Results for “Decision making” — Page 22

NASA NTRS1989

Performance evaluation of automated manufacturing systems using generalized stochastic Petri Nets

The main objective of this research is to develop a generic modeling methodology with a flexible and modular framework to aid in the design and performance evaluation of integrated manufacturing systems using a unified model. After a thorough examination of the available modeling methods, the Petri Net approach was adopted. The concurrent and asynchronous nature of manufacturing systems are easily captured by Petri Net models. Three basic modules were developed: machine, buffer, and Decision Making Unit. The machine and buffer modules are used for modeling transfer lines and production networks. The Decision Making Unit models the functions of a computer node in a complex Decision Making Unit Architecture. The underlying model is a Generalized Stochastic Petri Net (GSPN) that can be used for performance evaluation and structural analysis. GSPN's were chosen because they help manage the complexity of modeling large manufacturing systems. There is no need to enumerate all the possible states of the Markov Chain since they are automatically generated from the GSPN model.

Al-Jaar, Robert Y.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Cross-Cutting Risk Framework: Mining Data for Common Risks Across the Portfolio

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) defines risk management as an integrated framework, combining risk-informed decision making and continuous risk management to foster forward-thinking and decision making from an integrated risk perspective. Therefore, decision makers must have access to risks outside of their own project to gain the knowledge that provides the integrated risk perspective. Through the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Flight Projects Directorate (FPD) Business Change Initiative (BCI), risks were integrated into one repository to facilitate access to risk data between projects. With the centralized repository, communications between the FPD, project managers, and risk managers improved and GSFC created the cross-cutting risk framework (CCRF) team. The creation of the consolidated risk repository, in parallel with the initiation of monthly FPD risk managers and risk governance board meetings, are now providing a complete risk management picture spanning the entire directorate. This paper will describe the challenges, methodologies, tools, and techniques used to develop the CCRF, and the lessons learned as the team collectively worked to identify risks that FPD programs projects had in common, both past and present.

risk-informed decision making↗

NASA NTRS2018

Managing Complex Airplane System Failures Through a Structured Assessment of Airplane Capabilities

This report describes an analysis of current transport aircraft system-management displays and the initial development of a set of display concepts for providing information about aircraft system status. The new display concepts are motivated by a shift away from the current approach to aircraft system alerting that reports the status of physical components, and towards displaying the implications for mission capability. Specifically, the proposed display concepts describe transport airplane component failures in terms of operational consequences of aircraft system degradations. The research activity described in this report is an effort to examine the utility of different representations of complex systems and operating environments to support real-time decision making during off-nominal situations. A specific focus is to develop display concepts that provide more highly integrated information to allow pilots to more easily reason about the operational consequences of the off-nominal situations. The work can also serve as a foundational element to autonomy-supported decision making since we are developing ideas for integrating information from the airplane and the operational environment to support decision making.

operational decision making↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Earth-Independent Medical Operations (EIMO) Concept of Operations

Compared to the current paradigm for crew health in low-Earth orbit and Lunar missions that rely on constant communication with Mission Control, there is an anticipated shift in medical operations for deep-space exploration missions. This shift stems from mission constraints imposed by the considerable distance from Earth, which include resource limitations due to a lack of resupply, mass, power, volume, and data limitations, challenges imposed by communication latency and the inability to evacuate in case of emergencies. To transition towards a more self-reliant medical approach, a comprehensive strategy is essential to progressively enable crew autonomy and mitigate mission success risks in the challenging environment of space. This transformative shift is collectively referred to as "Earth-Independent Medical Operations" (EIMO), signifying the gradual transfer of medical care and decision-making from terrestrial resources to space-based assets. This transition is aimed at bolstering astronaut health and performance while simultaneously reducing the overall risks associated with space missions. The constraints related to EIMO necessitate an integrated development of medical systems, featuring interoperability with mission planning, vehicle design, spacesuit design, and data architecture. This integration is vital in establishing a robust medical infrastructure that not only supports the well-being of astronauts but also ensures the success of the mission as a whole. The Human Research Program (HRP) Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) Element has developed a model-based Concept of Operations (ConOps) outlining an initial vision for EIMO. Within this ConOps, a comprehensive view is presented, encompassing stakeholder needs, system objectives, and system goals associated with EIMO. Additionally, it provides illustrative examples of the various activities (scenarios) for which the system will be employed during missions. The selection of these activities has been meticulous, aiming to encompass a wide spectrum of medical conditions, including those falling under different risk categories, such as low-likelihood-low-consequence, low-likelihood-high-consequence, and high-likelihood-low-consequence. The selection of these activities (scenarios) effectively encompasses the wide range of medical events situated within an assumed probability-consequence bell curve. In each scenario, at least one of the five main EIMO components identified is captured. Those EIMO components are: Pre-mission Planning, Acute and Emergent Management Decision Making, Prolonged Medical Management Decision Making, Supplies and Resource Management, and Task Load Management. The ConOps was developed by a multidisciplinary team consisting of systems engineers, scientists, and clinicians across NASA and aims to serve as an initial recommendation to gradually and safely enabling crew autonomy for Mars missions and beyond.

