Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “abort”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 397 records · Page 22
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2013

Development of the Orion Crew-Service Module Umbilical Retention and Release Mechanism

The Orion CSM umbilical retention and release mechanism supports and protects all of the cross-module commodities between the spacecrafts crew and service modules. These commodities include explosive transfer lines, wiring for power and data, and flexible hoses for ground purge and life support systems. The mechanism employs a single separation interface which is retained with pyrotechnically actuated separation bolts and supports roughly two dozen electrical and fluid connectors. When module separation is commanded, either for nominal on-orbit CONOPS or in the event of an abort, the mechanism must release the separation interface and sever all commodity connections within milliseconds of command receipt. There are a number of unique and novel aspects of the design solution developed by the Orion mechanisms team. The design is highly modular and can easily be adapted to other vehiclesmodules and alternate commodity sets. It will be flight tested during Orions Exploration Flight Test 1 (EFT-1) in 2014, and the Orion team anticipates reuse of the design for all future missions. The design packages fluid, electrical, and ordnance disconnects in a single separation interface. It supports abort separations even in cases where aerodynamic loading prevents the deployment of the umbilical arm. Unlike the Apollo CSM umbilical which was a destructive separation device, the Orion design is resettable and flight units can be tested for separation performance prior to flight.Initial development testing of the mechanisms separation interface resulted in binding failures due to connector misalignments. The separation interface was redesigned with a robust linear guide system, and the connector separation and boom deployment were separated into two discretely sequenced events. These changes addressed the root cause of the binding failure by providing better control of connector alignment. The new design was tuned and validated analytically via Monte Carlo simulation. The analytical validation was followed by a repeat of the initial test suite plus test cases at thermal extremes and test cases with imposed mechanical failures demonstrating fault tolerance. The mechanism was then exposed to the qualification vibration environment. Finally, separation testing was performed at full speed with live ordnance.All tests of the redesigned mechanism resulted in successful separation of the umbilical interface with adequate force margins and timing. The test data showed good agreement with the predictions of the Monte Carlo simulation. The simulation proved invaluable due to the number of variables affecting the separation and the uncertainty associated with each. The simulation allowed for rapid assessment of numerous trades and contingency scenarios, and can be easily reconfigured for varying commodity sets and connector layouts.

Separation↗
NASA NTRS2014

Analytical Assessment of Simultaneous Parallel Approach Feasibility from Total System Error

In a simultaneous paired approach to closely-spaced parallel runways, a pair of aircraft flies in close proximity on parallel approach paths. The aircraft pair must maintain a longitudinal separation within a range that avoids wake encounters and, if one of the aircraft blunders, avoids collision. Wake avoidance defines the rear gate of the longitudinal separation. The lead aircraft generates a wake vortex that, with the aid of crosswinds, can travel laterally onto the path of the trail aircraft. As runway separation decreases, the wake has less distance to traverse to reach the path of the trail aircraft. The total system error of each aircraft further reduces this distance. The total system error is often modeled as a probability distribution function. Therefore, Monte-Carlo simulations are a favored tool for assessing a "safe" rear-gate. However, safety for paired approaches typically requires that a catastrophic wake encounter be a rare one-in-a-billion event during normal operation. Using a Monte-Carlo simulation to assert this event rarity with confidence requires a massive number of runs. Such large runs do not lend themselves to rapid turn-around during the early stages of investigation when the goal is to eliminate the infeasible regions of the solution space and to perform trades among the independent variables in the operational concept. One can employ statistical analysis using simplified models more efficiently to narrow the solution space and identify promising trades for more in-depth investigation using Monte-Carlo simulations. These simple, analytical models not only have to address the uncertainty of the total system error but also the uncertainty in navigation sources used to alert an abort of the procedure. This paper presents a method for integrating total system error, procedure abort rates, avionics failures, and surveillance errors into a statistical analysis that identifies the likely feasible runway separations for simultaneous paired approaches.

