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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
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This report evaluates the performance and safety of Lithium Ion (Li-Ion) cells when used in batteries. Issues discussed include the cycle life, energy efficiency, tolerance to higher charge voltage, tolerance to extended tapered charge voltage, charge on cycling, specific energy, low temperature discharge, low temperature charge, various charge characteristics, storage characteristics, and more of Li-Ion cells.
As hydrogen storage facilities increase in size and capacity, it may be necessary to evaluate codes and standards that regulate hydrogen, especially in relation to allowable aggregate quantities. Existing regulations for other substances with comparable hazards such as oxygen, natural gas, and petroleum were reviewed; most fuels do not have aggregate quantity limits despite sometimes having individual tank capacity restrictions or limits for certain non-industrial, indoor, or small-scale applications. This precedent suggests that specifying a hydrogen quantity limit may not be necessary. Several possible methods for identifying an appropriate limit are presented to illustrate different approaches for a limit basis. These methods are based on overall risk, or the specific consequences inflicted by a jet fire or an explosion on people and infrastructure. However, these example metrics tend to require assumptions about potential leak sizes, suggesting that a general aggregate quantity limit would be difficult to justify without more system-specific requirements.
Safety basis documentation development and review under U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) authorization have emerged as critical constraint throttling deployment of advanced nuclear reactors, with traditional processes demanding extraordinary resource investment that delays the delivery of these technologies. Traditional Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) processes rely on static documents with limited traceability [U.S. DOE]. The regulatory review and engagement processes are similarly constrained, often requiring significant effort and extensive manual verification. The scale of this challenge is exemplified by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) review of the NuScale application, which required over 250,000 staff hours and the evaluation of approximately two million pages of documentation [Bergman 2021]. The volume and complexity of information within nuclear licensing applications or authorization reviews demands innovative approaches to document generation and data management.
This report explores the effects of tubing size reductions on natural gas flow from representative depleted reservoir underground storage wells and fields using basic models for coupled reservoir and pipe flow. This work was motivated by interest at the U.S. Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, in evaluating the effects of tubing and packer as a potential safety upgrade to implement double-barrier systems to existing underground natural gas storage wells. Reservoir and well flow models were developed from widely accepted industry equations, verified against a commercial process simulator model, and validated against field data. The study utilized U.S. operator survey data to provide context and assure that modeling parameters including aver age deliverability rates for wells and fields, operating pressures, well depths, and storage capacities were all carefully considered to keep the modeling relevant to the known range of U.S. operations. The models generally found that wells and fields with inherently low deliverability were relatively insensitive to reductions in tubing diameter, primarily because the hydraulics in those cases were controlled by reservoir properties. For the high-producing wells and fields, the models found that reducing tubing diameter could produce significant reductions in deliverability, both at the field- and well-level. When put into context with occurrence data regarding average deliverability of fields and wells, it appears that most wells and most fields across the U.S. would experience deliverability reductions on the low end of what was simulated here, generally below 20%. For fields with moderate to high deliverability, reductions were generally larger, and could reach as high as 60% for the highest-producing wells and fields.
The design and operational characteristics of non-light water reactors are likely to change the role of human actions in safety function management and the types of human actions that are deemed important. The objectives of this report are to: • Identify the implications of small, advanced reactor design characteristics on human performance and the changing role of human actions in the management of safety functions. • Identify the methods that may be used to identify important human actions. • Identify how HFE safety reviewers can help ensure that the methods adequately model human actions to identify those that are important to safety. We identified the implications of small, advanced reactor characteristics on the role of personnel in safety function management. Then we addressed how designers can identify which human actions are important to safety using both probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and deterministic analyses. PRA identifies important human actions using risk-importance criteria. Deterministically identified important human actions include those identified by analyses of situations such as transients and accidents and defense in depth. In all cases, the acceptability of the analyses is dependent on the modeling, quantification, and criterion selection to determine which human actions are important. How well the designers address these processes determines the acceptability of their methodology.
An evaluation was performed to establish relationships between safety factors and reliability relationships. Results obtained show that the use of the safety factor is not contradictory to the employment of the probabilistic methods. In many cases the safety factors can be directly expressed by the required reliability levels. However, there is a major difference that must be emphasized: whereas the safety factors are allocated in an ad hoc manner, the probabilistic approach offers a unified mathematical framework. The establishment of the interrelation between the concepts opens an avenue to specify safety factors based on reliability. In cases where there are several forms of failure, then the allocation of safety factors should he based on having the same reliability associated with each failure mode. This immediately suggests that by the probabilistic methods the existing over-design or under-design can be eliminated. The report includes three parts: Part 1-Random Actual Stress and Deterministic Yield Stress; Part 2-Deterministic Actual Stress and Random Yield Stress; Part 3-Both Actual Stress and Yield Stress Are Random.
