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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Uncertainty Analysis of Inhalation Dose Coefficients for Nuclear Incident Response

This study addressed the need to characterize variability in inhalation dose coefficients due to uncertainties in respiratory tract deposition, systemic biokinetics, and physiological parameters. A Python-based implementation of the International Commission on Radiological Protection Publication 66 Human Respiratory Tract Model was developed called the Radiological Exposure Dose Calculator (REDCAL) to propagate parameter uncertainty.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Basis for Dose and Reactor Safety Design Criteria for Army Regulation AR 50–7 and DA Pamphlet

This report describes the basis used to develop the radiological dose acceptance and design criteria contained in the draft updates to Army Regulation 50–7 (AR 50–7) Army Reactor Program and its accompanying draft Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (PAM), Army Reactor Program Procedures. These criteria will apply to Army nuclear reactors that fall under AR 50–7 and its accompanying DA PAM and ensure alignment with the overall objectives of the Army Reactor Program. The development basis for the radiological dose and design criteria supports a modern, technology-neutral, risk-informed, and performance-based approach to Army regulation of reactors and the demonstration of “adequate protection of the public.” To establish these criteria that support the Army’s unique operational requirements, multiple well-known and well-established standards and their supporting documentation were reviewed to ensure consistency with existing regulatory safety levels, including guidance from U.S. and international sources. These include the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) regulations and policy, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission’s (CNSC’s) regulatory documents, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) safety standards, as well as industry input that is tailored specifically to advanced microreactors. This report walks through the key definitions and associated references used for these criteria, which are outlined in Section 2.0. Based on these definitions, the dose acceptance criteria were established for various receptors for routine reactor operations (Section 3.2), design basis accidents (Section 3.3), and beyond design basis accidents (Section 3.4). Comparisons of multiple national and international dose limits are provided in these sections. Lastly, Section 4.0 outlines the reactor safety design criteria contained in the draft DA PAM and their associated bases.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Using Best Basis Inventory Data to Direct Strategies for Real-Time Monitoring of Hanford High Level Waste

The proposed Direct Feed High Level Waste (DFHLW) approach for processing high-level tank waste at Hanford is intended to reduce processing time by bypassing the Pretreatment Facility and transferring waste directly from the tank farm to the WTP HLW vitrification facility. This processing strategy could reduce or eliminate the washing and leaching steps that would have occurred in the Pretreatment facility. Operation of the vitrification facility is subject to chemical and radiological limits protecting safety (e.g. Waste Acceptance Criteria, or WACs) and process quality (e.g. Process Control Limits, or PCLs). Without washing and leaching, there is a greater risk of exceeding the WACs and PCLs. Hanford process engineers have devised blending strategies based on known chemical and radiological composition, volumes, and solids loadings of individual layers within each waste tank. These blending campaigns succeed in predicting a processing strategy that does not exceed the WACs and PCLs. However, the calculations do not ascribe uncertainties to the tank analysis data, quantities of material taken from the tanks to make the blend, or potential for mixing of layers within tanks. In order to confirm that a process strategy is working, it would be advantageous to have inline or at-line analytical instrumentation installed in the processing facilities that deliver measurement results in real time.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Bioaccumulation Factor for Radium in Rio Grande Biota

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or Laboratory) Environmental Protection and Compliance Division’s Environmental Stewardship Group (EPC-ES) performs the radiological analysis portion of biota dose assessments using the computer program RESRAD-Biota (DOE 2004, DOE 2020). RESRAD-Biota uses a default bioaccumulation factor, B iv , for radium in aquatic animals. This bioaccumulation factor, also listed in Department of Energy (DOE) Standard, DOE-STD-1153-2019, is the ratio of a radionuclide concentration in fresh weight biota to the environment in which it resides, which for aquatic animals is water. DOE-STD-1153-2019 offers conservative values for these ratios that are specific to the radiological contaminant, the biota, and the environment. The B iv in RESRAD-Biota can be used for general screening (Level 1 screening). If the factor proves to be too conservative, then a site-specific B iv may be used. The biota dose assessment of fish from the northern New Mexico region of the Rio Grande fail the general screen, which indicates that further analysis is necessary. Level 2 analysis is site-specific but still has conservative limitations. Level 3 analysis is a more realistic and representative, sitespecific analysis. The purpose of this paper is to use data specific to the Rio Grande to calculate a new aquatic animal radium B iv . This B iv can then be used for Level 3 analysis of aquatic animals specifically in the northern New Mexico region of the Rio Grande. The calculated radium B iv is a useful value for performing detailed, accurate biota dose assessments and calculating dose to fish using RESRAD-Biota when only sediment data are available.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Regulatory Considerations for Domestic Reprocessing Facility Physical Security

