable for shallow land burial at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site on the Nevada National Security Site. Disposal of the INL Repackaged Uranium Metal and Oxide meets all performance objectives in DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P. The INL Repackaged Uranium Metal and Oxide waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the West Valley Demonstration Project Asbestos Contaminated Low-Level Waste Debris at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation assesses whether the West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Asbestos Contaminated Low-Level Waste (LLW) Debris is suitable for shallow land burial at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site on the Nevada National Security Site. Disposal of the WVDP Asbestos Contaminated LLW Debris meets all performance objectives in DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P. The WVDP Asbestos Contaminated LLW Debris is recommended for acceptance with the condition that the total radium-226 (226Ra) waste stream activity shall not exceed 2E+9 Bq.

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Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the Idaho National Laboratory Repackaged Uranium Metal and Oxide with Polychlorinated Biphenyls at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation assesses whether the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Repackaged Uranium Metal and Oxide with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) is suitable for shallow land burial at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site on the Nevada National Security Site. Disposal of the INL Repackaged Uranium Metal and Oxide with PCBs waste stream meets all the performance objectives contained in DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P. The INL Repackaged Uranium Metal and Oxide with PCBs waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the Idaho National Laboratory Test Reactor Area Foils at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation assesses whether the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Test Reactor Area (TRA) Foils waste stream is suitable for shallow land burial at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site on the Nevada National Security Site. Disposal of the INL TRA Foils waste stream meets all the performance objectives contained in DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P. The INL TRA Foils waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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Peer Review Comments on the Authorized Limits Technical Document (OREM-19-2573) for Disposal of Waste Containing Residual Radioactive Material at the U.S. Department of Energy Industrial Landfill IV, Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

Argonne National Laboratory is assigned responsibility by DOE/EM-4 to conduct a peer review of the proposed Authorized Limits (ALs) for disposal of waste containing residual radioactive material at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Industrial Landfill IV, Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The ALs document package (Document Number OREM-19-2573, dated May 2020) was sent to Argonne by DOE on June 1, 2020 (Oak Ridge 2020a). Argonne started the review immediately and held several BlueJeans meetings with Oak Ridge and DOE to discuss review comments. The first BlueJeans meeting was June 17, 2020. Oak Ridge presented a briefing of the AL package, followed by discussion of the assumptions, methodology, and parameters used in the analysis. A follow-up BlueJeans meeting was held on June 24, 2020, at which Argonne presented both general and specific review comments in PowerPoint slides. This set of slides - Review Comments on the “Authorized Limits for Disposal of Waste Containing Residual Radioactive Material at DOE Industrial Landfill IV, Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee” - was then emailed to Oak Ridge and DOE after the BlueJeans meeting on June 24, 2020. A PDF version of this slide set is included as Appendix A.

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Segmented Gamma Scanner for Radioactive Waste Assessment: A User Guide

Radioactive waste assessment is important for ensuring nuclear material security at various types of facilities, such as enrichment, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing plants. The waste generated at such nuclear facilities is stored in standard containers and is required to be characterized for material-accounting purposes. The segmented gamma scanner system is a popular, nondestructive analysis measurement system used for characterizing nuclear material, including radioactive waste. This document provides guidance on how to achieve effective performance from a segmented gamma scanner system for accurately quantifying fission products, activation products, and transuranic wastes.

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Using polymerization, glass structure, and quasicrystalline theory to produce high level radioactive borosilicate glass remotely: a 20+ year legacy

