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At least 397 records · Page 22

Summary of US DOE R&D Activities on Graphite Oxidation (2006–2021)

The objective of the international collaboration between United States Department of Energy (U.S.-DOE) and Generation IV International Forum (GIF) is the development of the next generation of nuclear energy systems. The current GIF Project Arrangement (PA) on Materials (2018-2022) was revised in 2019 and extended for another 10 years (2020-2030). The Work Package 1 (“Graphite”) of the extended Project Plan (PP) on Materials specifies technical tasks and High Level Deliverables for research and development (R&D) activities related to using graphite in fuel elements, reflectors, and support structures of Very High Temperature Reactors (VHTR). The graphite tasks include specification and acquisition, qualification and development of new grades, characterization of properties, and development of behavior models. Specifically, Task 1.4 (“Graphite Oxidation Behavior”) outlines planned activities related to acute oxidation by air and chronic oxidation by impurities in the helium coolant. A final report on experimental data regarding graphite oxidation behavior is scheduled for 2022 (deliverable 3.1.1.4.a). In preparation of this deliverable, this document summarizes the R&D activities funded by U.S.-DOE from 2006 (the inception of the VHTR system arrangement) through present (2021). This report is being submitted to the GIF Graphite Working Group (GWG) to serve as input for the GWG high-level deliverable to the Project Management Board (PMB) of PA on Materials. Besides U.S.-DOE, other organizations participating to Task 1.4 of the current PA on Materials are: European Commission’s Joint Research Center (JRC), Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), and Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). U.S.-DOE is the main contributor on graphite oxidation R&D, with 85 % commitment of total funding during 2018-2022.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

CMM Sequential Analysis Program

This report documents a design agency (DA) method to evaluate coordinate measuring machine (CMM) data by constructing an algorithm that is equivalent to the production agency (PA) algorithm for processing the raw CMM data. Several refinements of the CMM analyses were implemented at both the PA and the DA to process inherent limitations of the raw data, such as the absence of measurements at the exact ends of the connector-adapter assembly (CAA) and the recovery from these limitations through (worst-case) adjustments to the the positional errors. Also, inherent errors of the CMM measurements were accommodated by introducing a guard band, which effectively lowered the tolerance so that the CMM code could not pass bad parts. The DA and the PA showed remarkable agreement in all areas of analysis. The ultimate comparison is shown in Figures 13a and 13b, where the effect of using a guard band and end adjustments to the CMM measurements were clearly shown.

42 ENGINEERING↗

System Model Calculations for the Active Trenches of the Low-Level Burial Grounds, Hanford Site, Washington

Two lined trenches (Trench 31 and 34) located within the 200 West Low-Level Burial Ground (LLBG) area of the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Hanford Site are designated for permanent disposal of low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW). In accordance with DOE O 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, radioactive waste shall be managed and disposed in a manner that is protective of worker, public health and safety, and the environment. DOE O 435.1 requires a site-specific radiological performance assessment (PA) that includes calculations of potential releases and subsequent doses to members of the public for a period of 1,000 years after closure of a low-level waste (LLW) disposal facility. The purpose of this environmental calculation file (ECF) is to document the various dose calculations performed to support DOE’s LLBG PA. The dose assessments are performed to evaluate the potential exposure of an all-pathway representative person to radionuclide contaminants of potential concern (COPCs) that may be released from the LLBG Trenches 31 and 34 to the point of calculation (POC) located at the outer edge of a 100 m buffer zone surrounding the trench boundary. This ECF uses inputs from other ECFs and their associated model package reports (MPRs) supporting the LLBG PA. The five major objectives of this ECF are to present the results of the following: (1) Deterministic dose assessments for both groundwater and atmospheric exposure scenarios; (2) Radon-222 (Rn-222) flux emanating at the surface from the disposed wastes; (3) Uncertainty analyses of the groundwater pathway annual dose due to uncertainty in input parameters; (4) Sensitivity analyses of the input parameters that could potentially impact the fate and transport of the contaminants and doses; (5) Doses arising from inadvertent intruder exposure scenarios.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Repository-Scale Performance Assessment Incorporating Postclosure Criticality

