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CEOS Enabling Open Science via Science Data Systems

The Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS) strives to enhance international coordination and data exchange and to optimize societal benefit. CEOS contributes to NASA’s core mission and is critical to NASA’s Earth Science program and to the future of Earth observations community as a whole because it advances mission planning, interagency coordination and technical implementation. Within NASA, the CEOS Working Group on Information System and Services (WGISS) is a forum for the Earth Sciences Data Systems (ESDS) Program to collaborate with other international and domestic agencies in the development of Earth observation data systems and services. NASA leads the development and demonstration of multiple prototypes supporting CEOS and Group on Earth Observations (GEO) requirements. NASA’s participation in WGISS influences NASA’s Earth Observing System Data and Information System’s (EOSDIS) ability to make high-quality data products available to the broad science community both nationally and internationally. Combined with NASA’s free and open data policy, EOSDIS’s involvement in WGISS is essential to widespread use of research satellite measurements. This presentation focuses on an overview and recent status of NASA’s EOSDIS.

Diane Davies↗

DOE OSTI2022

ESTABLISHING ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR APPLYING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS

Drawing upon globally recognized efforts by a variety of institutions, the paper develops a practical and defensible framework for consideration and use by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to support the adoption of credible ethical standards for autonomous and intelligent systems (AIS). The analysis is based on a future hypothetical AIS that identifies signatures of misuse, diversion, and other research and development (R&D). The hypothetical system serves as an exemplar for subject matter expert (SME) workshop participants to begin to answer ethical AIS questions around how these systems should be governed and maintained, what the internal and external considerations associated with artificial intelligence (AI) tools are, and where the boundaries between ethical and non-ethical uses are. The ethical AIS workshop explored several important topics: (a) Recommendations that can be currently implemented by the IAEA, (b) Proposed defensible criteria and metrics aligned with an ethical AI for safeguards implementation, (c) Discussion of future needs and capabilities, and (d) Derive appropriate next steps and actions to support filling current technological, operational, and cultural gaps and realizing an effective ethical AI for safeguards framework. The Establishing Ethical Guidelines for Applying AI to IAEA Safeguards project creates awareness in the community of the ethical AIS approach.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NASA NTRS2012

The Namibia Early Flood Warning System, A CEOS Pilot Project

Over the past year few years, an international collaboration has developed a pilot project under the auspices of Committee on Earth Observation Satellite (CEOS) Disasters team. The overall team consists of civilian satellite agencies. For this pilot effort, the development team consists of NASA, Canadian Space Agency, Univ. of Maryland, Univ. of Colorado, Univ. of Oklahoma, Ukraine Space Research Institute and Joint Research Center(JRC) for European Commission. This development team collaborates with regional , national and international agencies to deliver end-to-end disaster coverage. In particular, the team in collaborating on this effort with the Namibia Department of Hydrology to begin in Namibia . However, the ultimate goal is to expand the functionality to provide early warning over the South Africa region. The initial collaboration was initiated by United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs and CEOS Working Group for Information Systems and Services (WGISS). The initial driver was to demonstrate international interoperability using various space agency sensors and models along with regional in-situ ground sensors. In 2010, the team created a preliminary semi-manual system to demonstrate moving and combining key data streams and delivering the data to the Namibia Department of Hydrology during their flood season which typically is January through April. In this pilot, a variety of moderate resolution and high resolution satellite flood imagery was rapidly delivered and used in conjunction with flood predictive models in Namibia. This was collected in conjunction with ground measurements and was used to examine how to create a customized flood early warning system. During the first year, the team made use of SensorWeb technology to gather various sensor data which was used to monitor flood waves traveling down basins originating in Angola, but eventually flooding villages in Namibia. The team made use of standardized interfaces such as those articulated under the Open Cloud Consortium (OGC) Sensor Web Enablement (SWE) set of web services was good [1][2]. However, it was discovered that in order to make a system like this functional, there were many performance issues. Data sets were large and located in a variety of location behind firewalls and had to be accessed across open networks, so security was an issue. Furthermore, the network access acted as bottleneck to transfer map products to where they are needed. Finally, during disasters, many users and computer processes act in parallel and thus it was very easy to overload the single string of computers stitched together in a virtual system that was initially developed. To address some of these performance issues, the team partnered with the Open Cloud Consortium (OCC) who supplied a Computation Cloud located at the University of Illinois at Chicago and some manpower to administer this Cloud. The Flood SensorWeb [3] system was interfaced to the Cloud to provide a high performance user interface and product development engine. Figure 1 shows the functional diagram of the Flood SensorWeb. Figure 2 shows some of the functionality of the Computation Cloud that was integrated. A significant portion of the original system was ported to the Cloud and during the past year, technical issues were resolved which included web access to the Cloud, security over the open Internet, beginning experiments on how to handle surge capacity by using the virtual machines in the cloud in parallel, using tiling techniques to render large data sets as layers on map, interfaces to allow user to customize the data processing/product chain and other performance enhancing techniques. The conclusion reached from the effort and this presentation is that defining the interoperability standards in a small fraction of the work. For example, once open web service standards were defined, many users could not make use of the standards due to security restrictions. Furthermore, once an interoperable sysm is functional, then a surge of users can render a system unusable, especially in the disaster domain.