Vitrification is currently the most widely used technology for the treatment of high level radioactive wastes (HLW) throughout the world. Most of the nations that have generated HLW are immobilizing in borosilicate glass. One of the primary reasons that glass has become the most widely used immobilization media is the relative simplicity of the vitrification process, e.g. melt a highly variable waste with some glass forming additives such as SiO 2 and B 2 O 3 in the form of a premelted frit and pour the molten mixture into a stainless steel canister. Seal the canister before moisture can enter the canister (10’ tall by 2’ in diameter) so the canister does not corrode from the inside out. Glass has also become widely used for HLW is that due to the fact that the short range order (SRO) and medium range order (MRO) found in the structure of glass atomistically bonds the radionuclides and hazardous species in the waste. The SRO and MRO have also been found to govern the melt properties such as viscosity and resistivity of the melt and the crystallization potential and solubility of certain species. Furthermore, the molecular structure of the glass also controls the glass durability, i.e. the contaminant/radionuclide release, by establishing the distribution of ion exchange sites, hydrolysis sites, and the access of water to those sites. The molecular structure is flexible and hence accounts for the flexibility of glass formulations to HLW waste variability. Nuclear waste glasses melt between 1050-1150°C which minimizes the volatility of radioactive components such as 99 Tc, 137 Cs, and 129 I. Nuclear waste glasses have good long term stability including irradiation resistance. Process control models were developed based on the molecular structure of glass, polymerization theory of glass, and quasicrystalline theory of glass crystallization. These models create a glass which is durable, pourable, and processable with 95% accuracy without knowing from batch to batch what the composition of the waste coming out of the storage tanks will be. These models have operated the Savannah River Site Defense Waste Processing Facility (SRS DWPF), which is the world’s largest HLW Joule heated ceramic melter, since 1996. This unique “feed forward” process control, which qualifies the durability, pourability, and processability of the waste plus glass additive mixture before it enters the melter, has enabled ~8000 tons of HLW glass and 4242 canisters to be produced since 1996 with only one melter replacement.

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UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Idaho National Laboratory Classified Mockup Low-Level Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Classified Mockup Low-Level Waste (LLW) (INEL208599QR0, Revision 0 [INL 2020]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the INL Classified Mockup LLW meets all performance objectives of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The INL Classified Mockup LLW stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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Fiscal Year 2020 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

U.S. Department of Energy Standard DOE-STD-5002-2017, “Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation,” requires preparation of an Annual Summary Report comparing low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities operations with the Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) and its supporting technical documents including the performance assessment (PA) and the composite analysis (CA). The fiscal year (FY) 2020 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) was prepared by reviewing planned and discovered changes, waste receipts, monitoring results, research and development (R&D) results, and the status of DAS conditions and issues to assess the validity of the DASs, PAs, and CAs.

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UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Idaho National Laboratory Routinely Generated Remote Handled Low-Level Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation assesses whether the Idaho National Laboratory Routinely Generated Remote Handled Low-Level Waste (NEID09MFCRLLW, Revision 7) is suitable for shallow land burial at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site on the Nevada National Security Site. Disposal of the INL Routinely Generated Remote Handled LLW meets all performance objectives of DOE Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P. The INL Routinely Generated Remote Handled LLW is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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Assessing the Potential for Inadvertent Human Intrusion at the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This paper recommends an approach to inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) at the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). IHI analysis uses the consequences of an individual inadvertently contacting buried waste to set waste concentration limits for near-surface disposal of low-level radioactive waste (LLW). Regulatory agencies are increasingly applying risk-informed decision-making to LLW waste management (NRC 2006). Risk-informed decision-making combines scientific risk assessment with stakeholder values and perceptions to determine a level of acceptable risk. Risk considers not only the consequences of an event, but also its probability of occurring.

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UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the TRU Waste Processing Center Mixed Low Level Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Transuranic (TRU) Waste Processing Center Mixed Low Level Waste (MLLW), FWORCHMLLW103, Revision 13 [TWPC 2021]), is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the TRU Waste Processing Center MLLW meets all performance objectives of DOE Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The TRU Waste Processing Center MLLW waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Idaho National Laboratory Classified Mockup Low-Level Waste, Revision 1, at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Classified Mockup Low-Level Waste (LLW) (INEL208599QR0, Revision 1 [INL 2021]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the INL Classified Mockup LLW meets all performance objectives of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The INL Classified Mockup LLW stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory Torus Cleanup System Molecular Sieve Dryer Bed at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (PPPL) Torus Cleanup System Molecular Sieve Dryer Bed (MSDB), PERM000000043, Revision 0 (Perma-Fix [PERM] 2021), is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the PPPL Torus Cleanup System MSDB meets all performance objectives of DOE Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The PPPL Torus Cleanup System MSDB waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Transuranic Waste Processing Center Low-Level Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Transuranic Waste Processing Center (TWPC) Low-Level Waste (LLW), FWORCHLLW0102, Revision 12 (TWPC 2021), is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the TWPC LLW meets all performance objectives of DOE Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The TWPC LLW waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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Solving Complex Radioactive Decay Chains for Future Assessment and Cleanup Decisions - 17046