Earth Independent Medical Operations↗

NASA NTRS2024

Earth-Independent Medical Operations (EIMO) Concept of Operations (ConOps)

Compared to the current paradigm for crew health in low-Earth orbit and Lunar missions that rely on constant communication with Mission Control, there is an anticipated shift in medical operations for deep-space exploration missions. This shift stems from mission constraints imposed by the considerable distance from Earth, which include resource limitations due to a lack of resupply, mass, power, volume, and data limitations, challenges imposed by communication latency and the inability to evacuate in case of emergencies. To transition towards a more self-reliant medical approach, a comprehensive strategy is essential to progressively enable crew autonomy and mitigate mission success risks in the challenging environment of space. This transformative shift is collectively referred to as "Earth-Independent Medical Operations" (EIMO), signifying the gradual transfer of medical care and decision-making from terrestrial resources to space-based assets. This transition is aimed at bolstering astronaut health and performance while simultaneously reducing the overall risks associated with space missions. The constraints related to EIMO necessitate an integrated development of medical systems, featuring interoperability with mission planning, vehicle design, spacesuit design, and data architecture. This integration is vital in establishing a robust medical infrastructure that not only supports the well-being of astronauts but also ensures the success of the mission as a whole. The Human Research Program (HRP) Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) Element has developed a model-based Concept of Operations (ConOps) outlining an initial vision for EIMO. Within this ConOps, a comprehensive view is presented, encompassing stakeholder needs, system objectives, and system goals associated with EIMO. Additionally, it provides illustrative examples of the various activities (scenarios) for which the system will be employed during missions. The selection of these activities has been meticulous, aiming to encompass a wide spectrum of medical conditions, including those falling under different risk categories, such as low-likelihood-low-consequence, low-likelihood-high-consequence, and high-likelihood-low-consequence. The selection of these activities (scenarios) effectively encompasses the wide range of medical events situated within an assumed probability-consequence bell curve. In each scenario, at least one of the five main EIMO components identified is captured. Those EIMO components are: Pre-mission Planning, Acute and Emergent Management Decision Making, Prolonged Medical Management Decision Making, Supplies and Resource Management, and Task Load Management. The ConOps was developed by a multidisciplinary team consisting of systems engineers, scientists, and clinicians across NASA and aims to serve as an initial recommendation to gradually and safely enabling crew autonomy for Mars missions and beyond.

