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DOE OSTI2021

Investigation of Luminescent Ceria as a Plutonium Oxide Simulant. Final Report

Plutonium oxide powders from various production lines at Los Alamos National Laboratory are stored and transported in specially designed “SAVY-4000”, “Hagan”, or other containment systems. Cerium oxide powder has been used as a less-hazardous simulant powder for testing accidental release from these containers under various operational scenarios. This work investigates the development and use of fluorescent cerium oxide powders as a more easily detectable, and potentially quantifiable, simulant powder for plutonium oxide container systems

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2022

MIS Shelf-Life Final Report for Plutonium Oxide Item 1000089 (SSR136 and SSR136A) from Rocky Flats Peroxide Precipitation and Calcination Process

A plutonium dioxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied to determine the gas generation and corrosion behavior in a storage environment. Sample 1000089 represents product-quality plutonium oxides produced in the Rocky Flats peroxide precipitation process currently stored in 3013 containers. This study followed over time the gas pressure and composition of a sample with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500th of the volume of a 3013 container. Gas compositions had been measured periodically over almost 13 years. The maximum observed gas pressure was 204 kPa and was related to a temperature excursion. The maximum observed gas pressure from gas generation was 126 kPa. The increase over the initial pressure of 86.7 kPa was due to the generation of hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen. Carbon dioxide, methane and carbon monoxide were minor components of the headspace gas. The material exhibited unusual behavior in that the atmosphere reached flammable levels of hydrogen and oxygen within the first 30 days and remained flammable for the duration of the experiment. It has been determined that the sample inside the reactor was a mixture of the AR material, material calcined at 800 °C, and material calcined at 950 °C. The experiment was terminated in 2012 and unloaded in 2016. A new reactor, SSR136A, was loaded with the original sample freshly calcined at 950 °C. The total pressure inside SSR136A remained close to the initial value of 93 kPa. The total pressure is composed of He (steady levels after the reloading) and hydrogen which is 10% of the reactor’s total pressure. Nitrogen and oxygen compose trace amounts of the reactor headspace. The internal components of SSR136 were inspected in 2021, five years after it was removed from the array. The inside surfaces of the inner bucket exposed to the original sample for 4,576 days had an etched appearance, and pit-like features were observed in the microscopic analysis. No corrosion was observed on the SSR136A inner bucket that held the freshly calcined sample that was exposed for 1,303 days.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2023

IER - 551: Experiment for Unresolved Resonance of Plutonium Actinides (EUROPA): CED-1 for True Intermediate Pu Benchmark

IER-551 or the Experiment for Unresolved Resonance Of Plutonium Actinides (EUROPA), is an experiment campaign to design and execute a series of true intermediate energy plutonium critical configurations. EUROPA is a collaboration between Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and the French Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) to validate current and future evaluations of 239,240 Pu isotopes. Preliminary designs were optimized using Particle Swarm Optimization to save on computation time and the configuration with highest percentage of intermediate neutrons causing fission found was BeO-Cd. This combination has over 70% of fissions occurring from intermediate energy neutrons. Secondary considerations regarding end benchmark uncertainties and quality of nuclear data resulted in a beryllium metal only experiment proposed as the final system. This final preliminary design achieves 68% intermediate fissions, sensitivities of fission and capture cross sections of 239 Pu of 0.3021 and -0.1610 respectively.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Packaging Plan for Mark-18A Plutonium Oxide

Mark-18A (Mk-18A) targets were irradiated at the Savannah River Site and have been in wet storage at the site since the 1970s. The Mk-18A Target Material Recovery Program has been established to recover the 244 Pu and heavy curium (≥50% 246 Cm and 248 Cm) in the targets at the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) and ship the materials to Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s (ORNL’s) Radiochemical Engineering Development Center for programmatic use. Two products will be recovered from the Mk- 18A targets for shipment from SRNL to ORNL: a plutonium oxide stream and an oxide material that will contain the americium, curium, and lanthanides. This document presents the plan for packaging of the plutonium oxide material for shipment and storage at ORNL.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2023

