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At least 397 records · Page 22
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1999

NASGRO 3.0: A Software for Analyzing Aging Aircraft

Structural integrity analysis of aging aircraft is a critical necessity in view of the increasing numbers of such aircraft in general aviation, the airlines and the military. Efforts are in progress by NASA, the FAA and the DoD to focus attention on aging aircraft safety. The present paper describes the NASGRO software which is well-suited for effectively analyzing the behavior of defects that may be found in aging aircraft. The newly revised Version 3.0 has many features specifically implemented to suit the needs of the aircraft community. The fatigue crack growth computer program NASA/FLAGRO 2.0 was originally developed to analyze space hardware such as the Space Shuttle, the International Space Station and the associated payloads. Due to popular demand, the software was enhanced to suit the needs of the aircraft industry. Major improvements in Version 3.0 are the incorporation of the ability to read aircraft spectra of unlimited size, generation of common aircraft fatigue load blocks, and the incorporation of crack-growth models which include load-interaction effects such as retardation due to overloads and acceleration due to underloads. Five new crack-growth models, viz., generalized Willenborg, modified generalized Willenborg, constant closure model, Walker-Chang model and the deKoning-Newman strip-yield model, have been implemented. To facilitate easier input of geometry, material properties and load spectra, a Windows-style graphical user interface has been developed. Features to quickly change the input and rerun the problem as well as examine the output are incorporated. NASGRO has been organized into three modules, the crack-growth module being the primary one. The other two modules are the boundary element module and the material properties module. The boundary-element module provides the ability to model and analyze complex two-dimensional problems to obtain stresses and stress-intensity factors. The material properties module allows users to store and curve-fit fatigue-crack growth data. On-line help and documentation are provided for each of the modules. In addition to the popular PC windows version, a unix-based X-windows version of NASGRO is also available. A portable C++ class library called WxWindows was used to facilitate cross-platform availability of the software.

Mettu, S. R.↗
DOE OSTI2022

UPDATES FROM THE INVOLUTE WORKING GROUP

The HFIR, RHF, and FRM II reactors represent a particular class of Research and Test Reactors that provide some of the most intense and continuous neutron fluxes for science, industry, and medical applications. These high-performance reactors have achieved compact cores by operating with Highly Enriched Uranium fuel (HEU, 235U/U ≥ 20 wt. %) and utilizing fuel plates curved as an involute. Due to the proliferation risks, the international community aims to reduce or eliminate, when possible, the use of HEU fuel in civilian facilities by converting them to a Low-Enriched Uranium fuel (LEU, 235U/U < 20 wt. %). Conversion of these reactors without significantly compromising their performance or safety is a challenging endeavor that can tremendously benefit from advanced computational tools and thus, eliminate unnecessary conservatism to ensure sufficient thermal margins. Therefore, models are being developed using modern Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) and Computational Structural Mechanics (CSM) software to evaluate the steady-state safety margins of various LEU designs instead of being reliant on the more traditional, conservative methods. To gain the confidence and acceptance of high-fidelity modeling by the nuclear regulators, Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and the involute reactors have formed an informal scientific group, the Involute Working Group (IWG). The IWG facilitates inter-organizational collaboration on experimental benchmarking, code-to-code comparisons, and Verification and Validation (V&V). This paper describes some of the recent IWG efforts in validating software against the existing experimental data, as well as code-to-code comparisons of different software used by the IWG members.

Bergeron, Aurelien↗
NASA NTRS2009

Connecting Research and Practice: An Experience Report on Research Infusion with SAVE