Mandl, Daniel↗

DOE OSTI2021

IAEA Facility-Level Safeguards and Implementation and Advanced Verification Technologies

IAEA Facility-Level Safeguards and Implementation - This presentation is intended to introduce the audience to the application of international safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency at nuclear facilities around the world. It covers the State Level Approach, random statistical sampling processes, material balance area structure, non-destructive assay techniques, and inspection areas. Addition of advanced verification technologies for the IAEA

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2025

Basis for Dose and Reactor Safety Design Criteria for Army Regulation AR 50–7 and DA Pamphlet

This report describes the basis used to develop the radiological dose acceptance and design criteria contained in the draft updates to Army Regulation 50–7 (AR 50–7) Army Reactor Program and its accompanying draft Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (PAM), Army Reactor Program Procedures. These criteria will apply to Army nuclear reactors that fall under AR 50–7 and its accompanying DA PAM and ensure alignment with the overall objectives of the Army Reactor Program. The development basis for the radiological dose and design criteria supports a modern, technology-neutral, risk-informed, and performance-based approach to Army regulation of reactors and the demonstration of “adequate protection of the public.” To establish these criteria that support the Army’s unique operational requirements, multiple well-known and well-established standards and their supporting documentation were reviewed to ensure consistency with existing regulatory safety levels, including guidance from U.S. and international sources. These include the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) regulations and policy, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission’s (CNSC’s) regulatory documents, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) safety standards, as well as industry input that is tailored specifically to advanced microreactors. This report walks through the key definitions and associated references used for these criteria, which are outlined in Section 2.0. Based on these definitions, the dose acceptance criteria were established for various receptors for routine reactor operations (Section 3.2), design basis accidents (Section 3.3), and beyond design basis accidents (Section 3.4). Comparisons of multiple national and international dose limits are provided in these sections. Lastly, Section 4.0 outlines the reactor safety design criteria contained in the draft DA PAM and their associated bases.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Transfer functions for Q A /Q B international regulatory limits for the safe transport of radioactive materials