Earth Independent Medical Operations↗

NASA NTRS2007

Implementing an Applied Science Program

The work implied in the NASA Applied Science Program requires a delicate balancing act for the those doing it. At the implementation level there are multiple tensions intrinsic to the program. For example each application of an existing product to a decision support process requires deep knowledge about the data and deep knowledge about the decision making process. It is highly probable no one person has this range of knowledge. Otherwise the decision making process would already be using the data. Therefore, a team is required. But building a team usually requires time, especially across agencies. Yet the program mandates efforts of relatively short duration. Further, those who know the data are scientists, which makes them essential to the program. But scientists are evaluated on their publication record. Anything which diverts a scientist from the research for his next publication is an anathema to him and potential death to their career. Trying to get another agency to use NASA data does not strike most scientists as material inherently suitable for publication. Also, NASA wishes to rapidly implement often substantial changes to another agency's process. For many reasons, such as budget and program constraints, speed is important. But the owner of a decision making process is tightly constrained, usually by law, regulation, organization and custom. Changes when made are slow, cautious, even hesitant, and always done according a process specific to the situation. To manage this work MSFC must balance these and other tensions. Some things we have relatively little control over, such as budget. These we try to handle by structural techniques. For example by insisting all of our people work on multiple projects simultaneously we inherently have diversification of funding for all of our people. In many cases we explicitly use some elements of tension to be productive. For example the need for the scientists to constantly publish is motivation to keep tasks short and to the immediate point. As another example, the DSS agency and it personnel are treated as integral to the effort at every step. Thus, their ways of doing things, their problems and their assets become part of the solution. MSFC also manages the Applied Science work' within a strategic framework.' First, the scientists are necessarily at the core of all of this work as well as all of the work within the larger' organization. We therefore strive to keep a roughly 50-50 balance between the work done on tasks funded directly by the research side of NASA's Science Mission Directorate and funding from the applied side. Done at both the organization level and the level of the individual, this keeps the scientist both happy and productive over the long term. We also try diligently to remove as much burden from the scientist as practical by employing people such as the authors and others to do tasks not requiring; scientific knowledge. We also have designed our effort to take full use of external partners. We actively seek and support, including fund, people from multiple organizations to join us as committed collaborators. In this we use today's money and today's problem to help us diversify and strengthen for tomorrow. MSFC also considers the Applied Science work holistically. Each element is viewed as a step in a larger process. At a management level we can chose to emphasize or encourage certain areas which service long term goals. Thus, if we think work in a particular area should be developed, we can start with the smaller, less costly elements and grow.

Rickman, Doug↗

NASA NTRS1976

Interorganizational transfer of technology - A study of adoption of NASA innovations

The paper describes a study on the effects of top management support, various techno-economic factors, organizational climate, and decision-making modes on the adoption of NASA innovations. Field research consisted of interviews and questionnaires directed to sixty-five organizations. Forty-five test cases where different decisions for adoption of ideas for new products or processes were made on NASA Tech Briefs were studied in relation to the effects of various factors on the degree of success of adoption, including: (1) the degree of general connection of the technology to the firm's existing operation, (2) the specificity of the relationship between the technology and some existing and recognized problem, (3) the degree of urgency of the problem to which the technology was related, (4) maturity of technology available to implement the technology, (5) availability of personnel and financial resources to implement the technology, (6) degree of top management interest, (7) the use of confrontation in joint-decision, (8) the use of smoothing in decision-making, and (9) the use of forcing in decision-making. It was found that top managements interest was important in the product cases only, and that the success of process innovations was dependent on the quality of information and the specificity of the relationship between the technology and some recognized existing problem.

Chakrabarti, A. K.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Problem Complexity and LLM: H-M Team Reliability in Challenging Environments

In traditional human-machine operations, the functional decomposition of actions and responsibilities among various agents is assigned a priori. For instance, in current air traffic operations, although assisted by software, human pilots have the ultimate control of aircraft. Multiagent human-machine and machine-machine systems will face problems of varying and potentially unpredicted complexity in future challenging scenarios of planetary, en route, and orbital activities. Hence, it is important to enable dynamic transfer of decision-making to appropriate team members, human or machine, depending on which agent is best equipped to solve that specific problem on a time budget. In this paper, we consider aspects of problem-solving and its modeling that affect the outcomes of decision-making as a function of solution quality and the likelihood of solving the problem on a required time budget. We focus on Large Language Models (LLM) as potential machine teammates and conclude that practical, predictive modeling of their performance, at the current stage of their development, is infeasible. Simple examples help us illustrate that current LLM will require fundamental advancements to provide reliable support in team decision-making, especially in safety-critical and time-critical domains. The study is not meant to diminish the value of the remarkable capabilities of LLM, but rather to gain a better understanding of the technology’s appropriate use and the needed additions.

function allocation↗

NASA NTRS2017

Uncertainty Estimation Cheat Sheet for Probabilistic Risk Assessment

Quantitative results for aerospace engineering problems are influenced by many sources of uncertainty. Uncertainty analysis aims to make a technical contribution to decision-making through the quantification of uncertainties in the relevant variables as well as through the propagation of these uncertainties up to the result. Uncertainty can be thought of as a measure of the 'goodness' of a result and is typically represented as statistical dispersion. This paper will explain common measures of centrality and dispersion; and-with examples-will provide guidelines for how they may be estimated to ensure effective technical contributions to decision-making.

