Results for “hardware failure” — Page 22

NASA NTRS1994

The MGS Avionics System Architecture: Exploring the Limits of Inheritance

Mars Global Surveyor (MGS) avionics system architecture comprises much of the electronics on board the spacecraft: electrical power, attitude and articulation control, command and data handling, telecommunications, and flight software. Schedule and cost constraints dictated a mix of new and inherited designs, especially hardware upgrades based on findings of the Mars Observer failure review boards.

Mars Global Surveyor MGS↗

NASA NTRS2009

NASA's Evolutionary Xenon Thruster (NEXT) Component Verification Testing

Component testing is a critical facet of the comprehensive thruster life validation strategy devised by the NASA s Evolutionary Xenon Thruster (NEXT) program. Component testing to-date has consisted of long-duration high voltage propellant isolator and high-cycle heater life validation testing. The high voltage propellant isolator, a heritage design, will be operated under different environmental condition in the NEXT ion thruster requiring verification testing. The life test of two NEXT isolators was initiated with comparable voltage and pressure conditions with a higher temperature than measured for the NEXT prototype-model thruster. To date the NEXT isolators have accumulated 18,300 h of operation. Measurements indicate a negligible increase in leakage current over the testing duration to date. NEXT 1/2 in. heaters, whose manufacturing and control processes have heritage, were selected for verification testing based upon the change in physical dimensions resulting in a higher operating voltage as well as potential differences in thermal environment. The heater fabrication processes, developed for the International Space Station (ISS) plasma contactor hollow cathode assembly, were utilized with modification of heater dimensions to accommodate a larger cathode. Cyclic testing of five 1/22 in. diameter heaters was initiated to validate these modified fabrication processes while retaining high reliability heaters. To date two of the heaters have been cycled to 10,000 cycles and suspended to preserve hardware. Three of the heaters have been cycled to failure giving a B10 life of 12,615 cycles, approximately 6,000 more cycles than the established qualification B10 life of the ISS plasma contactor heaters.

Herman, Daniel A.↗

NASA NTRS1981

Design and verification of a multiple fault tolerant control system for STS applications using computer simulation

General Dynamics/Convair is under NASA contract to integrate the Centaur upper stage into the space transportation system for future planetary missions. This requires that control of all safety critical functions be two-failure tolerant. The control system developed consists of five asynchronous computers, each contributing at their outputs to a 3-out-of-5 voting plane. Subsystem control is based on an end function redundancy management scheme. Analysis of multiple component failures and worst-case time-phase asynchrony among the computers is performed by a real-time computer simulation. The simulation emulates the hardware and subsystem interfaces, wire by wire, providing assessibility to any component for the insertion of preprogrammed failures. Observability is provided via a graphics system and diagnostic software. The simulation provides an engineering tool where the integrity of control system hardware and imbedded software can be demonstrated.

Szatkowski, G. P.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Intelligent Hardware-Enabled Sensor and Software Safety and Health Management for Autonomous UAS

Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) can only be deployed if they can effectively complete their mission and respond to failures and uncertain environmental conditions while maintaining safety with respect to other aircraft as well as humans and property on the ground. We propose to design a real-time, onboard system health management (SHM) capability to continuously monitor essential system components such as sensors, software, and hardware systems for detection and diagnosis of failures and violations of safety or performance rules during the ight of a UAS. Our approach to SHM is three-pronged, providing: (1) real-time monitoring of sensor and software signals; (2) signal analysis, preprocessing, and advanced on-the- y temporal and Bayesian probabilistic fault diagnosis; (3) an unobtrusive, lightweight, read-only, low-power hardware realization using Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) in order to avoid overburdening limited computing resources or costly re-certi cation of ight software due to instrumentation. No currently available SHM capabilities (or combinations of currently existing SHM capabilities) come anywhere close to satisfying these three criteria yet NASA will require such intelligent, hardwareenabled sensor and software safety and health management for introducing autonomous UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS). We propose a novel approach of creating modular building blocks for combining responsive runtime monitoring of temporal logic system safety requirements with model-based diagnosis and Bayesian network-based probabilistic analysis. Our proposed research program includes both developing this novel approach and demonstrating its capabilities using the NASA Swift UAS as a demonstration platform.