NASA systems need to be highly dependable to avoid catastrophic mission failures. This calls for rigorous engineering processes including meticulous validation and verification. However, NASA systems are often highly distributed and overwhelmingly complex, making the software portion of these systems challenging to understand, maintain, change, reuse, and test. NASA's systems are long-lived and the software maintenance process typically constitutes 60-80% of the total cost of the entire lifecycle. Thus, in addition to the technical challenges of ensuring high life-time quality of NASA's systems, the post-development phase also presents a significant financial burden. Some of NASA's software-related challenges could potentially be addressed by some of the many powerful technologies that are being developed in software research laboratories. Many of these research technologies seek to facilitate maintenance and evolution by for example architecting, designing and modeling for quality, flexibility, and reuse. Other technologies attempt to detect and remove defects and other quality issues by various forms of automated defect detection, architecture analysis, and various forms of sophisticated simulation and testing. However promising, most such research technologies nevertheless do not make the transition from the research lab to the software lab. One reason the transition from research to practice seldom occurs is that research infusion and technology transfer is difficult. For example, factors related to the technology are sometimes overshadowed by other types of factors such as reluctance to change and therefore prohibits the technology from sticking. Successful infusion might also take very long time. One famous study showed that the discrepancy between the conception of the idea and its practical use was 18 years plus or minus three. Nevertheless, infusing new technology is possible. We have found that it takes special circumstances for such research infusion to succeed: 1) there must be evidence that the technology works in the practitioner's particular domain, 2) there must be a potential for great improvements and enhanced competitive edge for the practitioner, 3) the practitioner has to have strong individual curiosity and continuous interest in trying out new technologies, 4) the practitioner has to have support on multiple levels (i.e. from the researchers, from management, from sponsors etc), and 5) to remain infused, the new technology has to be integrated into the practitioner's processes so that it becomes a natural part of the daily work. NASA IV&V's Research Infusion initiative sponsored by NASA's Office of Safety & Mission Assurance (OSMA) through the Software Assurance Research Program (SARP), strives to overcome some of the problems related to research infusion.

Lindvall, Mikael↗
NASA NTRS2022

Electrical Ground Support Equipment for the Sampling Caching System of the Mars 2020 Rover

In this work we describe in detail the architecture, design, testing and operation of the Electrical Ground Support Equipment (EGSE) “Blue Box” used to test and validate the Sampling Caching System (SCS) of the Mars 2020 Perseverance rover. The Blue Box architecture is centered around COTS motor controllers and COTS input-output modules communicating over an EtherCAT bus. A custom, low-level safety subsystem ensures no harm can be done to the flight articles. The modular architecture of the EGSE reduces cost and complexity while expediting assembly time. The Blue Box drives the 19 actuators of the SCS which span the main robotic arm, the corer system, the internal sample handling arm, the sample tube sealing system and the gas dust removal tool; mimicking the Rover Motor Control Assembly (RMCA). Due to the limited availability of RMCA’s, the EGSE enabled and performed the bulk of testing activities for SCS. The majority of the SCS actuators are composed of a 3-phase DC brushless motors, hall sensors for commutation, dual resolvers for output angular measurement, brakes, heaters and platinum thermistors. Additionally, the EGSE read 12 strain gauges forming part of a force torque sensor, and switches used for external positioning references. Over the 3-year span of the V&V campaign for the SCS, over 32 EGSE systems were built, tested and deployed to test venues at JPL and externally. The EGSE tested several families of the SCS subsystem, ranging from engineering units, life test units and two flight units. Test venues that this EGSE supported included lab benches, ultra-clean cleanrooms, ATLO facilities, and thermal vacuum chambers. Together with the test software systems, SSDEV and SSDEV-ECAT, the Blue Box EGSE enabled the team to efficiently test flight hardware and flight software together. We go over the safety features and fault management techniques employed to protect flight hardware. The effects of the long, 50-feet, EGSE harnesses on motor performance, EMI, electrical noise, and motor control performance are explained. Mitigations to these unwanted effects, including shielding strategy and inductance compensation, are summarized. We go over an excerpt of notable anomalies that this EGSE suffered through its operation, along with investigations and resolutions. Lessons learned, areas of improvement as part of future work, and recommendations for future implementations for similar EGSE’s, are shared.

Levine, Dan↗
NASA NTRS2002

Human performance cognitive-behavioral modeling: a benefit for occupational safety

Human Performance Modeling (HPM) is a computer-aided job analysis software methodology used to generate predictions of complex human-automation integration and system flow patterns with the goal of improving operator and system safety. The use of HPM tools has recently been increasing due to reductions in computational cost, augmentations in the tools' fidelity, and usefulness in the generated output. An examination of an Air Man-machine Integration Design and Analysis System (Air MIDAS) model evaluating complex human-automation integration currently underway at NASA Ames Research Center will highlight the importance to occupational safety of considering both cognitive and physical aspects of performance when researching human error.