Madden, Michael M.↗
NASA NTRS2012

State-Based Behavior Modeling of the Integrated SLS-MPCV System

In NASA's effort to foster a human spaceflight capability beyond Earth's orbit, two space systems are being developed - the Space Launch System (SLS) and the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV). As of this time, the interactions between the two systems during launch are not fully detailed. To remedy this situation, a Systems Engineering approach utilizing models was developed to investigate the behavior of the integrated SLS-MPCV stack during ascent and abort situations. Specifically, this innovative approach combines aspects of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) and state analysis to simultaneously model the physical, functional, and behavioral aspects of systems. This approach focuses solely on the interactions between the systems, leaving much of the internal workings of either system at a logical level (i.e., black box). By utilizing this newly defined approach, a behavior model for the integrated SLS-MPCV stack was developed, emphasizing only the subset of interactions between the systems that impact behavior. Finally, analysis is performed within the model to investigate requirements gaps and examine the execution times of key behaviors related to various ascent phases and abort scenarios. The work described in this paper is merely a portion of the outlined effort being undertaken for this project; only a segment of the SLS-MPCV system behavior will be described.

Space Launch System (SLS)↗
NASA NTRS2016

Concept of Operations for a Prospective "Proving Ground" in the Lunar Vicinity

NASA is studying a "Proving Ground" near the Moon to conduct human space exploration missions in preparation for future flights to Mars. This paper describes a concept of operations ("conops") for activities in the Proving Ground, focusing on the construction and use of a mobile Cislunar Transit Habitat capable of months-long excursions within and beyond the Earth-Moon system. Key elements in the conops include the Orion spacecraft (with mission kits for docking and other specialized operations) and the Space Launch System heavy-lift rocket. Potential additions include commercial launch vehicles and logistics carriers, solar electric propulsion stages to move elements between different orbits and eventually take them on excursions to deep space, a node module with multiple docking ports, habitation and life support blocks, and international robotic and piloted lunar landers. The landers might include reusable ascent modules which could remain docked to in-space elements between lunar sorties. The architecture will include infrastructure for launch preparation, communication, mission control, and range safety. The conops describes "case studies" of notional missions chosen to guide the design of the architecture and its elements. One such mission is the delivery of a ~10-ton pressurized element, co-manifested with an Orion on a Block 1B Space Launch System rocket, to the Proving Ground. With a large solar electric propulsion stage, the architecture could enable a year-long mission to land humans on a near-Earth asteroid. In the last case, after returning to near-lunar space, two of the asteroid explorers could join two crewmembers freshly arrived from Earth for a Moon landing, helping to safely quantify the risk of landing deconditioned crews on Mars. The conops also discusses aborts and contingency operations. Early return to Earth may be difficult, especially during later Proving Ground missions. While adding risk, limited-abort conditions provide needed practice for Mars, from which early return is likely to be impossible.

Love, Stanley G.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Development of a Mars Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS).

ECLS systems for very long-duration human missions to Mars will be designed to operate reliably for many years and will never be returned to Earth. The need for high reliability is driven by unsympathetic abort scenarios. Abort from a Mars mission could be as long as 450 days to return to Earth. Simply put, the goal of an ECLSS is to duplicate the functions the Earth provides in terms of human living and working on our home planet but without the benefit of the Earth's large buffers - the atmospheres, the oceans and land masses. With small buffers a space-based ECLSS must operate as a true dynamic system rather than independent processors taking things from tanks, processing them, and then returning them to product tanks. Key is a development process that allows for a logical sequence of validating successful development (maturation) in a stepwise manner with key performance parameters (KPPs) at each step; especially KPPs for technologies evaluated in a full systems context with human crews on Earth and on space platforms such as the ISS. This paper will explore the implications of such an approach to ECLSS development and the roles of ground and space-based testing necessary to develop a highly reliable life support system for long duration human exploration missions. Historical development and testing of ECLS systems from Mercury to the International Space Station (ISS) will be reviewed. Current work as well as recommendations for future work will be described.

