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Dose reconstruction for plutonium-239 intakes at the Rocky Flats Plant

Purpose: The Rocky Flats (RF) Plant was a weapons manufacturing facility that operated from the early 1950s to 1989. Its primary missions were the production of plutonium (Pu) pits for thermonuclear weapons and the processing of retired weapons for Pu recovery. The purpose of this study was to estimate radiation doses to a cohort of 4499 RF workers from an intake of 239 Pu, the primary plutonium isotope handled at the site. Materials and methods: The latest biokinetic models of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, or site-specific variations of those models, were used to estimate 239 Pu intakes for each worker based on model fits to bioassay data often coupled with lung measurements. Results: Urinary excretion and lung retention data for most 239 Pu intakes could be fit reasonably well by a mixture of Pu dioxide and moderately soluble material. For some workers, better fits were obtained by application of other absorption types including Type S, 239 Pu nitrate, or pure 239 Pu dioxide, or by assuming intake via a wound. The lungs typically received the highest tissue doses, with fifty-year committed equivalent doses in the range of 0.5–1 Sv for 275 workers, 1–5 Sv for 115 workers, and greater than 5 Sv for 12 workers. Conclusions: RF was a unique site regarding a large number of lung measurements available for determining the appropriate absorption types for inhaled material. Further, this provided higher confidence in reconstructed 239 Pu doses than is generally gained from urinary data alone.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Distribution of plutonium and radium in the human heart

Since 1968, the United States Transuranium and Uranium Registries (USTUR) has studied the biokinetics and tissue dosimetry of uranium and transuranium elements in nuclear workers. As part of the USTUR collaboration with the Million Person Study of Low-Dose Health Effects, radiation dose to different parts of the human heart is being estimated for workers with documented intakes of 239 Pu or 226 Ra. The study may be expanded for workers with intakes of 238 U and other radionuclides. The distribution of radionuclides, expressed in terms of concentration (Bq per kg of tissue) serves as an important parameter for estimating radiation dose. Based on available organs from workers who donated their bodies or tissues for research, nine undissected hearts were selected: seven from USTUR registrants with plutonium exposure (males) and two individuals with radium intakes (female and male). For the plutonium workers, estimated 239 Pu systemic deposition ranged from <74 Bq to 1765 Bq. Estimated 226 Ra ‘initial systemic intakes’ were 10.1 MBq and 14.8 kBq for the female patient and male worker, respectively. Organ dissection was based on a heart model published by Borrego et al (2019 J. Radiol. Prot. 39 950–65). This model includes nine cardiac substructures: aorta, left main coronary artery, left atrium, left anterior descending artery, left circumflex artery, left ventricle, right atrium, right coronary artery, and right ventricle. In addition, heart valves, fat attached to epicardium, fluids, and a coronary bypass graft were collected resulting in 111 samples that are currently undergoing radiochemical analyses and mass-spectrometric measurements. The 239 Pu and 226 Ra evaluations are not completed. The results of this study are intended to support radiation worker health studies by improving associated dosimetric and epidemiological models.

USTUR↗

THE MAYAK WORKER DOSIMETRY SYSTEM (MWDS-2013) FOR INTERNALLY DEPOSITED PLUTONIUM: AN OVERVIEW

The Mayak Worker Dosimetry System (MWDS-2013) is a system for interpreting measurement data from Mayak workers from both internal and external sources. This paper is concerned with the calculation of annual organ doses for Mayak workers exposed to plutonium aerosols, where the measurement data consists mainly of activity of plutonium in urine samples. The system utilises the latest biokinetic and dosimetric models, and unlike its predecessors, takes explicit account of uncertainties in both the measurement data and model parameters. The aim of this paper is to describe the complete MWDS-2013 system (including model parameter values and their uncertainties) and the methodology used (including all the relevant equations) and the assumptions made. Where necessary, supplementary papers which justify specific assumptions are cited.

