SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “defense”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 379 records · Page 21

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2022

Proposed Products to Support Shelter-Evacuation Decision Making in the Event of a Nuclear Detonation

Response strategies implemented in the first few hours to days after a nuclear detonation on the US homeland may save more than 100,000 lives. Effective planning and pre-event capability development can increase the response efficacy and so the number of lives saved. During such an event, the US Department of Defense, Joint Task Force Civil Support (DoD JTF-CS) provides command and control for the DoD forces supporting civil authority response operations. Among other activities, JTF-CS expects to support FEMA as well as State and local agencies in shelter and evacuation response activities. JTF-CS currently uses a manual method to generate evacuation decision making products. This method compares the dose that would be (a) acquired remaining at a given location to that (b) acquired during evacuation along a small number of routes. In these products, evacuation may be warranted when the projected “remain” dose is greater than the “evacuate” dose. This method only provides a limited consideration of the protection buildings provide their occupants. To inform the JTF-CS nuclear detonation response, the DoD Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has tasked Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to design a set of planning and response products to support shelter-evacuation activities. This report documents these products to facilitate DTRA and JTF-CS planning efforts. To provide context, we also provide appendices that summarize US planning guidance response zones, early (<72 h) response strategies, and other key topics.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2021

Nondestructive Assay Technical Infrastructure Program Mission and Vision

The Nondestructive Assay Program (NDAP) mission and vision is achieved by identifying and accomplishing a set of programmatic goals that correspond with eight broad technical program elements. The NDAP was created as a result of Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board Recommendation 2007-1, entitled “Safety-Related In Situ Nondestructive Assay of Radioactive Materials,” which emphasized the need to improve in situ measurements of radioactive material at US Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities. An NDAP five-year plan will define tasks to accomplish specific goals identified in the NDAP mission and vision. This mission and vision is applicable for eight technical program elements: Hardware/Software Development, Algorithm Development and Nuclear Data, Uncertainty Quantification, Nuclear Materials, Staffing, Personnel, And Training, Data Management, Requirement and Standards, and Information Preservation and Dissemination. An additional program element is technical support, which provides daily execution management support for the NDAP, site scope, and deliverable tracking via site task managers, along with technical advisement and support from the technical support group. The NDAP mission and vision provides attributes with specific goals for each program element, and some goals benefit multiple program elements. The goals and attributes defined herein are implemented via an NDAP five-year execution plan that defines site work scope, budget, and deliverables, all of which are updated annually. The NDAP is designed to benefit nondestructive assay (NDA) needs to support DOE nuclear criticality safety programs, ensuring that NDA technology is sufficiently capable of guaranteeing the safety of those who handle, store, process, or transport fissionable materials in the complex. Especially important for the NDAP is to maximize capabilities to identify, characterize, and manage in situ fissile material deposits in process equipment to ensure nuclear criticality safety at processing facilities.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Autonomous System Subversion Tactics: Prototypes and Recommended Countermeasures