Report on the Analysis of Plutonium-238 Oxide, Campaign #P5PO

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is currently producing Plutonium-238 oxide for NASA space programs. Through the irradiation of NpO 2 pellets in the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR), the production of Pu-238 oxide will be used for electrical power and heat on NASA spacecraft such as the Curiosity Mars Rover and the Voyager 1 and 2. The Transuranium Analytical Laboratory (TAL) leads the analytical effort for this project, which includes the dissolution of plutonium product oxide (PUP) and the analysis of the dissolved product solution using both radiological and inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) techniques that are required to meet product specifications. The Transuranic Analytical Laboratory received three samples of Pu-238 oxide for analysis in January of 2022. This report documents the analytical protocols performed by the TAL along with the results produced from said analytical protocols. This report also includes a comparison with the general-purpose heat source (GPHS) specifications.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

DOE OSTI2022

Capability to Process and Characterize Uranium-Zirconium (U-Zr) and Uranium-Zirconium-Plutonium (U-Zr-Pu) Alloys

This work investigated co-reduction of anhydrous compounds of uranium, zirconium, and plutonium to produce uranium rich ternary nuclear fuel alloys. Metallothermic co-reduction is a novel method to produce all-metal nuclear fuels. Metal fuels offer thermal, fissility, compatibility, and security benefits over oxide fuels. Alloys of uranium–10% zirconium with plutonium contents of 0%, 2.5%, 5%, and 10% were produced, with yields of 60–85% of theoretical values in a traditional calciothermic bomb reduction apparatus. Microstructural analysis indicated transformation of uranium phase from gamma to beta and then alpha, in alternating lamellar plates typical of alpha phase uranium and delta phase uranium-zirconium, with zirconium and carbides at prior grain boundaries. Some of the analyses were inconclusive in their results and therefore require additional testing. Successful ternary co-reduction would simplify production of homogeneous feedstock and thereby streamline manufacture of homogeneous ternary metallic fuel.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2025

APPLICATION OF INDUCTIVELY COUPLED PLASMA MASS SPECTROMETRY IN THE ANALYSIS OF PLUTONIUM CONTENT OF FAST CRITICAL ASSEMBLY FUEL DISPOSITION

Outline • Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) Plutonium Fuel Disposition • Brief campaign overview • Savannah River National Laboratory • Analytical capabilities and instrumentation • Typical FCA sample analysis process • Plutonium analysis by quadrupole-inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry (Q-ICP-MS) • Method description/development • Instrumentation • Data/control charts

Bonilla, Henry J. [Savannah River National Laborat↗

DOE OSTI2023

Plutonium Signatures in Molten-Salt Reactor Off-Gas Tank and Safeguards Considerations

Fluid-fueled molten-salt reactors (MSRs) are actively being developed by several companies, with plans to deploy them internationally. The current IAEA inspection tools are largely incompatible with the unique design features of liquid fuel MSRs (e.g., the complex fuel chemistry, circulating fuel inventory, bulk accountancy, and high radiation environment). For these reasons, safeguards for MSRs are seen as challenging and require the development of new techniques. This paper proposes one such technique through the observation of the reactor’s off-gas. Any reactor design using low-enriched uranium will build up plutonium as the fuel undergoes burnup. Plutonium has different fission product yields than uranium. Therefore, a shift in fission product production is expected with fuel evolution. The passive removal of certain gaseous fission products to the off-gas tank of an MSR provides a valuable opportunity for analysis without significant modifications to the design of the system. Uniquely, due to the gaseous nature of the isotopes, beta particle emissions are available for observation. The ratios of these fission product isotopes can, thus, be traced back to the relative amount and types of fissile isotopes in the core. This proposed technique represents an effective safeguards tool for bulk accountancy which, while avoiding being onerous, could be used in concert with other techniques to meet the IAEA’s timeliness goals for the detection of a diversion.

Dunkle, Nicholas (ORCID:000000027323011X)↗

NASA NTRS1972

Some neutron and gamma radiation characteristics of plutonium cermet fuel for isotopic power sources

Gamma and neutron measurements on various types of plutonium sources are presented in order to show the effects of O-17, O-18 F-19, Pu-236, age of the fuel, and size of the source on the gamma and neutron spectra. Analysis of the radiation measurements shows that fluorine is the main contributor to the neutron yields from present plutonium-molybdenum cermet fuel, while both fluorine and Pu-236 daughters contribute significantly to the gamma ray intensities.

Neff, R. A.↗

NASA NTRS1972

Plutonium-244 fission tracks - Evidence in a lunar rock 3.95 billion years old.