A key objective of the United States Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy’s Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology Campaign is to better understand the technical basis, risks, and uncertainty associated with the safe and secure disposition of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste. Commercial nuclear power generation in the United States has resulted in thousands of metric tons of SNF, the disposal of which is the responsibility of the DOE (Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended). Any repository licensed to dispose of SNF must meet requirements regarding the long-term performance of that repository. For an evaluation of the long-term performance of the repository, one of the events that may need to be considered is the SNF achieving a critical configuration during the postclosure period. Of particular interest is the potential behavior of SNF in dual-purpose canisters (DPCs), which are currently licensed and being used to store and transport SNF but were not designed for permanent geologic disposal. A study has been initiated to examine the potential consequences, with respect to long-term repository performance, of criticality events that might occur during the postclosure period in a hypothetical repository containing DPCs. The first phase (a scoping phase) consisted of developing an approach to creating the modeling tools and techniques that may eventually be needed to either include or exclude criticality from a performance assessment (PA) as appropriate; this scoping phase is documented in Price et al. (2019a). In the second phase, that modeling approach was implemented and future work was identified, as documented in Price et al. (2019b). This report gives the results of a repository-scale PA examining the potential consequences of postclosure criticality, as well as the information, modeling tools, and techniques needed to incorporate the effects of postclosure criticality in the PA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Permutation-adapted complete and independent basis for atomic cluster expansion descriptors

In many recent applications, particularly in the field of atom-centered descriptors for interatomic potentials, tensor products of spherical harmonics have been used to characterize complex atomic environments. When coupled with a radial basis, the atomic cluster expansion (ACE) basis is obtained. However, symmetrization with respect to both rotation and permutation results in an overcomplete set of ACE descriptors with linear dependencies occurring within blocks of functions corresponding to particular generalized Wigner symbols. All practical applications of ACE employ semi-numerical constructions to generate a complete, fully independent basis. While computationally tractable, the resultant basis cannot be expressed analytically, is susceptible to numerical instability, and thus has limited reproducibility. Here we present a procedure for generating explicit analytic expressions for a complete and independent set of ACE descriptors. The procedure uses a coupling scheme that is maximally symmetric w.r.t. permutation of the atoms, exposing the permutational symmetries of the generalized Wigner symbols, and yields a permutation-adapted rotationally and permutationally invariant basis (PA-RPI ACE). Theoretical support for the approach is presented, as well as numerical evidence of completeness and independence. A summary of explicit enumeration of PA-RPI functions up to rank 6 and polynomial degree 32 is provided. The PA-RPI blocks corresponding to particular generalized Wigner symbols may be either larger or smaller than the corresponding blocks in the simpler rotationally invariant basis. Finally, we demonstrate that basis functions of high polynomial degree persist under strong regularization, indicating the importance of not restricting the maximum degree of basis functions in ACE models a priori.

74 ATOMIC AND MOLECULAR PHYSICS↗

Annual Summary Report for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility—FY2021

This Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 annual summary report (ASR) documents the continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA), the composite analysis (CA) and associated operating disposal-authorization statement (ODAS) technical basis documents for the Remote Handled (RH) Low-Level Waste (LLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory. Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA for the RHLLW Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” In FY 2021, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility closure design, or institutional controls. Sixteen total waste-canister shipments were received at the RHLLW Disposal Facility, and 16 total waste canisters were emplaced.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Plutonium Oxidation State Distribution under WIPP Relevant Conditions (Rev. 2)

The oxidation state of plutonium in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) environment has been a topic of interest since the initial compliance certification application. Plutonium (Pu) was initially expected to be present primarily as Pu(IV), but since the presence of Pu(III) could not be ruled out, it was also included in performance assessment (PA) calculations. The redox of the other variant actinides, uranium (U) and neptunium (Np), are also coupled to the plutonium redox. This led to a position in performance assessment calculations that is commonly referred to as “50/50”. In which half of the PA realizations assume solubility is dominated by the low oxidation state [U(IV), Np(IV), Pu(III)] and the other half assume solubility is dominated by the higher oxidation state [U(VI), Np(V), Pu(IV)]. Recently, a joint group of WIPP project participants from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and the Department of Energy’s Carlsbad Field Office (DOE-CBFO) agreed on a new path forward for the oxidation state model in PA which will decouple the redox active actinides and will instead consider their redox as a function of E h . This will take the current binary approach and turn it into a system with four possible redox states.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Performance Assessment for the E-Area Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site: Appendix H