Robotics↗

NASA NTRS2013

Towards Real-time, On-board, Hardware-Supported Sensor and Software Health Management for Unmanned Aerial Systems

Unmanned aerial systems (UASs) can only be deployed if they can effectively complete their missions and respond to failures and uncertain environmental conditions while maintaining safety with respect to other aircraft as well as humans and property on the ground. In this paper, we design a real-time, on-board system health management (SHM) capability to continuously monitor sensors, software, and hardware components for detection and diagnosis of failures and violations of safety or performance rules during the flight of a UAS. Our approach to SHM is three-pronged, providing: (1) real-time monitoring of sensor and/or software signals; (2) signal analysis, preprocessing, and advanced on the- fly temporal and Bayesian probabilistic fault diagnosis; (3) an unobtrusive, lightweight, read-only, low-power realization using Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) that avoids overburdening limited computing resources or costly re-certification of flight software due to instrumentation. Our implementation provides a novel approach of combining modular building blocks, integrating responsive runtime monitoring of temporal logic system safety requirements with model-based diagnosis and Bayesian network-based probabilistic analysis. We demonstrate this approach using actual data from the NASA Swift UAS, an experimental all-electric aircraft.

System & Software Health Management↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

MIP: the First ISRU Flight Experiment

The Mars ISPP Precursor, “MIP”, was a flight experiment on the 2001 Mars Surveyor Lander that was designed to demonstrate In-situ Propellant Production-- ISPP-- for the first time on Mars. The experiment was designed to show that it was possible to produce oxygen from the carbon dioxide atmosphere, and to demonstrate the individual technology components that would go into a full-scale production plant. The aimpoint of the oxygen production was to showcase the possibility of producing oxygen for use as rocket fuel, ultimately as an enabling technology for a future human expedition to Mars. The MIP team built and qualified flight hardware for the experiment to fly on the Surveyor-2001 lander, but following the failure of the 1999 Mars Polar Lander spacecraft, the Surveyor-2001 lander mission was cancelled, and the MIP experiment was never flown. The experience in building and testing the hardware did show that the carbon dioxide electrolysis process was feasible, and led to incorporation of in-situ propellant production into the NASA reference plans for human Mars missions. Twenty years later, the technology is flying to Mars in the form of the MOXIE experiment on the Perseverance rover.

Geoffrey A Landis↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Results from Two Full-Scale Hawker 4000 Fuselage Drop Tests

In the spring of 2022, NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) conducted two full-scale drop tests on a Hawker 4000 partial fuselage structure for the evaluation of composite material response under dynamic impact loading conditions. The specific objectives of the tests were to induce dynamic composite damage initiation and progression and in primary structure and to understand the nature of the failure modes. The tests were conducted via dividing the fuselage hardware into three smaller sections. Dynamic drop tests were conducted on the forward and aft portions of the fuselage under different dynamic loading conditions, while the middle section was reserved for materials testing. Both tests were conducted by dropping the test articles from a height of 14 feet with significant amounts of pitch, which was added to initiate damage in specific regions of the structure. The test articles were ballasted then instrumented with accelerometers at various locations and speckle-coated on both exterior sides with a black and white stochastic pattern for use with three-dimensional digital image correlation (3D-DIC). In addition, the interior belly portion of the forward section test article was also speckle-coated, which was intended to capture deformations on the belly of the test article from the interior at impact. The interior of the aft section test article was not speckle-coated. Prior to testing, bow-tie markers were applied at various locations for use in marker tracking, to measure impact conditions such as vertical impact velocity and pitch. In this report, a partial summary of the data collected from the tests is presented. The data was primarily in the form of accelerometers to measure impact acceleration and 3D-DIC to measure deformation and failure onset and propagation. Post-test inspections revealed the primary damage mechanism was fiber cracking and delamination primarily in and around the area that contacted the impact surface. Acceleration pulse shapesin the ballast locations were trapezoidal in nature and ranged between 10 g and 40 g, depending on the location and test.

