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At least 397 records · Page 22

Azimuthal Sampling of Tectonic Release from Rayleigh Waves, Triggered by Shallow Explosions from the Source Physics Experiment: Theory

Underground explosions often produce Rayleigh waves with non-circular radiation patterns. The presence of significant anisotropic radiation patterns from isotropic sources is often attributed to the coincident release of tectonic strain across faults that are spatially near the explosion working point. However, poor instrument deployment geometries can lead to misinterpretations of these fields as isotropic when the are non-circular. In this work, we construct a physical representation for the first two moments of the Rayleigh wave radiation pattern triggered by a shallow, underground explosion. We then construct a hypothesis test for discriminating between the isotropic and anisotropic portion of the radiated Rayleigh wavefield, using these moments. We find that the screening power is completely quantified by a single parameter λ that depends on azimuthal deployment geometry as well as wavefield sampling. To improve radiation pattern discrimination, we present an algorithm for iteratively including receivers to sample the radiation pattern that increases the performance (power) of the hypothesis test at each iteration. Last, we discuss future applications of our method to data recorded from the Source Physics Experiment taking place at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS).

42 ENGINEERING↗

Radiochemically-supported microbial communities. A potential mechanism for biocolloid production of importance to actinide transport

The work described here revealed the presence of diverse microbial communities located across 19 subsurface sites at the NNSS/NTTR and nearby locations. Overall, the diversity of microorganisms was high for subsurface habitats and variable between sites. As of this writing, preparations are being made to combine the Illumina sequences and 16S rRNA clone libraries with other non-NNSS/NTTR well sites of Southern Nevada Regional Flow System for a publication manuscript describing our very broad landscape scale survey of subsurface microbial diversity. Isolates DRI-13 and DRI-14 remain to be fully characterized and named in accordance with the conventions established by Bergey's Manual of Systematic Bacteriology. In preparation to be published, these microorganisms will be submitted to the American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) and the Deutsche Sammlung von Mikroorganismen und Zellkulturen GmbH (DSMZ).It is anticipated that the data resulting from this study in combination with other data sets that will allow us to produce a number of publications that will be impactful to the subsurface microbiology community.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

The Mystery of the Gun Turret in the Desert

The mystery of the gun turret in the desert began with an ingenious idea: to develop a reusable open-air line of sight diagnostic device to support LLNL’s early nuclear weapons development efforts. Obtained from the Mare Island Navy Shipyard (MINS) in January 1957, the gun turret traveled by ship to the Naval Construction Battalion base at Port Hueneme, California, and then by truck to Area 2 in the Yucca Flats valley at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: October 1, 2013, through December 31, 2014