U.S. advanced non-light-water reactor vendors may pursue collocated on-site reprocessing activities. Therefore, these facilities are likely to possess formula quantities, or Category I quantities, of special nuclear material (SNM) during normal operations. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC) has yet to formally establish a regulatory framework for commercial reprocessing. While Category I requirements would explicitly not apply in this circumstance under current regulatory requirements, regulatory certainty does not exist. A novel framework should be developed to ensure public health and safety while also risk-informing the physical security requirements. This report reviews the relevant background of related rulemaking activities and proposes risk-informed physical protection requirements to satisfy these objectives. Insights from NRC security-related rulemaking activities provide a substantial technical basis to approach potential establishment of physical security requirements for reprocessing facilities. If a licensee can provide justification that the material satisfies a sufficient self-protecting radiation dose threshold, the material may not be subject to theft or diversion requirements and only potential sabotage requirements would apply. Furthermore, if the material can be justified to be moderately dilute, a set of risk-informed requirements could provide adequate protection of public health and safety. A revised performance objective for prevention of theft of moderately dilute Category I SNM may be detection to allow prompt recovery by a local law enforcement agency. However, a significant caveat to the proposed categorization scheme is the unknown integration of radiological sabotage with requirements for the protection against theft. Future licensees should consult with the NRC regarding treatment of this regulatory topic. Additionally, the self-protecting radiation dose threshold (either the existing or a proposed future threshold) would need to be considered. An integrated approach may apply graded potential requirements for protection against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage currently applicable to commercial nuclear power plants and Category I SNM facilities defined within 10 CFR 73.1(a).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Development of PNNL’s Plutonium Metallography Capability

The goal of this project was to develop plutonium metallography capabilities and establish workflows for characterization at PNNL’s Radiological Processing Facility (RPL). Developing and expanding on this capability opens more opportunities for PNNL to better support science through collaborations with other labs, plants, and sites withing the Department of Energy Complex and through programs within the National Nuclear Security Administration. This project established metallography equipment in an air glovebox, polishing protocols, as well as radiological and facility controls and procedures so that gram quantities of plutonium metal could be analyzed on multiple characterization tools. Data was collected and analyzed on two different delta phase plutonium - Gallium samples and a calciothermically reduced alpha plutonium metal using a combination of optical and electron microscopy, powder X-ray diffraction, and atom probe tomography. This report highlights the metallography capabilities, some preliminary data collections, and plans at PNNL to support plutonium material science.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2025

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Zero Trust Framework: CWMD Zero Trust Principles Model

The research focuses on the critical need for enhanced cybersecurity within the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office, specifically targeting Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear devices. Traditional perimeter-based security models are insufficient against modern cyber threats, prompting a shift toward Zero Trust principles (ZTP) that emphasize continuous verification and stringent security for all devices. Federal directives mandate the adoption of Zero Trust (ZT) across agencies, supported by guidelines from National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and National Security Agency (NSA). The research involved mapping ZT guidance from these agencies to develop tailored CWMD ZTP. The study identified gaps and areas for improvement, including clear transitional guidance from traditional to ZT architectures and the focus on explicit cross cutting capabilities. Design improvements are recommended to ensure increased comprehensive protection and resilience against sophisticated cyber threats for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) devices. Collaborative efforts among federal agencies are essential for the successful deployment of an optimized ZT guidance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2026

User’s Manual for RESRAD-RDD&IND Code Version 2: Vol. 2—User’s Guide for RESRAD-RDD&IND Code

