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DOE OSTI2024

Monitoring Plan for the Idaho National Laboratory Remote Handled Low Level Waste Disposal Facility

This monitoring plan for Idaho National Laboratory’s Remote-Handled Low Level Waste Disposal Facility was developed to meet the requirements for monitoring low-level waste disposal facilities according to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management,” and the guidance provided in the associated technical standard “Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation” (DOE-STD-5002-2017). The purpose of this monitoring plan is to document a monitoring strategy that includes (1) compliance monitoring activities to demonstrate compliance with regulatory standards/limits and (2) performance monitoring to build confidence the facility is performing as demonstrated in the facility performance assessment (PA) (DOE-ID 2018a), composite analysis (CA) (DOE ID 2012), and CA addendum (DOE-ID 2018b). The de minimus impact to the aquifer predicted by the PA suggests that aquifer compliance monitoring should be augmented with performance monitoring of the drainage course materials and sedimentary interbeds in the vadose zone beneath the facility to provide a more effective means of identifying performance deviations. The monitoring approach delineated in this document was informed by the systems evaluation of natural and engineered facility features presented in the PA, an assessment of aquifer baseline conditions (INL 2017d), the dose analysis conducted in support of the PA and CA, and monitoring data collected during the first four years of facility operations (baseline monitoring phase) (INL 2023b). This plan provides monitoring locations, sampling frequencies, and sampling methods; recommendations for data evaluation; and a description of the monitoring plan implementation. Collected data will be used to demonstrate facility compliance and to identify conditions that are not consistent with the key assumptions made by the PA and CA.

12 - MGMT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTE↗

DOE OSTI2018

Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility Stabilization and Ventilation Project-18121

Department of Energy contractor CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M) is responsible for the safe and compliant operation of the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF), a nuclear materials storage facility at Hanford containing 1,936 highly radioactive capsules containing cesium and strontium. The capsules are currently stored under approximately 4 m (13 ft) of water. The water shields workers from radiation and helps cool the capsules. WESF is a large, concrete structure nominally 48 m (160 ft) long, 30 m (98 ft) wide and 12 m (40 ft) high with the pool cells being approximately 4 m (13 ft) below grade level. It is a robust facility with walls ranging from 0.3 m to 1 m (1 ft to 3 ft) thick. While the capsules are currently in a safe configuration, WESF is an aging facility, and DOE and CH2M are modifying the facility to ensure continued safe and compliant operations and to support the eventual transfer of capsules to dry storage. Dry storage would eliminate the possibility of a release of radioactive material in the unlikely event of a major earthquake that might result in loss of pool storage water and overheating and breach of one or more capsules. The project was divided into two major deliverables: 1) Ventilation: replacement of the existing ventilation system which included a below-grade high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter pit with an above grade HEPA filter skid and new fans and ducting. 2) Stabilization: grouting deactivated facility hot cells and other void spaces to the maximum extent practical to reduce material at risk from legacy contamination. The aging ventilation system relied on HEPA filters that exceeded their operational life. Due to the high levels of radionuclide contamination, replacing the filters was impractical and highly hazardous. CH2M installed a new ventilation system to provide safe and compliant ventilation for future operations. The project used an existing, unused ventilation skid that was designed for another project. Repurposing the unused skid presented additional technical challenges to modify the system for the project specific requirements. The new system is above ground, easier to maintain and is built to current standards. New connections inside the facility were installed to allow the new ventilation to operate effectively. The stabilization project is unique in that core drilling and grouting was performed in an operating Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility, which brought forth safety basis and environmental regulatory challenges. The hot cells were isolated from all existing support utilities including electrical, process chemicals, manipulator ports, instrument air, etc. to seal the hot cells and prevent highly contaminated supernate or grout from leaking into adjacent galleries. A high flow grout was used to maximize the distance between injection ports. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2013

Data Sharing Report Characterization of Isotope Row Facilities Oak Ridge National Laboratory Oak Ridge TN