One of the fielding requirements for Advanced and Small Modular Reactors (AR/SMR) is the ability to support remote and autonomous operations. Autonomous Control Systems (ACS) are found on platforms such as Autonomous Space Vehicles, Cruise Missiles, and advanced driver-assistance systems. Each of these ACS implementations depends upon a set of decision support subsystems responsible for supporting Autonomous Mission Managers (names vary based upon field and author preferences). These Autonomous Mission Managers receive inputs from system sensors (e.g., LIDAR collection from an automobile travelling down a street; transients from a nuclear reactor), and perform a set of classifications (e.g., Red Traffic Light; Small Pedestrian at 10m; Load Rejection; Single Coolant Pump Trip), and then use these classifications in combination with recommendation algorithms to achieve platform goals (e.g., Stop the Vehicle at the Traffic Light, Avoid the Small Pedestrian; Trip the Reactor to prevent a Safety Event). The design, implementation, and fielding of an ACS capability will alter the cyber-attack surface such that existing risk management plans will need to be updated to include how to protect and defend against data-science and decision-support-system attack classes. These attack classes would include protection of the design and training environments where algorithm selection and testing and training data would be obvious attack vectors. These attack classes would also require an informed set of detection and response procedures to identify anomalous behaviors and document best practices for anomaly assessment and vulnerability mitigation and remediation. Last year we published a Cyber Threat Assessment Methodology for Autonomous and Remote Operations for AR/SMRs along with a companion publication on Cyber Attack and Defense Use Cases. The focus of the methodology was on describing and enumerating ACS processes, components, and functions such that security engineers could: evaluate subversion options against the target; identify threat actor attributes and capabilities derived from each subversion option; and identify security controls and response countermeasures. The Use Cases document offered detailed methodology examples including an assessment of a Military Base SMR, an Autonomous System Decision Loop, and implementation of AR/SMR Machine Learning algorithms. Our proposal at the end of last year was to focus on implementation of subversion prototypes related to the last Use Case area: AR/SMR Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms. We included six attack scenarios in our Use Cases paper: a Poisoning Attack against ML functions implemented using an FPGA; a Trojaning Attack against ML classifiers exploiting the excitability of Nuclear Engineers; a Backdooring Attack against ML Training environments to ensure persistence of an attack vector; a False Positive Evasion Attack against multi-factor Access Control Systems using clever inputs; an Inference Attack against ML models by an Insider with access to the Operational environment; and an Adversarial Reprogramming Attack against a Material Access Control Video Surveillance System. At the beginning of this year these six attack scenarios were provided to our research teams at Georgia Tech and Idaho State University and each team successfully implemented a subversion attack against a ML implementation to include transient misclassifications. While this is a notable outcome from this type of research, this paper offers the reader insight into not only how to structure and execute these types of attacks, but into the thought process behind how the researcher investigated the problem space, performed initial algorithm implementation, and the trial-and-error behind arriving at the successful subversion prototypes. We include in this paper a set of associated Scenarios on how these subversion prototypes could be implemented and an initial set of guidance for AR/SMR architects, Nuclear Regulators, and Cyber Defenders to implement awareness and defense capabilities into their current operational portfolios.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Briefing Book: Office of Experimental Sciences

Key to OES science is the advancement of experimental capabilities and vibrant partnerships with other elements of NNSA’s Defense Programs. OES fosters an experimental portfolio that spans the space from small scale studies utilizing tabletop instruments through complex and dynamic high energy density; hydrodynamic; and subcritical experiments on flagship national facilities like Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE), National Ignition Facility (NIF), Z machine at Sandia National Laboratories, Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT), and the U1a Complex in Nevada. Essential to meeting the deterrence challenges that drive OES is a functional strategy for integration of OES with Defense Programs pursuits in modeling and simulation, engineering and technology maturation, and stockpile and production modernization.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2020

Independent Technical Review of INL Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel (ASNF) Oxide Layer Radiolytic Gas Generation Resolution: Task 2

PNNL staff performed an independent technical review (ITR) of the aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) program Task 2. The objective of Task 2 is to determine G-values for the radiolytic production of gaseous molecular hydrogen (H 2 ) from the aluminum oxyhydroxide layers present on ASNF cladding. The G-values need to be defensible, bounding, but not overly conservative. As part of the ITR, the team reviewed program documents, Task 2 work plans, and results to date. In addition, the team held three separate video conferences with the program research staff to ask clarifying questions and obtain additional detail. The PNNL ITR team concludes that if the program follows the methodology and rigor outlined in the test matrices, the program will develop G-values for a defensible technical basis of extended storage of ASNF. Recommendations for improvement are given.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Enabling Cybersecurity, Situational Awareness and Resilience in Distribution Grids with High Penetration of Photovoltaics (CARE-PV) (Final Report)

