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Development of spectroscopic tools for nuclear forensics signatures development

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has been developing advanced spectroscopic tools for the characterization of plutonium-bearing compounds with the intent to develop material and process signatures for nuclear forensics. Plutonium in a production, refining, or finishing facility will exist in many forms including oxide precursors (PuF4, PuF3, Pu oxalate, etc.), oxide, and metal. The ability to identify plutonium in each of these chemical forms and determine their processing history is crucial for the development of spectroscopic signatures. This presentation will focus on our work to develop and apply spectroscopic tools at SRNL using doubled-walled cells (DWC) to characterize the thermal decomposition of oxalates, calcination chemistry, alpha-decay-induced chemistry, age dating since last calcination, and other signatures related to plutonium processing.

Villa-Aleman, Eliel↗

Who Invented the Christy Gadget

The Christy Gadget, named after its principal inventor, is the informal name for the device tested at Trinity on July 16th, 1945. In late 1944, Robert Christy proposed a novel invention that altered the design of the plutonium pit in Fat Man. While scientists originally intended to use a hollow sphere of plutonium, there was a substantial risk given a number of asymmetries that resulted from implosion. Christy proposed changing the design of the plutonium core to a solid sphere of plutonium with a modulated neutron source. The new model was adopted and used in the early implosion bombs. While there is little debate about the important role that Christy played in demonstrating its feasibility as a safe design, there is a debate as to who initially proposed the idea of the Christy Device. My project this summer outlines and resolves this dispute. While Christ does deserve the majority of the credit for the invention and design, I also acknowledge the important role Rudolf Peierls and John von Neumann played in its development.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Gamma ray analysis of the K2 containers

The K2 containers contain PuO2 with 238 Pu being the most abundant isotope of all plutonium isotopes. The purpose of this analysis is to determine the light element impurities in the PuO2. These light elements can interact with the alpha particles from plutonium decay to release gamma rays, protons, and neutrons through the reactions (α,α’), (α,p), and (α,n) respectively. The gamma rays released by the interactions can be measured and compared with the gamma rays released by the plutonium. The ratios of the gamma rays from the interactions and the plutonium gamma rays allow for the determination of the impurities in the items. The elements that can be detected are Lithium (Z=3), Beryllium (Z=4), Boron (Z=5), Fluorine (Z=9), Sodium (Z=11), Magnesium (Z=12), Aluminum (Z=13), Silicon (Z=14), Phosphorous (Z=15), Chlorine (Z=17), and Potassium (Z=19).

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Analysis of Tank 38H (HTF-38-22-91, -92) and Tank 43H (HTF-43-22-93, -94) Samples for Support of the Enrichment Control and Corrosion Control Programs

SRNL analyzed samples from Tank 38H and Tank 43H to support ECP and CCP. The results indicate the concentrations of most soluble species in the Tank 38H surface sample increased slightly from the previous surface sample. The Tank 38H sub-surface sample shows changes in concentration for soluble species in the solution with some increasing and some decreasing. The current Tank 38H sub-surface sample contains more sludge solids than the previous sample based on visual appearance. The small differences in the concentrations of major components between the Tank 38H surface and sub-surface samples indicate only minimal stratification of solution species within the tank. The Tank 43H surface and sub-surface samples are similar in composition to the previous samples. The similar solution compositions measured in the Tank 43H surface and sub-surface samples indicate a minimal stratification within the tank. The total uranium and plutonium in the current Tank 38H surface sample remains similar to the previous analysis. The Tank 38H sub-surface sample shows an increase in uranium and plutonium concentrations compared to the previous sample likely because of an increase in sludge solids in the current sample. The total uranium concentration in the two Tank 43H samples is essentially unchanged from previous sample results. The plutonium concentration in the Tank 43H surface sample is similar to the previous sample results while the plutonium in the Tank 43H sub-surface sample increased relative to the previous analysis. The sum of the major cations versus the sum of the major anions shows a difference of <10% for both samples from Tank 38H and for both samples from Tank 43H providing an indication of good data quality for the non-radioactive analytes in the samples. The silicon concentrations measured in the Tank 38H sub-surface sample increased compared with the previous sample results likely due to the presence of more sludge solids in the current sample. The Tank 38H surface sample silicon concentrations is similar to the previous sample results. The Tank 43H surface and sub-surface sample silicon concentrations both increased compared to the previous sample results. The samples analyzed from Tanks 38H and 43H show silicon concentrations ranging from 61.5 to 97.3 mg/L.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Density Measurement of NaCl-MgCl 2 -PuCl 3 and NaCl-UCl 3 -PuCl 3 Molten Salt Systems by Neutron Radiographic Dilatometry