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management (EM-OR) requested that Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU), working under the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) contract, provide technical and independent waste management planning support using funds provided by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Specifically, DOE EM-OR requested ORAU to plan and implement a survey approach, focused on characterizing the Isotope Row Facilities located at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for future determination of an appropriate disposition pathway for building debris and systems, should the buildings be demolished. The characterization effort was designed to identify and quantify radiological and chemical contamination associated with building structures and process systems. The Isotope Row Facilities discussed in this report include Bldgs. 3030, 3031, 3032, 3033, 3033A, 3034, 3036, 3093, and 3118, and are located in the northeast quadrant of the main ORNL campus area, between Hillside and Central Avenues. Construction of the isotope production facilities was initiated in the late 1940s, with the exception of Bldgs. 3033A and 3118, which were enclosed in the early 1960s. The Isotope Row facilities were intended for the purpose of light industrial use for the processing, assemblage, and storage of radionuclides used for a variety of applications (ORNL 1952 and ORAU 2013). The Isotope Row Facilities provided laboratory and support services as part of the Isotopes Production and Distribution Program until 1989 when DOE mandated their shutdown (ORNL 1990). These facilities performed diverse research and developmental experiments in support of isotopes production. As a result of the many years of operations, various projects, and final cessation of operations, production was followed by inclusion into the surveillance and maintenance (S&M) project for eventual decontamination and decommissioning (D&D). The process for D&D and final dismantlement of facilities requires that the known contaminants of concern (COCs) be evaluated and quantified and to identify and quantify any additional contaminants in order to satisfy the waste acceptance criteria requirements for the desired disposal pathway. Known facility contaminants include, but are not limited to, asbestos-containing material (ACM), radiological contaminants, and chemical contaminants including polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and metals.

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DOE OSTI2015

Opportunities for Automated Demand Response in California Wastewater Treatment Facilities

Previous research over a period of six years has identified wastewater treatment facilities as good candidates for demand response (DR), automated demand response (Auto-DR), and Energy Efficiency (EE) measures. This report summarizes that work, including the characteristics of wastewater treatment facilities, the nature of the wastewater stream, energy used and demand, as well as details of the wastewater treatment process. It also discusses control systems and automated demand response opportunities. Furthermore, this report summarizes the DR potential of three wastewater treatment facilities. In particular, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) has collected data at these facilities from control systems, submetered process equipment, utility electricity demand records, and governmental weather stations. The collected data were then used to generate a summary of wastewater power demand, factors affecting that demand, and demand response capabilities. These case studies show that facilities that have implemented energy efficiency measures and that have centralized control systems are well suited to shed or shift electrical loads in response to financial incentives, utility bill savings, and/or opportunities to enhance reliability of service. In summary, municipal wastewater treatment energy demand in California is large, and energy-intensive equipment offers significant potential for automated demand response. In particular, large load reductions were achieved by targeting effluent pumps and centrifuges. One of the limiting factors to implementing demand response is the reaction of effluent turbidity to reduced aeration at an earlier stage of the process. Another limiting factor is that cogeneration capabilities of municipal facilities, including existing power purchase agreements and utility receptiveness to purchasing electricity from cogeneration facilities, limit a facility’s potential to participate in other DR activities.