Britton, Paul↗

NASA NTRS2017

Uncertainty Estimation Cheat Sheet for Probabilistic Risk Assessment

"Uncertainty analysis itself is uncertain, therefore, you cannot evaluate it exactly," Source Uncertain Quantitative results for aerospace engineering problems are influenced by many sources of uncertainty. Uncertainty analysis aims to make a technical contribution to decision-making through the quantification of uncertainties in the relevant variables as well as through the propagation of these uncertainties up to the result. Uncertainty can be thought of as a measure of the 'goodness' of a result and is typically represented as statistical dispersion. This paper will explain common measures of centrality and dispersion; and-with examples-will provide guidelines for how they may be estimated to ensure effective technical contributions to decision-making.

Britton, Paul T.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Lognormal Uncertainty Estimation for Failure Rates

"Uncertainty analysis itself is uncertain, therefore, you cannot evaluate it exactly," Source Uncertain. Quantitative results for aerospace engineering problems are influenced by many sources of uncertainty. Uncertainty analysis aims to make a technical contribution to decision-making through the quantification of uncertainties in the relevant variables as well as through the propagation of these uncertainties up to the result. Uncertainty can be thought of as a measure of the 'goodness' of a result and is typically represented as statistical dispersion. This presentation will explain common measures of centrality and dispersion; and-with examples-will provide guidelines for how they may be estimated to ensure effective technical contributions to decision-making.

Britton, Paul T.↗

NASA NTRS2002

CATS-based Air Traffic Controller Agents

This report describes intelligent agents that function as air traffic controllers. Each agent controls traffic in a single sector in real time; agents controlling traffic in adjoining sectors can coordinate to manage an arrival flow across a given meter fix. The purpose of this research is threefold. First, it seeks to study the design of agents for controlling complex systems. In particular, it investigates agent planning and reactive control functionality in a dynamic environment in which a variety perceptual and decision making skills play a central role. It examines how heuristic rules can be applied to model planning and decision making skills, rather than attempting to apply optimization methods. Thus, the research attempts to develop intelligent agents that provide an approximation of human air traffic controller behavior that, while not based on an explicit cognitive model, does produce task performance consistent with the way human air traffic controllers operate. Second, this research sought to extend previous research on using the Crew Activity Tracking System (CATS) as the basis for intelligent agents. The agents use a high-level model of air traffic controller activities to structure the control task. To execute an activity in the CATS model, according to the current task context, the agents reference a 'skill library' and 'control rules' that in turn execute the pattern recognition, planning, and decision-making required to perform the activity. Applying the skills enables the agents to modify their representation of the current control situation (i.e., the 'flick' or 'picture'). The updated representation supports the next activity in a cycle of action that, taken as a whole, simulates air traffic controller behavior. A third, practical motivation for this research is to use intelligent agents to support evaluation of new air traffic control (ATC) methods to support new Air Traffic Management (ATM) concepts. Current approaches that use large, human-in-the-loop simulations are unquestionably valuable for this purpose, but pose considerable logistical, fiscal, and experimental control problems. First, data analysis is extremely complicated, owing simply to the large number of participants and data sources in such simulations. In addition, experienced human air traffic controllers working adjacent sectors tend to flexibly adapt to the evolving control problem - potentially shifting to other strategies than those under investigation. In addition, their performance is tightly coupled to the control interface, which in the development phase may support some concepts and supporting strategies better than others. A simple shift in strategy by one controller can change the character of a particular traffic scenario dramatically, which makes experimental comparison of ATC performance under different traffic scenarios difficult. Training a given team of controllers on operations under a new ATM concept for a sufficient period of time could avert such difficulties, but instituting an adequate training program is expensive and logistically difficult.

