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At least 397 records · Page 22
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2017

Development of New Type-B Containers and the 'Alternative Approach' Disposal of High-Activity Sealed Sources - 17385

The DOE/NNSA Office of Radiological Security (ORS) is undertaking two projects to enable the recovery and disposal of high-activity sealed sources. First, ORS has completed the development, certification, and fabrication of a new Type B package to support the recovery and transportation of high-activity sources commonly used in irradiators and cancer treatment devices. A second design is currently undergoing certification. The new containers will enable DOE/NNSA shipment of nearly 100 percent of all commercially used devices containing Cs-137 and Co-60, which are particularly significant from a National security, public health, and safety standpoint. Second, ORS and the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD) Source Collection and Threat Reduction (SCATR) are piloting the commercial disposal of a high-activity device under the NRC's revised guidance on concentration averaging and encapsulation. The Cs-137 blood irradiator is being proposed for disposal at the U.S. Ecology facility in Richland, WA. The project is intended to serve as a model for commercial disposal of similar Class C sources that for decades have been without a commercial disposal pathway. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

System-level logistics modeling of DPC direct disposal - 15511

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Used Nuclear Fuel Disposition, has been conducting a study of the technical feasibility of direct disposal of existing dual-purpose canisters (DPCs) loaded with commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF). The system-level logistical modeling described here is a part of this study with the primary goals to project the inventory of DPCs in the future and to understand the timing of DPC disposal constrained by thermal power limits for disposal and other key parameters of the waste management system. The logistics simulations also allow for estimating fuel age at emplacement, an important consideration if storage time is limited. This analysis evaluated the effects on DPC direct disposal from uncertainty in repository emplacement power limits, the repository start date, and whether or when the nuclear industry could transition to loading SNF into the smaller capacity multi-purpose canisters (MPCs). MPCs implemented at a future date would likely contain the youngest fuel with highest burnup, but smaller MPCs would cool to the emplacement power limits relatively quickly. The results of this analysis demonstrate that DPC direct disposal could be complete by about 2070 to 2170 depending on the repository emplacement power limit. These completion dates can be expedited by approximately 10 to 40 years in some scenarios through the transition to MPCs. The greatest average SNF age at emplacement is 88 years in the scenarios with the smallest repository thermal power limit in which no transition to MPCs is considered. Transition to MPCs could decrease the average age at emplacement, to as low as 42 years in some scenarios. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Preferred Concepts for Disposal of the UK Inventory of Depleted, Natural and Low Enriched Uranium - 16382

Depleted, natural and low enriched uranium (DNLEU) forms a significant quantity of the UK inventory of higher activity radioactive materials. The great majority comprises uranic materials produced from uranium enrichment operations and from reprocessing of spent nuclear fuels. The most recent estimate of the total quantity (stocks plus arisings) of UK-owned DNLEU from civil nuclear operations is 170,000 tU. Current UK Government strategy is for DNLEU to be stored indefinitely in existing or new facilities, as required. However, Government strategy for long-term management of uranic materials is under review and a change could potentially cause this material to be reclassified as a waste. An Integrated Project Team (IPT) was formed in 2012 with the objective of identifying and addressing the issues associated with the potential need to dispose of DNLEU, in order to inform wider decision-making on the long-term management of UK DNLEU. Key technical issues considered by the IPT relate to the following: 1. The need for an improved understanding of the UK DNLEU inventory. 2. The identification of preferred chemical and physical form(s), and preferred packaging and disposal concepts for DNLEU - the main subject of this paper. 3. The approach to safety assessment of DNLEU disposal. This paper summarises the disposal concepts under consideration by the IPT, and the rationale for identification of preferred concepts for disposal of DNLEU inventory components. The conclusions will be of interest to other programmes and countries with a requirement to manage large quantities of similar materials. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