This paper presents a proposed revision of the International Atomic Energy Agency transport regulations, related to the A 1 and A 2 limit values used to determine the radioactive transport classification. Based on the 'Q system', a novel methodology was introduced to derive Q A and Q B values related to scenarios involving external exposure from a distant source. These values are key parameters that respectively represent the total effective dose and total equivalent dose to the skin, from all primary and secondary particles contributing to radiation exposure. The International Working Group (WG A 1 /A 2 ) is established and associated with the TRANSSC Technical Expert Group on Radiation Protection. A review of the A 1 and A 2 values is performed in response to identified limitations within the existing Q system. The followed approach is based on Monte Carlo simulations that enabled the development of transfer functions aimed at reducing computational time and increasing the flexibility of dose evaluations for any radionuclide with known particle emission spectra. This method allows updating the Q A and Q B values to account for future data evolutions (decay data, fluence-to-dose conversion coefficients) and standardizing the calculation of regulation limits across all referenced radionuclides and scenarios related to external exposure. The transfer functions are established using three Monte Carlo simulation codes—FLUKA, Geant4, and MCNP—and address the previous limitations of the 'Q system', reflecting the latest International Commission for Radiation Protection recommendations and improvements in calculation techniques. The results of the WG show consistent agreement across the codes, with minor discrepancies observed at low primary energies due to statistical uncertainties and different handling of stopping power for electrons/positrons in the codes. This revised approach aligns with current standards and recommendations, ensuring that the radiological consequences of transport accidents are acceptable for the new A 1 and A 2 limits from a radiological protection perspective.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2021

Enabling Computation on Sensitive Data in International Safeguards with Privacy-Preserving Encryption Techniques

Privacy-preserving machine learning is a field of study that explores how to protect and preserve the privacy of sensitive data while allowing the data to be used by machine learning algorithms. This field has had substantial industry investment due to heightened concerns about privacy in the technology industry, with a focus in two broad application areas: financial services and healthcare. Numerous privacy-preserving methods have also been proposed for international safeguards, but they have been difficult to enact because the data they require is con- sidered sensitive or proprietary by the nuclear facility operator. This work examines how current privacy-preserving approaches might be used to enable the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to use that data to contribute to a safeguards conclusion about a state while giving nuclear operators confidence that their sensitive data is adequately protected. This paper begins by exploring several broad categories of privacy-preserving techniques including homomorphic encryption, secure multiparty computation, secure enclaves, and zero-knowledge proofs. Then we discuss some of the security considerations related to using these methods, potential use cases, and a conceptual system design for applying privacy-preserving methods in international safeguards.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2020

Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) NFE-18-07194 with TerraPower LLC (Final Report)

Because of the potential economic and safety benefits of the molten salt reactor (MSR) concept, development of several designs has been initiated around the world over the past decade. New international nuclear safeguards needs and verification challenges are likely to arise because of the commercial interests in MSRs and the number of MSR design variants. As a result, work was undertaken to explore the cross-cutting issues specific to the application of international nuclear safeguards (i.e., safeguards) to liquid-fueled molten salt reactors (LFMSRs). Through a public-private partnership, a report was developed that focuses on the TerraPower Molten Chloride Fast Reactor (MCFR) design that has received a funding award from the US Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy. The report is intended to provide a preliminary analysis for a safeguards-by-design (SBD) effort to inform designers about how safeguards could be applied to LFMSRs by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).Although the report specifically focuses on the TerraPower design, the conclusions are applicable to the main design features of LFMSRs and can be used to extrapolate how existing IAEA safeguards measures for other fuel cycle facilities can be appropriately applied or modified. The report evaluates the appropriate safeguards approaches for LFMSRs, presents existing safeguards inspection technologies are still valid for LFMSRs, and identifies new challenges that will require novel measurement instruments to meet verification standards of the IAEA and the international safeguards regime. This document summarizes the results of the work performed under the full report developed as part of the Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA). This summary does not contain any protected CRADA information and is intended for public release.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Safeguards Technical Objectives for Thorium Molten Salt Reactor Fuel Cycles