Callantine, Todd J.↗

NASA NTRS2023

Identifying and Documenting Expert Knowledge, A Practical Study of Design Patterns

Globalization, powered by digitization, is increasing technology growth and knowledge transfer rates to levels not seen in the previous 3500 years, obscuring absolute truth and accelerating rates of innovation and production. Competing,or remaining competitive, in this global marketplace requires a learning organization adopt a method of capture, retention, and reuse for demonstrated tacit knowledge to accelerate the development of increasingly complex systems of high quality at a reasonable cost. The architectural theory of Patterns and Pattern Language is a validated methodology for mining tacit domain knowledge from a proven system. This work applies architectural theory to a multi-year development experiment and captures exposed knowledgeas a design patternin a model based systems engineering tool, demonstrating applicability ofdigital engineering initiativesin thedescription and reuse of expert design knowledge.By creating and archiving model based expressions of expert knowledge,a learning organization canimprovepractical decision making and avoid uninformed concept phase decision making

systems engineering↗

NASA NTRS1997

Evolutionary Concepts for Decentralized Air Traffic Flow Management

Alternative concepts for modifying the policies and procedures under which the air traffic flow management system operates are described, and an approach to the evaluation of those concepts is discussed. Here, air traffic flow management includes all activities related to the management of the flow of aircraft and related system resources from 'block to block.' The alternative concepts represent stages in the evolution from the current system, in which air traffic management decision making is largely centralized within the FAA, to a more decentralized approach wherein the airlines and other airspace users collaborate in air traffic management decision making with the FAA. The emphasis in the discussion is on a viable medium-term partially decentralized scenario representing a phase of this evolution that is consistent with the decision-making approaches embodied in proposed Free Flight concepts for air traffic management. System-level metrics for analyzing and evaluating the various alternatives are defined, and a simulation testbed developed to generate values for those metrics is described. The fundamental issue of modeling airline behavior in decentralized environments is also raised, and an example of such a model, which deals with the preservation of flight bank integrity in hub airports, is presented.

Adams, Milton↗

NASA NTRS1984

A Full Mission Simulator Study of Aircrew Performances: the Measurement of Crew Coordination and Decisionmaking Factors and Their Relationships to Flight Task Performances

Sixteen three man crews flew a full mission scenario in an airline flight simulator. A high level of verbal interaction during instances of critical decision making was located. Each crew flew the scenario only once, without prior knowledge of the scenario problem. Following a simulator run and in accord with formal instructions, each of the three crew members independently viewed and commented on a videotape of their performance. Two check pilot observers rated pilot performance across all crews and, following each run, also commented on the video tape of the crew's performance. A linguistic analysis of voice transcript is made to provide assessment of crew coordination and decision making qualities. Measures of crew coordination and decision making factors are correlated with flight task performance measures.

Murphy, M. R.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Take Material to Space or Make It There?

Most human missions in space have been brief, lasting only days or weeks, and they have taken all the materials they need. Using the alternate method, the International Space Station recycles water and oxygen, and it is often assumed that future Moon and Mars missions should also recycle their life support materials. The “take or make” decision is primarily based on cost, and making or recycling material on longer space missions can sometimes be less expensive than taking it. Longer missions favor recycling over resupply when the initial cost to provide recycling equipment is less than the cost to provide resupply. Recycling was clearly cheaper than taking material to the space station in the space shuttle era when launch costs were very high. Launch costs have decreased and the take or make decision point has changed. The recent reduction in launch cost by a factor of about twenty-five to fifty makes taking material cost less than making or recycling it for much longer missions. The cost breakeven point when making rather than taking material is less expensive is now much farther out in time than before. Material recycling or in situ production no longer saves cost except for very large or very long missions.

Space manufacturing↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Take Material to Space or Make It There?

Most human missions in space have been brief, lasting only days or weeks, and they have taken all the materials they need. Using the alternate method, the International Space Station recycles water and oxygen, and it is often assumed that future Moon and Mars missions should also recycle their life support materials. The “take or make” decision is primarily based on cost, and making or recycling material on longer space missions can sometimes be less expensive than taking it. Longer missions favor recycling over resupply when the initial cost to provide recycling equipment is less than the cost to provide resupply. Recycling was clearly cheaper than taking material to the space station in the space shuttle era when launch costs were very high. Launch costs have decreased and the take or make decision point has changed. The recent reduction in launch cost by a factor of about twenty-five to fifty makes taking material cost less than making or recycling it for much longer missions. The cost breakeven point when making rather than taking material is less expensive is now much farther out in time than before. Material recycling or in situ production no longer saves cost except for very large or very long missions.

Space manufacturing↗

NASA NTRS1975

Community perspectives

General aviation is considered from the perspective of the local community's decision-making process in determining its needs for access to general aviation services. The decision-making model, preliminary decision, community characteristics, and planning processes are discussed.

Source record↗