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At least 397 records · Page 22

Safety aspects of dry spent fuel storage and spent fuel management

As with the storage of all radioactive materials, the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) must conform to safety requirements. Safety aspects like safe enclosure of radioactive materials, safe removal of decay heat, nuclear criticality safety and avoidance of unnecessary radiation exposure must be achieved throughout the storage period. The implementation of these safety requirements can be achieved by dry storage of SF and HLW in casks as well as in other systems such as dry vault storage systems or spent fuel pools, where the latter is neither a dry nor a passive system. After the events of Fukushima, the advantages of passively and inherently safe dry storage systems have become more obvious. TUV and BAM, who work as independent experts for the competent authorities, present the licensing process for sites and casks and inform about spent nuclear fuel management and issues concerning dry storage of spent nuclear fuel, based on their long experience in these fields. All safety relevant issues like safe enclosure, shielding, removal of the decay heat or behavior of cask and building under accident conditions are checked and validated with state-of-the-art methods and computer codes before the license approval. It is shown how dry storage systems can ensure the compliance with the mentioned safety criteria over a long storage period. Exemplarily, the process of licensing, erection and operation of selected German dry storage facilities is presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Opportunities for Cost Effective Disposal of Radioactively Contaminated Solid Waste on the Oak Ridge Reservation, Oak Ridge, TN - 13045

Department of Energy (DOE) requirements for the release of non-real property, including solid waste, containing low levels of residual radioactive materials are specified in DOE Order 458.1 and associated guidance. Authorized limits have been approved under the requirements of DOE Order 5400.5, predecessor to DOE Order 458.1, to permit disposal of solid waste containing low levels of residual radioactive materials at solid waste landfills located within the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR). Specifically, volumetric concentration limits for disposal of solid waste at Industrial Landfill V and at Construction/Demolition Landfill VII were established in 2003 and 2007, respectively, based on the requirements in effect at that time, which included: an evaluation to ensure that radiation doses to the public would not exceed 25 mrem/year and would be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), with a goal of a few mrem/year or less (in fact, these authorized limits actually were derived to meet a dose constraint of 1 mrem/year); an evaluation of compliance with groundwater protection requirements; and reasonable assurance that the proposed disposal is not likely to result in a future requirement for remediation of the landfill. Prior to approval as DOE authorized limits, these volumetric concentration limits were coordinated with the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) and documented in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the TDEC Division of Radiological Health and the TDEC Division of Solid Waste Management. These limits apply to the disposal of soil and debris waste generated from construction, maintenance, environmental restoration, and decontamination and decommissioning (D and D) activities on the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation. The approved site-specific authorized limits were incorporated in the URS/CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) waste profile system that authorizes disposal of special wastes at either of the RCRA Subtitle D landfills. However, a recent DOE assessment found that implementation of the site-specific authorized limits for volumetrically contaminated waste was potentially limited due in part to confusion regarding the applicability of volumetric concentration limits and/or surface activity limits to specific wastes. This paper describes recent efforts to update the authorized limits for Industrial Landfill V and Construction/Demolition Landfill VII and to improve the procedures for implementation of these criteria. The approved authorized limits have been evaluated and confirmed to meet the current requirements of DOE Order 458.1, which superseded DOE Order 5400.5 in February 2011. In addition, volumetric concentration limits have been developed for additional radionuclides, and site-specific authorized limits for wastes with surface contamination have been developed. Implementing procedures have been revised to clarify the applicability of volumetric concentration limits and surface activity limits, and to allow the use of non-destructive waste characterization methods. These changes have been designed to promote improved utilization of available disposal capacity of the onsite disposal facilities within the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation. In addition, these changes serve to bring the waste acceptance requirements at these DOE onsite landfills into greater consistency with the requirements for commercial/ public landfills under the TDEC Bulk Survey for Release (BSFR) program, including two public RCRA Subtitle D landfills in close proximity to the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