A novel neutron radiographic technique was developed and implemented to measure the change in volume as a function of temperature of select plutonium-containing liquid chloride mixtures from melt to 1250 K. These measurements were performed at Los Alamos National Laboratory by members of the molten salt research group under support from Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN) voucher NE-21-25117: “Density Measurements of Plutonium Bearing Salts via Neutron Beam Dilatometry”. This technical report contains a description of the experimental method and a summary of the results. Initial characterization of the {NaCl, MgCl 2 , UCl 3 , PuCl 3 } salts used in this experiment includes a combination of x-ray diffraction, differential scanning calorimetry, gamma ray spectroscopy, and inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry. Four samples of NaCl + MgCl 2 + x mol% PuCl 3 and four samples of NaCl + UCl 3 + x mol% PuCl 3 were prepared at the Plutonium Facility, shipped to the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE), and radiographed with the density via neutron radiography (DvNR) apparatus. Density data in the form of meniscus heights were recorded as a function of temperature. The results show a linear dependence of density with temperature and a third order polynomial dependence of density with composition as a function of PuCl 3 addition in the corresponding halide salt mixture. Additions of PuCl 3 result in a significant increase in density of the salt mixture and a slight reduction in the coefficient of volumetric expansion. These results represent a first measurement of the density of plutonium chloride salt mixtures and, in combination with additional measurements, may lead to a generalized description of the density of such salt systems for arbitrary compositions and temperature.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Development of Automated Material Handling System with Alternate Gripper Designs for the Purpose of Increased Performance & Worker Safety

Savannah River National Laboratory’s (SRNL) Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Program leads the development and transition of automated unit operations for the processing of Plutonium oxide. A mixing can is opened, filled with material, mixed, set inside of a die can, and finally punched into compressed material. Replication of the process is constructed in A-area, where the mixing can weighs 1.6 kg (3.5 lbs.) and the compressed material weighs 4 kg (8.8 lbs.). Due to the constant process of Plutonium disposition, the fatigue on workers and worker dose accumulates quickly over time. SPD aims to automate this process by using a robotic arm to replace the hands-on worker. Automation will: Reduce worker radiation dose; Increase process throughout; Reduce costs for the disposition of Plutonium oxide.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

In-situ Synthesis of PuCl 3 and Corresponding Raman and Density Functional Theory Vibrational Modes

The experimental and calculated Raman spectrum of PuCl 3 has been reported for the first time. PuCl 3 is a primary species found in plutonium metal refinement, specifically in pyrochemical salt processes including multicycle direct oxide reduction, metal chlorination, and electrorefining. As such, Raman signatures of PuCl 3 could serve as potential forensic indicators of material process history. A novel technique for synthesizing PuCl 3 from the in-situ chlorination of plutonium metal with HCl was developed to establish these signatures. Cerium metal surrogates were utilized to ensure optimization of the plutonium experiments and to minimize personnel exposure, and all experiments were carried out in a Raman reaction chamber designed for air-tight, high vacuum environments. In-situ Raman spectroscopy was employed in conjunction with Density Functional Theory (DFT) to investigate the vibrational modes of PuCl 3 . Associated mixed oxy and hydroxyl phases are also reported. The combined Raman and DFT results have eliminated inconsistencies in Raman mode assignments for the MX 3 family of metal chlorides having P6 3 /m symmetry, and IR modes derived from the DFT calculations are additionally presented. The data observed in this study is of potential interest to nuclear forensic analyses, nuclear sample aging, nuclear energy, plutonium processing, and stockpile stewardship.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Summary of Gas Generation Behavior Observed in 3013 Surveillance and Monitoring Program Shelf-Life Experiments