Bayesian analysis' retrospective dosimetry↗

An integrated approach for determining plutonium mass in spent fuel assemblies with nondestructive assay

There are a variety of reasons for quantifying plutonium (Pu) in spent fuel. Below, five motivations are listed: (1) To verify the Pu content of spent fuel without depending on unverified information from the facility, as requested by the IAEA ('independent verification'). New spent fuel measurement techniques have the potential to allow the IAEA to recover continuity of knowledge and to better detect diversion. (2) To assure regulators that all of the nuclear material of interest leaving a nuclear facility actually arrives at another nuclear facility ('shipper/receiver'). Given the large stockpile of nuclear fuel at reactor sites around the world, it is clear that in the coming decades, spent fuel will need to be moved to either reprocessing facilities or storage sites. Safeguarding this transportation is of significant interest. (3) To quantify the Pu in spent fuel that is not considered 'self-protecting.' Fuel is considered self-protecting by some regulatory bodies when the dose that the fuel emits is above a given level. If the fuel is not self-protecting, then the Pu content of the fuel needs to be determined and the Pu mass recorded in the facility's accounting system. This subject area is of particular interest to facilities that have research-reactor spent fuel or old light-water reactor (LWR) fuel. It is also of interest to regulators considering changing the level at which fuel is considered self-protecting. (4) To determine the input accountability value at an electrochemical processing facility. It is not expected that an electrochemical reprocessing facility will have an input accountability tank, as is typical in an aqueous reprocessing facility. As such, one possible means of determining the input accountability value is to measure the Pu content in the spent fuel that arrives at the facility. (5) To fully understand the composition of the fuel in order to efficiently and safely pack spent fuel into a long-term repository. The NDA of spent fuel can be part of a system that cost-effectively meets the burnup credit needs of a repository. Behind each of these reasons is a regulatory structure with MC&A requirements. In the case of the IAEA, the accountable quantity is elemental plutonium. The material in spent fuel (fissile isotopes, fission products, etc.) emits signatures that provide information about the content and history of the fuel. A variety of nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques are available to quantify these signatures. The effort presented in this paper is investigation of the capabilities of 12 NDA techniques. For these 12, none is conceptually capable of independently determining the Pu content in a spent fuel assembly while at the same time being able to detect the diversion of a significant quantity of rods. For this reason the authors are investigating the capability of 12 NDA techniques with the end goal of integrating a few techniques together into a system that is capable of measuring Pu mass in an assembly. The work described here is the beginning of what is anticipated to be a five year effort: (1) two years of modeling to select the best technologies, (2) one year fabricating instruments and (3) two years measuring spent fuel. This paper describes the first two years of this work. In order to cost effectively and robustly model the performance of the 12 NDA techniques, an 'assembly library' was created. The library contains the following: (a) A diverse range of PWR spent fuel assemblies (burnup, enrichment, cooling time) similar to that which exists in spent pools today and in the future. (b) Diversion scenarios that capture a range of possible rod removal options. (c) The spatial and isotopic detail needed to accurately quantify the capability of all the NDA techniques so as to enable integration. It is our intention to make this library available to other researchers in the field for inter-comparison purposes. The performance of each instrument will be quantified for the full assembly library for measurements in three different media: air, water and borated water. The 12 NDA techniques being researched are the following: Delayed Gamma, Delayed Neutrons, Differential Die-Away, Lead Slowing Down Spectrometer, Neutron Multiplicity, Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence, Passive Prompt Gamma, Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity, Self-integration Neutron Resonance Densitometry, Total Neutron (Gross Neutron), X-Ray Fluorescence, {sup 252}Cf Interrogation with Prompt Neutron Detection.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Temperature and concentration dependences of the electrical resistivity for alloys of plutonium with americium under normal conditions

The temperature and concentration dependences of the electrical resistivity for alloys of americium with plutonium are analyzed in terms of the multiband conductivity model for binary disordered substitution-type alloys. For the case of high temperatures (T > {Theta}{sub D}, {Theta}{sub D} is the Debye temperature), a system of self-consistent equations of the coherent potential approximation has been derived for the scattering of conduction electrons by impurities and phonons without any constraints on the interaction intensity. The definitions of the shift and broadening operator for a single-electron level are used to show qualitatively and quantitatively that the pattern of the temperature dependence of the electrical resistivity for alloys is determined by the balance between the coherent and incoherent contributions to the electron-phonon scattering and that the interference conduction electron scattering mechanism can be the main cause of the negative temperature coefficient of resistivity observed in some alloys involving actinides. It is shown that the great values of the observed resistivity may be attributable to interband transitions of charge carriers and renormalization of their effective mass through strong s-d band hybridization. The concentration and temperature dependences of the resistivity for alloys of plutonium and americium calculated in terms of the derived conductivity model are compared with the available experimental data.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