INTRINSIC DOSIMETRY: A POTENTIAL NEW TOOL FOR NUCLEAR FORENSICS INVESTIGATIONS

Thermoluminescence (TL) dosimetry was used to measure dose effects on the raw stock material of borosilicate container glass from different geographical locations. Effects were studied at times up to 60 days post-irradiation at doses from 0.15 to 20 Gy. The minimum detectable dose using this technique was estimated to be 0.15 Gy which is roughly equivalent to a 24 hr irradiation 1 cm from a 50 ng source of 60Co. Two peaks were identified in the TL glow curve, a relatively unstable peak around 125°C and a more stable peak around 225°C. Differences in TL glow curve shape and intensity were also observed for the glasses from different geographical origins. We investigate radiation induced defects in glass to further develop the technique of intrinsic dosimetry–the measurement of the total absorbed dose received by the walls of a container holding radioactive material. Intrinsic dosimetry is intended to be used as an interrogation tool to provide enhanced pathway information on interdicted or newly discovered waste containers of unknown origin or history by considering the total absorbed dose received by a container in tandem with the physical characteristics of the radioactive material housed within that container. One hypothetical scenario is presented to illustrate the application of intrinsic dosimetry to waste management and nuclear forensics.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Remote monitoring of Alpha Gamma hot cell facility by ARG-US RFID system - 15177

Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) has developed a monitoring and tracking system for nuclear materials based on radio frequency identification (RFID) technology. The system, called ARG-US ('Watchful Guardian'), has been in fielding testing and applications at selected U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites since 2010. ARG-US utilizes battery-powered tags to remotely and continuously monitor the environmental parameters, e.g., radiation levels, of the tagged items such as containers of radioactive materials. To demonstrate that the system can monitor nuclear and radiological facilities as well, a compact system was installed in the Alpha Gamma Hot Cell Facility (AGHCF) at Argonne in 2013. AGHCF is a Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facility that is being decommissioned. It is also being used to support de-inventory of other facilities on the Argonne site. As such, large quantities of radioactive materials and wastes are being discharged from the hot cell, loaded into transport containers, and shipped away. The deployed ARG-US system monitors worker areas, material transfer areas, cell exhaust HEPA filters, and?on a rover/robot?in-cell locations of AGHCF. Thus far, the system is performing as designed and yielding results that can be corroborated by existing surveillance means. The in-cell unit is particularly valuable, as it yields information that would otherwise be hard to obtain. In time, the benefits of automated monitoring 24/7 by ARG-US should become apparent and may lead to a fuller system with more distributed tags in the hot cell areas until the facility is fully decommissioned. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nevada Test Site Radiation Protection Program - Revision 1

Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835, 'Occupational Radiation Protection,' establishes radiation protection standards, limits, and program requirements for protecting individuals from ionizing radiation resulting from the conduct of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) activities. 10 CFR 835.101(a) mandates that DOE activities be conducted in compliance with a documented Radiation Protection Program (RPP) as approved by DOE. This document promulgates the RPP for the Nevada Test Site (NTS), related (on-site or off-site) U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) operations, and environmental restoration off-site projects. This NTS RPP promulgates the radiation protection standards, limits, and program requirements for occupational exposure to ionizing radiation resulting from NNSA/NSO activities at the NTS and other operational areas as stated in 10 CFR 835.1(a). NNSA/NSO activities (including design, construction, operation, and decommissioning) within the scope of this RPP may result in occupational exposures to radiation or radioactive material. Therefore, a system of control is implemented through specific references to the site-specific NV/YMP RCM. This system of control is intended to ensure that the following criteria are met: (1) occupational exposures are maintained as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), (2) DOE's limiting values are not exceeded, (3) employees are aware of and are prepared to cope with emergency conditions, and (4) employees are not inadvertently exposed to radiation or radioactive material.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 214: Bunkers and Storage Areas Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This document constitutes an addendum to the September 2006, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 214: Bunkers and Storage Areas as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for: • CAS 25-23-01, Contaminated Materials • CAS 25-23-19, Radioactive Material Storage These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove these URs because contamination is not present at these sites above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