On April 24, 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC, now the Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted the Project 57 safety experiment in western Emigrant Valley north east of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site) on lands withdrawn by the Department of Defense (DoD) for the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). The test was undertaken to develop (1) a means of estimating plutonium distribution resulting from a nonnuclear detonation; (2) biomedical evaluation techniques for use in plutonium-laden environments; (3) methods of surface decontamination; and (4) instruments and field procedures for prompt estimation of alpha contamination (Shreve, 1958). Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the land surface. Following the experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DoD. Various radiological surveys have been performed in the area and in 2007, the DOE expanded the demarked contamination area by posting signs 200 to 400 feet (60 to 120 meters) outside of the original fence. Plutonium in soil is thought to attach preferentially to smaller particles. Therefore, redistribution of soil particulates by wind (dust) is the mechanism most likely to transport plutonium beyond the boundary of the Project 57 contamination area. In 2011, DRI installed two instrumentation towers to measure radiological, meteorological, and dust conditions. The monitoring activity was implemented to determine if radionuclide contamination was detectable in samples of airborne dust and characterize meteorological and environmental parameters that influence dust transport. Collected data also permits comparison of radiological conditions at the Project 57 monitoring stations to conditions observed at Community Environmental Monitoring Program (CEMP) stations around the NTTR. Biweekly samples of airborne particulates are submitted for laboratory assessment of gross alpha and gross beta radioactivity and for determination of gamma-emitting radionuclides. Annual average gross alpha values at the Project 57 monitoring stations are in the same range as the highest two values reported for the CEMP stations surrounding the NTTR. Annual average gross beta values at the Project 57 monitoring stations are slightly higher than the lowest value reported for the CEMP stations surrounding the NTTR. Gamma spectroscopy analyses on samples collected from the Project 57 stations identified only naturally occurring radionuclides. No manmade radionuclides were detected. Thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) indicated that the average annual radioactivity dose at the monitoring stations is higher than the dose determined at surrounding CEMP stations but approximately half of the estimated national average dose received by the general public as a result of exposure to natural sources. The TLDs at the Project 57 monitoring stations are exposed to both natural sources (terrestrial and cosmic) and radioactive releases from the Project 57 contamination area. These comparisons show that the gross alpha, gross beta, and gamma spectroscopy levels at the Project 57 monitoring stations are similar to levels observed at the CEMP stations but that the average annual dose rate is higher than at the CEMP stations. Winds in excess of approximately 15 mph begin to generate dust movement by saltation (migration of sand at the ground surface) or direct suspension in the air. Saltated sand, PM10 (inhalable) dust, and PM2.5 (fine particulate dust) exhibit an approximately exponential increase with increasing wind speed. The greatest concentrations of dust occur for winds exceeding 20 mph. During the reporting period, winds in excess of 20 mph occurred approximately 1.6 percent of the time. Preliminary assessment of individual wind events suggests that dust generation is highly variable likely because of the influence of other meteorological and environmental parameters. Although winds sufficient to generate significant amounts of dust occur at the Project 57 site, they are infrequent and of short duration. Additionally, the potential for wind transport of dust is dependent on other parameters whose influence have not yet been assessed.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Nevada National Security Site: Site-Directed Research and Development (SDRD) Fiscal Year 2015 Annual Report

This report presents results of multiple research projects, new and ongoing, funded under the Site-Directed Research and Development Program for the Nevada National Security Site during federal fiscal year 2015. The Site's legacy capabilities in remote sensing combined with new paradigms for emergency response and consequence management help drive the need to develop advanced aerial sensor platforms. Likewise, dynamic materials science is a critical area of scientific research for which basic physics issues are still unresolved. New methods of characterizing materials in extreme states are vitally needed, and these efforts are paving the way with new knowledge. Projects selected in FY 2015 for the Exploratory Research portfolio exhibit a strong balance of NNSS mission relevance. Geoscience, seismology, and techniques for detecting underground nuclear events are still essential focus areas. Many of the project reports in the second major section of this annual report are ongoing continuations in multi-year lifecycles. Diagnostic techniques for stockpile and nuclear security science figured prominently as well, with a few key efforts coming to fruition, such as phase transition detection. In other areas, modeling efforts toward better understanding plasma focus physics has also started to pay dividends for major program needs.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems Testing: Evaluation of VIS SWIR MWIR and LWIR passive imagers.

This report contains analysis of unmanned aerial systems as imaged by visible, short-wave infrared, mid-wave infrared, and long-wave infrared passive devices. Testing was conducted at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) during the week of August 15, 2016. Target images in all spectral bands are shown and contrast versus background is reported. Calculations are performed to determine estimated pixels-on-target for detection and assessment levels, and the number of pixels needed to cover a hemisphere for detection or assessment at defined distances. Background clutter challenges are qualitatively discussed for different spectral bands, and low contrast scenarios are highlighted for long-wave infrared imagers.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Requirements Doc for Refurb of JASPER Facility in B131HB

The Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) Program target fabrication facility is currently located in building 131 (B131) of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). A portion of this current facility has been committed to another program as part of a larger effort to consolidate LLNL capabilities into newer facilities. This facility assembles precision targets for scientific studies at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). B131 is also going through a modernization project to upgrade the infrastructure and abate asbestos. These activities will interrupt the continuous target fabrication efforts for the JASPER Program. Several options are explored to meet the above conflicting requirements, with the final recommendation to prepare a new facility for JASPER target fabrication operations before modernization efforts begin in the current facility assigned to JASPER. This recommendation fits within all schedule constraints and minimizes the disruption to the JASPER Program. This option is not without risk, as it requires moving an aged, precision coordinate measuring machine, which is essential to the JASPER Program’s success. The selected option balances the risk to the machine with continuity of operations.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Classification of the Z-Pinch Waste Stream as Low-Level Waste for Disposal

The purpose of this document is to describe the waste stream from Z-Pinch Residual Waste Project that due to worker safety concerns and operational efficiency is a candidate for blending Transuranic and low level waste together and can be safely packaged as low-level waste consistent with DOE Order 435.1 requirements and NRC guidance 10 CFR 61.42. This waste stream consists of the Pu-ICE post-shot containment systems, including plutonium targets, generated from the Z Machine experiments requested by LANL and conducted by SNL/NM. In the past, this TRU waste was shipped back to LANL after Sandia sends the TRU data package to LANL to certify the characterization (by CCP), transport and disposition at WIPP (CBFO) per LANL MOU-0066. The Low Level Waste is managed, characterized, shipped and disposed of at NNSS by SNL/NM per Sandia MOU # 11-S-560.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Special Analysis for the Disposal of the INL Waste Associated with the Unirradiated Light Water Breeder Reactor (LWBR) Waste Stream at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site

This special analysis (SA) evaluates whether the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Waste Associated with the Unirradiated Light Water Breeder Reactor (LWBR) waste stream (INEL167203QR1, Revision 0) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the INL Waste Associated with the Unirradiated LWBR waste meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999). The INL Waste Associated with the Unirradiated LWBR waste stream is recommended for acceptance with the condition that the total uranium-233 ( 23 3U) inventory be limited to 2.7E13 Bq (7.2E2 Ci).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

FY 2016 Site-Directed Research & Development Annual Report

As the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) continues to evolve and transition its mission to a broader scope, significant challenges lie ahead that present unique opportunities for our research and development (R&D) enterprise. At the juncture, we are poised to create a different future investment strategy. Our decisions at the beginning of a new tri-decade span must be guided as expertly as possible given the greater complexity and multifaceted nature of our work.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Field Response Prediction: Framing the problem.

Predicting the performance of radiation detection systems at field sites based on measured performance acquired under controlled conditions at test locations, e.g., the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), remains an unsolved and standing issue within DNDO’s testing methodology. Detector performance can be defined in terms of the system’s ability to detect and/or identify a given source or set of sources, and depends on the signal generated by the detector for the given measurement configuration (i.e., source strength, distance, time, surrounding materials, etc.) and on the quality of the detection algorithm. Detector performance is usually evaluated in the performance and operational testing phases, where the measurement configurations are selected to represent radiation source and background configurations of interest to security applications.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Special Analysis for the Disposal of the Materials and Energy Corporation Sealed Sources at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site

This special analysis (SA) evaluates whether the Materials and Energy Corporation (M&EC) Sealed Source waste stream (PERM000000036, Revision 0) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the M&EC Sealed Source waste meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999). The M&EC Sealed Source waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Plan for IER-443 Testing of the Y-12 and AWE Criticality Accident Alarm System Detectors at the Godiva IV Burst Reactor

