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At least 379 records · Page 21
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Interactive Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Security Workshop

The goal of this workshop is to role play and walk through various UAS incursion scenarios to: 1. Recognize the complex interactions between physical protection, response, and UAS technologies in a nuclear security event; 2. Identify potential regulatory and legal complications dealing with UAS as aircraft; 3. Identify communication/coordination touch points with facility security and law enforcement; 4. Identify possible physical security and response strategies to help mitigate UAS impact.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Radiation hard gallium oxide scintillators for high count rate radiation detection

Despite decades of materials research, the availability of appropriate crystalline radiation-hard scintillators with ultrafast decay times (~10ns) and high light yields (>2000 ph/MeV) are still limited. In this study, we demonstrate the potential of gallium oxide (β-Ga 2 O 3 ) based scintillators for high count rate applications. The low-cost rugged β-Ga 2 O 3 scintillators were grown using the optical float zone (FZ) technique. Several dopants and growth atmospheres were used to demonstrate the balance between ultrafast primary decay time and the light yield of the scintillators. Light yields as high as 6446 ± 716 ph/MeV were obtained with 18.3 ns decay time for 662 keV gamma rays. Decay times as fast as 12ns were obtained with a 3212 ± 357 ph/MeV light yield. An excellent 662 keV gamma energy resolution of 7% was obtained using the β-Ga 2 O 3 :Ce crystals. Even with these excellent scintillation properties, the gamma radiation hardness of β-Ga 2 O 3 crystals was better than the leading radiation-hard lead tungstate (PbWO 4 ) crystals. Twenty-six scintillators fabricated from the grown β-Ga 2 O 3 crystals were tested for radiation hardness with a 60 Co gamma irradiation rate of 14 krad/h with a total radiation dose of 2 Mrad. The scintillation properties of these crystals remained unaffected. To date, no other scintillator has demonstrated such high radiation resistance. Furthermore, these FZ-grown low-cost, non-hygroscopic, and high-density β-Ga 2 O 3 scintillators can replace the existing scintillators in many applications ranging from nuclear and high energy physics experiments to nuclear security.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2025

White Paper: Scalable Digital Twin Capabilities for Aging and Surveillance of Engineered Systems

This white paper presents a multi-year initiative to develop practical, secure, and scalable digital twin capabilities for engineered systems in aging and surveillance contexts—an approach pioneered at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) that maps directly onto the needs and ambitions of the Navy for ship- and fleet-level digital twins. LLNL’s work in building part- and process-level digital twins for advanced manufacturing, with a vision to scale up to entire factory floors and, ultimately, enterprise-wide digital twins, offers an adaptable pathway for the Navy as it seeks to modernize lifecycle management, readiness, and predictive maintenance across ships and fleets. For our application, we integrate physics-based modeling with automated data ingestion, processing, and AI-driven calibration, creating hybrid models that are both interpretable and data responsive. We modernized legacy workflows, established centralized data infrastructure, automated experimental pipelines, and demonstrated end-to-end coupling of accelerated aging data with finite element simulations via optimization and surrogate modeling. The result is a generalizable framework that supports part-level digital twins today and lays the groundwork for future system-level twins suitable for Navy applications.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2021

Advanced Simulation and Computing (FY22 Implementation Plan Rev 0)

The DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is an integrated technical program for maintaining the safety, surety, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The SSP incorporates nuclear test data, computational modeling and simulation, and experimental facilities to advance understanding of nuclear weapons. The suite of data analyzed comes from activities including stockpile surveillance, experimental research, and development and engineering programs. This integrated national program requires the continued use of experimental facilities and the computational capabilities to support the SSP missions. These component parts, in addition to an appropriately scaled production capability, enable NNSA to support stockpile requirements. The ultimate goal of the SSP, and thus of the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program, is to ensure that the U.S. maintains a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent. Specific work activities and scope contained in this Implementation Plan (IP) represent the full-year annual operating plan for FY22. The Initial IP, effective , should be consistent with the Department’s Base Table when operating under a Continuing Resolution (CR). The final IP, effective date TBD, is consistent with the final, enacted appropriation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