full scale testing↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Results from Two Full-Scale Hawker 4000 Fuselage Drop Tests

In the spring of 2022, NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) conducted two full-scale drop tests on a Hawker 4000 partial fuselage structure for the evaluation of composite material response under dynamic impact loading conditions. The specific objectives of the tests were to induce dynamic composite damage initiation and progression and in primary structure and to understand the nature of the failure modes. The tests were conducted via dividing the fuselage hardware into three smaller sections. Dynamic drop tests were conducted on the forward and aft portions of the fuselage under different dynamic loading conditions, while the middle section was reserved for materials testing. Both tests were conducted by dropping the test articles from a height of 14 feet with significant amounts of pitch, which was added to initiate damage in specific regions of the structure. The test articles were ballasted then instrumented with accelerometers at various locations and speckle-coated on both exterior sides with a black and white stochastic pattern for use with three-dimensional digital image correlation (3D-DIC). In addition, the interior belly portion of the forward section test article was also speckle-coated, which was intended to capture deformations on the belly of the test article from the interior at impact. The interior of the aft section test article was not speckle-coated. Prior to testing, bow-tie markers were applied at various locations for use in marker tracking, to measure impact conditions such as vertical impact velocity and pitch. In this report, a partial summary of the data collected from the tests is presented. The data was primarily in the form of accelerometers to measure impact acceleration and 3D-DIC to measure deformation and failure onset and propagation. Post-test inspections revealed the primary damage mechanism was fiber cracking and delamination primarily in and around the area that contacted the impact surface. Acceleration pulse shapesin the ballast locations were trapezoidal in nature and ranged between 10 g and 40 g, depending on the location and test.

full scale testing↗

NASA NTRS2010

Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV): Developing Flight Rationale for the Space Shuttle Program

Introducing composite vessels into the Space Shuttle Program represented a significant technical achievement. Each Orbiter vehicle contains 24 (nominally) Kevlar tanks for storage of pressurized helium (for propulsion) and nitrogen (for life support). The use of composite cylinders saved 752 pounds per Orbiter vehicle compared with all-metal tanks. The weight savings is significant considering each Shuttle flight can deliver 54,000 pounds of payload to the International Space Station. In the wake of the Columbia accident and the ensuing Return to Flight activities, the Space Shuttle Program, in 2005, re-examined COPV hardware certification. Incorporating COPV data that had been generated over the last 30 years and recognizing differences between initial Shuttle Program requirements and current operation, a new failure mode was identified, as composite stress rupture was deemed credible. The Orbiter Project undertook a comprehensive investigation to quantify and mitigate this risk. First, the engineering team considered and later deemed as unfeasible the option to replace existing all flight tanks. Second, operational improvements to flight procedures were instituted to reduce the flight risk and the danger to personnel. Third, an Orbiter reliability model was developed to quantify flight risk. Laser profilometry inspection of several flight COPVs identified deep (up to 20 mil) depressions on the tank interior. A comprehensive analysis was performed and it confirmed that these observed depressions were far less than the criterion which was established as necessary to lead to liner buckling. Existing fleet vessels were exonerated from this failure mechanism. Because full validation of the Orbiter Reliability Model was not possible given limited hardware resources, an Accelerated Stress Rupture Test of a flown flight vessel was performed to provide increased confidence. A Bayesian statistical approach was developed to evaluate possible test results with respect to the model credibility and thus flight rationale for continued operation of the Space Shuttle with existing flight hardware. A non-destructive evaluation (NDE) technique utilizing Raman Spectroscopy was developed to directly measure the overwrap residual stress state. Preliminary results provide optimistic results that patterns of fluctuation in fiber elastic strains over the outside vessel surface could be directly correlated with increased fiber stress ratios and thus reduced reliability.