Since legacy distribution systems have very limited visibility beyond the substation, high penetration of PV at the grid edge presents some unique operational challenges. One approach to address these challenges is to use information from advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and µPMUs. However, exploiting this information is impacted by a number of factors, including multi-timescale measurements, volume of data generated, communication network impairments (e.g., information loss and latency) and susceptibility to cyber-attacks. Therefore, one of the critical tasks involved in the management of a distribution grid is to develop complete situational awareness by integrating cyber-security mechanisms with state estimation strategies and leveraging this situational awareness to assure energy services at strategic locations while exploiting AMI/PV inverter/ µPMU data. This CARE-PV project addresses the fundamental challenges in situational awareness and resilience to cyber and physical vectors by exploiting the synergy between innovative modeling, estimation, data analytics, testing and validation using smart PV inverters designed at K-State and facilities at NREL. Specifically, the project involved the development, testing and validation of the following novel enabling technologies: (Thrust 1) Resilience to cyber vectors that impact data integrity was addressed via a two-level defense strategy that combines cyber intrusion detection using self-learning, cooperative smart PV inverters, and a novel moving target defense framework to combat data integrity attacks. (Thrust 2) Resilience to cyber-physical vectors that impact situational awareness by limiting data availability was addressed via novel centralized and decentralized, sparsity-based static and dynamic state estimation approaches that enhance observability even when the underlying system is unobservable. (Thrust 3) Leveraging a unique probabilistic sensitivity analysis approach accompanied by one-of-a-kind dominant influencer set computation, the vulnerability of critical infrastructure at strategic locations was evaluated so that proactive PV-based control strategies can be used to support operations under normal/outage scenarios. These CARE-PV project innovations were demonstrated on both small-scale IEEE and larger utility-scale testbeds (Thrust 4). Feedback from Industry Advisory Board members was used to formulate a commercialization pathway for a subset of CARE-PV technologies. These CARE-PV technologies will ultimately lead to reliable and secure, large-scale integration of renewable energy and mitigate the risk of energy disruption resulting from cyber incidents and other emerging threats within the energy environment.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2023

NDA Systems Deployed at the Savannah River Site

SRNL’s Nuclear Measurements group develops and implements equipment, methods, and techniques to rapidly provide answers to challenging measurement questions in the areas of: • Environmental Monitoring • Legacy Waste Cleanup • Defense Material •Surplus Defense Material • Customers want: • Good, Fast, Cheap –pick three • Simple

Whiteside, Tad↗

DOE OSTI2023

Understanding Plant Signaling Via Innovations in Probe Delivery and Imaging

The goal of this project was to develop tools for studying plant processes in living tissues. We wanted a method for introducing probes for studying plant processes such that plants could remain intact and imaged iteratively. Towards this end, we successfully optimized carbon nanofibers that we showed could deliver non-permeable signaling probes/biomolecules to plant cells. These were created on a rigid backing and also successfully transferred to a flexible backing to use with curved plant structures. We also built fiber optic microscopes that permit iterative non-destructive fluorescence or light micrographs and created protocols and devices to stabilize plant organs during imaging. These tools were developed in conjunction with research aimed understanding receptor-mediated peptide trafficking and responses relevant to plant cell growth and defense tradeoff. During this project, we designed and built two fiberoptic fluorescence microscopes; (b) designed, fabricated and validated different nanospike designs for delivering probes to plants, including the feasibility of delivering DNA constructs for expression studies; (c) developed fluorescent peptide probes (active and inactive versions of a secreted receptor ligand called phytosulfokine or PSK) and performed mobility tests after application to plants using microscopy; (d) used appropriate genetic plant backgrounds to facilitate PSK trafficking and response mechanisms; (e) determined the transcriptional changes due to PSK-induced signaling related to growth/defense tradeoff; (f) performed experiments showing the growth/defense tradeoff involves repression of specific defense components in response to PSK. This project also involved the training of two PhD students and five Masters students.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2023

5G Securely Energized and Resilient: Task 2 and 3 Progress Report

The 5G Securely Energized and Resilient project implemented at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory is sponsored by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense and is designed to demonstrate the successful deployment of 5G-6G (FutureG) technologies in the context of electrical microgrid scenarios. Through implementation of this project, cybersecurity researchers were able to design a platform to better understand the fundamental system architecture, limitations, and benefits of 5G systems supporting energy system requirements. Although the work for this project was developed in the context of “FutureG Advanced Component Development & Prototypes,” which is a U.S. Department of Defense effort to ensure communications system resilience in the context of military deployments, the results can also apply to communications for electrical grids in general. Several key points were established in Tasks 2 and 3 of this project that are further expanded on in the body of this document.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2024

Final Report

This final progress report describes the development of the CANDO Software package at ThirdLaw Technologies LLC (TLT) towards a software platform that will be used by its subsidiary company ThirdLaw Molecular LLC (TLM) for the development of therapeutic Spiroligomer™ molecules. ThirdLaw Molecular LLC is 95% owned by ThirdLaw Technologies LLC. TLM is developing a new therapeutics platform based on Spiroligomer™ molecules and is currently funded by the Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DOD/DTRA W15QKN209C004). Spiroligomer™ molecules are complex, highly-preorganized macromolecules with programmable three-dimensional shapes. Spiroligomer™ molecules are currently synthesized by TLM in the form of large (>880,000 member) DNA-encoded libraries and screened against dangerous bacteria and viruses as part of the DOD/DTRA project. The CANDO software package is being developed to enable the computational design of Spiroligomer™ molecules for the development of therapeutic and diagnostic molecules. Towards this end, over the period of the grant we implemented software algorithms and a user interface within CANDO to enable the computational design of Spiroligomer™ molecules.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