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DOE OSTI2016

Plant model of KIPT neutron source facility simulator

Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) of the United States and Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT) of Ukraine are collaborating on constructing a neutron source facility at KIPT, Kharkov, Ukraine. The facility has 100-kW electron beam driving a subcritical assembly (SCA). The electron beam interacts with a natural uranium target or a tungsten target to generate neutrons, and deposits its power in the target zone. The total fission power generated in SCA is about 300 kW. Two primary cooling loops are designed to remove 100-kW and 300-kW from the target zone and the SCA, respectively. A secondary cooling system is coupled with the primary cooling system to dispose of the generated heat outside the facility buildings to the atmosphere. In addition, the electron accelerator has a low efficiency for generating the electron beam, which uses another secondary cooling loop to remove the generated heat from the accelerator primary cooling loop. One of the main functions the KIPT neutron source facility is to train young nuclear specialists; therefore, ANL has developed the KIPT Neutron Source Facility Simulator for this function. In this simulator, a Plant Control System and a Plant Protection System were developed to perform proper control and to provide automatic protection against unsafe and improper operation of the facility during the steady-state and the transient states using a facility plant model. This report focuses on describing the physics of the plant model and provides several test cases to demonstrate its capabilities. The plant facility model uses the PYTHON script language. It is consistent with the computer language of the plant control system. It is easy to integrate with the simulator without an additional interface, and it is able to simulate the transients of the cooling systems with system control variables changing on real-time.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

DOE OSTI2017

Compressed Natural Gas Vehicle Maintenance Facility Modification Handbook

To ensure the safety of personnel and facilities, vehicle maintenance facilities are required by law and by guidelines of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and the International Fire Code (IFC) to exhibit certain design features. They are also required to be fitted with certain fire protection equipment and devices because of the potential for fire or explosion in the event of fuel leakage or spills. All fuels have an explosion or fire potential if specific conditions are present. The hazard presented by liquid fuels, such as gasoline and diesel, results from the spillage of these liquids and subsequent ignition of vapors, causing a fire or explosion. Facilities that maintain liquid-fueled vehicles and implement appropriate safety measures are protected with ventilation systems designed to capture liquid fuel vapors at or near floor level. To minimize the potential for ignition in the event of a spill, receptacles, electrical fixtures, and hot-work operations, such as welding, are located outside of these areas. Compressed natural gas (CNG) is composed of methane with slight amounts of heavier simple hydrocarbons. Maintenance facilities that maintain CNG vehicles indoors must be protected against fire and explosion. However, the means of ensuring safety are different from those employed for liquid fuels because of the gaseous nature of methane and the fact that it is lighter than air. Because CNG is lighter than air, a release will rise to the ceiling of the maintenance facility and quickly dissipate rather than remaining at or near floor level like liquid fuel vapors. Although some of the means of protection for CNG vehicle maintenance facilities are similar to those used for liquid-fueled vehicles (ventilation and elimination of ignition sources), the types and placement of the protection equipment are different because of the behavior of the different fuels. The nature of gaseous methane may also require additional safeguards, such as combustible gas detectors and control systems, or specialized space heating, which are not needed in facilities servicing liquid-fuel vehicles. This handbook covers maintenance facilities that service CNG-fueled vehicles. Although similar requirements are mandated for liquefied natural gas (LNG) or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) fueled vehicles, LNG and LPG are not covered in this handbook.

30 DIRECT ENERGY CONVERSION↗

DOE OSTI2021

Saltstone Waste Characterization Analysis - Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) Waste Stream (Q4 CY2020)

The Saltstone Production and Disposal Facility is designed and permitted by the state of South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) to treat and dispose of low-level radioactive and hazardous liquid waste (salt solution) remaining from the processing of radioactive material at the Savannah River Site (SRS). Low-level waste (LEW) aqueous streams from the Effluent Treatment Project (ETP) and decontaminated solutions from the Tank Closure Cesium Removal Unit (TCCR) and the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) are stored in Tank 50 until the LEW can be transferred to the Saltstone Facility for treatment and disposal. In the past, decontaminated solution from the Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit (MCU) was stored in Tank 50 until the LEW could be transferred to the Saltstone Facility for treatment and disposal. MCU is currently in a suspended operations state. LEW that meets the Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) can be transferred, stored, and treated in the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) for subsequent disposal as saltstone grout in the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Sampling will be conducted as new waste streams are identified for treatment and disposal at the Saltstone Industrial Wastewater Treatment Facility (IWTF) and Z-Area Industrial Solid Waste Landfill (ISWLF), Facility ID# 025500-1603, General Condition B.9 or every six years in accordance with South Carolina (SC) Regulation 61-107.19 Parti C, “Solid Waste Management: Solid Waste Landfills and Structural Fill - General Requirements.”