Gas generation experiments have been conducted in small- and full-scale test containers at Los Alamos National Laboratory on samples of plutonium oxide material collected from plutonium processes across the DOE complex and tested at the bounding conditions for the Department of Energy 3013 Standard. The gas composition and pressures in the sealed experimental containers were measured over periods of months to years. These experiments have provided results for the formation and consumption of hydrogen and other gases. The conditions supporting the formation of flammable gas mixtures of hydrogen and oxygen in flammable gas mixtures were also determined. Different behaviors were observed between the materials tested based on their compositions, the stabilization performed on the material, and the post stabilization handling of the material. Many of the experiments are still ongoing. This report summarizes the results obtained for the gas generation behavior for high-purity plutonium oxides and salt-bearing impure plutonium oxides in sealed containers.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Gamma Spectrometry Code Rodeo for Uranium Enrichment—FY 2022 Report

In the first two quarters of FY22, data acquisition continued at ORNL and LLNL using uranium sources of known enrichments. This was an FY21 task which could not be completed in FY21 because of problems encountered with the ORNL M400 CZT in Q4 of FY21, and the subsequent repairs. The detector was received back from H3D in the first of September 2021 , and the measurements resumed . Measurements using the repaired detector were completed in Q1 of FY22. The spectra were distributed by ORNL to the analyzing labs. Analysis results were received in Q2 of FY2022. The results from the various codes were intercompared and an ANOVA analysis was performed. Random and systematic uncertainties were established for each code. The ANOVA results and discussions were included in a revised version of FY21Annual Report issued in March 2022. A paper was presented at the INMM 2022Annual Conference, with the analysis results from the various isotopic codes, and the ANOVA table with random and systematic uncertainties. The Project Work Plan (PWP) for FY22 included a task to perform field testing of the M400 CZT and the analysis codes using UF 6 cylinder measurements at the Framatome Fuel Fabrication Facility in Richland, WA. PNNL was the lead for the field testing task. PNNL drafted a Field Test Plan, and refined it based on comments received from the team. PNNL coordinated with Framatome facility, the logistics of carrying out the field testing . A collimator and shield made out of TFlex (tungsten impregnated polymer) was designed and professionally manufactured. The collimators were used in the field test measurements. The measurements at Framatome were completed on April 21, 2022. A total of 34 Type 30B cylinders were measured using three M400 detectors (PNNL, LLNL, and ORNL detectors). Measurements using M400 were taken at two locations on the side of each cylinder and from the end-on bottom location. Additionally, HPGe measurements were taken at the end-on location to establish ground truth. Cylinder wall thickness measurements were also made at all three locations. To gain a better understanding of the effect of background from surrounding cylinders, the same five cylinders measured individually in low background locations were measured again in the cylinder storage yards. Due to inclement weather, manufacturer delays, shipping delays, and equipment failure, the measurement campaign spanned twice as long compared to the original timeline. Gamma-ray spectra from M400 and HPGe detectors, along with the cylinder data and photographs were organized and shared with the collaborators for further analysis. Spectra were analyzed by the participating laboratories. FY22 PWP also consists of tasks related to plutonium source measurements, adapting the codes to analyze plutonium spectra, and inter-comparison of the results from various codes. Plutonium spectra are being acquired at LANL, ORNL, and LLNL. LANL, SNL and LLNL are in the process of modifying FRAM, GADRAS, and CZTU, respectively. The plutonium related tasks will be completed in Q2 of FY23.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