People are like plutonium

An analogy is drawn between the study of human behavior and the study of plutonium to demonstrate that soft and hard sciences are more similar than different, making the distinction moot and unproductive. The studies of human behavior and plutonium follow a common scientific research cycle that aligns with Thomas Kuhn’s views of scientific change. This common research cycle provides evidence that the thought processes and methodologies required for success are congruent in the soft and hard sciences. The primary implication from this analogy is that scientists in all disciplines should eradicate the distinction between soft and hard sciences. Focusing on similarities rather than differences among researchers from different disciplines is necessary to enhance collective intelligence and the type of transdisciplinary collaboration required to tackle difficult sociotechnical problems. CCS Concepts: • Social and professional topics • User characteristics • Cultural characteristics.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Plutonium Sustainment Monthly Program Report September 2012

In September of 2012 the Plutonium Sustainment program at LANL completed or addressed the following high-level activities: 1) Completed assembly, inspection, packing, and approvals for Pollux. Completed shipment to DAF in early October in accordance with the Gemini Core Team’s schedule. 2) Delivered the draft Program Implementation Plan and revised repeatedly. 3) Met with Kansas City Plant staff to “kick-off” the non-nuclear pit-component production mission. All MRT L2 Milestones 4195-4198 or the relevant PBIs associated with Plutonium Sustainment have been met and evidence packages submitted. The year-end budget/performance indices were 0.96 (S.P.I.) and 1.00 (C.P.I.). Table 1 identifies all Baseline Change Requests (BCRs) that were initiated, in process, or completed during the month. The earned value metrics overall for LANL are within acceptable thresholds, so no high-level recovery plan is required. Note that the planned (budget) and earned value for September includes planned carryover holdbacks (no allocation) with no associated FY12 costs. This has a minor (positive) impact on S.P.I. and a significant (positive) impact on the C.P.I. For Pu Sustainment overall, the C.P.I. in September neglecting the $10.75M holdback is 0.90. Likewise, the C.P.I. for FY12 is 1.004. With the facility infrastructure element removed, the C.P.I. in September becomes 0.92. Likewise, the C.P.I. for FY12 is 0.992. Again neglecting the holdback, the S.P.I. numbers for Pu Sustainment overall are 0.94 (Sept) and 0.96 (FY12) and with the facility infrastructure element removed 0.95 (Sept) and 0.95 (FY12).

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

The effect of plutonium dioxide water surface coverage on the generation of hydrogen and oxygen

The conditions for the production of oxygen during radiolysis of water adsorbed onto plutonium dioxide powder are discussed. Studies in the literature investigating the radiolysis of water show that both oxygen and hydrogen can be generated from water adsorbed on high-purity plutonium dioxide powder. These studies indicate that there is a threshold in the amount of water below which oxygen is not generated. The threshold is associated with the number of monolayers of adsorbed water and is shown to occur at approximately two monolayers of molecularly adsorbed water. Material in equilibrium with 50% relative humidity (RH) will be at the threshold for oxygen generation. Using two monolayers of molecularly adsorbed water as the threshold for oxygen production, the total pressure under various conditions is calculated assuming stoichiometric production of hydrogen and oxygen. The specific surface area of the oxide has a strong effect on the final partial pressure. The specific surface areas resulting in the highest pressures within a 3013 container are evaluated. The potential for oxygen generation is mitigated by reduced relative humidity, and hence moisture adsorption, at the oxide surface which occurs if the oxide is warmer than the ambient air. The potential for oxygen generation approaches zero as the temperature difference between the ambient air and the material approaches 6°C.