In support of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's on-line calculators for risk and dose assessment, a decay chain tool was developed to address the need to understand how radionuclide activity changes with time as the activity measured in the past will be different from current and future levels. When a radionuclide decays, its activity decreases exponentially as a function of time transforming into a different atom - a decay product. The atoms keep transforming to new decay products until they reach a stable state and are no longer radioactive. The series of decay products created to reach this balance is called the decay chain. For radionuclide chains, the daughter products can have significant implications in dosimetry and remediation. Thus, risk assessors evaluating sites with radioactive contamination need to plan for future progeny ingrowth, in addition to sampled radionuclides. These are important considerations for risk quantification during the characterization and cleanup plans, particularly when sampling may have occurred years before the remediation cleanup work begins. If a radionuclide half-life and current activity are known, then hand-calculating the future activity is straightforward. However, calculating the ingrowth of progeny quickly becomes cumbersome for longer chains such as the Thorium-232 decay series. For the more complex chains where many daughters are formed, possibly with multiple branches, this calculation involves solving a complex set of simultaneous differential equations known as the Bateman Equation. The Decay Chain Activity Projection Tool calculates the activity of radionuclides and their progeny as a function of time. This tool currently uses a combination of Perl, JavaScript, Plot.ly, and jQuery to automatically construct the radionuclide decay chains, solve the resulting Bateman Equation, and provide the user with tabular solution output and plots. Additional software may be used as development advances. The risk assessor can then use the data for exposure assessment and cleanup decisions without further costly sampling. The benefits of providing this calculator are to prevent overestimation of risk due to decay of the parent isotope and to avoid underestimation of risk due to ingrowth of progeny more toxic than the parent. Graphs are provided to show the simultaneous decay rates and ingrowth, as well as tabular output at time-point T and all the decay half-life intervals. (authors)

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Demonstration of SuperLig{sup R} 605 and SuperLig{sup R} 644 in a Regeneration Flow Sheet to Remove Radioactive Strontium and Cesium from Seawater - 16236

Remediation techniques are needed for efficient removal of radioactive strontium and cesium from seawater. Molecular Recognition Technology, using selective SuperLig{sup R} resins, demonstrates a clean chemistry approach to solving this problem. Molecular Recognition Technology offers high levels of separation of chemically pure metal contaminants, whose subsequent disposal is compatible with simple waste forms (grout and glass). SuperLig{sup R} resins can be regenerated with common reagents and used many times, limited by a dose of 1 E+9 Rad, which assures low volumes of secondary solid waste. The metal selectivity of the SuperLig{sup R} resin ensures that the solid waste is of low residual activity. These properties of sustainability are illustrated in a project that demonstrated the ability of two SuperLig{sup R} resins to selectively remove Cs and Sr from a seawater mimic representative of the contaminated seawater in Fukushima, Dai'ichi, Japan harbor. Removal of radioactive Sr-90 and Cs-134/Cs-137 from seawater using conventional ion exchange or a complexing agent is complicated by the presence of large excesses of competing ions such as Na, K, Ca, and Mg, which can be co-extracted. These competing ions, if co-extracted, reduce the capacity of a single pass resin with the consequent increase in volume of spent resin or decrease in capacity of a regenerable resin. The successful demonstration reported in this study has shown the ability of two proprietary resins, SuperLig{sup R} 605 and SuperLig{sup R} 644, to remove Sr and Cs, respectively, with high selectivity from simulated solutions containing these metal ions together with major constituents of seawater at their normal concentrations. This effort was part of a demonstration project to investigate methods for removal of Sr-90 and Cs-134/Cs-137 from 160,000 cubic meters of seawater impounded at Fukushima, Dai'ichi, Japan harbor. SuperLig{sup R} resins can be regenerated by elution with small volumes of simple acid solutions. SuperLig{sup R} resins have a high tolerance to radiation, with their performance not being degraded by doses of 1.0 E+9 Rad. Estimates, based on the results obtained, are that Cs and Sr levels in the volume of seawater in the Fukushima, Dai'ichi, Japan harbor could be reduced to desired discharge limits in 200 days with some 30 cubic meters of the two SuperLig{sup R} resins and that decontamination factors of 10 or more could be achieved. Results of the demonstration, together with advantages of the Molecular Recognition Technology process over conventional procedures for these separations are presented and discussed. (authors)

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