An Examination of Issues Related to a Europa Subsurface Component for the JIMO Mission

The Galileo Europa data set served to revolutionize our view of Europa. In particular the strong evidence of a large, cold, salty Ocean beneath 5-30 km of ice has profoundly altered the significance of Europa in our thinking, especially of context of habitability in the solar system. While much remains to be learned from spacecraft observations of several sorts, there are significant questions answerable only by in-situ techniques; these relate to the formation of Europa, the nature of its ocean, and the prospects for life in its ocean, sediments, and ice. We feel that wide-ranging discussion of an in-situ subsurface mission to Europa, as part of JIMO, should proceed. The science objective of the mission is to characterize the icy shell of Europa to resolve its provenance, estimate the composition of brine of the Europa ocean, and search for evidence of Earth-like life. Probably anyone would agree that an in-situ mission to Europa would be of great value, but he or she would also immediately take the position that such a mission is utterly impractical. We take the position here of defining the least complex mission that can nonetheless justify its cost and to argue that such a mission is realistic enough that it should be seriously considered. Our mission thinking has been: 1) Soft landing. A soft lander is required on a site sufficiently flat to offer a stable platform; no further site selectivity is required. 2) Subsurface exploration. The Europa subsurface must be examined. Surficial processes on Europa arguably have exposed the upper 200 m of shell to chemical effects from the Jovian radiation belts as well as cometary infall, etc; to examine native ice we must descend below that point to, for discussion, 300 m. At that depth we argue that the ice is characteristic of ice at depth and possibly is effectively sea ice. 3) Science data. A few simple measurements at various depths and at 300 m constitute a scientifically successful mission. Measurements would include analysis of meltwater for a few inorganic ions and amino acids and an optical examination of the borehole wall. 4) Communication. Transmission of data to an orbiter is essential, but we will constrain the landed mission to a daily communication over a few days. 5) Subsurface access. Drilling to 300 m is a significant challenge; it can be addressed by several means: Thermal Probe (Cryobot) which permits water to refreeze above the vehicle. This is our tentative choice with plutonium as the fuel to generate thermal energy for drilling and electrical power for operations. Open Hole Drill, a thermal system in which the meltwater is removed for greater thermal efficiency. Meltwater removal on Europa is both a complexity and a risk, but analysis is improved. Mechanical Drilling in which cutting or grinding generates ice chips which are removed. This is too complex at Europa temperatures. The measurement objectives for the mission will be: Obj. 1: Determine the concentration of simple inorganic salts in the Europa Ice Shell and, by extrapolation, of the ocean. These data will also validate spaceborne sensors. Obj. 2: Determine the nature and abundance of amino acids in the ice such that cometary infall material in the upper ice can be compared to material at depth. Obj. 3: Optically examine the ice to resolve inclusion structure, particulate content, and stratification. Access to 300 m depth is a significant if not audacious plan; we are aware that this has not been done on any planetary body. Our approach is the use of a plutonium heat source; to overcome Europa's surface temperature and to melt ice a significant amount of plutonium is needed, and significant shielding and other protective steps will be required. The quantity of plutonium is a key concern. The mission will require subsurface collection and processing of samples for in situ analysis, calling for a miniature, high pressure micro-sampling system designed to meet needs of instruments that require low presses for operation. The inlet system itself collects a micro-sample in the external high pressure environment, then transfers it into a protected low pressure environment for analysis.