IP-2 Steam Generator Lower Assembly Packaging, Transport and Disposal - 16510

WMG, Inc. led a team of industry experts in the first of its kind packaging, transportation and disposal of four (4) Steam Generator Lower Assemblies (SGLAs). The project had a number of significant challenges including qualifying the SGLAs as IP-2 packages, implementing roadway improvements and orchestrating the use of three different modes of transportation. In the end, these SGLAs would be the first large components disposed at the WCS Disposal facility in Andrews Texas. The client was re-purposing the SGLA storage mausoleum for 'Fukushima equipment' preparedness so it became necessary to dispose of the assemblies. The WMG team needed to: - Dismantle the mausoleum to allow removal of the SGLAs, - Design, fabricate, deliver and install IP-2 SGLA packaging, and - Transport the packaged SGLAs from the client to the WCS facility for disposal. After qualifying the packaging as IP-2 containers, the SGLAs were loaded onto special equipment for over-the-road transport to the harbor in Kewaunee, WI. Following trans-load, the SGLAs were barged down Lake Michigan through the Mississippi River to the Port of Houston for another trans-load. The SGLAs arrived by rail at WCS' Andrews TX facility. Each transport segment required coordination for transport clearances, proper marking, labeling and placarding for that particular mode of transport as well as coordination with the team involved in moving the large packages from one conveyance to another. The project was completed with zero safety issues, significantly below dose goals, ahead of schedule, and within budget. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2019

Panel Session 16: Hot Topics and Emerging Issues in US Commercial LLRW Management and Disposal

This panel focused on emerging issues in commercial LLW management in the US from the perspective of active members of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Forum, Inc. State, compact, federal and industry officials will share their views on a variety of timely and significant topics related to low-level radioactive waste management, disposal and related issues. Presentations proposed include: 1 - Overview of NRC Activities and Initiatives (John Tappert, US NRC (USA)); 2 - Advocates for Responsible Disposal in Texas (Edward Selig, Advocates for Responsible Disposal in Texas (ARDT) (USA)); 3 - Hot Topics and Emerging Issues in U.S. Commercial LLW Management and Disposal (Joe Weismann, US Ecology (USA)); 4 - DOE/NNSA Office of Radiological Security (ORS) Sealed Source Management and Disposal (David Martin, Energetics Incorporated (USA), Temeka Taplin, US DOE NNSA (USA))

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DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 46: Final Closure of Unlined LLW Disposal Facilities Worldwide (R3.5)

This panel discussed the on-going and emerging issues with the design and construction of final cover system of unlined disposal facilities (e.g., material disposal areas (MDAs), subsurface disposal areas (SDAs), burial grounds, and similar historical waste trenches, pits and vaults). The discussion focused on key technical and regulatory issues as well as lessons learned from years of engineering and construction in US and non-US locations. Panelists with presentations: Closure of Unlined LLW Disposal Sites (Craig Benson); Closure of LLW Facilities (Paul Pointon); Final Closure of Unlined LLW Disposal Facilities - Lessons Learned (Kevin Foye)

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DOE OSTI2020

Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, UMTRCA Title I Disposal Site 35 Years Postclosure (1985-2020) - 20288

The DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, Disposal Site is a former uranium ore-processing site located in the borough of Canonsburg and an important part of US history. For 46 years (1911-1957), the site processed ore, for vanadium, radium and then uranium. Soils and groundwater beneath the site were contaminated by the milling operations. The 15-hectare (37-acre) site is owned by the US government and managed by LM, which serves as the federal land manager and steward of cultural, historical, and natural resources at Cold War legacy sites that have been successfully cleaned up to remedial standards. In 1978 Congress directed DOE to remediate 22 inactive uranium-ore processing sites under the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA), in accordance with standards promulgated by the US Environmental Protection Agency in Title 40 CFR Part 192 (40 (CFR 192). Subpart B of 40 CFR 192 regulates the cleanup of contaminated groundwater at the processing sites. The radioactive materials were encapsulated in US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved disposal cells, and the NRC general license for UMTRCA Title I sites is established in 10 CFR 40.27. Canonsburg was the first site to be remediated under UMTRCA. From 1983 to 1985, the Canonsburg site underwent cleanup under this US law that provides for the safe and environmentally sound disposal, long-term stabilization, and control of uranium mill tailings in a manner that minimizes or eliminates radiation health hazards to the public. The site is unique in that it is one of only two UMTRCA Title I sites in the eastern half of the United States, the other site being the Burrell, Pennsylvania, Title I Disposal Site, a vicinity property to the Canonsburg site. It has been 35 years since the disposal cell at the Canonsburg site was completed. This paper discusses the many efforts that have been taken to maintain the site and presents some of the lessons learned concerning the long-term care of the site. The discussion includes but is not limited to the following: (1) Preserving site history so the community can better appreciate and understand the site. (2) Community outreach efforts, and the importance of maintaining transparency of environmental monitoring results with the community. (3) Pursuing reuse opportunities that offer the potential for improving the community. (4) Remaining engaged with the local community. (5) Remaining proactive in the long-term care of the site. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Progress in demonstrating the performance of Engineered Barriers for the disposal of HLW and SNF: lab studies and demonstration experiments - 20293