Recently completed cross-section evaluations sponsored in part by the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program were incorporated into the 2018 release of the ENDF/B-VIII.0 cross-section library. Evaluated isotopes of interest to the nuclear data and criticality safety community include 16 O, 56 Fe, and 63,65 Cu. For performance validation, benchmark models defined in the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project Handbook were selected based on energy-integrated k eff sensitivities to total cross sections of interest and compared with experimental values. Of the 102 benchmark configurations that were utilized, 63 are sensitive to 16 O, 32 sensitive to 63,65 Cu, and 25 sensitive to 56 Fe. Selected benchmarks were modeled in SCALE 6.2.3 Criticality Safety Analysis Sequence (CSAS) continuous-energy Monte Carlo k eff calculations with ENDF/B-VII.1, with a hybrid ENDF/B-VII.1 with ENDF/B-VIII.0 data substituted for individual isotopes of interest, and with ENDF/B-VIII.0. ENDF/B-VIII.0 showed improved agreement with experimental k eff for 56 Fe, 63 Cu, elemental copper, and full library substitution while producing lessened agreement for 16 O and 65 Cu. Furthermore, with full library and isotope-specific ENDF/B-VIII.0 performance, a best-case ENDF library was formed by excluding underperforming isotopes’ ENDF/B-VIII.0 data, reverting 16 O and 65 Cu cross sections to ENDF/B-VII.1. This resulted in the average relative deviation between calculated and experimental data improving from 1.45σ for the ENDF/B-VIII.0 library to 1.32σ for the best-case library, relative to benchmark uncertainty.
NASA's Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) referred 8 times to the NASA "Silent Safety Program." This term, "Silent Safety Program" was not an original observation but first appeared in the Rogers Commission's Investigation of the Challenger Mishap. The CAIB on page 183 of its report in the paragraph titled 'Encouraging Minority Opinion,' stated "The Naval Reactor Program encourages minority opinions and "bad news." Leaders continually emphasize that when no minority opinions are present, the responsibility for a thorough and critical examination falls to management. . . Board interviews revealed that it is difficult for minority and dissenting opinions to percolate up through the agency's hierarchy. . ." The first question and perhaps the only question is - what is a silent safety program? Well, a silent safety program may be the same as the dog that didn't bark in Sherlock Holmes' "Adventure of the Silver Blaze" because system safety should behave as a devil's advocate for the program barking on every occasion to insure a critical review inclusion. This paper evaluates the NASA safety program and provides suggestions to prevent the recurrence of the silent safety program alluded to in the Challenger Mishap Investigation. Specifically targeted in the CAM report, "The checks and balances the safety system was meant to provide were not working." A silent system safety program is not unique to NASA but could emerge in any and every organization. Principles developed by Irving Janis in his book, Groupthink, listed criteria used to evaluate an organization's cultural attributes that allows a silent safety program to evolve. If evidence validates Jams's criteria, then Jams's recommendations for preventing groupthink can also be used to improve a critical evaluation and thus prevent the development of a silent safety program.