Occupational Health↗
NASA NTRS2011

International Space Station (ISS) Risk Reduction Activities

As the assembly of the ISS nears completion, it is worthwhile to step back and review some of the actions pursued by the Program in recent years to reduce risk and enhance the safety and health of ISS crewmembers, visitors, and space flight participants. While the ISS requirements and initial design were intended to provide the best practicable levels of safety, it is always possible to reduce risk -- given the determination and commitment to do so. The following is a summary of some of the steps taken by the ISS Program Manager, by our International Partners, by hardware and software designers, by operational specialists, and by safety personnel to continuously enhance the safety of the ISS. While decades of work went into developing the ISS requirements, there are many things in a Program like the ISS that can only be learned through actual operational experience. These risk reduction activities can be divided into roughly three categories: (1) Areas that were initially noncompliant which have subsequently been brought into compliance or near compliance (i.e., Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris [MMOD] protection, acoustics) (2) Areas where initial design requirements were eventually considered inadequate and were subsequently augmented (i.e., Toxicity Level 4 materials, emergency hardware and procedures) (3) Areas where risks were initially underestimated, and have subsequently been addressed through additional mitigation (i.e., Extravehicular Activity [EVA] sharp edges, plasma shock hazards) Due to the hard work and cooperation of many parties working together across the span of nearly a decade, the ISS is now a safer and healthier environment for our crew, in many cases exceeding the risk reduction targets inherent in the intent of the original design. It will provide a safe and stable platform for utilization and discovery.

Fodroci, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2001

Automated Theorem Proving in High-Quality Software Design

The amount and complexity of software developed during the last few years has increased tremendously. In particular, programs are being used more and more in embedded systems (from car-brakes to plant-control). Many of these applications are safety-relevant, i.e. a malfunction of hardware or software can cause severe damage or loss. Tremendous risks are typically present in the area of aviation, (nuclear) power plants or (chemical) plant control. Here, even small problems can lead to thousands of casualties and huge financial losses. Large financial risks also exist when computer systems are used in the area of telecommunication (telephone, electronic commerce) or space exploration. Computer applications in this area are not only subject to safety considerations, but also security issues are important. All these systems must be designed and developed to guarantee high quality with respect to safety and security. Even in an industrial setting which is (or at least should be) aware of the high requirements in Software Engineering, many incidents occur. For example, the Warshaw Airbus crash, was caused by an incomplete requirements specification. Uncontrolled reuse of an Ariane 4 software module was the reason for the Ariane 5 disaster. Some recent incidents in the telecommunication area, like illegal "cloning" of smart-cards of D2GSM handies, or the extraction of (secret) passwords from German T-online users show that also in this area serious flaws can happen. Due to the inherent complexity of computer systems, most authors claim that only a rigorous application of formal methods in all stages of the software life cycle can ensure high quality of the software and lead to real safe and secure systems. In this paper, we will have a look, in how far automated theorem proving can contribute to a more widespread application of formal methods and their tools, and what automated theorem provers (ATPs) must provide in order to be useful.

Schumann, Johann↗
NASA NTRS2004

A Software Architecture for Semiautonomous Robot Control

A software architecture has been developed to increase the safety and effectiveness with which tasks are performed by robots that are capable of functioning autonomously but sometimes are operated under control by humans. The control system of such a robot designed according to a prior software architecture has no way of taking account of how the environment has changed or what parts of a task were performed during an interval of control by a human, so that errors can occur (and, hence, safety and effectiveness jeopardized) when the human relinquishes control. The present architecture incorporates the control, task-planning, and sensor-based-monitoring features of typical prior autonomous-robot software architectures, plus features for updating information on the environment and planning of tasks during control by a human operator in order to enable the robot to track the actions taken by the operator and to be ready to resume autonomous operation with minimal error. The present architecture also provides a user interface that presents, to the operator, a variety of information on the internal state of the robot and the status of the task.