The IAEA Assistance and Training Programme for Transport Security

The IAEA Office of Nuclear Security is working cooperatively with the U.S. Department of Energy's Global Threat Reduction Initiative, European Union and Australia to provide transport security assistance to countries throughout the world. Assistance is available to countries in reviewing and upgrading their transport security programs at all levels: (1) National level (regulatory and other government agencies); and (2) Operator level (shippers and carriers). Assistance is directed at implementing a consistent level of security throughout the life cycle of radioactive material (same level of security during transport as when in a fixed facility) Upgrade assistance can include: (1) Expert advisory missions to provide advice and guidance; (2) Training courses for regulatory, governmental and industry personnel; (3) Transport security awareness; (4) Detailed training on designing and implementing transport security programs; (5) Planning to identify and prioritize needs (developing security approaches and plans); (6) Developing model security plans and procedures; and (7) Equipment (vehicles, packages, command and control equipment, etc.). Country visits are now being scheduled to initiate transport security cooperative activities. A training course has been developed to assist countries in developing and implementing transport security programs. The training course has been given as a national training course (three times) and as a Regional training course (three times). The course addresses recommended security provisions for the transport of all radioactive material.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Effects of Gain Changes on RPM Performance

The mission of the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration's (DOE/NNSA's) Office of the Second Line of Defense (SLD) is to strengthen the capability of foreign governments to deter, detect, and interdict the illicit trafficking of special nuclear and other radioactive materials across international borders and through the global maritime shipping system. The goal of this mission is to reduce the probability of these materials being fashioned into a weapon of mass destruction or radiological dispersal device that could be used against the United States or its international partners. This goal is achieved primarily through the installation and operation of radiation detection equipment at border crossings, airports, seaports, and other strategic locations around the world. In order to effectively detect the movement of radioactive material, the response of these radiation detectors to various materials in various configurations must be well characterized. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) investigated two aspects of Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) settings, based on a preliminary investigation done by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL): source-to-detector distance effect on amplifier gain and optimized discriminator settings. This report discusses this investigation. A number of conclusions can be drawn from the ORNL testing. First, for increased distance between the source and the detector, thus illuminating the entire detector rather than just the center of the detector (as is done during detector alignments), an increase in gain may provide a 5-15% increase in sensitivity (Fig. 4). However, increasing the gain without adjusting the discriminator settings is not recommended as this makes the monitor more sensitive to electronic noise and temperature-induced fluctuations. Furthermore, if the discriminators are adjusted in relation to the increase in gain, thus appropriately discriminating against electronic noise, the sensitivity gains are less than 5% (Fig. 6). ORNL does not consider this slight increase in sensitivity to be a worthwhile pursuit. Second, increasing the ULD will increase sensitivity a few percent (Fig. 7); however, it is not clear that the slight increase in sensitivity is worth the effort required to make the change (e.g., reliability, cost, etc.). Additionally, while the monitor would be more sensitive to HEU, it would also be more sensitive to NORM. Third, the sensitivity of the system remains approximately the same whether it is calibrated to a small source on contact or a large source far away (Fig. 6). This affirms that no changes to the existing calibration procedure are necessary.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Report on a 2009 mini-demonstration of the ARG-US Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) system in transportation.

The Packaging Certification Program (PCP) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM), Office of Packaging and Transportation (EM-14), has developed a radio frequency identification (RFID) tracking and monitoring system for the management of nuclear materials during storage and transportation. The system, developed by the PCP team at Argonne National Laboratory, consists of hardware (Mk-series sensor tags, fixed and handheld readers, form factor for multiple drum types, seal integrity sensors, and enhanced battery management), software (application programming interface, ARG-US software for local and remote/web applications, secure server and database management), and cellular/satellite communication interfaces for vehicle tracking and item monitoring during transport. The ability of the above system to provide accurate, real-time tracking and monitoring of the status of multiple, certified containers of nuclear materials has been successfully demonstrated in a week-long, 1,700-mile DEMO performed in April 2008. While the feedback from the approximately fifty (50) stakeholders who participated in and/or observed the DEMO progression were very positive and encouraging, two major areas of further improvements - system integration and web application enhancement - were identified in the post-DEMO evaluation. The principal purpose of the MiniDemo described in this report was to verify these two specific improvements. The MiniDemo was conducted on August 28, 2009. In terms of system integration, a hybrid communication interface - combining the RFID item-monitoring features and a commercial vehicle tracking system by Qualcomm - was developed and implemented. In the MiniDemo, the new integrated system worked well in reporting tag status and vehicle location accurately and promptly. There was no incompatibility of components. The robust commercial communication gear, as expected, helped improve system reliability. The MiniDemo confirmed that system integration is technically feasible and reliable with the existing RFID and Qualcomm satellite equipment. In terms of web application, improvements in mapping, tracking, data presentation, and post-incident spatial query reporting were implemented in ARG-US, the application software that manages the dataflow among the RFID tags, readers, and servers. These features were tested in the MiniDemo and found to be satisfactory. The resulting web application is both informative and user-friendly. A joint developmental project is being planned between the PCP and the DOE TRANSCOM that uses the Qualcomm gear in vehicles for tracking and communication of radioactive material shipments across the country. Adding an RFID interface to TRANSCOM is a significant enhancement to the DOE infrastructure for tracking and monitoring shipments of radioactive materials.