Version 2.0 of the RESRAD-RDD&IND computer code is designed to support the implementation of protective action guides (PAGs) after a nuclear emergency incident including a radiological dispersal device (RDD) and/or an improvised nuclear device (IND) incident (EPA 2017). Eight different group types, addressing various decisions, are available for selection. The RESRAD-RDD&IND code calculates radiological doses, stay times, etc., for the selected group that the user wishes to focus on. (That is, the results for all the groups are not calculated simultaneously, and the input for those other groups do not matter, although some parameter values are shared between groups.) Version 2.0 has a user-friendly interface so that the RESRAD-RDD&IND code can be used with minimal training. For example, the user can select the major characteristics of the problem-event type, source term, and decision type from the left side of the interface and then calculate the results with the default assumptions for the exposure scenarios. More in-depth analysis would include specifying site-specific exposure scenario characteristics in the right side of the interface. The procedures for data entry and results viewing are self-explanatory. This is because common window maneuvering features and text instructions were incorporated in the interface design. General and context-specific help are available to aid users entering parameter values, as well. The RESRAD-RDD&IND computer code gives the user the option to select either an RDD or IND incident for analysis. For an RDD event analysis, 11 radionuclides (Am-241, Cf-252, Cm-244, Co-60, Cs-137, Ir-192, Po-210, Pu-238, Pu-239, Ra-226, and Sr-90) are included. These 11 radionuclides are the radionuclides most likely used for an RDD. More than 90 radionuclides can be selected for an IND event analysis. Initial default concentrations are provided for 44 radionuclides for a uranium-fueled IND event. These 44 radionuclides are those that would contribute significantly to the radiation dose associated with a uranium-fueled bomb detonation. The radionuclides generated from ingrowth of these 44 initial radionuclides are also automatically included in the analysis. Pu-239, Cs-134m, Ru-105, and Rb-89 and their progeny can be selected for analysis if they are detected and their concentrations are determined. This user’s guide, which is Volume 2 of the User’s Manual for RESRAD-RDD&IND Code Version 2, provides instructions to users on how to install the RESRAD-RDD&IND code, navigate the interface, and use the various features, including those discussed above, to set up an analysis and view/print the results in text outputs. Volume 1 of the User’s Manual for RESRAD-RDD&IND Code Version 2 (Yu et al. 2026), which contains descriptions of the methodology and theoretical basis for dose modeling and the mathematical equations implemented in the code, can be accessed and viewed through the Help menu in the code or can be downloaded from the RESRAD website (https://resrad.evs.anl.gov).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Urban Deployment Model: A Toolset for the Simulation and Performance Characterization of Radiation Detector Deployments in Urban Environments

Static and mobile radiation detectors can be deployed in urban environments for a range of nuclear security applications, including radiological source search-and-tracking scenarios. Modeling detector performance for such applications is challenging, as it does not depend solely on the detector capabilities themselves. Many factors must be taken into consideration, including specific source and background signatures, the topology and constraints of the deployment environment, the presence of nuisance sources, and whether detectors are mobile or static. When considering the simultaneous deployment of multiple, heterogeneous detectors, assessment of the system-wide performance requires the simulation of the individual detectors, and a system-level analysis of the detection performance. In radiological source search-and-tracking scenarios, performance is mostly dominated by the probability of encounter, which depends on the specifics of a given deployment, e.g., static vs. mobile detectors or a combination of both modalities, the number of detectors deployed, the dynamic vs. static setting of false alarm rates, and individual vs. networked operation. The Urban Deployment Model (UDM) toolset was specifically developed to cover the gap in the available generic frameworks for the simulation of radiation detector deployments at city scales. UDM provides a unified and modular framework to support the simulation and performance characterization of heterogeneous detector deployments in urban environments. This paper presents the key components along the UDM workflow.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Computational Fluid Dynamics Modeling to Facilitate Qualification of Stack Sampling Probe Location

Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modeling was used to help evaluate modifications to a radiological effluent stack and assist with establishing a stack sampling location that met the mixing criteria for qualification. Requirements for stack sampling location are listed in the American National Standards Institute/Health Physics Society (ANSI/HPS) N13.1-2021 standard. Modeling was performed to help develop a suitable design for increasing building ventilation for the radiological effluent stack. The ANSI/HPS N13.1-2021 criteria for the air monitoring probe location are that the coefficient of variation of velocity uniformity, gaseous tracer uniformity, and particulate tracer uniformity must be less than or equal to 20%. Furthermore, no point in the sampling location may have a gaseous tracer concentration that varies from the mean concentration by more than 30%. Additionally, the flow angle at the sampling location must not be more than 20 degrees. The ANSI/HPS N13.1-2021 standard allows for models (physical or computational) to be employed to perform the full suite of qualification tests, followed by a more limited set of verification tests on the actual stack to qualify the stack sampling location. Here, a series of computational model simulations were employed to evaluate the stack qualification criteria. Significant time and re-source savings are achieved using CFD modeling. CFD modeling demonstrated that the stack meets the criteria at the sample probe location. Verification tests were performed on the modified stack to measure the velocity uniformity and flow angle at the stack sampling location, and results demonstrated that the CFD model results may be used to support the qualification of the stack sampling location.