Advancing Fissile Materials Production Modeling with Adaptive Computing Environment and Simulations (ACES)

The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) provides advanced capabilities to simulate the uranium enrichment process to support international negotiations on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Uranium isotope separation centrifuges connected in a cascade configuration can produce the low-enriched uranium needed for nuclear power. However, those same centrifuges connected in a different configuration can also produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Having the capability to assess cascade operations and identify nefarious activities promotes the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while restricting nuclear weapons proliferation. DNN R&D's Nonproliferation Stewardship Program Adaptive Computing Environment and Simulations (ACES) project is creating a modern, sustainable ecosystem of physics-based models and data-analytics tools that enables analysts to model uranium enrichment systems, simulate operational scenarios, and apply various policy options to explore potential outcomes.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Stable Element Doping of Sol-gel Toward Simulating Environmental Matrix in Surrogate Explosive Nuclear Debris

Training nuclear forensic analysis personnel in post-detonation scenarios is of critical importance to nuclear threat response capabilities. Thus, realistic nuclear debris simulants which resemble the size, color, elemental composition, and radionuclide content of actual nuclear fallout from a recent detonation would be valuable for training nuclear first responders in realistic scenarios. As nuclear fallout types vary significantly in each of these parameters based on detonation environment (rural, urban, maritime etc.) and collection location, the ability to tailor each of these parameters accurately in simulated debris would be of immense benefit to the post-detonation analysis community for training both in-field collections and triage and the validation of laboratory level nuclear forensic techniques. Sol-gel synthesis techniques can provide the tunability of size, shape and composition required for producing surrogate nuclear debris of a wide variety. The sol-gel process consists of forming a metal oxide material, often silica, through polymerization of a metal-alkoxy precursor. In this work, we characterize the ability to load the sol-gel particles with secondary elemental components such as iron, aluminum, and calcium toward approximating the elemental composition of debris from various detonation environments and demonstrate the ability to produce particles with controllable size, shape, and color. We also demonstrate quantitative radionuclide encapsulation toward reproducing the radionuclide content of actual fallout from a recent detonation. Finally, we then employ these techniques in producing simulated aerodynamic debris samples with realistic elemental matrix composition and radionuclide content simulating a recent uranium-fueled detonation taking place in a rural desert environment and compare it to historic fallout from the Nevada Nuclear Security Site.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2020

Twenty Years of Collaborative Materials Exercises by the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group

The Collaborative Materials Exercise (CMX) series are a critical mechanism used to advance the ITWG's mission of identifying, developing and promoting the best practices of nuclear forensics. These exercises are not designed to test laboratory performance, but as learning experiences that provide opportunities for participants to test and demonstrate state-of-the-practice to the global scientific and law enforcement communities. They are run as mock nuclear forensic investigations under realistic scenarios, with timelines and conditions designed to mimic actual operations. These situations provide the relatively unique opportunity for the appropriate governmental agencies to exercise their collective response to a nuclear security incident. Utilizing well-characterized materials of a known history and origin that are taken from specific process locations within the nuclear fuel cycle, these 'real world' materials are used to fully consider the potential significance of process-derived heterogeneities and characteristics that might be used by investigators to derive useful information such as intended use, point of loss of control, process history or origin. While individual laboratory results are kept confidential, a summary of the major outcomes of each exercise is published in the open literature. The ITWG has carried out six CMXs since 1999. The sixth (CMX-6) and largest (21 participants) was completed in June 2019. Each CMX has contributed demonstrably to advancements in the state of practice and the emergence of novel techniques in nuclear forensic science.