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DOE OSTI2025

April 2025 Semiannual Composite Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) Decontaminated Salt Solution (DSS) Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) Results

The aqueous waste from the Salt Waste Processing Facility is sampled semiannually for transfers to the Saltstone Production Facility. Salt solution is treated at the Saltstone Production Facility and disposed of in the Saltstone Disposal Facility. Per request of customer, X-TTR-Z-00027, Revision 0, one Saltstone Disposal Facility waste form was prepared at Savannah River National Laboratory using the Salt Waste Processing Facility Decontaminated Salt Solution and Z-area premix material for the April 2025 semiannual Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure sample. The sample contained 60:40 (by weight) of slag and fly ash (referred to as the “Cement-Free grout sample”). Results from the technical report support Task 2: ‘Grout Leaching Analyses’ of the Task Technical Request prepared by Savannah River Mission Completion. At 43 days cured, the Saltstone sample was collected and shipped to a certified laboratory for analysis using the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure. The April 2025 semiannual Cement-Free grout sample met the South Carolina Code of Regulations for Hazardous Waste Management Regulations 61-79.261.24 and 61-79.268.48 requirements for a non-hazardous waste form with respect to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals and Underlying Hazardous Constituents, and met the Saltstone Production Facility Waste Acceptance Criteria that was in effect at the time of the sample collection at the Salt Waste Processing Facility.

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DOE OSTI2015

Authorization to proceed with production engineering for the waste treatment and immobilization plant's high-level waste facility - 15595

The U.S. Department of Energy restricted certain engineering, procurement, and construction work on the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant's (WTP) Pretreatment Facility, and to a lesser degree the High-Level Waste (HLW) Facility in 2012 and early 2013 because of the impact of unresolved technical issues on the facility design, and a misalignment between the facility design and nuclear safety basis. The U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River Protection (ORP) needed a way to minimize project management risk, while continuing limited critical path construction work for the HLW Facility and resolving the technical and safety basis issues. ORP developed a process to systematically address and resolve the technical, management, and quality issues that led DOE to restrict HLW Facility production activities in 2012 and 2013. This process provided for a phased resumption of HLW engineering, procurement, and construction activities on an incremental basis and a final decision for release to full production. In August 2014, ORP provided authorization for the WTP contractor to resume all engineering work necessary to finalize the HLW Facility design. The decision to proceed with production engineering in the HLW Facility, representing the first of two decision points, was based on significant progress in resolving HLW technical issues and improving work processes to align the HLW design and safety basis. Full release for HLW equipment procurements and construction is forthcoming based on conditions that must be fully satisfied and demonstrated during a transition period expected to continue for the next few years. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Introduction on Recently Revised Regulatory Framework Related to Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities in Korea - 16488