Kortenkamp, David↗
NASA NTRS2016

Technical Reference Suite Addressing Challenges of Providing Assurance for Fault Management Architectural Design

Research into complexities of software systems Fault Management (FM) and how architectural design decisions affect safety, preservation of assets, and maintenance of desired system functionality has coalesced into a technical reference (TR) suite that advances the provision of safety and mission assurance. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IVV) Program, with Software Assurance Research Program support, extracted FM architectures across the IVV portfolio to evaluate robustness, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods applied to the architectures and designs. This investigation spanned IVV projects with seven different primary developers, a wide range of sizes and complexities, and encompassed Deep Space Robotic, Human Spaceflight, and Earth Orbiter mission FM architectures. The initiative continues with an expansion of the TR suite to include Launch Vehicles, adding the benefit of investigating differences intrinsic to model-based FM architectures and insight into complexities of FM within an Agile software development environment, in order to improve awareness of how nontraditional processes affect FM architectural design and system health management.

Fitz, Rhonda↗
NASA NTRS2016

Final Report of the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance Agile Benchmarking Team

To ensure that the NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) community remains in a position to perform reliable Software Assurance (SA) on NASAs critical software (SW) systems with the software industry rapidly transitioning from waterfall to Agile processes, Terry Wilcutt, Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) established the Agile Benchmarking Team (ABT). The Team's tasks were: 1. Research background literature on current Agile processes, 2. Perform benchmark activities with other organizations that are involved in software Agile processes to determine best practices, 3. Collect information on Agile-developed systems to enable improvements to the current NASA standards and processes to enhance their ability to perform reliable software assurance on NASA Agile-developed systems, 4. Suggest additional guidance and recommendations for updates to those standards and processes, as needed. The ABT's findings and recommendations for software management, engineering and software assurance are addressed herein.

Software Assurance↗
NASA NTRS2011

Long-Term International Space Station (ISS) Risk Reduction Activities

As the assembly of the ISS nears completion, it is worthwhile to step back and review some of the actions pursued by the Program in recent years to reduce risk and enhance the safety and health of ISS crewmembers, visitors, and space flight participants. While the initial ISS requirements and design were intended to provide the best practicable levels of safety, it is always possible to further reduce risk given the determination, commitment, and resources to do so. The following is a summary of some of the steps taken by the ISS Program Manager, by our International Partners, by hardware and software designers, by operational specialists, and by safety personnel to continuously enhance the safety of the ISS, and to reduce risk to all crewmembers. While years of work went into the development of ISS requirements, there are many things associated with risk reduction in a Program like the ISS that can only be learned through actual operational experience. These risk reduction activities can be divided into roughly three categories: Areas that were initially noncompliant which have subsequently been brought into compliance or near compliance (i.e., Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris [MMOD] protection, acoustics) Areas where initial design requirements were eventually considered inadequate and were subsequently augmented (i.e., Toxicity hazard level-4 materials, emergency procedures, emergency equipment, control of drag-throughs) Areas where risks were initially underestimated, and have subsequently been addressed through additional mitigation (i.e., Extravehicular Activity [EVA] sharp edges, plasma shock hazards). Due to the hard work and cooperation of many parties working together across the span of more than a decade, the ISS is now a safer and healthier environment for our crew, in many cases exceeding the risk reduction targets inherent in the intent of the original design. It will provide a safe and stable platform for utilization and discovery for years to come.

Forroci, Michael P.↗
NASA NTRS2007

The Dangers of Failure Masking in Fault-Tolerant Software: Aspects of a Recent In-Flight Upset Event

On 1 August 2005, a Boeing Company 777-200 aircraft, operating on an international passenger flight from Australia to Malaysia, was involved in a significant upset event while flying on autopilot. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau's investigation into the event discovered that an anomaly existed in the component software hierarchy that allowed inputs from a known faulty accelerometer to be processed by the air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU) and used by the primary flight computer, autopilot and other aircraft systems. This anomaly had existed in original ADIRU software, and had not been detected in the testing and certification process for the unit. This paper describes the software aspects of the incident in detail, and suggests possible implications concerning complex, safety-critical, fault-tolerant software.