This section provides supporting material for the development of DU-specific final inventory limits for the GW pathways for every generic waste form and SWF parent radionuclide requiring an inventory limit. The final inventory limits are based on nominal PA transport simulations using PORFLOW as reported in Chapter 5. The nominal PA settings represent the compliance case where some modeling parameter settings are defined based on conservative (pessimistically leaning) arguments. In the overall computational approach employed in this PA, a multitiered radionuclide screening process is adopted as discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.7. In the multitiered process, the initial list of 1,252 parent radionuclides is shortened substantially using conservative, but simple, transport models, along with a reasonably low cutoff criterion of 0.1% SOF value. Multidimensional PORFLOW flow and transport modeling is employed for every parent radionuclide that failed the GW screening. The generic waste form limits represent Tier-3 analyses, while Tier-4 analyses are employed for SWF limits, where warranted.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Annual Summary Report for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility—FY 2022

This Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 annual summary report (ASR) documents the continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA), the composite analysis (CA) and associated operating disposal-authorization statement (ODAS) technical-basis documents for the Remote-Handled (RH) Low-Level Waste (LLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory. Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA for the RHLLW Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” In FY 2022, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility-closure design, or institutional controls. Fifteen waste canister shipments were received at the RHLLW Disposal Facility, and 15 waste canisters were emplaced in disposal vaults.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Secure Storage: Historical Documentation of TA-08-0032, TA-11-0036, TA-22-0016, TA-22-0023, TA-22-0025, TA-22-0035, TA-37-0006, TA-37-0009, and TA-37-0020

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Los Alamos Field Office (NA-LA), is pursuing the decommissioning and demolition (D&D) of facilities contaminated with high-explosives residues at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (Laboratory or LANL). This effort affects nine facilities associated with high-explosives and detonator research, development, and storage: Technical Area (TA) 8 Facility 32 (TA-08-0032), TA-11-0036, TA-22-0016, TA-22-0023, TA-22-0025, TA-22-0035, TA-37-0006, TA-37-0009, and TA-37-0020. All nine facilities proposed for D&D have been evaluated for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) and determined eligible. NA-LA previously requested the State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) to concur with the NRHP-eligibility determinations of these nine properties presented in four reports: (1) TA-08-0032 was determined eligible for listing in the NRHP in the report, From Ranching to Radiography: An Assessment of Historic Buildings at Anchor West Site (TA-8), Vol. 1 (McGehee et al. 2008a). The SHPO concurred with this eligibility determination on November 26, 2008. (2) TA-11-0036 was determined eligible for listing in the NRHP in the report, ESA Division’s Five-Year Plan: Consolidation and Revitalization at Technical Areas 3, 8, 11, and 16, Vol. 1) (McGehee et al. 2003). The SHPO concurred with this eligibility assessment on June 22, 2003. (3) TA-22-0016, TA-22-0023, TA-22-0025, and TA-22-0035 were determined eligible for listing in the NRHP in the report, DX Division’s Facility Strategic Plan: Consolidation and Revitalization at Technical Areas 6, 8, 9, 14, 15, 22, 36, 39, 40, 60, and 69, Vol. 1 (McGehee et al. 2005a). The SHPO concurred with these eligibility determinations on April 18, 2006. (4) TA-37-0006, TA-37-0009, and TA-37-0020 were determined eligible for listing in the NRHP in the report, High Explosives and the Nuclear Stockpile: An Assessment of Historic Buildings at Magazine Area C (TA-37), Vol. 1 (McGehee et al. 2008b). The SHPO concurred with these eligibility determinations on April 17, 2008. In a letter dated January 24, 2020, NA-LA acknowledged that the D&D of these nine NRHP-eligible facilities was an adverse effect that requires resolution through mitigation. NA-LA proposed the use of standard mitigation practices as defined in the Programmatic Agreement (PA) among the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Los Alamos Field Office, the New Mexico State Historic Preservation Office, and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning Management of the Historic Properties at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico. The PA states that adverse effects to NRHP-eligible buildings and structures will be resolved according to the standard practices defined in Part II, Section 10, of the Laboratory’s Cultural Resources Management Plan, A Plan for the Management of the Cultural Heritage at Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico (Purtzer et al. 2019), and Section 2.B of Appendix D of the PA itself. The standard practice documentation package includes the following components: (1) Interior and exterior photography and production of archival-quality digital photographs; (2) Documentation and curation of historically significant equipment and artifacts; (3) A list of all known drawings for the property; (4) Reduced-scale reproductions of selected drawings for the property; (5) A location map that shows the location of the property relative to the entire Laboratory property; (6) Reproduction of historical TA maps; (7) A TA map that depicts the footprint of each eligible and non-eligible facility; and (8) An expanded historic context that uses oral-history interviews, if available. On March 3, 2020, the SHPO concurred with the adverse effect determination and the mitigation plan. The documentation package, as previously described, is provided in Volumes 1 and 2 of this report.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Impact to Groundwater All-Pathways Dose Estimates for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Performance Assessment Using Updated Dose Coefficients from DOE-STD-1196-2022