08 HYDROGEN↗

DISSOLUTION OF PLUTONIUM METAL IN 8-10 M NITRIC ACID

The H-Canyon facility will be used to dissolve Pu metal for subsequent purification and conversion to plutonium dioxide (PuO 2 ) using Phase II of HB-Line. To support the new mission, the development of a Pu metal dissolution flowsheet which utilizes concentrated (8-10 M) nitric acid (HNO 3 ) solutions containing potassium fluoride (KF) is required. Dissolution of Pu metal in concentrated HNO 3 is desired to eliminate the need to adjust the solution acidity prior to purification by anion exchange. The preferred flowsheet would use 8-10 M HNO 3 , 0.015-0.07 M KF, and 0.5-1.0 g/L Gd to dissolve the Pu up to 6.75 g/L. An alternate flowsheet would use 8-10 M HNO 3 , 0.05-0.2 M KF, and 1-2 g/L B to dissolve the Pu. The targeted average Pu metal dissolution rate is 20 mg/min-cm 2 , which is sufficient to dissolve a “standard” 2250-g Pu metal button in 24 h. Plutonium metal dissolution rate measurements showed that if Gd is used as the nuclear poison, the optimum dissolution conditions occur in 10 M HNO 3 , 0.04-0.05 M KF, and 0.5-1.0 g/L Gd at 112 to 116 °C (boiling). These conditions will result in an estimated Pu metal dissolution rate of ~11-15 mg/min-cm 2 and will result in dissolution times of 36-48 h for standard buttons. The recommended minimum and maximum KF concentrations are 0.03 M and 0.07 M, respectively. The data also indicate that lower KF concentrations would yield dissolution rates for B comparable to those observed with Gd at the same HNO 3 concentration and dissolution temperature. To confirm that the optimal conditions identified by the dissolution rate measurements can be used to dissolve Pu metal up to 6.75 g/L in the presence of representative concentrations of Fe and Gd or B, a series of experiments was performed to demonstrate the flowsheets. In three of the five experiments, the offgas generation rate during the dissolution was measured and samples were analyzed for hydrogen gas (H 2 ). The use of 10 M HNO 3 containing 0.03-0.05 M KF, 0.5-1.0 g/L Gd, and 1.9 g/L Fe resulted in complete dissolution of the metal in 2.0-3.5 h. When B was used as the neutron poison, 10 M HNO 3 solutions containing 0.05-0.1 M KF, 1.9 g/L Fe, and 1 g/L B resulted in complete dissolution of the metal in 0.75-2.0 h. Dissolution rates estimated using data from the flowsheets demonstrations agreed reasonably well with the measured rates; although, a discrepancy was observed in the Gd system. The presence of 1 g/L Gd or B in the dissolving solution had about the same effect on the dissolution rate. The predominant Pu valence in the dissolving solution was Pu(IV). The concentration of Pu(VI) was evaluated by UV-visible spectroscopy and was estimated to be significantly less than 1 wt %. The offgas generation rates and H 2 concentrations measured in the offgas from experiments performed using 10 M HNO 3 containing 0.05 M KF, 1.9 g/L Fe and either 1 g/L Gd or B were approximately the same. These data support the conclusion that the presence of either 1 g/L Gd or B had the same general effect on the dissolution rate. The calculated offgas generation during the dissolutions was 0.6 mol offgas/mol of Pu. The H 2 concentration measured in the offgas from the dissolution using Gd as the neutron poison was approximately 0.5 vol %. In the B system, the H 2 ranged from nominally 0.8 to 1 vol % which is about the same as measured in the Gd system within the uncertainty of the analysis. The offgas generation rate for the dissolution performed using 10 M HNO 3 containing 0.03 M KF, 0.5 g/L Gd, and 1.9 g/L Fe was approximately a factor of two less than produced in the other dissolutions; however, the concentration of H 2 measured in the offgas was higher. The adjusted concentration ranged from 2.7 to 8.8 vol % as the dissolution proceeded. Higher concentrations of H 2 occur when the Pu dissolution proceeds by a metal/acid reaction rather than nitrate oxidation. The higher H 2 concentration could be attributed to the reduced activity of the fluoride due to complexation with Pu as the dissolution progressed. Dissolution of Pu metal at 20 °C in 10 M HNO 3 containing 0.05 M KF showed that the Pu metal dissolves slowly without any visible gas generation. As the Pu metal dissolves, it forms a more-dense Pu-bearing solution which sank to the bottom of the dissolution vessel. The dissolved Pu did not form a boundary layer around the sample and failed to distribute homogeneously due to minimal (thermally-induced) mixing. This indicates that in the H-Canyon dissolver insert, the Pu will diffuse out of the insert into the bulk dissolver solution where it will disperse. At 35 °C, the Pu metal dissolved without visible gas generation. However, due to thermal currents caused by maintaining the solution at 35 °C, the dissolved Pu distributed evenly throughout the dissolver solution. It did not form a boundary layer around the sample.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Qualification of the Savannah River National Laboratories Coulometer, Model SRNL-Rev. 2 (Serial # SRNL-003 Coulometer) for use in Process 3401a, Plutonium Assay by Controlled Coulometer