When one considers space missions to the outer edges of our solar system and far beyond, our sun cannot be relied on to produce the required spacecraft (s/c) power. Solar energy diminishes as the square of the distance from the Sun. At Mars it is only 43% of that at earth. At Jupiter, it falls off to only 3.6% of Earth's. By the time we get out to Pluto, solar energy is only .066% what it is on Earth. Beyond the orbit of Mars, it is not practical to depend on solar power for a s/c. However, the farther out we go the more power we need to heat the s/c and to transmit data back to Earth over the long distances. On Earth, knowledge is power. In the outer solar system, power is knowledge. Solar arrays only operate at 19% efficiency, are very vulnerable to damage from radiation and temperature extremes, and cannot be used for even nearby missions that operate in extended darkness, or under the surface of a planet or moon. Twenty-six U.S. space missions, from the Transit to Cassini, have used radioisotope power systems and heater units to take s/c to the far reaches of our solar system and have demonstrated an outstanding record of safety and reliability. Radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG's) have proven to be safe, reliable, maintenance-free, and capable of providing both thermal and electrical power for decades under the harsh environments of deep space. RTG's have no problem operating in the high radiation belts of space, the extreme temperatures, or the severe dust storms of Mars, and they have proven to be the most reliable power source ever flown on U.S. s/c. For example, the two Pioneer s/c operated for more than two decades and the Voyager s/c may last for 40 years. RTG's are not nuclear reactors, they serve only as power generators and are not involved in the propulsion of the s/c. They operate on the principle of thermoelectric generation that converts heat directly into electricity, they have no moving parts, are extremely reliable, and have met or exceeded all safety and performance expectations. Federal laws and regulations require analysis and evaluation of the safety risks and any potential environmental impacts. Extensive safety testing of RTG's and RTG components has been performed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to demonstrate the ability to survive accidents related to Space Shuttle launches and assure that the systems would be safe under all accident conditions, including accidents at or near the launch pad or during orbital reentry. Many design improvements have been made over the four decades that RTG's have been flown on space missions. This paper outlines the operation and safety standards of RTG's and the advanced developments expected to be used on future deep space missions such as the Europa Orbiter, Pluto/Kuiper Express, Solar Probe, Europa Lander, and Titan Explorer missions.
This report describes the assessment of the recently published ANSI/AISC N690-18, Specification for Safety-Related Steel Structures for Nuclear Facilities. This work was performed for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for potential endorsement of N690-18 for use in the design of nuclear power plants. Currently the NRC endorses the use of an earlier version: N690-1994 (R2004), and thus, a technical review of the updated N690 Specification, which contains significant changes, is warranted. The N690-18 Specification reflects advances and improvements in steel design gained from experience, analytical studies, and experimental data over the years. The N690-18 specification also contains a new Appendix N9 that addresses the design of safety-related steel-plate composite (SC) walls which are a relatively new type of structural member for which previously there has not been any U.S. code or standard that governs its design. The technical review of N690-18 was performed in order to assess the adequacy of the provisions for use by the NRC in updating its regulatory guidance for nuclear power plants. The research developed the technical basis for acceptance of the new specification and also identified areas where additional staff guidance is needed for the design of safety-related steel structures at nuclear power plants. The results of the research have determined that the N690-18 specification is a significant enhancement from the N690-1994 (R2004) edition. The new specification contains substantial upgrades in the design of structural steel and includes new provisions for design of SC wall sections, which can benefit the nuclear power industry as well as the NRC review process. All of the improvements, if endorsed by the NRC with certain regulatory positions, will allow clearer and more consistent regulatory guidance, and will avoid the need for justification by licensees and related reviews each time certain methods or approaches are used.
Lithium-ion batteries inevitably suffer minor damage or defects caused by external mechanical abusive loading, e.g. , penetration, deformation, and scratch without triggering a hard/major short circuit. The replacement of cells becomes a dilemma if the safety risk of the defective batteries remains unknown. Herein, by introducing a representative defect form, i.e. , screw indentation, we demonstrate the safety characteristics of defective batteries. We prove that defective batteries have a significantly increased thermal risk and deteriorated mechanical integrity, but can go undetected due to prompt voltage recovery and insignificant local temperature increase. We discover that the voltage curve within the first few cycles contains sufficient information to identify defective batteries from otherwise good ones and propose methodologies to monitor the cells. Capacity loss and current leakage are two characteristics that can be estimated using the voltage curve. According to the defect size and position, the capacity loss could be 1 to 10 2 mA h and the leakage current could be 5–50 mA. Results remove the barriers for defective battery safety risk evaluation, enabling identification, monitoring, and early warning of minor damaged batteries.