Kezirian, Michael T.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Fracture Control for Additively Manufactured Spacecraft Structures

This paper describes how the intent of current NASA fracture control requirements may be applied to “fracture critical” additively manufactured spacecraft hardware. Fracture control is a multi-discipline design and certification methodology that is applied in order to mitigate catastrophic failure of structures resulting from growth of an undetected crack-like defect. The methodology is defined in existing NASA standards and is required on all human-rated space structures. As legacy spacecraft structures have been built using primarily metallic and composite materials manufactured using well established methods, guidance for application of fracture control to parts composed of these material types has been established and is documented in several NASA requirements. Additive manufactured structures offer advantages in design flexibility and manufacturing efficiency and as a result are expected to continue to be used more and more in the future. Recently, relevant guidance has been published by NASA to define materials and processes requirements for certain additive manufactured hardware, but procedures for fracture control are not addressed yet in any requirements or guidance document. While use of additive manufactured parts in non-critical scenarios may be of relatively low concern in current structural certification processes, there is a need for new fracture control guidance in order to use and certify additively manufacture hardware that is “fracture critical” where failure of the part may result in loss of life or loss of vehicle. Assurance of damage tolerance, i.e., that as-built flaws in a given part either do not exist or will not grow to become catastrophic, is of particular interest to the fracture control community. This poses a challenge due to the fact that damage tolerance behavior is not well understood in additive manufactured parts compared to legacy material types and manufacturing techniques. The discussion contained herein is necessary at this time as new guidance in this area should be founded collaboratively by the technical community at large. Different hardware types (e.g., pressure vessel, structural member) are described to highlight specific challenges and solutions for each. The discussion concludes with considering specific disciplines within fracture control (non-destructive evaluation, materials & processes, fracture mechanics, and structural certification) in a proposed extension of existing fracture control requirements to additive manufactured parts.

McElroy, Mark↗

NASA NTRS2019

Fracture Control for Additive Manufactured Spacecraft Structures

This paper describes how the intent of current NASA fracture control requirements may be applied to “fracture critical” additively manufactured spacecraft hardware. Fracture control is a multi-discipline design and certification methodology that is applied in order to mitigate catastrophic failure of structures resulting from growth of an undetected crack-like defect. The methodology is defined in existing NASA standards and is required on all human-rated space structures. As legacy spacecraft structures have been built using primarily metallic and composite materials manufactured using well established methods, guidance for application of fracture control to parts composed of these material types has been established and is documented in several NASA requirements. Additive manufactured structures offer advantages in design flexibility and manufacturing efficiency and as a result are expected to continue to be used more and more in the future. Recently, relevant guidance has been published by NASA to define materials and processes requirements for certain additive manufactured hardware, but procedures for fracture control are not addressed yet in any requirements or guidance document. While use of additive manufactured parts in non-critical scenarios may be of relatively low concern in current structural certification processes, there is a need for new fracture control guidance in order to use and certify additively manufacture hardware that is “fracture critical” where failure of the part may result in loss of life or loss of vehicle. Assurance of damage tolerance, i.e., that as-built flaws in a given part either do not exist or will not grow to become catastrophic, is of particular interest to the fracture control community. This poses a challenge due to the fact that damage tolerance behavior is not well understood in additive manufactured parts compared to legacy material types and manufacturing techniques. The discussion contained herein is necessary at this time as new guidance in this area should be founded collaboratively by the technical community at large. Different hardware types (e.g., pressure vessel, structural member) are described to highlight specific challenges and solutions for each. The discussion concludes with considering specific disciplines within fracture control (non-destructive evaluation, materials & processes, fracture mechanics, and structural certification) in a proposed extension of existing fracture control requirements to additive manufactured parts.