China, Denmark, France, India, Indonesia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, among others, are exploring commercial thorium fuel cycles for domestic power production and/or international export. For any thorium fuel cycle facilities built and/or operated in a non-nuclear weapon State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, those facilities and any associated nuclear material would be subject to international nuclear safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Thorium fuel cycle facilities offered for the application of safeguards under a voluntary offer agreement by a nuclear weapon State would also be subject to safeguards, if selected by the IAEA. Compared to uranium/plutonium fuel cycle facilities, thorium fuel cycle facilities are comparatively diverse from an inspection and accounting perspective, differing greatly in material type, form, and design from uranium/plutonium fuel cycle facilities and also from each other. Of these, the most complex thorium fuel cycles – and therefore likely the most challenging to the implementation of international nuclear safeguards – are those that include thorium molten salt reactors. With thorium fuel cycles approaching near-term commercial deployment timelines, it is imperative that the international nuclear safeguards community begins to think about how to adapt existing international nuclear safeguards concepts and approaches to thorium fuel cycles, as well as mitigate any gaps that may exist. This paper focuses on the development of recommended safeguards technical objectives for efficient and effective application of international nuclear safeguards measures (e.g., containment / surveillance, non-destructive assay, destructive assay, environmental sampling) to thorium molten salt reactors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Evaluation of China Experimental Fast Reactor Startup Tests (Final Report)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of China Experimental Fast Reactor Start-up Tests (Final Report, Revision 1)

This report documents the results and observations on the Coordinated Research Project (CRP) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on “Neutronics Benchmark of CEFR Start-Up Tests.” The China Experimental Fast Reactor (CEFR) is a 65MWt sodium-cooled fast reactor with highly enriched uranium oxide fuel. The reactor achieved first criticality in 2010, and a series of start-up tests were conducted to measure various reactor physics parameters. In 2018, the IAEA launched the CRP for validation and qualification of member states' computation capabilities in the field of fast reactor simulation by utilizing the measured data in the CEFR start-up test. Twenty-nine international organizations from eighteen member countries, including Argonne National Laboratory, have participated in the CRP. The CEFR start-up tests offer a rare opportunity to validate U.S. nuclear engineering software because it is a well-specified benchmark with corresponding measurements for a recently built fast reactor starting up with a known fuel composition (fresh fuel). Previous fast reactor validation benchmarks frequently involve reactors that have already been started up and contain irradiated fuel that is difficult to characterize with high certainty.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Select Proliferation Studies on TRISO-fueled, Heat-Pipe-cooled Microreactors

Nuclear microreactors carry the potential to open up new markets for the nuclear industry, as their expected cost competitiveness in non-traditional market segments (e.g., mines, military bases, extraterrestrial surfaces, and remote areas), and their inherent safety features make them deployable when other power sources are unavailable or difficult to exploit. For countries that have not traditionally participated in nuclear power, microreactors represent a clean energy solution [1]. However, their use, especially in non-weapons states, may entail challenges in terms of maintaining international nuclear safeguards [2]. Furthermore, the deployment locations where microreactors may prove most cost competitive would be difficult to access by state and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors [3]. In addition to the isolated nature of potential deployment sites, the low-power characteristic of microreactors suggests that numerous microreactors would need to be deployed to meet energy demands. That, coupled with the unique physics of many current microreactor designs, opens up a new area of research with respect to nonproliferation and safeguards concerns [2]. Whereas traditional facilities are inspected as isolated cases when looking for signs of diversion or misuse; microreactors may need to be assessed in the context of the entire fleet to which they belong. International safeguards necessitate timely detection of any significant quantities (SQs) of material that are being diverted (e.g., 1 SQ of special nuclear material diverted over the course of a 1-year period) [4]. For low-enriched uranium, the IAEA defines 1 SQ as corresponding to 75 kg of 235U. The purpose of the present paper is to explore the detectability threshold for material diversion in microreactors by relying on critical control drum angles, excess reactivity, and the reactor lifetime as the selected operational parameters. For this assessment, a heat-pipe-cooled microreactor was regarded as the base design. While the conclusions reached in this paper are not readily extendable to the design of actual microreactors, the analysis herein enables conclusions to be drawn regarding the level of accuracy needed for reference calculations in order to detect diversion scenarios by utilizing the selected operational parameters (i.e., mainly control drum angles, critical insertion angle, and the reactor lifetime).