Air Monitoring↗
DOE OSTI2020

INTEGRATION OF FLEX EQUIPMENT AND OPERATOR ACTIONS IN PLANT FORCE-ON-FORCE MODELS WITH DYNAMIC RISK ASSESSMENT

The overall operation and maintenance cost to protect nuclear power plants accounts for approximately 7% of the total cost of power generation, with labor accounting for half of this cost. In the current research, from interaction with utilities and other stakeholders, it was determined that physical security forces account for nearly 20% of the entire workforce at several nuclear power plants. Labor costs continue to rise in the U.S., so any measures to reduce the cost of operating a nuclear power plant will need to include a reduction in labor. The physical security pathway within the DOE’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability program aims to lower the cost of physical security through directed research into modeling and simulation, application of advanced sensors or deployment of advanced weapons. This report presents a modeling and simulation framework for integrating Diverse and Flexible Mitigation Capability (FLEX) portable equipment performance with Force on Force models of a plant’s physical security posture. The generic framework is described in detail, followed by a case study of modeling an adversarial attack aimed at causing a radiological release by sabotaging the plant’s power supply and its ultimate heat sink capabilities at a hypothetical nuclear power plant. Two different FLEX deployment strategies, series and parallel, are modeled with distinct timelines. The results of the adversarial attack modeled in a commercial Force on Force tool are integrated with the FLEX deployment model in INL’s dynamic modeling tool EMRALD. Monte Carlo simulation is used to model the distribution of the timeline in FLEX deployment strategies. The results demonstrate that, even in the extreme case of a successful adversarial attack, deployment of FLEX equipment can result in a significantly high likelihood of preventing radiological release. The modeling and simulation framework integrating FLEX equipment with Force on Force models enables the nuclear power plants to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Methodology and Application of Physical Security Effectiveness Based on Dynamic Force-on-Force Modeling

This report describes the research and development being performed at INL towards a dynamic modeling and simulation framework to enable physical security optimization at commercial nuclear power plants. The framework is based on the dynamic modeling tool EMRALD and is demonstrated for applications that can result in physical security optimization. Two main applications are presented: 1. Integrating FLEX portable equipment performance with FOF models of a plant’s physical security posture, and 2. Location optimization of bullet resistant enclosure. The generic framework for modeling FLEX portable equipment is described in detail, followed by a case study modeling an adversarial attack aimed at causing a radiological release by sabotaging the plant’s power supply and its ultimate heat sink capabilities at a hypothetical PWR. Two distinct FLEX deployment strategies, series and parallel, are modeled with distinct timelines. The results of the adversarial attack modeled in a commercial FOF tool, AVERT, are integrated with the FLEX deployment model in EMRALD. Monte Carlo simulation is used to model the distribution of the timeline in FLEX deployment strategies. Thermal-hydraulic analysis of FLEX performance is performed in RELAP5 and integrated with the EMRALD simulations to provide more realistic timelines in the models. The results demonstrate that, even in the extreme case of a successful adversarial attack, deployment of FLEX equipment can result in a significantly high likelihood of preventing radiological release. The modeling and simulation framework of integrating FLEX equipment with FOF models enables the NPPs to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security. The objective of location optimization of BRE is to determine the best location in the plant for a new BRE being planned by the plant to enhance their physical security effectiveness. The plant physical security FOF model is integrated with EMRALD that performs Monte Carlo simulation to run different attack scenarios and a discrete set of potential BRE locations. Sensitivity analysis is used to determine the most effective location for the BRE. The optimization approach can be extended to wide applications such as location optimization of remotely operated weapons and other strategic fixed assets.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Multilevel Approach To Addressing Emerging Technologies In Nuclear Security

Emerging technologies present a unique set of challenges to operators and regulators. Although emerging technologies can be used to strengthen nuclear security systems, they also can increase risks to nuclear facilities. The disruptive nature of emerging technologies could also leave operators unprepared for threats to nuclear materials or facilities. To address the potentially dangerous consequences associated with these innovations, strong adaptive mechanisms and international cooperation on threat mitigation and technological integration are vital. This paper examines the nuclear security implications of emerging technologies from an institutional (as opposed to technology-specific) perspective. Drawing on insights from a recent workshop series hosted by the Stimson Center and the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Global Material Security, as well as research funded by Global Material Security and separate research conducted by Stimson, the paper begins with a definition of emerging technology that bounds the scope of the problem while leaving some margin for expert interpretation. The subsequent sections highlight the challenges as well as potential benefits that these technologies pose at each level of the nuclear security establishment, from the operators of sites hosting radiological or nuclear material, to regulators and national policy makers, to international institutions. Each section also includes specific recommendations for incorporating emerging technologies into radiological and nuclear security planning.