Tracks attributed to the spontaneous fission of plutonium-244 and of uranium-238 were detected in a large whitlockite crystal in the lunar breccia 14321 from the Fra Mauro formation. For a track-retention age of 3.95 b.y., the number of plutonium tracks relative to the number of uranium tracks is 0.51 plus or minus 0.15, provided that the rock was not heavily neutron-irradiated 3.95 b.y. ago.

Hutcheon, I. D.↗

DOE OSTI2013

SHIELDING AND DETECTOR RESPONSE CALCULATIONS PERTAINING TO CATEGORY 1 QUANTITIES OF PLUTONIUM AND HAND-HELD PLASTIC SCINTILLATORS

Nuclear facilities sometimes use hand-held plastic scintillator detectors to detect attempts to divert special nuclear material in situations where portal monitors are impractical. MCNP calculations have been performed to determine the neutron and gamma radiation field arising from a Category I quantity of weapons-grade plutonium in various shielding configurations. The shields considered were composed of combinations of lead and high-density polyethylene such that the mass of the plutonium plus shield was 22.7 kilograms. Monte-Carlo techniques were also used to determine the detector response to each of the shielding configurations. The detector response calculations were verified using field measurements of high-, medium-, and low- energy gamma-ray sources as well as a Cf-252 neutron source.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DOE OSTI2015

Analysis of pressurization of plutonium oxide storage vials during a postulated fire

The documented safety analysis for the Savannah River Site evaluates the consequences of a postulated 1000 °C fire in a glovebox. The radiological dose consequences for a pressurized release of plutonium oxide powder during such a fire depend on the maximum pressure that is attained inside the oxide storage vial. To enable evaluation of the dose consequences, pressure transients and venting flow rates have been calculated for exposure of the storage vial to the fire. A standard B vial with a capacity of approximately 8 cc was selected for analysis. The analysis compares the pressurization rate from heating and evaporation of moisture adsorbed onto the plutonium oxide contents of the vial with the pressure loss due to venting of gas through the threaded connection between the vial cap and body. Tabulated results from the analysis include maximum pressures, maximum venting velocities, and cumulative vial volumes vented during the first 10 minutes of the fire transient. Results are obtained for various amounts of oxide in the vial, various amounts of adsorbed moisture, different vial orientations, and different surface fire exposures.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2019

Process Development for Plutonium-238 Production at Oak Ridge National Laboratory

The third chemical processing campaign conducted at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) with irradiated neptunium oxide–aluminum cermet targets produced plutonium-238 oxide product meeting purity specifications for space power applications. This is a major step for the Plutonium-238 Supply Program toward reestablishing production. This summary highlights results to date and presents focus areas of current activities to improve process efficiency and to increase production rate.

DePaoli, David↗

DOE OSTI2019

Surplus Plutonium Disposition

The Department of Energy is focused on meeting legal obligations to the state of South Carolina. Dilute and Dispose is a technically proven, cost-effective approach that is currently being used to dispose of up to six metric tons of impure plutonium. NNSA proposes to use this process to permanently dispose of additional inventories of surplus plutonium. Savannah River Site, its infrastructure, and critically skilled workforce are key assets central to successful completion of this national security mission.

Source record↗

DOE OSTI2017

Coordination of Plutonium Separations

NASA and the Department of Energy (DOE) are currently working together to reestablish a 238Pu supply capability using DOE's existing facilities and reactors. The effort is being led by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). Target rods, containing neptunium oxide (NpO2), are fabricated at ORNL and irradiated in the ORNL High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) currently and soon will be irradiated in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Irradiated targets are processed in hot cells at the ORNL Radiochemical Engineering Center to recover the plutonium (Pu) product and unconverted neptunium (Np) for recycle. The 238PuO2 product is shipped to Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for fabrication of heat source pellets. Key activities, such as the transport of the neptunium to ORNL, irradiation of neptunium, and chemical processing to recover the newly generated 238Pu, have been demonstrated with the initial amounts of ~100 g heat-source plutonium oxide (HS PuO2) produced. Product samples have been shipped to LANL for evaluation, including chemical impurity analysis. This paper will examine the status of producing new 238Pu from irradiated targets.