There are 24 units of nuclear power reactors in operation and 4 units of nuclear power reactors under construction in Korea as of November 2015. However, there is no permanently shutdown nuclear power reactor and decommissioned or under decommissioning nuclear power reactor. There are only 2 research reactors being decommissioned since 1997. It is realized that improvement of the regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear facilities has been emphasized constantly from the point of view of IAEA's safety standards. IAEA published the safety requirement on decommissioning of facilities on July 2014; its title is the Safe Decommissioning of Facilities, General Safety Requirement Part 6. According to follow up action on the result of IAEA's Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission to Korea in 2011, regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear facilities in Korea was revised through comparing to IAEA safety standards. It was identified that items should be revised to improve the regulatory framework for decommissioning. Those are as follows: absence of legal definition of decommissioning, incomplete procedure for safety regulation after permanent shutdown, un-detailed acceptance criteria for decommissioning plan, incomplete requirements for early preparing and periodic update of decommissioning plan, un-detailed requirements on standard format and contents for decommissioning plan, and incomplete radiological criteria on site and building reuse after completion of decommissioning. Nuclear Safety Act related to decommissioning of nuclear facilities was revised and promulgated on 21 July 2015. As the lower statute of Nuclear Safety Act, Enforcement Decree of the Nuclear Safety Act and Enforcement Regulation of the Nuclear Safety Act were also revised and promulgated on 21 July 2015. In this paper, related to decommissioning of nuclear facilities such as nuclear power reactor, research or training reactor, and nuclear fuel cycle facility, it was introduced the main changes of the amended and promulgated Nuclear Safety Act on July 2015. It was also mentioned about the current issue in accordance with its implementation. Main contents of revised Nuclear Safety Act are that decommissioning plan should be submitted for nuclear installations to be constructed and operated, and this plan should be updated periodically. In addition, 3 years of grace period was set to submit preliminary decommissioning plan for the facility which has already been approved prior to July 2018. Preliminary decommissioning plan should be updated every 10 years, and regulatory body should review this document. According to the revised Nuclear Safety Act, in the case of a nuclear power reactor after the approval of the change on operating license for permanent shutdown, should submit final decommissioning plan within 5 years, and be approved by the regulatory body. On July 2015, Kori Unit 1 was determined not to apply its 2nd continued operation, and will expire in 2017. Kori Unit 1 will be the first case for the submission of final decommissioning plan. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2018

Decommissioning Concept of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facility - 18255

As the Korean Nuclear Safety Act was revised, it is urgent to prepare a decommissioning plan for the nuclear fuel cycle facilities operated by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, KAERI. First, the basic concepts necessary for dismantling each facility and the order of dismantling for each dismantling work were determined. In this paper, we consider the disassembly order of the nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as the post irradiation fuel examination facility, the research reactor fuel production facility, the radioactive waste treatment facility, the radioactive waste form examination facility. The decommissioning plan for the research nuclear fuel cycle facilities will be based on the abovementioned dismantling basic concept and disassembly sequences. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

The New Modular High-Energy X-ray Source Facility Shielding Design

Several new research facilities will soon be constructed as part of the creation of a new engineering complex on the campus of the University of Tennessee, Knoxville (UTK). As part of this renovation, a state of the art nuclear engineering building will be constructed. This building will include a critical experiment facility, a graphite pile, and a modular high-energy X-ray source (or accelerator facility). The proximity of these new facilities to UTK's football stadium brings heightened attention to their design and safety. An important aspect of this specific design is that shielding is required to contain the new radiation sources. The work completed will reflect the specific project planning and novel two-story facility design of the modular high-energy X-ray source. It will also provide a detailed shielding and dose analysis of the facility as a whole. The end design places an accelerator into a well-shielded room; it will then direct the x-ray beam through a collimating hole in the shielding wall into the next room. The x-ray beam is to be used as a part of a materials irradiation and imaging laboratory in the adjoining room. The design satisfies all regulatory requirements, and it will serve as the preliminary facility layout design and shielding analysis for a novel two-story modular high energy X-ray source facility. The dose rates calculated by the Monte Carlo models using the NCRP shielding thickness values are well below the dose limitations set by the State of Tennessee, which leaves room for optimization. Further work could be done to complete the optimization by reducing the shielding thickness while maintaining a dose below dose regulations by using a less conservative method for calculating the initial thicknesses. (authors)

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Update to the Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility - 20124

In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance. In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. In accordance with the guidance and recommendations in US DoE's technical standard for DAS, deterministic and probabilistic analyses were performed to demonstrate the SDF system, which includes the engineered cover system, the SDUs, the waste form, and the natural features of the site, provides a reasonable expectation that saltstone disposal will meet performance objectives. Post-closure doses to future members of the public (MOP) were evaluated; dose estimates from the air pathway were well below the 1.0 E-04 Sv/yr (10 mrem/yr) performance objective within 1,000 years, and the calculated doses to the MOP from all exposure pathways, including the groundwater and air pathways, were well below the 2.5 E-04 Sv/yr (25 mrem/yr) performance objective within 1,000 years. Doses following an assumed intrusion event within the facility boundaries were well below the IHI performance objectives, where the acute IHI dose was below the acute IHI dose performance objective of 5.0 E-03 Sv (500 mrem) and the chronic IHI dose was below the chronic IHI dose performance objective of 1.0 E-03 Sv/yr (100 mrem/yr) within 1,000 years. (author)