This document provides the scope and details of the “Plan for Testing the Y-12 and AWE Criticality Accident Alarm System Detectors at the Godiva IV Burst Reactor”. Due to the relative simplicity of the testing goals, scope, and methodology, the NCSP Manager approved execution of the test when ready. No preliminary CED-1 or final design CED-2 reports were required or issued. The test will subject Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) detectors supplied by Y- 12 and AWE to very intense and short duration mixed neutron and gamma radiation fields. The goals of the test will be to (1) substantiate functionality, for both existing and newly acquired Y- 12 CAAS detectors, and (2) the ability of the AWE detectors to provide quality temporal dose information after a hypothetical criticality accident. ANSI/ANS-8.3.1997 states that the “system shall be sufficiently robust as to actuate an alarm signal when exposed to the maximum radiation expected”, which has been defined at Y-12, in Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs), to be a dose rate of 10 Rad/s. ANSI/ANS-8.3.1997 further states that “alarm actuation shall occur as a result of a minimum duration transient” which may be assumed to be 1 msec. The pulse widths and dose rates which will be achieved in this test will exceed these requirements. Pulsed radiation fields will be produced by the Godiva IV fast metal burst reactor at the National Criticality Experimental Research Center (NCERC) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The magnitude of the pulses and the relative distances to the detectors will be varied to afford a wide range of radiation fluence and pulse widths. The magnitude of the neutron and gamma fields will be determined by reactor temperature rise to fluence and dose conversions which have been previously established through extensive measurements performed under IER-147. The requirements for CAAS systems to detect and alarm under a “minimum accident of concern” as well as other functional requirements specified in ANSI/ANS-8.3.1997, are not included in the test. Routine and periodic maintenance and calibrations performed at Y-12 and AWE are intended to provide adequate confirmation for meeting these requirements.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Subsurface Noble Gas Sampling Manual

The intent of this document is to provide information about best available approaches for performing subsurface soil gas sampling during an On Site Inspection or OSI. This information is based on field sampling experiments, computer simulations and data from the NA-22 Noble Gas Signature Experiment Test Bed at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS). The approaches should optimize the gas concentration from the subsurface cavity or chimney regime while simultaneously minimizing the potential for atmospheric radioxenon and near-surface Argon-37 contamination. Where possible, we quantitatively assess differences in sampling practices for the same sets of environmental conditions. We recognize that all sampling scenarios cannot be addressed. However, if this document helps to inform the intuition of the reader about addressing the challenges resulting from the inevitable deviations from the scenario assumed here, it will have achieved its goal.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: January 1 through December 31, 2016

On April 24, 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC, now the Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted the Project 57 safety experiment in western Emigrant Valley northeast of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site) on lands withdrawn by the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). The test was undertaken to develop (1) a means of estimating plutonium distribution resulting from a non-nuclear detonation; (2) biomedical evaluation techniques for use in plutonium-laden environments; (3) methods of surface decontamination; and (4) instruments and field procedures for prompt estimation of alpha contamination (Shreve, 1958). Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the land surface. Following the experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DOD. Various radiological surveys were performed in the area and in 2007, the DOE expanded the demarked Contamination Area (CA) by posting signs 200 to 400 ft (60 to 120 m) outside of the original fence.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory EnergyX Macroencapsulation Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) EnergyX Macroencapsulation mixed low-level waste (MLLW) (BCLAMACRONCAP, Revision 2 [LLNL 2017]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the LLNL EnergyX Macroencapsulation MLLW meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999). The LLNL EnergyX Macroencapsulation waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Analysis of Sulfur-35 as a Young Groundwater Tracer at E-Tunnel, Rainier Mesa, Nevada National Security Site

Analysis of the relatively short-lived radionuclide sulfur-35 (t 1/2 = 87 days) provides useful insight into groundwater discharge from E-Tunnel at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Discharge rates at E-Tunnel vary with precipitation, potentially as the result of short or fast flowpaths between recharge and discharge. The presence of sulfur-35 in groundwater would indicate a significant component of young (< 2-year-old) groundwater. We collected two large volume (20 L) samples of discharge water in November 2016. The samples were sent to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), where they were processed and analyzed by Liquid Scintillation Counting (LSC). Sulfur-35 was not detected in either the sample or field duplicate, a finding consistent with E-Tunnel discharge containing no significant component of groundwater with age less than six months.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