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Destructive Analysis of TRISO Particles: Crush/Burn/Leach Followed by Davies-Gray Titration and IDMS

The accurate accounting of nuclear materials is a cornerstone of international nuclear safeguards. One emerging challenge in this domain is the fabrication of TRIstructural ISOtropic (TRISO) particle fuels. Although these innovative fuel forms are critical for advanced reactor applications, their robust refractory ceramics and coating compositions present significant obstacles to destructive analysis (DA) methods. Ensuring full and quantitative recovery from these particles is essential for accurate mass accountancy. The current study was initiated to address these challenges, first by validating a previously established destructive method developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for the quantitative recovery of uranium from TRISO particles and then following that process with uranium content determination through isotope dilution mass spectrometry (IDMS) and Davies-Gray titration. This study expands on the scope of a digestive method that was developed under the Advanced Gas Reactor Fuel Development and Qualification program and is currently implemented in both the Coated Particle Fuel Development Laboratory and Irradiated Fuels Examination Laboratory at ORNL. The success of the previous Advanced Gas Reactor work relied on developing a DA method to evaluate the fabrication process and reactor experiments. The methodology described in this report was designed to rigorously investigate the efficacy of the crush/burn/leach sample preparation of TRISO particles; it aims to quantify uranium recovery while also assessing the effects of TRISO constituents (e.g., silicon and zirconium) on analytical precision and accuracy. By comparing the results from the titration method and IDMS, we sought to determine whether existing analytical procedures accepted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be effectively translated to TRISO fuel forms. The team employed an approach that involved processing replicate TRISO samples, optimizing the milling (i.e., crushing) step and performing serial leaches. The elemental composition of the analytical samples was examined to prepare for interference studies in the second year of this project. The integration of gamma spectrometry to verify residual uranium activity further strengthened the validation. Statistical methods were applied to the collected data to evaluate the uncertainties arising from sampling, sample preparation and uranium quantification. These uncertainties were then compared to the IAEA’s international target values (ITVs). Additional data collected in upcoming project work will strengthen the uncertainty estimates. Ultimately, it is hoped that this project will contribute materially to the body of work related to characterization of TRISO based fuels for the purpose of material accountancy and its applications to international safeguards.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Nuclear Safeguards: Feature Extraction for Machine Learning Enrichment Analysis of UF 6 Cylinders

With the increasing international interest in using nuclear material as sources of energy, comes the growing concern that we may see an increase in proliferation threats. Uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) is used in the nuclear fuel cycle for uranium enrichment. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitor the enrichment levels of UF 6 stored in transportation cylinders, to ensure the enrichments match that of a facility operator’s declarations. However, only a characteristic subset of UF 6 cylinders can be measured by inspectors from the IAEA during these inspections. In turn, the inspector may not identify a cylinder whose enrichment levels do not match the facility declarations. Therefore, our team attempts to develop a machine learning network that could determine the enrichment percentage of cylinders as they enter and exit facilities. The machine learning model must be robust against spectral variations due to factors that are internal and external to the UF 6 cylinder. Such factors include but are not limited to the speed and distance of the moving vehicle, cylinder type, cylinder orientation, and fill level. Many features in the spectral continuum can be used to identify and correct for some of these variations. As a consequence, the model must extract numerous features in the continuum. We investigate new approaches in continuum subtraction to verify enrichment percentage: interpolation and extrapolation of lines at the notable characteristic spectral peaks. It was determined that there was no clear answer on which method proved superior, therefore the decision was made to implement both new methods into the current codebase. We currently rely on synthetic training and testing data to analyze the results and fine tune our models but hope to test the system on measured data soon.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2020

Overview of the OECD-NEA Working Party on International Nuclear Data Evaluation Cooperation (WPEC)