Carsey, F. D.↗

Developing a New Criticality Safety Hands-On Training Utilizing ZPPR Plates

Nuclear criticality safety is an extremely important part of the work at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). As part of the work LANL performs to continue to keep criticality safety a top priority, LANL has developed and regularly teaches nuclear criticality safety training classes for both the United States Department of Energy Nuclear Criticality Safety Program as well as internal trainings for LANL employees. A portion of the training classes is comprised of hands-on demonstrations, where students get the opportunity to handle special nuclear material at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC). One hands-on demonstration uses the “Class foils,” thin HEU foils which are stacked with lucite moderator plates. A hand-stack is performed until the multiplication reaches the “three-quarters rule,” where the demonstration is continued remotely on a vertical lift assembly up until the system is critical. This hands-on demonstration eventually achieves a critical configuration and follows the ANS-1 guidelines on an approach to critical. Another hands-on demonstration involves handling clad plutonium and neptunium spheres, and follows procedures using criticality safety evaluations to ensure that the hands-on demonstrations remain subcritical.This hands-on demonstration also involves the use of polyethylene shells around the plutonium sphere to demonstrate how additional reflector increases the criticality of a system. This paper is focused on developing a new hands-on demonstration using Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) plates. This new hands-on demonstration will follow the ANS-8 standards as it is not desired to achieve criticality with the ZPPR plates during the hands-on demonstration. A hands-on demonstration using multiple plutonium parts will likely be more applicable to personnel who handle plutonium on a daily basis, such as LANL glovebox operators.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

High sensitivity measurement of femtogram-level 238 Pu by thermal ionization mass spectrometry with correction of background 238 U

Low-concentration plutonium isotopic measurements provide a valuable fingerprint to identify possible material origins in the context of environmental contamination monitoring, environmental tracing, nuclear safeguards, nuclear forensics, and treaty monitoring. Thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS) has long been recognized as one of the most sensitive techniques for plutonium isotopic measurement, but has not generally been utilized for 238 Pu determination, especially at low concentrations, due to an isobaric interference from 238 U, prevalent as background. Here, this work demonstrates a new analytical technique for correction of background 238 U from the 238 Pu counts collected during a TIMS analysis. The technique takes advantage of the higher ionization temperature of U relative to Pu and uses a 235 U tracer added after plutonium purification chemistry for 238 U semi-quantitative determination. This technique has been successfully applied to the determination of 238 Pu concentration and the 238 Pu/ 239 Pu ratio in sample types including single-isotope standards, isotopic certified reference materials, matrix-containing environmental reference materials, and simulated nuclear detonation debris. The results have been directly compared on a sample-by-sample basis to alpha spectrometry results. The detection limit by this new technique is 0.23 fg 238 Pu, which was previously unachievable by mass spectrometry and is possible in around 1 h of analysis time post-chemistry compared to weeks of required counting time by alpha spectrometry (at the same atom amount). We also present original, high precision data for Pu isotope concentrations in IAEA-384, Fangataufa Sediment, including 242 Pu results for the first time. The new technique allows measurement of a key isotope, 238 Pu, that was previously not measured in small environmental or nuclear forensics collections.

238Pu↗

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: (Jan 1 - Dec 31 2018)

During the late 1950s, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (now the U.S. Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted a series of safety experiments to determine if a nuclear device subjected to a large conventional explosives detonation would result in a nuclear yield. The AEC obtained temporary use of a large portion of western Emigrant Valley from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) for one of these experiments: Project 57. Following the Project 57 safety experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DOD. Emigrant Valley is part of the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). For safety and security reasons, access to the NTTR is controlled using both physical (i.e., fences) and administrative (e.g., signs and postings) controls. Therefore, the public cannot access the Project 57 site and there are no known human receptors that routinely access the site. Project 57 was detonated on April 24, 1957, in Emigrant Valley approximately 13 mi (21 km) northeast of the north end of Yucca Flat. This test was undertaken to develop: (1) a means of estimating immediate distribution and long-term redistribution of plutonium dispersed during a nonnuclear detonation; (2) biomedical evaluation techniques for use in likely plutonium-laden environments; (3) methods of decontaminating ground areas, pavements, and building materials; and (4) alpha survey instruments and field monitoring procedures to promptly estimate contaminant deposition. Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the ground surface. Various radiological surveys have been performed in the area since Project 57 was conducted. The AEC delineated the area containing radioactive material based on radioactivity surveys performed shortly after the test was conducted. A designated Contamination Area (CA), marked by a fence, was established later. The distribution of americium-241 (Am-241) in the area was determined again in a 1997 flyover, which showed Am-241 ranging from as much as 70,000 counts per second (cps) at ground zero to background (<70 cps). This survey also documented Am-241 radioactivity on the ground surface beyond the east side CA fence at levels of up to 150 cps. In 2007, the DOE expanded the CA by posting “Contamination Area” signs 200 ft to 400 ft (60 m to 120 m) beyond the original fence, which formed a new CA boundary.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