Andrews, Ian↗
DOE OSTI2020

Emulating Variable Uranium Enrichments With Radiation Signature Training Devices (RSTD)

Radiological signature training devices (RSTDs) are sealed sources (or assemblies of sources) that emulate the radiation signature of larger masses of special nuclear material for passive detection while maintaining a minimal logistical footprint in security, radiological safety, criticality safety, and transportation requirements. Previous work focused on emulation of large quantities of highly enriched uranium for search and field identification with radioisotope identification detectors and mobile systems. New work has expanded into investigating use of the RSTDs with laboratory safeguards tools, such as MGAU and FRAM, and emulating uranium spectra of multiple enrichments over more energy regions (particularly the x-ray region).

Blessinger, Christopher S.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Nuclear Remote System Design: Radiation and Electronics

Idaho National Laboratory has unique opportunities to examine fuels, materials, and experiment inside of the available radiological hot cells. Due to the uninhabitable nature of a hot cell environment, everything done inside of the hot cell is operated remotely. Remote operations are optimized by Nuclear Remote System Design (NRSD). NRSD is the designing, altering, or configuring of structures, items, and systems that will be placed into radiological environments.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2023

Analyzing Insider Risk Threat to the Internet of Things (IoT)

Recent technological advancement has created a growing convergence of innovation. From machine learning to ubiquitous computing to wireless networks and automation, the world is seeing new technology increasingly capable of connecting with each other. Devices and systems use open communications networks to interact, process information, and react. This is called the Internet of Things (IoT) and is comprised of physical devices that exchange data over networks, creating revolutionary possibilities. The most common way most people interact with an IoT is through ‘smart home’ products like Amazon’s Alexa, which use microphones, speakers, and phones to control a variety of devices, from lights and thermostats, to cameras, to appliances and vacuum cleaners. But the open nature of IoT networks—necessary for their ability to communicate and operate—also introduces privacy and security concerns. At a personal level, this might mean a hack into a home to steal private information, but when applied in broader industries like healthcare, transportation, manufacturing, or the military, this vulnerability can have serious consequences. As IoT usage and interconnectivity increases, so too does the susceptibility to malicious actors. And the entire system is only as secure as its least secure member. This creates particular risk and vulnerability to radiological material industries, as a competent insider adversary could utilize the IoT to potentially steal or access classified or sensitive information about employees, sites, or systems; or simply sabotage security or maintenance from a more remote—and less secure—device. The IoT relies on a secure network across the entire system, especially in transport which may lack the security of more permanent locations; if one device fails, it can create a ripple effect and an insider threat may seek to exploit that connectivity. While IoT benefits drive increased innovation and usage, there are also vulnerabilities an insider threat could exploit; this risk of an IoT to radiological material must be addressed in any mitigation effort.

Kinney, Justin↗
DOE OSTI2020

Low Level Radon Concentration and Radon Daughter Dose Monitoring in an Arid-zone Waste Store - 20081

Radioactive waste containing predominantly soil and rubble from the clean-up of a former uranium and thorium minerals processing research facility is currently stored at the Woomera Test Range in South Australia awaiting final disposal. Prior to commencing any manipulation of the nearly 10,000 waste drums (205 L or 55 gallon each), radon concentration monitoring and radon daughter dosimetry has been undertaken to (i) gain understanding of the temporal and spatial variation of radon and its daughters within the storage facility, which could provide insights into the radiological source term and (ii) confirm that radiological risks to workers are below the guideline values. A time series of nearly 12 months of detailed observations shows low level radon concentrations with annual average values that are slightly above the average radon concentrations in Australian homes. Peak values in summer are about three times higher than the annual average based on the CRM measurements. Both radon concentrations and annual effective dose are well below the regulatory limits. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