Disposal of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) and spent nuclear fuels (SNF) in a geological disposal facility requires a fundamental understanding of the degradation processes of materials used in its engineered barrier system (EBS) over very long timescales. Beyond the wasteform itself (i.e. the borosilicate glass for HLW or the fuel matrix and cladding for SNF), materials often employed in a disposal concept include metallic containers (typically copper and/or carbon steel) and clay-based buffer materials (typically bentonite). In this paper we explore key developments on the long-term evolution of materials employed for the immobilisation, isolation and containment of HLW and SNF in a geological disposal facility, including nuclear glasses, candidate container materials and clay buffers. Our discussion is based on the latest findings from both experimental studies and in-situ demonstration experiments. We present relevant findings from the long-term evolution of HLW glasses (UK composition), metallic materials for the containment system (envisaged in Switzerland, Sweden, Canada and other countries), and bentonite clays (envisaged in many national disposal programmes). (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

A Methodology for defining intermediate level waste package characteristics that ensure criticality safety in a geological disposal facility - 14599

Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) is responsible for implementing geological disposal of the UK's higher activity radioactive wastes. These wastes include fissile nuclides and, therefore, demonstration of the criticality safety of the wastes under disposal conditions forms an important component of RWM's disposal system safety case. The basis for ensuring criticality safety of intermediate level waste (ILW) packages is to specify controls on the fissile material content of individual packages through the application of deterministic criticality safety assessments (CSAs). The approach is defined and controlled through RWM's Disposability Assessment process, which aims to ensure that: criticality is prevented during waste package transport to a GDF; the risk of criticality is tolerable and as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) during GDF operations; and the likelihood and consequences of criticality arising from the evolution of waste packages after GDF closure are low. The most restrictive phase determines the package fissile material limit and, until now, in many cases the GDF post-closure phase has provided the most restrictive limit. Currently, the GDF post-closure limits are derived deterministically using highly stylised and conservative assumptions about fissile material accumulations occurring on very long timescales into the future. RWM, waste producers and regulators do not currently consider this approach to be yielding an appropriate balance of risk. Therefore, RWM is modifying the process for setting fissile material limits on ILW packages by making use of the outcomes of its recent research projects to establish the likelihood of post-closure criticality in a GDF and the consequences of hypothetical post-closure criticality events (presented in companion papers). This paper presents the revised methodology, which is based on the requirement that criticality in a GDF can be demonstrated to be of low and tolerable consequences with regard the performance of a GDF. A probabilistic 'low-likelihood package envelope' is proposed that establishes the packaging and disposal facility conditions under which post-closure criticality is considered to be of low likelihood and low consequence. The bounding conditions for establishing the extent of the package envelope have been evaluated through application of the methodologies and models developed in RWM's Likelihood of Criticality research project. It is expected that the vast majority of ILW packages would meet the package envelope requirements. The methodology also allows the use of other options, such as deterministic CSAs, for waste packages that fall outside the low-likelihood package envelope. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2013