McElroy, Mark↗

NASA NTRS1991

On-board fault management for autonomous spacecraft

The dynamic nature of the Cargo Transfer Vehicle's (CTV) mission and the high level of autonomy required mandate a complete fault management system capable of operating under uncertain conditions. Such a fault management system must take into account the current mission phase and the environment (including the target vehicle), as well as the CTV's state of health. This level of capability is beyond the scope of current on-board fault management systems. This presentation will discuss work in progress at TRW to apply artificial intelligence to the problem of on-board fault management. The goal of this work is to develop fault management systems. This presentation will discuss work in progress at TRW to apply artificial intelligence to the problem of on-board fault management. The goal of this work is to develop fault management systems that can meet the needs of spacecraft that have long-range autonomy requirements. We have implemented a model-based approach to fault detection and isolation that does not require explicit characterization of failures prior to launch. It is thus able to detect failures that were not considered in the failure and effects analysis. We have applied this technique to several different subsystems and tested our approach against both simulations and an electrical power system hardware testbed. We present findings from simulation and hardware tests which demonstrate the ability of our model-based system to detect and isolate failures, and describe our work in porting the Ada version of this system to a flight-qualified processor. We also discuss current research aimed at expanding our system to monitor the entire spacecraft.

Fesq, Lorraine M.↗

NASA NTRS2015

NASA's Corrosion Technology Laboratory at the Kennedy Space Center: Anticipating, Managing, and Preventing Corrosion

The marine environment at NASAs Kennedy Space Center (KSC) has been documented by ASM International (formerly American Society for Metals) as the most corrosive in North America. With the introduction of the Space Shuttle in 1981, the already highly corrosive conditions at the launch pads were rendered even more severe by the highly corrosive hydrochloric acid (HCl) generated by the solid rocket boosters (SRBs). Numerous failures at the launch pads are caused by corrosion. The structural integrity of ground infrastructure and flight hardware is critical to the success, safety, cost, and sustainability of space missions. NASA has over fifty years of experience dealing with unexpected failures caused by corrosion and has developed expertise in corrosion control in the launch and other environments. The Corrosion Technology Laboratory at KSC evolved, from what started as an atmospheric exposure test site near NASAs launch pads, into a capability that provides technical innovations and engineering services in all areas of corrosion for NASA, external partners, and customers.This paper provides a chronological overview of NASAs role in anticipating, managing, and preventing corrosion in highly corrosive environments. One important challenge in managing and preventing corrosion involves the detrimental impact on humans and the environment of what have been very effective corrosion control strategies. This challenge has motivated the development of new corrosion control technologies that are more effective and environmentally friendly. Strategies for improved corrosion protection and durability can have a huge impact on the economic sustainability of human spaceflight operations.

Corrosion Control↗

NASA NTRS1986

Application of Weibull analysis to SSME hardware

Generally, it has been documented that the wearing of engine parts forms a failure distribution which can be approximated by a function developed by Weibull. The purpose here is to examine to what extent the Weibull distribution approximates failure data for designated engine parts of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). The current testing certification requirements will be examined in order to establish confidence levels. An examination of the failure history of SSME parts/assemblies (turbine blades, main combustion chamber, or high pressure fuel pump first stage impellers) which are limited in usage by time or starts will be done by using updated Weibull techniques. Efforts will be made by the investigator to predict failure trends by using Weibull techniques for SSME parts (turbine temperature sensors, chamber pressure transducers, actuators, and controllers) which are not severely limited by time or starts.

Gray, L. A. B.↗

NASA NTRS1981

A Voyager attitude control perspective on fault tolerant systems

In current spacecraft design, a trend can be observed to achieve greater fault tolerance through the application of on-board software dedicated to detecting and isolating failures. Whether fault tolerance through software can meet the desired objectives depends on very careful consideration and control of the system in which the software is imbedded. The considered investigation has the objective to provide some of the insight needed for the required analysis of the system. A description is given of the techniques which have been developed in this connection during the development of the Voyager spacecraft. The Voyager Galileo Attitude and Articulation Control Subsystem (AACS) fault tolerant design is discussed to emphasize basic lessons learned from this experience. The central driver of hardware redundancy implementation on Voyager was known as the 'single point failure criterion'.