Wham, Robert↗

DOE OSTI2025

Control Selection for the Neutralization Tank in the Aqueous Recovery System at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility

The Aqueous Recovery System (ARS) at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) recovers and purifies plutonium (Pu) using aqueous chemistry techniques. The neutralization tanks in the ARS collect waste streams with various impurities and greatly reduced concentrations of Pu than are produced during aqueous processing. Criticality safety is primarily achieved in the ARS by using geometrically favorable process vessels. However, due to the geometry of neutralization tanks, each tank is administratively limited to no more than 450 g Pu, thus representing the transition from geometry to mass control. To ensure that this mass limit is not exceeded, an administrative control requires taking two samples of any solution to be sent to a neutralization tank. Normal operations are expected to result in less than 50 g Pu in a neutralization tank filled to its capacity of 250 L. Process upsets may cause an inadvertent transfer of up to 1000 g Pu to a neutralization tank, producing a system that is potentially not subcritical for all possible configurations of the tank. To ensure that a neutralization tank remains safety subcritical, passive engineered controls (e.g. changing tank geometry or adding fixed poisons), active engineered controls (e.g. interlocks), and administrative controls (e.g. soluble poisons and valve isolation) were considered and their viability evaluated. Ultimately, the team chose an administrative, dual-valve isolation strategy. This paper will thoroughly discuss the various control strategy options and why many of the options were not feasible for maintaining criticality safety.

Dressman, Phillip M. [Savannah River Nuclear Solut↗

DOE OSTI2025

Control Selection for the Neutralization Tank in the Aqueous Recovery System at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility

The Aqueous Recovery System (ARS) at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) recovers and purifies plutonium (Pu) using aqueous chemistry techniques. The neutralization tanks in the ARS collect the waste streams, containing various impurities and greatly reduced concentrations of Pu, that are produced during aqueous processing. Criticality safety is primarily achieved in the ARS by using geometrically favorable process vessels. However, due to the geometry of neutralization tanks, each tank is administratively limited to no more than 450 g Pu, thus representing the transition from geometry to mass control. To ensure that this mass limit is not exceeded, an administrative control requires taking two samples of any solution to be sent to a neutralization tank. Normal operations are expected to result in less than 50 g Pu in a neutralization tank filled to its capacity of 250 L. Process upsets may cause an inadvertent transfer of up to 1000 g Pu to a neutralization tank, producing a system that is potentially not subcritical for all possible configurations of the tank. To ensure that a neutralization tank remains safety subcritical, passive engineered controls (e.g.changing tank geometry or adding fixed poisons), active engineered controls (e.g. interlocks), and administrative controls (e.g. soluble poisons and valve isolation) were considered and their viability evaluated. Ultimately, the team chose an administrative, dual-valve isolation strategy. This paper will thoroughly discuss the various control strategy options and why many of the options were not feasible for maintaining criticality safety.

Dressman, Phillip M. [Savannah River Nuclear Solut↗

DOE OSTI2022

A Machine Learning Method for the Forensics Attribution of Separated Plutonium

Plutonium (Pu) source attribution would be a powerful tool to support nuclear nonproliferation efforts. This capability to find the source of a Pu sample would act as a deterrent to smuggling efforts, and also help regulatory agencies verify declared nuclear activities. Work at Texas A&M University yielded a nuclear forensics methodology, which is capable of determining separated Pu’s reactor of origin, fuel burnup, and the time since irradiation (TSI)—three parameters of interest. The methodology used a set of ten intra-element isotopic ratios found in separated Pu, which was compared to a library of isotopic ratio values produced using neutronics simulations for reactors of interest. By calculating the probability that unknown Pu sample’s isotopic ratio set matched a set in the library, the methodology could predict the three parameters of interest of the sample. One shortcoming of this methodology was an inability to correctly attribute spoofed Pu, where Pu sourced from two different reactors or two different fuel burnup levels are mixed. A new methodology to rectify this vulnerability using machine learning (ML) technique is developed, instead of the maximum likelihood calculation previously used and the results are satisfactory. The ML approach leverages the existing simulated data for training the algorithm, but use them efficiently by only using intra-element isotope ratios that contribute to the attribution one of the three parameters at a time. Previously, all isotope ratios were used to attribute all three parameters together. The new methodology attributes the Pu parameters in three steps, one for each parameter, rather than resolving all of the three parameters simultaneously like the previous maximum likelihood approach. First, a support vector machine classifier with a set of seven isotopic ratios finds the reactor of origin and a set of regression models trained using gaussian process predicts the burnup with a different set of seven isotopes. Finally, TSI is calculated analytically using decay equations. Thus far, the new methodology is capable of attributing pure Pu samples and has been validated using experimental data. The next step will to be augment the classifier training data set with spoofed Pu data.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