42 ENGINEERING↗

On the Alpha Radiation Damage to the O-Ring Seal of the SAVY-4000 Container

In this memo, the dose to an O-ring from the alpha decay of 238 PuO 2 is calculated. These calculations were made in order to assess possible radiation damage to the O-ring, which could lead to failure and loss of integrity of the seal created by the O-ring. The O-ring being discussed here provides the seal between the lid and bottom of a nuclear materials container. The container will be used for the storage and transport of a number of different radioactive materials. The analysis is made using 238 PuO 2 as it would create the greatest damage to the O-ring when considering the materials that may be stored in it. Contamination of the O-ring is not expected to occur. But in the event radioactive material comes in contact with the O-ring, these calculations provide an estimate of the radiation damage.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Nanocomposite Materials for Radionuclide Sequestration from Groundwater Environments

The half-lives of radionuclides range from fractions of a second to billions of years. Since no practical method of altering radioactive decay exists, and since exposure to either the energy emitted from radioactive decay or chemical properties of radionuclides poses dire health risks, radioactive materials must be segregated and controlled. The capture, treatment, and disposition of radioactive materials remain an extraordinary challenge. In here, we focus our attention on the synthesis and characterization of a unique class of nanocomposite materials that have potential for removal of radionuclide contamination. Specifically, we report a simple approach to decorate the surface of iron-based (Fe/FexOy) material with various nano-catalysts. Specifically, copper (Cu), tin (Sn), and silver (Ag) nanoparticles were prepared through two different reduction approaches, namely, citrate and cetyltrimethylammonium bromide (CTAB) methods, on the iron-based material surface. All samples were characterized by a variety of analytical tools, which included scanning electron microscopy (SEM), electron-dispersive X-ray microanalysis (EDS), and EDS mapping to elucidate materials’ morphology as well as nano-catalysts’ loading and location on the iron-based structures.

Hunyadi Murph, Simona E.↗

Accelerating Nuclear Facility Mission Completion Through an Improved Chemical Hazard Control Strategy - 20460

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management [1], explicitly identifies hazardous materials in addition to radioactive materials when establishing the scope of materials that must be evaluated in Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. This inclusion has led to a near decade-long progression of more and more rigorous application of chemical hazard controls in these facilities. The progressive addition of more rigorous chemical hazard controls has occurred across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex, having been driven by contractors and regulators alike. However, chemical hazards in other DOE facilities have been, and continue to be, controlled using traditional industrial safety centered strategies. Thus, identical chemical hazards are controlled using dramatically different approaches based solely on the facility type. Not only are the controls different, the analysis and derivation rigor and requirements are also significantly different. In particular, chemical control derivation and application in non-nuclear facilities are much less onerous than the comprehensive hazard analysis process used in nuclear facilities, even in circumstances in which chemicals are not initiators to, or do not exacerbate a nuclear event. While the derivation and control approaches used in these two types of facilities are disparate, the safety results are similarly effective based on a review of reported chemical events from 2014 through 2018. While both approaches achieve comparable safety outcomes, the approach used in nuclear facilities results in significantly greater preparation costs and implementation costs. Furthermore, the problem with the differing approach is not relegated to the control preparation and implementation burden. The operational impact of potentially unnecessary controls slows mission completion without a corresponding increase in safety, not to mention the dilution of the importance of Technical Safety Requirements. The proposed solution must first include a critical and thorough examination of DOE Complex and top-tier chemical industry chemical hazard control practices, coupled with a similar examination of the driving facility regulatory requirements. Results from the examination can then be used to fuel a bold departure from current chemical control practices in Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. Development of an improved and consistent chemical hazard control process would follow, one that continues to ensure safety while accelerating mission completion and significantly reducing the burden associated with chemical hazard control development and implementation. The improved process must establish a hierarchy where radiological hazards are addressed using safety class and safety significant controls and chemical hazards are addressed using overarching safety management programs (with limited unique exceptions). The improved Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy, while compliant with 10 CFR 830 [1], would be founded on the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program [2], and the complementary DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System [3]. In this way, the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy would, wherever appropriate, be the same process used at other DOE Complex facilities. Ultimately, the improved process will maintain safety and significantly reduce costs and life cycle risk through faster mission completion. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of a Course in Gamma Ray Spectrometry