The TRANSCEND University Consortium: Theme 4: Nuclear Materials - 20431

The safe and secure management of Pu is a matter of international concern, with ∼250 t of separated Pu currently stockpiled worldwide. The UK's civil inventory of nuclear materials contains significant stocks of separated Pu from the reprocessing of Magnox and AGR spent fuels. The preferred option for the 138.5 tonnes of Pu is re-use as mixed oxide (MOx) fuel, although 5% is not suitable for re-use and is recommended for direct disposal. However, it will take more than 15 years to implement re-use, requiring that the Pu be kept in interim storage in its current state for that period, i.e. as PuO{sub 2} powder within inert steel storage cans at Sellafield. The focus of the work presented here is thus plutonium storage and the direct disposal of plutonium. The Research and Development needs of both are now pressing: in the case of storage due to it being the current default; in the case of immobilization and disposal because of a comparative lack of Research and Development on Pu conditioning and packaging due to policy uncertainty as to whether it would be disposed of in a Geologic Disposal Facility (GDF). Addressing these needs is complicated by Pu's high radioactivity, decay heat and radiotoxicity, criticality, nuclear safeguard requirements and, for some UK Pu contaminated materials targeted for disposal, poor inventory. Thus, there is also a critical requirement for underpinning research on Pu bearing materials in these two contexts. In response to these needs, the TRANSCEND Consortium (Transformative Science and Engineering for Nuclear Decommissioning, a multi-disciplinary collaboration of 11 universities and 8 key industry partners from across the UK's civil nuclear sector) is seeking to provide technical underpinning to ongoing option development for the UK's civil Pu stockpile. Whilst understanding the behaviour of plutonium during its re-use as MOx is beyond the scope of the TRANSCEND Consortium work plan, the main objectives of the work are: (1) For interim storage: to understand how the surface structure and properties of pristine and radiation damaged PuO{sub 2} change with time in the absence and presence of water; and (2) For immobilization and disposal: to understand the mechanisms of incorporation of Pu into ceramic and glass-ceramic waste-forms, as well as the effect on these of self-induced radiation damage. Each objective is being addressed through separate work packages, the details of which are discussed in this paper. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A Rapid Sequential Separation Method for Determination of Actinides and TENORM in Fracking Wastes - 20223