Schwantes, Jon M.↗
DOE OSTI2023

Partnership for Radiation Studies (PaRS): A Consortium for Advancing Radiation Science among Underrepresented STEM Students

The Partnership for Radiation Studies (PaRS) consortium was recently awarded by U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The five-year grant aims to increase the number of underrepresented students in STEM disciplines, with simultaneous advancement of nuclear radiation science. The goal is to hire more underrepresented minorities at national laboratories. The consortium’s progress will be tracked/reported annually. This paper and subsequent presentation cover details of the consortium, highlighting the key activities of participating national laboratories in assisting the minority-serving institutions.

Minority Serving Institutions Partnership Program,↗
DOE OSTI2025

Mitigation for the demolition of building 25-3124,equipment testing laboratory, area 25, Nevada national security site, NYE county, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to document the mitigation of adverse effects of a proposed undertaking that would demolish Building 25-3124 in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in compliance with the terms of the 2024 Programmatic Agreement among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (NNSS PA). Building 25-3124 (State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource # B19009) is a contributing element to the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District (SHPO Resource # D424), which has been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A, B, C, and D (Reno et al. 2023). The proposed demolition constitutes an adverse effect. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) consulted with the SHPO on an adverse effect finding for the undertaking and notified the SHPO of its intent to use the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA on December 11, 2024 (Julian to Reed). The SHPO concurred on December 30, 2024 (Reed to Julian). Therefore, NNSA/NFO has prepared mitigation pursuant to the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA Appendix D.I.A for contributing elements to recorded, NRHP-eligible districts.

#B19009↗
DOE OSTI2025

Mitigation for the demolition of building 25-4314, radiation services, area 25, Nevada national security site, NYE county, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to document the mitigation of adverse effects of a proposed undertaking that would demolish Building 25-4314 in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in compliance with the terms of the 2024 Programmatic Agreement among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (NNSS PA). Building 25-4314 (State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource # B19016) is a contributing element to the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District (SHPO Resource # D424), which has been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A, B, C, and D (Reno et al. 2023). The proposed demolition constitutes an adverse effect. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) consulted with the SHPO on an adverse effect finding for the undertaking and notified the SHPO of its intent to use the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA on December 11, 2024 (Julian to Reed). The SHPO concurred on December 30, 2024 (Reed to Julian). Therefore, NNSA/NFO has prepared mitigation pursuant to the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA Appendix D.I.A for contributing elements to recorded, NRHP-eligible districts.

#B19016↗
DOE OSTI2025

Mitigation for the demolition of building 25-4838, vehicle maintenance shop, area 25, Nevada national security site, NYE county, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to document the mitigation of adverse effects of a proposed undertaking that would demolish Building 25-4838 in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in compliance with the terms of the 2024 Programmatic Agreement among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (NNSS PA). Building 25-4838 (State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource # B19019) is a contributing element to the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District (SHPO Resource # D424), which has been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A, B, C, and D (Reno et al. 2023). The proposed demolition constitutes an adverse effect. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) consulted with the SHPO on an adverse effect finding for the undertaking and notified the SHPO of its intent to use the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA on December 11, 2024 (Julian to Reed). The SHPO concurred on December 30, 2024 (Reed to Julian). Therefore, NNSA/NFO has prepared mitigation pursuant to the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA Appendix D.I.A for contributing elements to recorded, NRHP-eligible districts.

#B19019↗
DOE OSTI2025

Mitigation for the demolition of building 25-3153, fire station, area 25, Nevada national security site, NYE county, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to document the mitigation of adverse effects of a proposed undertaking that would demolish Building 25-3153 in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in compliance with the terms of the 2024 Programmatic Agreement among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (NNSS PA). Building 25-3153 (State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource # B19004) is a contributing element to the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District (SHPO Resource # D424), which has been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A, B, C, and D (Reno et al. 2023). The proposed demolition constitutes an adverse effect. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) consulted with the SHPO on an adverse effect finding for the undertaking and notified the SHPO of its intent to use the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA on December 11, 2024 (Julian to Reed). The SHPO concurred on December 30, 2024 (Reed to Julian). Therefore, NNSA/NFO has prepared mitigation pursuant to the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA Appendix D.I.A for contributing elements to recorded, NRHP-eligible districts.