The majority of undergraduate and graduate students in nuclear science and engineering take a general course in nuclear instrumentation where one of the topics is typically in gamma ray spectrometry. Rarely are courses offered solely on this subject matter other than intensified workshops conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or private companies which can be expensive especially for large groups of students. Currently there are many world-wide projects in routine monitoring and advanced research that employ gamma rays. Some but not an exhaustive list of these topics include neutron activation analysis, naturally occurring radioactivity materials (NORM), nuclear forensics, nuclear security, in-situ gamma ray detection, galactic gamma ray detection, health physics and advanced instrumentation. At the Nuclear Engineering Teaching Laboratory at the University of Texas at Austin, many of our students are involved in an array of research topics that involve gamma ray spectrometry in their Masters of Science theses, PhD dissertations and special topics courses. It was decided to invest the time and effort to develop a course with a strong technical component to complement their research activities. A detailed stand-alone course in gamma ray spectrometry that includes a series lectures in modular form has been developed. As well we have incorporated fourteen advanced animations to better explain some of the fundamental physical processes and experimental set-ups. Six laboratory sessions and multiple homework assignments have also been established. This course is applicable to senior undergraduate students, graduate students, and novice researchers the above mentioned fields in a traditional class/laboratory setting or for intense one to two week workshops. A great deal of effort was undertaken to prepare a stand-alone course in gamma ray spectrometry which includes many of the fundamental aspects as well as the more advanced instrumentation. Animations of gamma ray interactions and experimental set ups were also developed. Six laboratories and six assignments were also conceived. Every topic has its own module thus a 'pick and choose' subset of lectures can be given to different levels of understanding. This course is applicable to senior undergraduate students, graduate students, novice researchers in neutron activation analysis and naturally occurring radioactive material, and for intense one to two week workshops. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

The IAEA Assistance Training Programme for Transport Security

The IAEA Office of Nuclear Security is working cooperatively with the U.S. Department of Energy's Global Threat Reduction Initiative, European Union and Australia to provide transport security assistance to countries throughout the world. Assistance is available to countries in reviewing and upgrading their transport security programs at all levels: (1) National level (regulatory and other government agencies); and (2) Operator level (shippers and carriers). Assistance is directed at implementing a consistent level of security throughout the life cycle of radioactive material (same level of security during transport as when in a fixed facility) Upgrade assistance can include: (1) Expert advisory missions to provide advice and guidance; (2) Training courses for regulatory, governmental and industry personnel; (3) Transport security awareness; (4) Detailed training on designing and implementing transport security programs; (5) Planning to identify and prioritize needs (developing security approaches and plans); (6) Developing model security plans and procedures; and (7) Equipment (vehicles, packages, command and control equipment, etc.). Country visits are now being scheduled to initiate transport security cooperative activities. A training course has been developed to assist countries in developing and implementing transport security programs. The training course has been given as a national training course (three times) and as a Regional training course (three times). The course addresses recommended security provisions for the transport of all radioactive material.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Correction Factors Applied to Finger Dosimetry: A Theoretical Assessment of Appropriate Values for Use in Handling Radiopharmaceuticals