Optimization of Waste Disposal - 13338

From 2009 through 2011, remediation of areas of a former fuel cycle facility used for government contract work was conducted. Remediation efforts were focused on building demolition, underground pipeline removal, contaminated soil removal and removal of contaminated sediments from portions of an on-site stream. Prior to conducting the remediation field effort, planning and preparation for remediation (including strategic planning for waste characterization and disposal) was conducted during the design phase. During the remediation field effort, waste characterization and disposal practices were continuously reviewed and refined to optimize waste disposal practices. This paper discusses strategic planning for waste characterization and disposal that was employed in the design phase, and continuously reviewed and refined to optimize efficiency. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2013

A Safety Case Approach for Deep Geologic Disposal of DOE HLW and DOE SNF in Bedded Salt - 13350

The primary objective of this study is to investigate the feasibility and utility of developing a defensible safety case for disposal of United States Department of Energy (U.S. DOE) high-level waste (HLW) and DOE spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in a conceptual deep geologic repository that is assumed to be located in a bedded salt formation of the Delaware Basin [1]. A safety case is a formal compilation of evidence, analyses, and arguments that substantiate and demonstrate the safety of a proposed or conceptual repository. We conclude that a strong initial safety case for potential licensing can be readily compiled by capitalizing on the extensive technical basis that exists from prior work on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), other U.S. repository development programs, and the work published through international efforts in salt repository programs such as in Germany. The potential benefits of developing a safety case include leveraging previous investments in WIPP to reduce future new repository costs, enhancing the ability to effectively plan for a repository and its licensing, and possibly expediting a schedule for a repository. A safety case will provide the necessary structure for organizing and synthesizing existing salt repository science and identifying any issues and gaps pertaining to safe disposal of DOE HLW and DOE SNF in bedded salt. The safety case synthesis will help DOE to plan its future R and D activities for investigating salt disposal using a risk-informed approach that prioritizes test activities that include laboratory, field, and underground investigations. It should be emphasized that the DOE has not made any decisions regarding the disposition of DOE HLW and DOE SNF. Furthermore, the safety case discussed herein is not intended to either site a repository in the Delaware Basin or preclude siting in other media at other locations. Rather, this study simply presents an approach for accelerated development of a safety case for a potential DOE HLW and DOE SNF repository using the currently available technical basis for bedded salt. This approach includes a summary of the regulatory environment relevant to disposal of DOE HLW and DOE SNF in a deep geologic repository, the key elements of a safety case, the evolution of the safety case through the successive phases of repository development and licensing, and the existing technical basis that could be used to substantiate the safety of a geologic repository if it were to be sited in the Delaware Basin. We also discuss the potential role of an underground research laboratory (URL). (authors)

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DOE OSTI2018

Buffer Material Degradation in High Level Radioactive Waste Disposal - 18454

The concept of geological disposal for high-level radioactive waste (HLW) is based on a multi-barrier system comprising the natural geological barrier that repository host rock provides and its surroundings, as well as an engineered barrier system (EBS) that includes waste form, waste canisters, buffer materials, and backfill. The multi-barrier system is expected to perform its desired functions to isolate waste from the biosphere and achieve HLW disposal. Because of the interaction processes of radionuclide decay heat with hydraulic and water-mineral reactions in the radioactive waste repository, the bentonite buffer degradation resulting from the external temperature and pressure warrants investigation. However, seldom addressed in Taiwan is the influence of thermo-hydro-chemical (T-H-C) processes on buffer material degradation in the EBS of HLW disposal repositories as related to smectite clay dehydration. Therefore, we adopted the chemical kinetic model of smectite dehydration to calculate the amount of water expelled from smectite clay minerals caused by higher temperatures of waste decay heat. We discovered that smectite clay could cause volume shrinkage because of a loss of interlayer water, which can lead to bentonite buffer compression. The results of this study may be used in advanced research on the evolution of bentonite degradation for both performance assessments and safety analyses of final HLW disposal in Taiwan. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Update on the Status of Deep Borehole Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste in Germany - 20285