With recent advances in unconventional drilling technology in the US and around the world, the risks of environmental contamination and exposure due to technologically enhanced naturally occurring radioactive materials (TENORM) from fracking wastes have also surfaced. Although the Permian Basin (southeastern New Mexico, western Texas) has long been a modest producer of oil, the advent of fracking technology a decade ago turned it into hot property for producers. A 2018 assessment of undiscovered, technically recoverable continuous oil and gas resources by the U.S. Geological Survey estimates an average 46.3 billion barrels of oil and 281 trillion cubic feet of gas. This is likely to increase the use of unconventional drilling and TENORM generation. TENORM concentrations in oil and gas exploration and production waste can be several hundred to several thousand times higher than background TENORM concentrations. Both the thorium and uranium decay chains contribute to airborne radionuclides arising from the radon gas escaping the ground and subsequently decaying as airborne particulates. Additionally, radon decay products {sup 210}Pb and {sup 210}Po can build up in scale on the internal surfaces of oil and gas handling pipes and in sludge in refineries, becoming potential inhalation and ingestion hazards for workers. Furthermore, southeastern NM is also home to world's only licensed and operating transuranic nuclear waste repository, the DoE's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Plutonium isotopes ({sup 239+240}Pu) and {sup 241}Am, are expected to account for more than 99% of the total radioactivity scheduled for disposal in the WIPP repository. Thus, an improved understanding of the environmental fate and transport of TENORM, liberated by unconventional drilling, is essential to assess how best to protect individuals and the environment. In this context, accurate measurement of TENORM and actinides in environmental and biological samples is essential. In this presentation, a new sequential method for the separation and pre-concentration of actinides (Pu, Am, Np) and TENORM (Po, U and Th) derived from oil and gas exploration is proposed. The TEVA method involves a rapid co-precipitation step to remove matrix interferences from the samples, followed by plutonium oxidation state adjustment to Pu (IV) and an incubation period of ∼ 1 hour at 50-60 deg. C to allow the resultant Po (II) to oxidize into Po(IV). The polonium, neptunium, thorium and plutonium are then separated on a TEVA column, while americium and uranium are separated on a TRU column. After separation, the alpha counting source was prepared by micro-precipitation with copper sulfide (CuS) for polonium and neodymium fluoride (NdF{sub 3}) for actinides. The efficiency and reliability of the procedures were tested by analyzing filter, drinking water and frack sand samples. The method is simple, robust and can be performed quickly with excellent removal of interferences, high chemical recovery and very good alpha peak resolution. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Computational insights into the structure of anhydrous Pu(III) oxalate

Despite the plutonium oxalate method's wide use in plutonium reprocessing, the method's mechanistic details remain unclear, particularly the identity of the plutonium oxidation state during conversion from an oxalate hydrate to the oxide. Recently, the optical vibrational spectra of Pu(III) oxalate during calcination were measured, providing an experimental reference for computational studies aimed at elucidating the oxalate structure. Here, in this work, we compare the vibrational and electronic properties of two candidate anhydrous Pu(III) oxalate structures calculated using density functional theory with recent experiments. We find that both structures are plausible and may coexist at experimental temperatures, providing insights into the broad features measured in the Raman and infrared spectra.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Production of anhydrous ƒ-element fluorides through the ionothermal treatment of ƒ-element oxalates

The pivotal role of uranium and plutonium fluorides in the nuclear fuel cycle, particularly in the pyrochemical reduction process, is well recognized. Traditionally, the fluorination of uranium and plutonium materials relies on the use of highly toxic and corrosive gases (e.g., HF (g) , F 2(g) ). Herein, we present an alternative approach using the ionic liquid 1‑butyl‑3-methylimidazolium hexafluorophosphate ([Bmim][PF 6 ] (l) ) and/or hexafluorophosphoric acid (HPF 6(aq) ) as fluorinating agents for the ƒ-element oxalates M$^{III}_{2}$(C 2 O 4 ) 3 ∙ 9H 2 O (s) M$^{III}_{2}$(C 2 O 4 ) 3 ∙ 9H 2 O (s) (M III = Ce, Pu) and M IV (C 2 O 4 ) 2 ∙ 6H 2 O (s) (M IV = Th, U). Our findings demonstrate that [Bmim][PF 6 ] (l) and HPF 6(aq) enable the ionothermal fluorination of ƒ-element oxalates, resulting in the formation of anhydrous CeF 3(s) , ThF 4(s) , and UF 4(s) within 2 hours at 200 °C. This method also facilitates the partial fluorination of plutonium(III) oxalate, yielding a mixture of anhydrous PuF 3(s) and an unidentified phase. Overall, the ionothermal treatment approach offers a safer and more efficient means of producing anhydrous ƒ-element fluorides than conventional methods involving hazardous gases. In addition, we describe the morphology of UF 4(s) materials as a function of production route and demonstrate the presence of morphological signatures that could be used during a nuclear forensic investigation.

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