Much is still not known about the end-state of core materials in each unit that was operating on March 11, 2011 at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Daiichi). Information obtained from Daiichi is required to inform Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) activities, improving the ability of the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Incorporated (TEPCO Holdings) to characterize potential hazards and to ensure the safety of workers involved with cleanup activities. This information also has important implications for the safety and operation of U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. This document summarizes results from the Fiscal Year 2021 (FY2021) U.S. effort to review Daiichi information and extract insights to enhance the safety of existing and future nuclear power plant designs. This U.S. effort, which was initiated in 2014 by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), is completed by a group of experts in reactor safety and plant operations that identify examination needs and evaluate recent Daiichi examination data to address these needs. Since its inception, annual reports were issued that document significant safety insights being obtained in areas of special emphasis: system and component performance, radionuclide surveys and sampling, debris end-state location, combustible gas effects, and plant operations and maintenance. In addition to reducing uncertainties related to severe accident modeling progression, these insights have and continue to be used to update guidance for severe accident prevention, mitigation, and emergency planning. Reduced uncertainties in modeling the events at Daiichi improve the realism of reactor safety evaluations that inform future D&D activities. A key aspect of prior U.S. efforts, the updated list of information requests, is included in this FY2021 report to ensure that they are transmitted to organizations within Japan. This report also continues to emphasize how information obtained from the affected reactors at Daiichi has been and will continue to be used to update severe accident management strategies and reduce uncertainties in systems analysis code models. In addition, recommendations are included that would expand the use of this information to provide insights regarding maintenance, radiation protection, design, and siting activities for existing and new reactors.
Much is still not known about the end-state of core materials in each unit that was operating on March 11, 2011 at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Daiichi). Information obtained from Daiichi is required to inform Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) activities, improving the ability of the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Incorporated (TEPCO Holdings) to characterize potential hazards and to ensure the safety of workers involved with cleanup activities. This document, which has been updated to include Fiscal Year 2020 (FY2020) information, summarizes results from a U.S. effort to review Daiichi information and extract insights to enhance the safety of existing and future nuclear power plant designs. This U.S. effort, which was initiated in 2014 by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), is completed by a group of experts in reactor safety and plant operations that identify examination needs and evaluate recent Daiichi examination data to address these needs. Since its inception, comprehensive annual reports were issued that document significant safety insights being obtained in areas of special emphasis: system and component performance, radionuclide surveys and sampling, debris end-state location, combustible gas effects, and plant operations and maintenance. In addition to reducing uncertainties related to severe accident modeling progression, these insights have and continue to be used to update guidance for severe accident prevention, mitigation, and emergency planning. Reduced uncertainties in modeling the events at Daiichi improve the realism of reactor safety evaluations that inform future D&D activities. For FY2020, it was decided that the program would gain more benefit from a more concise report that emphasizes new information and insights that affect prior findings and recommendations from the U.S. experts participating in this effort. A key aspect of prior U.S. efforts, the updated list of information requests, is included in this letter report to ensure that they are transmitted to organizations within Japan. In addition, findings and associated recommendations are provided regarding information presented by TEPCO Holdings, Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation (NDF), and the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). This letter report also continues to emphasize how information obtained from the affected reactors at Daiichi has been and will continue to be used to update severe accident management strategies, improve maintenance activities (especially in areas of radiation protection) and reduce uncertainties in systems analysis code models. In addition, recommendations are included that would expand the use of this information to provide insights regarding maintenance, radiation protection, design, and siting activities of existing and new reactors.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable of answering technical questions, synthesizing domain knowledge, and supporting engineering workflows. For nuclear science and engineering, these capabilities require careful, domain-specific evaluation before they can be credibly incorporated into safety-related activities, regulatory review, or technical decision support. This paper presents preliminary results from benchmarking framework for evaluating LLM capabilities in nuclear contexts. The framework is organized into three evaluation categories: nuclear fundamentals, general dual-use knowledge, and plant specific knowledge. These categories are intended to distinguish general nuclear engineering competence from broader technical reasoning and more context-dependent nuclear knowledge. Initial evaluations focus on nuclear fundamentals using questions representative of the knowledge expected of a nuclear professional engineer. Results indicate that contemporary frontier models perform at a high level and substantially exceed the performance of older model generations, with some models approaching saturation of the current benchmark. These findings suggest both the rapid improvement of LLM capabilities in specialized technical domains and the need for more discriminating evaluation methods. The paper presents the benchmark structure, preliminary model-comparison results, and ongoing work. This work supports development of verifiable, responsible, and safety-conscious methods for assessing AI systems in nuclear engineering applications.
This report evaluates leakage behavior from tritium containment vessels under thermal abuse and combined thermal-mechanical abuse conditions to better understand safety implications for releases occurring in a fire scenario. Surrogate gases were used for all tests in this report. Leakage through the valves from thermal pressurization was observed when heating rates >0.8°C/s were sustained to >300°C. Gas plumes were visualized from vessels that were heated above 260°C and then dropped.