The phase-out of nuclear energy in Germany will take place in 2022. A site for final disposal of high level radioactive waste (HLRW) has not yet been found, but a site selection process was restarted by Act on the Search for and Selection of a Site for a Disposal Facility for High-Level Radioactive Waste (Site Selection Act - StandAG 2017). This act was based on a recommendation by a commission which also advised to follow up the development of deep borehole disposal (DBD) as an alternative option for final disposal of HLRW. This paper summarizes briefly the status of DBD in Germany and if this option should be pursued in Germany. Although there are some merits of DBD, it can only be a real option if research and development is supported. The technical equipment for boreholes of the required size will only be developed if there is funding and a feasibility test. Furthermore, any concept of DBD and technology must be detailed further, and some requirements of the act must be reconsidered. The paper concludes that despite the possible merits of DBD, the political and financial support for R and D will only be provided for the time being if DBD is pushed by interested parties. Alternatively, if the site selection procedure is not progressing well, then the alternative option of DBD may find greater interest in the future. However, its availability will be severely limited due to the missing development of detailed concepts and its demonstration of feasibility. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2014

{sup 137}Cs sorption into bentonite from Cidadap-Tasikmalaya as buffer material for disposal demonstration plant facility at Serpong

According to co-location principle, near surface disposal type the disposal demonstration plant facility will be build at Serpong nuclear area. The facility also for anticipation of future needs to provide national facility for the servicing of radwaste management of non-nuclear power plant activity in Serpong Nuclear Area. It is needs to study the material of buffer and backfill for the safety of demonstration plant facility. A local bentonite rock from Cidadap-Tasikmalaya was used as the buffer materials. Objective of experiment is to find out the specific data of sorption characteristic of Cidadap bentonite as buffer material in a radwaste disposal system. Experiments were performed in batch method, where bentonite samples were contacted with CsCl solution labeled with Cs-137 in 100 ml/g liquid:solid ratio. Initial Cs concentration was 10{sup −8} M and to study the effects of ionic strength and Cs concentration in solution, 0.1 and 1.0 M NaCl also CsCl concentration ranging 10{sup −8} - 10{sup −4} M were added in solution. As the indicator of Cs saturated in bentonite samples, Kd value was applied. Affected parameters in the experiment were contact time, effects of ionic strength and concentration of CsCl. Results showed that sorption of Cs by bentonite reached constantly after 16 days contacted, and Kd value was 10.600 ml/g. Effect of CsCl concentration on Kd value may decreased in increased in CsCl concentration. Effect of ionic strength increased according to increased in concentration of background and would effect to Kd value due to competition of Na ions and Cs in solution interacts with bentonite. By obtaining the bentonite character data as buffer material, the results could be used as the basis for making of design and the basic of performance assessment the near surface disposal facility in terms of isolation capacity of radwaste later.

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DOE OSTI2013

Direct disposal of spent fuel: developing solutions tailored to Japan

With the past Government policy of 100% reprocessing in Japan now open to discussion, options for direct disposal of spent fuel (SF) are now being considered in Japan. The need to move rapidly ahead in developing spent fuel management concepts is closely related to the ongoing debate on the future of nuclear power in Japan and the desire to understand the true costs of the entire life cycle of different options. Different scenarios for future nuclear power - and associated decisions on extent of reprocessing - will give rise to quite different inventories of SF with different disposal challenges. Although much work has been carried out spent fuel disposal within other national programmes, the potential for mining the international knowledge base is limited by the boundary conditions for disposal in Japan. Indeed, with a volunteer approach to siting, no major salt deposits and few undisturbed sediments, high tectonic activity, relatively corrosive groundwater and no deserts, it is evident that a tailored solution is needed. Nevertheless, valuable lessons can be learned from projects carried out worldwide, if focus is placed on basic principles rather than implementation details. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2012

The Vapor Plume at Material Disposal Are C in Relation to Pajarito Corridor Facilities