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DOE OSTI2020

On Temperature Limits for the Outer Surface of a Container in a Disposal Facility - 20313

The temperature in a disposal facility for high-level radioactive waste (HLRW) is an issue for safety. When the recommencement of the search for and selection of a site for a disposal facility for HLRW in Germany was stipulated by the Site Selection Act (StandAG 2017) in 2017, a precautionary temperature limit of 100 deg. C on the outer surface of the containers with high-level radioactive waste in the disposal facility section was set. This precautionary temperature limit shall be applied in preliminary safety analyses provided that the 'maximum physically possible temperatures' in the respective host rocks have not yet been determined due to pending research. Therefore, this issue is addressed and discussed in this paper, contributing to 'pending research' by a review of the literature. This paper briefly discusses a few examples of thermohydraulic, mechanical, chemical and biological processes in a disposal facility, because temperature limits are derived based on safety impacts regarding THMCB-processes. The temperature-dependent processes have been extracted from databases for features, events and processes (FEP-databases). Furthermore, it is discussed if the feasibility to retrieve and recover HLRW is hampered at high temperatures. A design temperature concerning single components of a disposal facility for the preservation of their features can be derived when a safety concept is established. However, the interactions of all relevant processes in a disposal concept must be considered to determine a specific temperature limit for the outer surface of the containers. Therefore, applicable temperature limits may vary for particular safety and disposal concepts in the following host rocks: rock salt, clay stone and crystalline rock. Technical solutions for retrieval and design options for recovery seem to be viable up to temperatures of 200 deg. C with different, sometimes severe, downsides according to expert judgement. Temperature limits regarding the outer surface of the containers can be derived specifically for each safety concept and design of the disposal facility in a host rock. General temperature limits without reference to specific safety concepts or the particular design of the disposal facility may narrow down the possibilities for optimisation of the disposal facility and could adversely affect the site selection process in finding the best suitable site. (authors)

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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Test Capabilities of the NASA Langley Direct Connect Supersonic Combustion Test Facility with Historical Perspective

In 1969, a combustion-heated direct-connect test facility was assembled at the NASA Langley Research Center to conduct basic research in ramjet and scramjet propulsion systems. The facility was initially used in assessing the mixing, ignition, flame holding, and combustion characteristics of various ramjet and scramjet combustors. Over the years, the facility was updated and modified to conduct increasingly longer and more complicated tests. Today, the facility is known as the Direct Connect Supersonic Combustion Test Facility and is part of the NASA Langley Scramjet Test Complex. More recently, the facility has been used by external customers to test fuel-cooled and uncooled, flight-like test articles. Tests have been conducted at ramjet flight conditions for up to 15 minutes of continuous operation. Even though the facility is nearly 50 years old, it remains a viable and useful tool in the support of various U.S. hypersonic programs.