The Performance Assessment (PA) for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RHLLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was completed in 2018 (DOE-ID 2018) using dose coefficients from U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Standard DOE-STD-1196-2011 (DOE 2011). Internal and external dosimetry was updated in 2021 and a new technical standard was published in 2022 (DOE-STD-1196-2022) (DOE 2022). This technical memorandum provides a comparison of the ingestion dose coefficients between those published in DOE (2011) and those published in DOE (2022). The dose coefficients in DOE (2022) were then used to calculate the all-pathways dose for the groundwater pathway and the results between the doses published in the 2018 PA and those calculated using the updated dose coefficients in DOE (2022) were compared. Several other issues in the 2018 RHLLW Disposal Facility PA were also addressed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Report Series: Finding of Effect, and Mitigation Documentation for Building 23-702, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-702 in the town of Mercury (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15278), which is on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada (see Figure 1). The purpose of the undertaking is related to the modernization of Mercury for future mission needs. The NNSA/NFO will implement this undertaking in accordance with the Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada, hereafter referred to as the Mercury PA. Building 23-702 was built in 1965 as a foil handling building for the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL), who worked on the design and engineering of nuclear weapons and other nuclear experiments. The building appeared to have secondarily functioned as a storage for radioactive sources in the 1980s and 1990s. The building was operational until 2004, then deactivated sometime between 2005 and 2014. The town of Mercury and the immediate surrounding area have been formally determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (National Register, NRHP) as the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230) under Criteria A and C for its importance in supporting nuclear testing and scientific research from 1951 through 1992. Building 23-702 was identified as a contributing element to the MHD in a 2018 architectural survey of the district (Reno et al.) and recorded on a Nevada Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) form (Reno et al. 2017). Building 23-702 was also identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Annual Summary Report for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility—FY 2023

This Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 annual summary report (ASR) documents the continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA), the composite analysis (CA) and associated operating disposal-authorization statement (ODAS) technical-basis documents for the Remote-Handled (RH) Low-Level Waste (LLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory. Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA for the RHLLW Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” In FY 2023, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility-closure design, or institutional controls. Eleven waste canister shipments were received at the RHLLW Disposal Facility, and ten waste canisters were emplaced in disposal vaults.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Finding Of Adverse Effect and Proposed Mitigation for the Removal of Joshua Trees at Building 23-210, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) recently removed two fallen Joshua trees that were part of an Accessory Resource (AR) to the former Department of Defense (DOD) Motor Pool Maintenance Compound in Mercury (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. C307) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1). The Joshua trees were part of AR3, a landscaped feature at the entrance to the compound. There are two remaining Joshua trees at risk of falling which may require removal in the future. The NNSA/NFO is proactively consulting with the SHPO regarding the potential removal of the remaining two trees. The purpose of the undertaking is to ensure that dead or dying Joshua trees do not cause damage to the remaining landscape elements, nor injury to NNSS employees. The NNSA/NFO will implement this undertaking in accordance with the Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada, hereafter referred to as the Mercury PA. Building 23-210 was the DOD’s motor vehicle maintenance compound constructed in 1951. The compound included its own repair shop and fuel station. The town of Mercury and the immediate surrounding area have been formally determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (National Register, NRHP) as the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230) under Criteria A and C for their importance in supporting nuclear testing and scientific research from 1951 through 1992. The former DOD Motor Pool Compound was identified as a contributing element to the MHD in a 2018 architectural survey of the district (Reno et al. 2018) and recorded on a Nevada Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) form (Reno et al. 2017). The foundation for Building 23-210 was also identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category III contributing element with three contributing ARs. Category III properties are those that may include elements for which there are several representatives in the MHD, such as foundations, and those elements which possess characteristics that are not unique to the MHD and are commonly found in other non-NNSS facilities. The former DOD compound, which is identified by the foundation for the Building 23-210 and its ARs, is a historic property for the purposes of compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Preliminary Screening of Features, Events, and Processes for an Arctic-Focused Climate Intervention Performance Assessment

Geoengineering, the deliberate large-scale intervention in Earth's climate system, holds significant potential in the rapidly warming Arctic, where temperatures currently rise at more than twice the global average, accelerating ice sheet and permafrost melt. This contributes to global sea-level rise and releases methane, a potent greenhouse gas. Strategies like solar radiation management (SRM) and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) could mitigate these effects; for instance, SRM techniques aim to reflect a portion of the sun's energy back into space, potentially slowing ice melt and stabilizing permafrost. However, geoengineering in the Arctic faces challenges, including potential unintended consequences on the fragile ecosystem, disruption of local weather patterns, and impacts on indigenous communities. Effective governance requires robust international cooperation, environmental impact assessments, and regulatory frameworks. Despite these challenges, geoengineering's potential benefits make it a critical research area. This report explores application of the Performance Assessment (PA) methodology to Arctic Climate Intervention, providing an initial screening of relevant features, events, and processes (FEPs). At the core of the PA approach is the identification and evaluation of FEPs that could impact the performance of the intervention scheme. Here we provide an initial screening of FEPs to consider in the application of PA to Arctic Climate Intervention.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Full Submersion Water Testing of SAVY-4000 Nuclear Material Storage Containers

SAVY-4000 (SAVY) containers are the primary container used at Technical Area (TA) TA-55 plutonium facility for the prevention of water ingress to mitigate against a criticality event. The basis for water resistance of these containers has long been attributed to the Polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) membrane that is assembled on the outermost surface of the filter assembly. On August 22nd a test of a container used inside of a glovebox was performed that brought into question this long-standing-basis. This test was performed by inverting a SAVY-lid onto a specialized piece of equipment for evaluating the integrity of the PTFE membrane. During the test water was observed passing through the filter indicating that the filter membrane was no longer preventing the ingress of water through the filter. The assumption after making this observation was that alpha-particles were rapidly degrading the membrane creating a leak path through the underlying aluminosilicate media (Fiberfrax®). The apparatus used was designed to only test the lid rather than the entire SAVY assembly. A test plan, PA-PLAN-01921, was developed to investigate whether a fully assembled container with a fully degraded PTFE membrane would be capable of meeting the criteria defined in PA-RD-1009 of not allowing more than 200 ml of water to enter the container with a water column of 6-inches applied over a 2-hour period. This report provides the results of the testing performed against PA-PLAN-01921.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