Rasmussen, R. D.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Body of Knowledge (BOK) for Copper Wire Bonds

Copper wire bonds have replaced gold wire bonds in the majority of commercial semiconductor devices for the latest technology nodes. Although economics has been the driving mechanism to lower semiconductor packaging costs for a savings of about 20% by replacing gold wire bonds with copper, copper also has materials property advantages over gold. When compared to gold, copper has approximately: 25% lower electrical resistivity, 30% higher thermal conductivity, 75% higher tensile strength and 45% higher modulus of elasticity. Copper wire bonds on aluminum bond pads are also more mechanically robust over time and elevated temperature due to the slower intermetallic formation rate - approximately 1/100th that of the gold to aluminum intermetallic formation rate. However, there are significant tradeoffs with copper wire bonding - copper has twice the hardness of gold which results in a narrower bonding manufacturing process window and requires that the semiconductor companies design more mechanically rigid bonding pads to prevent cratering to both the bond pad and underlying chip structure. Furthermore, copper is significantly more prone to corrosion issues. The semiconductor packaging industry has responded to this corrosion concern by creating a palladium coated copper bonding wire, which is more corrosion resistant than pure copper bonding wire. Also, the selection of the device molding compound is critical because use of environmentally friendly green compounds can result in internal CTE (Coefficient of Thermal Expansion) mismatches with the copper wire bonds that can eventually lead to device failures during thermal cycling. Despite the difficult problems associated with the changeover to copper bonding wire, there are billions of copper wire bonded devices delivered annually to customers. It is noteworthy that Texas Instruments announced in October of 2014 that they are shipping microcircuits containing copper wire bonds for safety critical automotive applications. An evaluation of copper wire bond technology for applicability to spaceflight hardware may be warranted along with concurrently compiling a comprehensive understanding of the failure mechanisms involved with copper wire bonded semiconductor devices.

Body of Knowledge (BOK)↗

NASA NTRS1972

Long life assurance study for manned spacecraft long life hardware. Volume 3: Long life assurance studies of components

The guidelines for selecting hardware to be used in manned spacecraft to obtain a five year operational lifetime without maintenance were developed. An analysis was conducted on the design, application, failure mechanisms, manufacturing processes and controls, screen and burn-in techniques, and quality control of hardware items. The equipment considered for evaluation include: (1) electric motors and bearings; (2) accelerometers; (3) gyroscopes and bearings; (4) compressors and pumps, (5) magnetic tape recorders; (6) plumbing components and tubing; (7) check valves; (8) pressure regulators and solenoid valves; (9) thermal control valves; (10) pressure vessels and positive expulsion devices; (11) nickel cadmium batteries; and (12) transducers.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2008

A Testbed for Evaluating Lunar Habitat Autonomy Architectures

A lunar outpost will involve a habitat with an integrated set of hardware and software that will maintain a safe environment for human activities. There is a desire for a paradigm shift whereby crew will be the primary mission operators, not ground controllers. There will also be significant periods when the outpost is uncrewed. This will require that significant automation software be resident in the habitat to maintain all system functions and respond to faults. JSC is developing a testbed to allow for early testing and evaluation of different autonomy architectures. This will allow evaluation of different software configurations in order to: 1) understand different operational concepts; 2) assess the impact of failures and perturbations on the system; and 3) mitigate software and hardware integration risks. The testbed will provide an environment in which habitat hardware simulations can interact with autonomous control software. Faults can be injected into the simulations and different mission scenarios can be scripted. The testbed allows for logging, replaying and re-initializing mission scenarios. An initial testbed configuration has been developed by combining an existing life support simulation and an existing simulation of the space station power distribution system. Results from this initial configuration will be presented along with suggested requirements and designs for the incremental development of a more sophisticated lunar habitat testbed.

Lawler, Dennis G.↗