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) regulations limit the dose to the skin to 500 mSv per year. This is also the dose limit recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). The operational quantity recommended by ICRP for quantifying dose to the skin is the personal dose equivalent, Hp(0.07) and is identical to NRC s shallow dose equivalent, Hs, also measured at a skin depth of 7 mg cm 2. However, whereas ICRP recommends averaging the dose to the skin over an area of 1 cm2 regardless of the size of the exposed area of skin, USNRC requires the shallow dose equivalent to be averaged over 10 cm2. To monitor dose to the skin of the hands of workers handling radioactive materials and particularly in radiopharmaceutical manufacturing facilities, which is the focus of this work, workers are frequently required to wear finger ring dosimeters. The dosimeters monitor the dose at the location of the sensitive element, but this is not the dose required to show compliance (i.e., the dose averaged over the highest exposed contiguous 10 cm2 of skin). Therefore, it may be necessary to apply a correction factor that enables estimation of the required skin dose from the dosimeter reading. This work explored the effects of finger ring placement and of the geometry of the radioactive materials being handled by the worker on the relationship between the dosimeter reading and the desired average dose. A mathematical model of the hand was developed for this purpose that is capable of positioning the fingers in any desired grasping configuration, thereby realistically modeling manipulation of any object. The model was then used with the radiation transport code MCNP to calculate the dose distribution on the skin of the hand when handling a variety of radioactive vials and syringes, as well as the dose to the dosimeter element. Correction factors were calculated using the results of these calculations and examined for any patterns that may be useful in establishing an appropriate correction factor for this type of work. It was determined that a correction factor of one applied to the dosimeter reading, with the dosimeter placed at the base of the middle finger, provides an adequate estimate of the required average dose during a monitoring period for most commonly encountered geometries. Different correction factors may be required for exceptional or unusual source geometries and must be considered on a case-by-case basis.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Anomaly Detection in Radiation Sensor Data with Applications to Transportation Security

In this paper, we present a new approach for detecting trucks transporting illicit radioactive materials using radiation data. The approach is motivated by the high number of false alarms that typically results when using radiation portal monitors. Our approach is a three-stage anomaly detection process that consists of transforming the radiation sensor data into wavelet coefficients, representing the transformed data in binary form, and detecting anomalies among data sets using a proximity-based method. The approach is evaluated using simulated radiation data, and the results are encouraging. From a transportation security perspective, our results indicate that the concomitant use of gross count and spectroscopy radiation data improves identification of trucks transporting illicit radioactive materials. The results also suggest that the use of additional heterogeneous data with radiation data may enhance the reliability of the detection process. Further testing with real radiation data and mixture of cargo is needed to fully validate the results.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Assessing potential induced radioactivity in materials processed with X-ray energy above 5 MeV: Assessment protocols and practical experience

In accordance with ISO11137-1 section 5.1.2, ‘the potential for induced radioactivity in product shall be assessed’. This article describes how compliance to this requirement may be achieved using qualified test methods. Materials of consideration are conceptually discussed. Results of testing conducted on products processed with a 7.5 MeV X-ray irradiation process are provided. As X-ray becomes more widely used in healthcare sterilization, having standard assessment protocols for activation coupled with a shared database of material test results will benefit all healthcare product manufacturers seeking to avail of this innovative technology.

Kroc, Thomas K.↗

LYNX: An unattended sensor system for detection of gamma-ray and neutron emissions from special nuclear materials

This manuscript profiles an unattended and fully autonomous detection system sensitive to gamma-ray and neutron emissions from special nuclear material. The LYNX design specifically targets applications that require radiation detection capabilities but possess little or no infrastructure. In these settings, users need the capability to deploy sensors for extended periods of time that analyze whatever signal-starved data can be captured, since little or no control may be exerted over measurement conditions. The fundamental sensing elements of the LYNX system are traditional NaI(Tl) and 3He detectors. The new developments reported here center on two themes: low-power electronics and computationally simple analysis algorithms capable of discriminating gamma-ray signatures indicative of special nuclear materials from those of naturally occurring radioactive material. Incorporating tripwire-detection algorithms based on gamma-ray spectral signatures into a low-power electronics package significantly improves performance in environments where sensors encounter nuisance sources.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