DOE OSTI2024

Towards Risk-Informed Performance-Based Emergency Planning: Review of Regulation, Guidance, and Methods

At a fundamental level, nuclear facility safety is built upon the concept of defense-in-depth (DID), which entails multiple, independent layers of protection for public health and safety. Within the DID structure, emergency preparedness (EP) is the last layer of defense and provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Over several decades, the EP regulatory framework has evolved in response to lessons learned from actual events, experience with maintaining and testing EP capabilities, and advances in a wide range of technologies. Furthering this evolution, recent developments in risk-informed performance-based (RIPB) design and licensing approaches provide an opportunity to leverage insights regarding the attributes of the specific facility and site to inform EP.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Complete Evaluation on Advanced Reactor Machine Learning Subversion Attacks (Final)

Navigating through the world of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in nuclear reactors and their Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems demands a careful, deliberate journey. AI’s capability to manage massive datasets and streamline control systems has indeed carved out a significant role in various sectors, including nuclear energy. However, while AI, and particularly Large Language Models (LLMs), bring a lot to the table in terms of operational efficiency and anomaly detection, they also expose the sector to a new breed of cybersecurity threats, like Inference Attacks, Adversarial Attacks, and Trojan Attacks. This guide is designed to be a straightforward manual, diving deep into the intertwining worlds of AI and cybersecurity within nuclear reactors, and tailoring insights for three crucial audiences: I&C Vendors/Developers, Nuclear Regulators, and Nuclear Reactor Operators and Cyber Defense Teams. (1) Section 2, directed at I&C Vendors/Developers, will provide a clear and focused look at several cybersecurity attacks, offering practical recommendations and detailed scenarios related to AI cybersecurity. This section isn’t just about identifying problems but also about giving solid, usable solutions. (2) Section 3, meant for Nuclear Regulators, gets straight to the point about regulations, policy suggestions, and guidelines that are needed to lay down a robust, secure, and ethical foundation for the application of AI in nuclear operations. The focus is on making sure that everything adheres to international standards and laws while being practicable and clear-cut. (3) Section 4, aimed at Nuclear Reactor Operators and Cyber Defense Teams, offers an exhaustive exploration and technical reports, with clear recommendations and scenario analyses vital to protect operational environments and guarantee the secure application of AI in nuclear reactor operations. The goal is simple: as we step into an era where AI becomes a fundamental element of our technological and energy infrastructures, this guide is here to act as a clear, direct handbook, ensuring that AI is implemented within the nuclear sector in a manner that is secure, responsible, and practical. It’s about striking a balance – optimizing the undeniable benefits offered by AI while securing and shielding against potential cyber threats as we move through this new and complex landscape.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Deep Learning and Natural Language Processing for Accelerated Inverse Design of Optical Metamaterials

Optical metamaterial device design has enjoyed a long track of success over the past 50 years leading to the manipulation of light over a wide range of wavelengths spanning the ultraviolet to the far infrared. The manipulation of light over such wavelengths has already led to many technological advancements such as the design of selective radiative absorbers for solar energy, daytime passive cooling using deep space, and optical invisibility cloaks for defense applications. Further disruptive advancements in energy, defense, computing, and biomedical fields could be enabled or enhanced by future optical metamaterial devices. These technologies could lead to increased energy efficiency and hence reduced national primary energy consumption, cheap long duration energy storage, and next generation solid-state heat engines. But historically the methods to invent and develop all of these devices have been time- consuming and based mostly on intuition and iteration. Finding an optimal design can take years.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2022

Deep Learning and Natural Language Processing for Accelerated Inverse Design of Optical Metamaterials

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2024

Multilevel Cybersecurity for Photovoltaic Systems

The motivation behind this project is to protect critical infrastructure in electric power generation pertaining to solar photovoltaic (PV) systems. This growing renewable energy resource is becoming a more vital part of the nation’s energy portfolio, particularly since it has achieved grid-parity to existing generation methods in terms of cost. It is thus vital that steps be taken to ensure the cybersecurity of these assets. The project goal was to devise a multilevel cybersecurity solution to address PV security gaps at the inverter and system levels, and field test the solution under the supervision and review of a US-based solar inverter manufacturer and PV installer/operator. A two-level cyberattack defense approach was formulated whereby the first level, the solar inverter level, hardens individual devices and achieves a deeply cyber-secure inverter. The inverter level security involves a multi-layer defense-in-depth approach for securing the inverter while also providing data for the system level algorithms. The second level, the system level, addresses intrusion detection and restoration involving an ensemble of inverters and relevant systems.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2024

OSCAR-Mike: Why not ATAK?

The Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) is evaluating methods to increase the probability that international partners will detect radioactive materials. One proposed method to accomplish this goal is to improve communications within teams operating in challenging environments. The goal of these improvements would be to enable remote monitoring of detection equipment, share data among end users in the field and subject matter experts, and integrate data from radiation detectors with other types of sensors and camera systems. Accomplishing this goal has the potential to improve the capabilities of currently deployed NSDD equipment. During FY 2021, Oak Ridge National Laboratory demonstrated some core and expanded capabilities of the Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK), a situational awareness application developed by the US Department of Defense, to enable precision targeting, navigation, and data sharing. During FY 2022, Oak Ridge National Laboratory developed software requirements for an NSDD team awareness kit–based system. The requirements were developed by liaising with NSDD management and subject matter experts to determine NSDD’s needs and by reviewing available software and hardware solutions with US Department of Defense team awareness kit program managers and developers and radiation detection equipment vendors.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2023

A section 110 evaluation of the 10,500-foot blast line civil effects structures and military trenches associated with the apple-2 test, area 1, nevada national security site, nye county, nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) has tasked Desert Research Institute (DRI) with identifying and evaluating additional resources that contribute to the significance of the Apple-2 Historic District as part of a Section 110 effort. Apple-2 was a 1955 atmospheric test in which the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) conducted an extensive civil effects program named Operation Cue. The objective of Operation Cue was to understand the blast and thermal effects of the test by using a simulated community of residential buildings, industrial structures, utilities, and commercial equipment arranged at various distances from ground zero (GZ). Military operations conducted by the Department of Defense (DoD) as part of the Desert Rock VI exercise were also associated with the Apple-2 test. The Apple-2 Historic District was originally defined in 2000 by Johnson and Edwards as 15 highly visible contributing elements dispersed across the landscape. Since its original recording, DRI has conducted additional archival research and this report details the identification and evaluation results of testing-related material remains at a distance of 10,500 ft from the Apple-2 GZ. Between 2017 and 2020, DRI conducted fieldwork at 10,500 ft from the Apple-2 GZ, revisited previously recorded contributing elements, and identified and evaluated newly recorded resources associated with Operation Cue as well as DoD operations. In total, DRI revisited or newly identified 15 principal resources. Of these, 13 are located within the historic district and contribute to the district’s significance. A set of military trenches and the associated material remains are discontiguous from the district, but also contribute to the district’s significance.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2025

Conceptual Model Testing Related to SDU 6 Drainwell Observations

From its inception in the early 1950s through the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the Savannah River Site (SRS) produced nuclear materials for national defense in five reactors. Additionally, irradiated reactor fuel and target tubes were dissolved in nitric acid to recover plutonium and uranium using the PUREX (Plutonium Uranium Reduction EXtraction) process. Liquid waste from these chemical separations processes was then stored onsite in 51 underground tanks. Eight waste storage tanks have been operationally closed (i.e. cleaned and grouted) and the remaining tanks hold a mixture of liquids, insoluble solids, and precipitated salts (SRMC-LWP-2022-00001), the latter generated by evaporating water from the liquid waste. Waste is currently being retrieved from tanks and separated into 1) high-radioactivity, low-volume, and 2) low-radioactivity, high-volume components, principally through the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) (SRMC-LWP-2023-00001). The former waste stream is vitrified in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), stored onsite, and destined for offsite disposal in a deep geologic repository. The latter stream is mixed with dry cementitious materials in the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) and the wet slurry placed in onsite Saltstone Disposal Units (SDUs) within the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF), where it hardens into a cement waste form termed saltstone. A low-infiltration surface cover system will be placed over the SDF at closure, where SDUs will then be in the subsurface post-closure (SRR-CWDA-2019-00001).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