Henninger, Donald L.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Integrated Human-in-the-Loop Ground Testing - Value, History, and the Future

Systems for very long-duration human missions to Mars will be designed to operate reliably for many years and many of these systems will never be returned to Earth. The need for high reliability is driven by the requirement for safe functioning of remote, long-duration crewed systems and also by unsympathetic abort scenarios. Abort from a Mars mission could be as long as 450 days to return to Earth. The key to developing a human-in-the-loop architecture is a development process that allows for a logical sequence of validating successful development in a stepwise manner, with assessment of key performance parameters (KPPs) at each step; especially important are KPPs for technologies evaluated in a full systems context with human crews on Earth and on space platforms such as the ISS. This presentation will explore the implications of such an approach to technology development and validation including the roles of ground and space-based testing necessary to develop a highly reliable system for long duration human exploration missions. Historical development and systems testing from Mercury to the International Space Station (ISS) to ground testing will be reviewed. Current work as well as recommendations for future work will be described.

Henninger, Donald L.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Launch and Landing of Russian Soyuz - Medical Support for US and Partner Astronauts

Launching, landing, flight route, expeditions, Soyuz, near Kazakhstan USOS Crew Surgeon -Quarantine and direct care to crew before launch, then present in close proximity to launch for abort. IP Crew Surgeon -same Deputy Crew Surgeon -Back up for crew surgeon, care for immediate family, stationed at airport for helicopter abort response Russian based US doctor -Coordinate with SOS staff USOS Crew Surgeon -Nominal helicopter response and initial medical care and support during return on gulfstreamIPcenter dotP Crew Surgeon -same Deputy Crew Surgeon -Ballistic helicopter support Russian based US doctor -Coordinate with SOS staff Direct return doctor -Direct medical care on return flight

Menon, Anil↗
NASA NTRS2018

Optimization of Second Fault Detection Thresholds to Maximize Mission POS

In order to support manned spaceflight safety requirements, the Space Launch System (SLS) has defined program-level requirements for key systems to ensure successful operation under single fault conditions. To accommodate this with regards to Navigation, the SLS utilizes an internally redundant Inertial Navigation System (INS) with built-in capability to detect, isolate, and recover from first failure conditions and still maintain adherence to performance requirements. The unit utilizes multiple hardware- and software-level techniques to enable detection, isolation, and recovery from these events in terms of its built-in Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) algorithms. Successful operation is defined in terms of sufficient navigation accuracy at insertion while operating under worst case single sensor outages (gyroscope and accelerometer faults at launch). In addition to first fault detection and recovery, the SLS program has also levied requirements relating to the capability of the INS to detect a second fault, tracking any unacceptable uncertainty in knowledge of the vehicle's state. This detection functionality is required in order to feed abort analysis and ensure crew safety. Increases in navigation state error and sensor faults can drive the vehicle outside of its operational as-designed environments and outside of its performance envelope causing loss of mission, or worse, loss of crew. The criteria for operation under second faults allows for a larger set of achievable missions in terms of potential fault conditions, due to the INS operating at the edge of its capability. As this performance is defined and controlled at the vehicle level, it allows for the use of system level margins to increase probability of mission success on the operational edges of the design space. Due to the implications of the vehicle response to abort conditions (such as a potentially failed INS), it is important to consider a wide range of failure scenarios in terms of both magnitude and time. As such, the Navigation team is taking advantage of the INS's capability to schedule and change fault detection thresholds in flight. These values are optimized along a nominal trajectory in order to maximize probability of mission success, and reducing the probability of false positives (defined as when the INS would report a second fault condition resulting in loss of mission, but the vehicle would still meet insertion requirements within system-level margins). This paper will describe an optimization approach using Genetic Algorithms to tune the threshold parameters to maximize vehicle resilience to second fault events as a function of potential fault magnitude and time of fault over an ascent mission profile. The analysis approach, and performance assessment of the results will be presented to demonstrate the applicability of this process to second fault detection to maximize mission probability of success.

Anzalone, Evan↗
NASA NTRS2018

The International Orion Spacecraft Is off Towards the Stars

Following a very successful year of manufacturing, assembly and testing in factories located around the globe, NASA and ESA are preparing to deliver the major Exploration Mission-1 (EM-1) Orion flight elements, including the Crew Module, ESA Service Module and Launch Abort System. This international effort to design and develop a deep space exploration capable human spacecraft is rapidly transitioning from the design, development and test phase to the early test flight and production phase. Two major flight tests, an Ascent Abort test and EM-1, Orion's first flight onboard NASA's new heavy lift Space Launch System, are planned for the near future. Further, Orion will play a crucial role in the ambitious new Deep Space Gateway human exploration Program. This paper gives a short overview of the system and subsystem configuration of the Orion spacecraft, including NASA and ESA contributions, a status of EM-1, AA-2 and EM-2 spacecraft production, and a look at Orion's role in the construction and operation of the Deep Space Gateway. The paper will also address the innovative international cooperation methods being employed to conduct Orion and Service Module integration.