Johnson, C. W.↗
DOE OSTI2021

SAM Co-Development to Support Fluoride-salt-cooled High-temperature Reactor Design and Licensing (CRADA 2018-18177 Final Report)

This project aims to raise the SAM code's technical and commercial maturity level to enable the Kairos Power ("Kairos") to use SAM to support its KP-FHR design analysis and licensing application. Argonne National Laboratory ("Argonne") has actively developed and maintained SAM, a modern system-level analysis tool for advanced nonlight water reactors safety analysis. Kairos is currently actively pursuing development of an FHR design and associated technology, and consequently requires a pedigreed safety analysis tool. The purpose of this project is to increase the maturity of the SAM code for the modeling and simulation of the KP-FHR design, thus enabling its use in safety analyses that support licensing application. Argonne will primarily be responsible for software design, development, and testing; while Kairos will be responsible for software requirements, assessment of software capabilities, needs, gaps, and priorities, and development of proprietary models. The research and development activities for the joint SAM development project include: a series of identification and prioritization studies on design characteristics, event sequences, relevant phenomena, and software capabilities; SAM capability enhancements for specific KP-FHR systems and components; performing code verification and validations; integrating uncertainty quantification (UQ), model calibration, and sensitivity analysis (SA) techniques in safety analyses; and raising the software quality rigor level for commercial-grade applications.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

SCALE Newsletter (Number 52, Spring 2020)

SCALE Newsletter is published by the Reactor and Nuclear Systems Division of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This issue, number 52 from Spring of 2020, holds information about the current state, planned updates, and previews of the SCALE system designed and maintained by ORNL staff. This issue contains employee spotlights for Dr. Kursat Bekar as well as Dr. Andrew M. Holcomb and displays data and charts from new/updated features of SCALE such as new data libraries, Fulcrum 3D visualizations, and interactions with ENDF/B-VIII.0 data.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
NASA NTRS1976

Mission Control Center (MCC) System Specification for the Shuttle Orbital Flight Test (OFT) Timeframe

System specifications to be used by the mission control center (MCC) for the shuttle orbital flight test (OFT) time frame were described. The three support systems discussed are the communication interface system (CIS), the data computation complex (DCC), and the display and control system (DCS), all of which may interfere with, and share processing facilities with other applications processing supporting current MCC programs. The MCC shall provide centralized control of the space shuttle OFT from launch through orbital flight, entry, and landing until the Orbiter comes to a stop on the runway. This control shall include the functions of vehicle management in the area of hardware configuration (verification), flight planning, communication and instrumentation configuration management, trajectory, software and consumables, payloads management, flight safety, and verification of test conditions/environment.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1998

Nimbus/TOMS Science Data Operations Support

Projected goals include the following: (1) Participate in and provide analysis of laboratory and in-flight calibration of LTV sensors used for space observations of backscattered LTV radiation; (2) Provide support to the TOMS Science Operations Center, including generating instrument command lists and analysis of TOMS health and safety data; (3) Develop and maintain software and algorithms designed to capture and process raw spacecraft and instrument data, convert the instrument output into measured radiance and irradiances, and produce scientifically valid products; (4) Process the TOMS data into Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 data products; (5) Provide analysis of the science data products in support of NASA GSFC Code 916's research.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1998

Nimbus/TOMS Science Data Operations Support

1. Participate in and provide analysis of laboratory and in-flight calibration of UV sensors used for space observations of backscattered UV radiation. 2. Provide support to the TOMS Science Operations Center, including generating instrument command lists and analysis of TOMS health and safety data. 3. Develop and maintain software and algorithms designed to capture and process raw spacecraft and instrument data, convert the instrument output into measured radiance and irradiances, and produce scientifically valid products. 4. Process the TOMS data into Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 data products. 5. Provide analysis of the science data products in support of NASA GSFC Code 916's research.

Childs, Jeff↗
NASA NTRS2004

Abstraction and Assume-Guarantee Reasoning for Automated Software Verification

Compositional verification and abstraction are the key techniques to address the state explosion problem associated with model checking of concurrent software. A promising compositional approach is to prove properties of a system by checking properties of its components in an assume-guarantee style. This article proposes a framework for performing abstraction and assume-guarantee reasoning of concurrent C code in an incremental and fully automated fashion. The framework uses predicate abstraction to extract and refine finite state models of software and it uses an automata learning algorithm to incrementally construct assumptions for the compositional verification of the abstract models. The framework can be instantiated with different assume-guarantee rules. We have implemented our approach in the COMFORT reasoning framework and we show how COMFORT out-performs several previous software model checking approaches when checking safety properties of non-trivial concurrent programs.

Chaki, S.↗