As always, Range Safety has been involved in a number of exciting and challenging activities and events. Throughout the year, we have strived to meet our goal of protecting the public, the workforce, and property during range operations. During the past year, Range Safety was involved in the development, implementation, and support of range safety policy. Range Safety training curriculum development was completed this year and several courses were presented. Tailoring exercises concerning the Constellation Program were undertaken with representatives from the Constellation Program, the 45th Space Wing, and the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel. Range Safety actively supported the Range Commanders Council and it subgroups and remained involved in updating policy related to flight safety systems and flight safety analysis. In addition, Range Safety supported the Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel and addressed policy concerning unmanned aircraft systems. Launch operations at Kennedy Space Center, the Eastern and Western ranges, Dryden Flight Research Center, and Wallops Flight Facility were addressed. Range Safety was also involved in the evaluation of a number of research and development efforts, including the space-based range (formerly STARS), the autonomous flight safety system, the enhanced flight termination system, and the joint advanced range safety system. Flight safety system challenges were evaluated. Range Safety's role in the Space Florida Customer Assistance Service Program for the Eastern Range was covered along with our support for the Space Florida Educational Balloon Release Program. We hope you have found the web-based format both accessible and easy to use. Anyone having questions or wishing to have an article included in the 2008 Range Safety Annual Report should contact Alan Dumont, the NASA Range Safety Program Manager located at the Kennedy Space Center, or Michael Dook at NASA Headquarters.
This paper discusses the technology development (TD) efforts that led to the development of a High-Capacity High-Assay Low Enriched Uranium Transportation (HALEU) transportation concept. In 2018, the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Technology and Research Development tasked Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to investigate strategies to transport large quantities of HALEU. To complete this task, INL collaborated with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The project was completed in 2020, and one of the project outcomes was a transportation concept that consisting of five individual Type B packages transported on a single legal-weight truck (LWT). The total payload capacity of this concept is 1,881 kg (4,149 lb) of HALEU in the form of uranium dioxide (UO2) powder. The concept utilizes an existing Type B packaging design carrying a novel fuel basket design with an incorporated flux trap. The basket can be loaded with 18 individual fuel canisters. The research collaboration investigated the U.S. certification potential of this concept. This part of the project included evaluations of criticality safety, radiological safety, thermal safety, structural integrity, and confinement under hypothetical accident scenarios of transport. The results of these evaluations demonstrated a promising potential for U.S. certification of this concept. Eventually, the described efforts led to the pursuance and issuance of a U.S. patent, thus, protecting the associated intellectual property (IP). Current short-term goals include making this IP available to private industry partners for licensing, directly supporting DOE’s objectives of accelerating commercialization of national laboratory-generated IP. If additional funding becomes available, long-term research goals could include exploring the feasibility of transporting other uranium chemical forms (e.g., UF4) with this concept, or refining operational procedures to load or unload the packagings.
Information obtained from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Daiichi) is required to inform future Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) activities, improving the ability of the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Incorporated (TEPCO Holdings) to characterize potential hazards and to ensure the safety of workers involved with cleanup activities. This information also has important implications for the safety and operation of U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. This document summarizes results from the Fiscal Year 2022 (FY2022) U.S. effort to review Daiichi information and extract insights to enhance the safety of existing and future nuclear power plant designs. This U.S. effort, which was initiated in 2014 by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, is completed by a group of experts in reactor safety and plant operations that identify examination needs and evaluate recent Daiichi examination data to address these needs. Fukushima-related information and associated discussions during forensics meetings benefit operating, new, and advanced reactors. Significant safety insights are being obtained in several areas: system and component performance, radionuclide surveys and sampling, debris end-state location, combustible gas effects, and plant operations and maintenance. In addition to reducing uncertainties related to severe accident modeling progression, these insights have and continue to be used to update guidance for severe accident prevention, mitigation, and emergency planning. As discussed in this document, revised operator guidance was successfully used to improve operator response during a loss of off-site power event at the Duane Arnold Energy Center plant. Reduced uncertainties in modeling the events at Daiichi improve the realism of reactor safety evaluations that inform future D&D activities. U.S. evaluations of information from Fukushima and input regarding future examinations are of interest to several organizations within Japan. Meeting presentations by Japan describe how comments and recommendations documented in prior U.S. forensics effort reports, including consensus information requests developed by forensics effort participants, are considered in future Fukushima D&D activities. As discussed in this report, TEPCO Holdings considered these information requests in their D&D planning activities. An updated list of consensus information requests is included in this FY2022 report.