This report discusses the process used to prove in the SRNL-Rev.2 coulometer for isotopic data analysis used in the special plutonium material project. In May of 2012, the PAR 173 coulometer system that had been the workhorse of the Plutonium Assay team since the early 1970s became inoperable. A new coulometer system had been purchased from Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) and installed in August of 2011.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Arrays of Bottles of Plutonium Nitrate Solution

In October and November of 1981 thirteen approaches-to-critical were performed on a remote split table machine (RSTM) in the Critical Mass Laboratory of Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) in Richland, Washington using planar arrays of polyethylene bottles filled with plutonium (Pu) nitrate solution. Arrays of up to sixteen bottles were used to measure the critical number of bottles and critical array spacing with a tight fitting Plexiglas® reflector on all sides of the arrays except the top. Some experiments used Plexiglas shells fitted around each bottles to determine the effect of moderation on criticality. Each bottle contained approximately 2.4 L of Pu(NO 3 ) 4 solution with a Pu content of 105 g Pu/L and a free acid molarity H + of 5.1. The plutonium was of low 240 Pu (2.9 wt.%) content. These experiments were sponsored by Rockwell Hanford Operations because of the lack of experimental data on the criticality of arrays of bottles of Pu solution such as might be found in storage and handling at the Purex Facility at Hanford. The results of these experiments were used “to provide benchmark data to validate calculational codes used in criticality safety assessments of [the] plant configurations” (Ref. 1). Data for this evaluation were collected from the published report (Ref. 1), the approach to critical logbook, the experimenter’s logbook, and communication with the primary experimenter, B. Michael Durst. Of the 13 experiments preformed 10 were evaluated. One of the experiments was not evaluated because it had been thrown out by the experimenter, one was not evaluated because it was a repeat of another experiment and the third was not evaluated because it reported the critical number of bottles as being greater than 25. Seven of the thirteen evaluated experiments were determined to be acceptable benchmark experiments. A similar experiment using uranyl nitrate was benchmarked as U233-SOL-THERM-014.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 415: Project 57 No. 1 Plutonium Dispersion (NTTR), Nevada (Revision 0)

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 415, Project 57 No. 1 Plutonium Dispersion (NTTR). CAU 415 is located on Range 4808A of the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) and consists of one corrective action site: NAFR-23-02, Pu Contaminated Soil. The CAU 415 site consists of the atmospheric release of radiological contaminants to surface soil from the Project 57 safety experiment conducted in 1957. The safety experiment released plutonium (Pu), uranium (U), and americium (Am) to the surface soil over an area of approximately 1.9 square miles. This area is currently fenced and posted as a radiological contamination area. Vehicles and debris contaminated by the experiment were subsequently buried in a disposal trench within the surface-contaminated, fenced area and are assumed to have released radiological contamination to subsurface soils. Potential source materials in the form of pole-mounted electrical transformers were also identified at the site and will be removed as part of closure activities.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Potential hydrogen and oxygen partial pressures in legacy plutonium oxide packages at Oak Ridge

An approach to estimate the maximum hydrogen and oxygen partial pressures within sealed containers is described and applied to a set of packages containing high-purity plutonium dioxide. The approach uses experimentally determined maximum hydrogen and oxygen partial pressures and scales the experimentally determined pressures to the relevant packaged material properties. The important material properties are the specific wattage and specific surface area (SSA). Important results from the experimental determination of maximum partial pressures are (1) the ratio of hydrogen to oxygen is stoichiometric, and (2) the maximum pressures increase with increasing initial rates of production. The material properties that influence the rates are the material specific wattage and the SSA. The unusual properties of these materials, high specific wattage and high SSA, result in higher predicted maximum pressures than typical plutonium dioxide in storage. The pressures are well within the deflagration range for mixtures of hydrogen and oxygen.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Plutonium Training Opportunities