direct connect test facility↗

DOE OSTI2016

Distance to Radiation Facility and Treatment Choice in Early-Stage Breast Cancer

Purpose: Breast-conserving therapy (BCT) is a recommended alternative to mastectomy (MT) for early-stage breast cancer. Limited access to radiation therapy (RT) may result in higher rates of MT. We assessed the association between distance to the nearest RT facility and the use of MT, in a modern cohort of women. Methods and Materials: Women with stage 0-II breast cancer eligible for BCT diagnosed from 2004 to 2010 were identified from the Florida Cancer Data System (FCDS). Distances from patient census tracts to the nearest RT facility census tract were calculated. Multivariate logistic regression was used to identify explanatory variables that influenced MT use. Results: Of the 27,489 eligible women, 32.1% (n=8841) underwent MT, and 67.8% (n=18,648) underwent BCS. Thirty-two percent of patients lived in a census tract that was >5 miles from an RT facility. MT use increased with increasing distance to RT facility (31.1% at ≤5 miles, 33.8% at >5 to <15 miles, 34.9% at 15 to <40 miles, and 51% at ≥40 miles, P<.001). The likelihood was that MT was independently associated with increasing distance to RT facility on multivariate analysis (P<.001). Compared to patients living <5 miles away from an RT facility, patients living 15 to <40 miles away were 1.2 times more likely to be treated with MT (odds ratio [OR]: 1.19, 95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.05-1.35, P<.01), and those living ≥40 miles away were more than twice as likely to be treated with MT (OR: 2.17, 95% CI: 1.48-3.17, P<.001). However, in patients younger than 50 years (n=5179), MT use was not associated with distance to RT facility (P=.235). Conclusions: MT use in a modern cohort of women is independently associated with distance to RT facility. However, for young patients, distance to RT is not a significant explanatory variable for MT use.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

DOE OSTI2014

Estimates of Radioxenon Released from Southern Hemisphere Medical isotope Production Facilities Using Measured Air Concentrations and Atmospheric Transport Modeling

Abstract The International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty monitors the atmosphere for radioactive xenon leaking from underground nuclear explosions. Emissions from medical isotope production represent a challenging background signal when determining whether measured radioxenon in the atmosphere is associated with a nuclear explosion prohibited by the treaty. The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) operates a reactor and medical isotope production facility in Lucas Heights, Australia. This study uses two years of release data from the ANSTO medical isotope production facility and Xe-133 data from three IMS sampling locations to estimate the annual releases of Xe-133 from medical isotope production facilities in Argentina, South Africa, and Indonesia. Atmospheric dilution factors derived from a global atmospheric transport model were used in an optimization scheme to estimate annual release values by facility. The annual releases of about 6.8×1014 Bq from the ANSTO medical isotope production facility are in good agreement with the sampled concentrations at these three IMS sampling locations. Annual release estimates for the facility in South Africa vary from 1.2×1016 to 2.5×1016 Bq and estimates for the facility in Indonesia vary from 6.1×1013 to 3.6×1014 Bq. Although some releases from the facility in Argentina may reach these IMS sampling locations, the solution to the objective function is insensitive to the magnitude of those releases.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

DOE OSTI2018

Standardizing Acquisition Path Analysis: Quantifying a State’s Ability to Establish and Clandestinely Operate an Undeclared Nuclear Facility of a Given Type

Acquisition path analysis is an important tool for developing safeguards strategies as it allows for the determination and assessment of all technically plausible paths a state may pursue to obtain weapons usable nuclear material. A state may obtain such material either through diverting declared material, misusing a declared facility to produce undeclared material, producing undeclared material in a clandestine facility, illicitly importing undeclared material, or combinations of these actions. In states with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has mechanisms in place to detect the diversion of declared material or the misuse of a declared facility for undeclared production, and it can adjust the frequency and intensity of those mechanisms to achieve specific detection probability and timeliness goals. The IAEA also has tools to look for and investigate indications of clandestine nuclear facilities or undeclared imports of nuclear material, but it only has limited control over the actual effectiveness of those measures. However, quantifying a state’s technical capability to establish and clandestinely operate an undeclared facility of a given type or to import nuclear material and quantifying the probability that it will evade detection are both much more difficult. By looking at a facility’s detection susceptibility as opposed to explicit detection probability, this research uses a new approach to score detection risks. Using these risks, along with a more structured approach to determine a state’s capability of establishing and operating a clandestine nuclear facility, this research develops a methodology to quantify a state’s ability to successfully construct and operate a clandestine facility without detection. This research considers the use of this methodology when evaluating each undeclared import path step.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