An Architectural Survey of the U12G Tunnel Historic District, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in conjunction with the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), proposes to demolish six buildings and three storage areas located at the U12g Tunnel portal area in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The buildings are 12-358 (Signal Vault); 12-201800 (Storage Quonset Hut); 12-202555 (Walker Shack); 12-868 (Pipe Assembly); 12-B100933 (Electrical Shop); 12-B100944 (Conference Room); and Storage Area 1; Storage Area 2; and Storage Area 3. The buildings and storage areas were selected for demolition as part of the DOE’s Real Property Efficiency Plan to reduce the footprint of unused and non-operational facilities on the NNSS. They are all vacant and have no proposed uses for current or upcoming NNSS missions. Demolition activities constitute an undertaking subject to review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) (54 United States Code [USC] § 306101) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800. Identification efforts began with resources proposed for demolition in federal Fiscal Year (FY) 23. Four buildings were proposed to be demolished in FY23 (12-358, 12-868, 12-201800, and 12-202555). These buildings and the U12g Tunnel Historic District (SHPO No. D444) were recorded in Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Adverse Effect for the Proposed Demolition of Five Buildings in Area 12, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Menocal et al. 2023). Identification efforts indicated three buildings (12-358, 12-201800, and 12-868) supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. The fourth building post-dated the use of U12g Tunnel for nuclear testing activities. The report recommended that three of the four buildings (12-358, 12-201800, 12-868) and the U12g Tunnel Historic District may be eligible for the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the three buildings and on the historic district. The Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) concurred with the report’s findings (Reed 2023). The U12g Tunnel was determined eligible as a historic district under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criterion A, at the local level, in the context of the Cold War as an underground testing environment for the development of nuclear weapons and to assess the effects of a nuclear explosion on materials and equipment with a period of significance from 1959 to 1971. It was also determined eligible under Significance Criterion C for embodying the distinctive characters of a horizontal tunnel complex used for nuclear testing and as a significant and distinguishable entity. The three buildings were determined to be contributing elements of the district. The undertaking was expanded with the addition of two buildings and three storage areas proposed to be demolished and located within U12g Tunnel Historic District in FY24. These five resources (12-B100933, 12-B100944, and Storage Areas 1, 2, and 3) were recorded in Supplemental Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Effect for Additional Proposed Demolition at U12g Tunnel, Area 12, Nevada national Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Brannan et al. 2024). Identification efforts indicated that the two buildings and Storage Area 1 supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. Storage Area 1 and Storage Area 2 post-dated the nuclear testing activities at U12g Tunnel and were not recommended as contributing elements to the district. The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the newly identified buildings and one storage area and on the historic district. The SHPO concurred that the expanded undertaking would result in adverse effects to historic properties (Reed 2025). To resolve these adverse effects, NNSA/NFO, in consultation with the SHPO, is following standard mitigation as stipulated in the 2024 Programmatic Agreement DE-GM58-22NA25554 Among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (hereafter referred to as the NNSS PA). The standard mitigation measures are outlined in Appendix D of the NNSS PA. As such, this architectural survey has been prepared in accordance with Appendix D of the NNSS PA and follows the report format outlined in Appendix F. It includes a historic context that describes the district’s origin, history, and support functions, its significance in the context of nuclear testing on the NNSS, and identifies contributing and non-contributing elements within the district. The report is accompanied by Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) forms for individual resources and a Historic District Resource Assessment (HDRA) for the U12g Tunnel Historic District. In total, this architectural report identified 32 primary resources within the district boundary. Six of the primary resources were previously identified as contributing elements. An additional 17 resources are recommended as contributing elements to the district for a total of 23 contributing elements. The other nine resources identified are recommended as non-contributing elements to the district.

12-201800↗

Annual Summary Report for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility—FY 2024

This Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 annual summary report (ASR) documents the continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA), the composite analysis (CA), and associated operating disposal- authorization statement (ODAS) technical-basis documents for the Remote-Handled (RH) Low-Level Waste (LLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RHLLW) Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” In FY 2024, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility-closure design, or institutional controls. Nineteen waste canister shipments were received at the RHLLW Disposal Facility, and all nineteen waste canisters were emplaced in disposal vaults.

12 - MGMT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTE↗