#B19004↗
DOE OSTI2020

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions (CY 2019)

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils because this source dominates the potential offsite dose. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2021

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2020

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. Radionuclides in air from NNSS activities have been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils because this sources dominates the potential offsite dose. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of manmade radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), specifically the National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities (40 CFR 61, Subpart H, 2020) limits the release of radioactivity from a DOE facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent (EDE) to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by reporting environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS. This alternative was proposed and formerly submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2001 (EPA 2001a) and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are closer to radionuclide releases than where the public resides so they act as protective substitutes for public receptor locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in Table 2 of 40 CFR 61, Appendix E. For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. The EPAapproved air transport model, called the Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88-PC) is also used to calculate the effective dose equivalent to the maximally exposed individual from NNSS air emissions. CAP88-PC was also used to calculate the population dose, or the collective EDE (expressed as person-rem [roentgen equivalent man] per year [person-rem/y]) for all individuals combined who reside within 80 kilometers (km) of NNSS emission sources. In 2020, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by both the air sampling data collected at critical receptor air monitoring stations and CAP88-PC modeling. The average concentrations of radioactivity at air critical receptor stations ranged from 0.2% to a maximum of 4.2% of the allowed NESHAP limit. CAP88-PC modeling of all 2020 NNSS radionuclide emissions showed the maximally exposed individual to be in Amargosa Valley and this individual received a potential dose of 0.063 mrem/y. The collective dose was calculated to be 0.29 person-rem/year for the 521,300 people who lived within 80 km of NNSS emission sources.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Pit Technologies at a Glance

The National Nuclear Security Administration has tasked Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) with important national security work: to develop a plutonium pit manufacturing capability and deliver a minimum of 30 plutonium pits per year in the years ahead. A pit is a hollow sphere of plutonium that, when uniformly compressed by explosives inside a warhead or bomb, causes a nuclear explosion. New pits are needed to maintain the nation’s nuclear stockpile and are a key component of nuclear deterrence and world peace. LANL’s Pit Technologies (PT) division manufactures these pits safely and securely. The work takes place in the Plutonium Facility (PF-4), the nation’s most modern plutonium science and manufacturing facility. LANL is currently the only place in the country with the capability to manufacture plutonium pits.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Nuclear Forensics

Nuclear forensics is a key part of the nuclear security strategy for the United States and the international community. The NACS Division is central to the leadership role that LLNL has had in nuclear forensics over the past 25 years. Our current nuclear forensic program includes conducting R&D on provenance and attribution signatures, collaborating with international partners, training the next generation of nuclear forensic experts, developing test materials for verification and validation exercises, and providing expert advice to national and international policy makers. Key to our success in these areas has been the strong and continuing involvement in nuclear forensic casework obtained through law enforcement and intelligence channels as well as our outstanding analytical capabilities. NACS must continue to conduct forward-thinking R&D in nuclear forensics that supports operational programs and addresses intelligence gaps. To maintain leadership in nuclear forensics, we must attract, develop, and retain the best talent. The NNSA has a central leadership role in developing educational initiatives for nuclear forensics. In concert with the Glenn T. Seaborg Institute, the NACS Division will continue to participate in all nuclear forensic educational initiatives (undergraduate, graduate, postdoctoral) and incorporate LLNL’s D&I vision into its student and postdoc recruitment efforts. We will continue to build formal relationships with key academic partners and institutions with active and emerging nuclear forensic research interests. We will also strengthen relationships with NNSA DNN and SSAA funded university consortia (e.g. NSSC, ACE, CNEC, CVT, ETI, MTV), helping them conduct research of interest and relevance to nuclear forensics, while at the same time evaluating and recruiting promising talent from these programs.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