Kirasich, Mark↗
NASA NTRS2020

Artificial Gravity in Mars Orbit for Crew Acclimation

NASA’s current baseline plan for a crewed Mars mission anticipates a transit time of up to three hundred days in microgravity and 3-14 days on the Martian surface for gravity acclimation before the crew can safely perform their first Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA). While there are multiple options for how initial surface operations will be performed, all current designs involve acclimation on the surface, and the impacts on the mission schedule, required supplies, and crew lander systems are significant. This paper proposes an alternative option utilizing artificial gravity, which offers benefits in terms of mission scope, mass savings, crew health, and long-term strategic vision. By moving the acclimation requirement to the orbiting habitat’s existing systems, rather than adding redundant systems to the lander, the Mars Descent Vehicle (MDV) can be a much smaller, simpler, and lighter design. Rather than the lander being designed to support crew for days, it would be mere hours. While ambitious, the concept of pre-acclimation in orbit can be not only safe and feasible, but done with fairly minimal changes to the planned architecture and overall mass requirements. The data used draws on decades of established research and demonstrates how this capability can be not only used for pre-acclimation, but also to support crew during early orbital-only missions, surface abort contingency scenarios, return-to-orbit abort scenarios, and as an early proof of capability into larger and more ambitious artificial gravity designs needed for extended exploration missions in the future.

Rowe, Justin↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

TPSAS-NF1676L-14919-DND

Manned spacecraft abort during ascent is a particularly unpleasant event. Not only does this represent a mission failure, but it can also be a very severe loading event on the crew. There are several dynamic events happening within a few hundred milliseconds while the vehicle is under aerodynamic-induced strain and possibly divergent control. Some of these events are spacecraft separation, abort motor ignitions, and aerodynamic variation. This paper will describe a methodology for implementing this analysis within a multi-body solution. Some generic examples will be shown along with some guidance on what parameters are important.

Isam S Yunis↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger tragedy was caused by an Apollo mistake, terminating risk analysis

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment. This led to decreasing understanding of risk. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in design.” The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the neglect of PRA. Continuing to neglect the mathematical estimation of risk led Shuttle into a high risk design that produced tragic results. The initial design of the Shuttle emphasized increasing capability and reducing cost without analysis or even mention of risk. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. … One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. … Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.” Not computing risk led to removing launch abort, removing crew escape, selecting less reliable Solid Rocket Boosters, placing the crew compartment next to the rocket boosters, and accepting more stressed shielding tile designs. Accepting these specific risks directly caused the shuttle disasters. The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a case of management failure. The focus is on the Challenger launch decision hours before, which is a dramatic example of bad management. However, the true cause of the Challenger disaster occurred decades earlier in the Apollo era. When the easily predictable failures occurred, failure investigations focused on how they might have been avoided. The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. The ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid a negative public reaction to realistic risk analysis.

Harry W. Jones↗
NASA NTRS1963

GEMINI LAUNCH ESCAPE

Simulation operation of gemini launch escape system, showing the launch sequence and pilot role in an abort action

GEMINI PROJECT↗
NASA NTRS1964

Launch-phase monitoring.

Launch phase real time monitoring in terms of landing point control in abort situation and safe trajectories

FLIGHT SAFETY↗
NASA NTRS2012

Mode Selection Techniques in Variable Mass Flexible Body Modeling

In developing a flexible body spacecraft simulation for the Launch Abort System of the Orion vehicle, when a rapid mass depletion takes place, the dynamics problem with time varying eigenmodes had to be addressed. Three different techniques were implemented, with different trade-offs made between performance and fidelity. A number of technical issues had to be solved in the process. This paper covers the background of the variable mass flexibility problem, the three approaches to simulating it, and the technical issues that were solved in formulating and implementing them.

Launch Abort System↗