A vapor plume made up of volatile organic compounds is present beneath Material Disposal Area C (MDA C) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The location and concentrations within the vapor plume are discussed in relation to existing and planned facilities and construction activities along Pajarito Road (the 'Pajarito Corridor') and in terms of worker health and safety. This document provides information that indicates that the vapor plume does not pose a threat to the health of LANL workers nor will it pose a threat to workers during construction of proposed facilities along Pajarito Road. The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Laboratory) monitors emissions, effluents, and environmental media to meet environmental compliance requirements, determine actions to protect the environment, and monitor the long-term health of the local environment. LANL also studies and characterizes 'legacy' waste from past Laboratory operations to make informed decisions regarding eventual corrective actions and the disposition of that waste. Starting in 1969, these activities have been annually reported in the LANL Environmental Report (formerly Environmental Surveillance Report), and are detailed in publicly accessible technical reports meeting environmental compliance requirements. Included among the legacy sites being investigated are several formerly used material disposal areas (MDAs) set aside by the Laboratory for the general on-site disposal of waste from mission-related activities. One such area is MDA C located in Technical Area 50 (TA-50), which was used for waste disposal between 1948 and 1974. The location of TA-50 is depicted in Figure 1. The present paper uses a series of maps and cross sections to address the public concerns raised about the vapor plume at MDA C. As illustrated here, extensive sampling and data interpretation indicate that the vapor plume at MDA C does not pose a threat to the health of LANL workers nor will it pose a threat to workers during construction of the proposed facilities and utility trenches. The public cannot be directly exposed to the vapor plume beneath MDA C because Pajarito Road is closed to the public.

COMPLIANCE↗
DOE OSTI2013

Integrated Disposal Facility FY 2012 Glass Testing Summary Report

PNNL is conducting work to provide the technical basis for estimating radionuclide release from the engineered portion of the disposal facility for Hanford immobilized low-activity waste (ILAW). Before the ILAW can be disposed, DOE must conduct a performance assessment (PA) for the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) that describes the long-term impacts of the disposal facility on public health and environmental resources. As part of the ILAW glass testing program, PNNL is implementing a strategy, consisting of experimentation and modeling, to provide the technical basis for estimating radionuclide release from the glass waste form in support of future IDF PAs. Key activities in FY12 include upgrading the STOMP/eSTOMP codes to do near-field modeling, geochemical modeling of PCT tests to determine the reaction network to be used in the STOMP codes, conducting PUF tests on selected glasses to simulate and accelerate glass weathering, developing a Monte Carlo simulation tool to predict the characteristics of the weathered glass reaction layer as a function of glass composition, and characterizing glasses and soil samples exhumed from an 8-year lysimeter test. The purpose of this report is to summarize the progress made in fiscal year (FY) 2012 and the first quarter of FY 2013 toward implementing the strategy with the goal of developing an understanding of the long-term corrosion behavior of LAW glasses.

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DOE OSTI2014

2013 Annual Site Inspection and Monitoring Report for Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act Title I Disposal Sites

This report, in fulfillment of a license requirement, presents the results of long-term surveillance and maintenance activities conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) in 2013 at 19 uranium mill tailings disposal sites established under Title I of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) of 1978.1 These activities verified that the UMTRCA Title I disposal sites remain in compliance with license requirements. DOE operates 18 UMTRCA Title I sites under a general license granted by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in accordance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 40.27 (10 CFR 40.27). As required under the general license, a long-term surveillance plan (LTSP) for each site was prepared by DOE and accepted by NRC. The Grand Junction, Colorado, Disposal Site, one of the 19 Title I sites, will not be included under the general license until the open, operating portion of the cell is closed. The open portion will be closed either when it is filled or in 2023. This site is inspected in accordance with an interim LTSP. Long-term surveillance and maintenance services for these disposal sites include inspecting and maintaining the sites; monitoring environmental media and institutional controls; conducting any necessary corrective actions; and performing administrative, records, stakeholder relations, and other regulatory stewardship functions. Annual site inspections and monitoring are conducted in accordance with site-specific LTSPs and procedures established by DOE to comply with license requirements. Each site inspection is performed to verify the integrity of visible features at the site; to identify changes or new conditions that may affect the long-term performance of the site; and to determine the need, if any, for maintenance, follow-up or contingency inspections, or corrective action in accordance with the LTSP. LTSPs and site compliance reports are available on the Internet at http://www.lm.doe.gov/.

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