This report was created to examine the current state of plutonium training in the United States and to discover ways in which to ensure that the next generation of plutonium workers are fully qualified.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Literature review for oxalate oxidation processes and plutonium oxalate solubility

A literature review of oxalate oxidation processes finds that manganese(II)-catalyzed nitric acid oxidation of oxalate in precipitate filtrate is a viable and well-documented process. The process has been operated on the large scale at Savannah River in the past, including oxidation of 20 tons of oxalic acid in F-Canyon. Research data under a variety of conditions show the process to be robust. This process is recommended for oxalate destruction in H-Canyon in the upcoming program to produce feed for the MOX facility. Prevention of plutonium oxalate precipitation in filtrate can be achieved by concentrated nitric acid/ferric nitrate sequestration of oxalate. Organic complexants do not appear practical to sequester plutonium. Testing is proposed to confirm the literature and calculation findings of this review at projected operating conditions for the upcoming campaign.

HB-line↗

GrayQb TM Single-Faced Version 2 (SF2) Hanford Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) deployment report

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) in partnership with CH2M Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) deployed the GrayQb TM SF2 radiation imaging device at the Hanford Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) to assist in the radiological characterization of the canyon. The deployment goal was to locate radiological contamination hot spots in the PRF canyon, where pencil tanks were removed and decontamination/debris removal operations are on-going, to support the CHPRC facility decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) effort. The PRF canyon D&D effort supports completion of the CHPRC Plutonium Finishing Plant Decommissioning Project. The GrayQb TM SF2 (Single Faced Version 2) is a non-destructive examination device developed by SRNL to generate radiation contour maps showing source locations and relative radiological levels present in the area under examination. The Hanford PRF GrayQbTM Deployment was sponsored by CH2M Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) through the DOE Richland Operations Office, Inter-Entity Work Order (IEWO), DOE-RL IEWO- M0SR900210.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Effects Influencing Plutonium-Absorber Interactions and Distributions in Routine and Upset Waste Treatment Plant Operations

This report is the third in a series of analyses written in support of a plan to revise the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation Report (CSER) that is being implemented at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Criticality Safety Group. A report on the chemical disposition of plutonium in Hanford tank wastes was prepared as Phase 1 of this plan (Delegard and Jones 2015). Phase 2 is the provision of a chemistry report to describe the potential impacts on criticality safety of waste processing operations within the WTP (Freer 2014). In accordance with the request from the Environmental and Nuclear Safety Department of the WTP (Miles and Losey 2012), the Phase 2 report assessed the potential for WTP process conditions within and outside the range of normal control parameters to change the ratio of fissile material to neutron-absorbing material in the waste as it is processed with an eye towards potential implications for criticality safety. The Phase 2 study also considered the implications should WTP processes take place within the credible range of chemistry upset conditions. In the present Phase 3 report, the 28 phenomena described in the Phase 2 report were considered with respect to the disposition of plutonium and various absorber elements. The phenomena identified in the Phase 2 report are evaluated in light of the Phase 1 report and other resources to determine the impacts these phenomena might have to alter the plutonium/absorber dispositions and ratios. The outcomes of the Phase 3 evaluations then can be used to inform subsequent engineering decisions and provide reasonable paths forward to mitigate or overcome real or potential criticality concern in plant operations.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Aqueous Chloride Operations Overview: Plutonium and Americium Purification/Recovery

These are a set of slides intended for an information session as part of recruiting activities at Brigham Young University. It gives an overview of aqueous chloride operations, specifically on plutonium and americium purification/recovery. This presentation details the steps taken perform these processes, from plutonium size reduction, dissolution, solvent extraction, oxalate precipitation, to calcination. For americium recovery, it details the CLEAR (chloride extraction and actinide recovery) Line, oxalate precipitation and calcination.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