The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) Working Party on International Nuclear Data Evaluation Cooperation (WPEC) was established in 1989 to facilitate collaboration in nuclear data activities. Over its thirty year history, different Subgroups have been created to address topics in nearly every aspect of nuclear data, including: experimental measurements, evaluation, validation, model development, quality assurance of databases and the development of software tools. WPEC has recently completed activities on fission yield evaluation, the general nuclear database structure (GNDS) to replace the ENDF-6 format, methods to provide feedback to evaluation, studies of specific capture cross sections, new methods in thermal scattering kernel evaluation and the Collaborative International Evaluated Library Organisation (CIELO) Pilot Project. Ongoing activities in GNDS application programming interface (API) development, methods for covariance evaluation and quality assurance in nuclear data validation using the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) database are complemented by the work of two Expert Groups that oversee the High-Priority Request List (HPRL) for Nuclear Data and the continuous development of the GNDS. New activities on the use of integral experiments for nuclear data validation and adjustment, as well as the use of the Shielding Integral Benchmark Archive and Database (SINBAD) for validation have begun and will be coordinated alongside future Subgroups. After three decades we will review the status of WPEC, how it integrates other collections and activities organised by the NEA and how it dovetails with the initiatives of the IAEA and other bodies to effectively coordinate international activities in nuclear data.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

NASA NTRS1985

Government-to-government cooperation in space station development

A memoranda of understanding was recently signed between the United States (NASA) and three international Space Station partners - Canada, European Space Agency (ESA), and Japan. The international partners are performing parallel Phase B preliminary design studies, concurrent with the U.S., on their proposed elements/systems for possible integration and operation with the U.S. Space Station System complex. During the 21-month Space Station Phase B study, a large amount of technical interface data will have to be transferred between the U.S. and the international partners. Scheduled bilateral technical coordination meetings will also be held. The coordination and large number of interfaces required to integrate the international requirements into the Space Station require a clean interface management organizational structure and operation procedures to accomplish the integration task. The international coordination management organizational structure, management tools, and communications network are discussed including the proposed international elements/systems being studied by the international partners.

Nassiff, S. H.↗

DOE OSTI2023

29 th International Training Course on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities (Project Summary)

Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) has hosted the International Training Course on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities since 1978. This course is the flagship training course of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On behalf of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Sandia manages, develops, and coordinates all course materials, and works closely with the IAEA to arrange all logistical details for the course ITC-29 incorporated some updates to the facility models, based on feedback received in ITC-28 and the ITC-29 dry run. In addition, all the graphics were refreshed after ITC-28 and implemented in the posters, data handbooks, etc. As in ITC-28, the ITC-29 staff worked closely with the IAEA on course materials, including a peer review process to ensure all course materials were aligned with Nuclear Security Series No. 13 and other relevant international guidance documentation from the IAEA. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, ITC-29 was postponed twice and eventually took place in the late summer/early fall of 2022. Due to ongoing COVID-19 restrictions and safety requirements, the number of participants was reduced by about 31 percent from 59 participants in ITC-28 to 41 in ITC-29. As a result, the number of subgroups also decreased from eight in ITC-28 to six for ITC-29. This enabled the Sandia team to implement more opportunities for social distancing, particularly in the large classrooms. Despite the challenges, ITC-29 still passed a significant milestone, with the one-thousandth participant of the international training course attending during this event. Finally, the ITC staff continued the use of its improved method of evaluation to capture participants’ satisfaction with the updated course and to gather feedback concerning future improvements. This document provides a brief description of ITC-29, including a summary of lessons learned and key recommendations for future development efforts.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2024

INSEN 2023 Yearly Updates

The International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) is the primary international network for nuclear security educational initiatives. INSEN plays a central role in fostering collaboration and knowledge-sharing among nuclear security education experts worldwide. In the wake of the global pandemic, INSEN remained committed to strengthening nuclear security education and resumed in-person activities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed its continued dedication and support to the network’s mission and presented new activities aimed at elevating global nuclear security efforts. Throughout the year and during the annual and leadership meetings, working groups showcased their vibrant work and presented innovative ideas, invigorating the attendees’ dedication to their crucial work. Comprehensive presentations by the IAEA during the INSEN annual and leadership meetings highlighted the importance of the network and its continued commitment to promoting nuclear security on a global scale. One notable and encouraging trend was the increase in network membership, signifying a growing commitment to nuclear security worldwide and the continued interest in nuclear security from member states and international organizations. The value of initiatives such as the Women in Nuclear Security Initiative was emphasized at the annual meeting, accenting the need for diverse perspectives and expertise to ensure a secure nuclear landscape.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