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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Summary of Technical Interchange Meetings (TIMs) Designed to Enable Earth Independent Medical Operations (EIMO)

The Exploration Medical Capability Element (ExMC) in NASA’s Human Research Program hosted a series of TIMs in 2023-2024 designed to stimulate discussion around specific topics with the goal of enabling EIMO. In context of the thematic constituent elements of EIMO, namely pre-mission planning, acute/emergent/prolonged medical decision making, supply/resource management and task load management, subject matter experts from industry, academia and government (NASA and other Agencies) provided valuable and actionable guidance and recommendations. Earth-based medical experts will remain indispensable for pre-mission planning, however, management of acute/emergent medical contingencies will require a gradual transition of medical care and decision making from terrestrial to space-based assets to enable support of astronaut health and performance and reduce overall mission risk. Key to achieving these enhancements is providing an integrated data system platform capable of utilizing multiple data streams in concert with a variety of on-board databases and passive monitoring of video and wearable sensors to enable a multi-modal, agentic AI-based clinical decision support system (CDSS) to support crew medical officer (CMO) medical decision-making. The EIMO series of TIMs (I-V) have proven to be instructive and portend a significant paradigm shift will be necessary to maintain crew health and performance on exploration class missions. Importantly, since the expected paradigm shift will be significantly different from the methods of operation that have been employed for the majority of missions from the inception of human spaceflight to date, any proposed methods must be deployed in the setting of ongoing operations early and be “tested, reviewed and practiced” while reliable back-up is available to facilitate an Enterprise-wide level of comfort and acceptance. Serious constraints on data transmission coupled with a large and expanding universe of on-board medical informatics data streams will necessitate implementation of a CDSS to supplant the current reliance on support provided by ground-based SMEs. Establishment of trust in the system by CMO/crew and the ground-based medical support team will be essential. Co-development of a CDSS with industry partners will assure that state of the art tools can be employed, and industry efficiencies can be leveraged. Training regimens, materials and tools must evolve to be responsive (just-in-time training) and facilitate autonomous execution of procedures. Proficiency metrics should be established and be based on validated competencies or milestones as opposed to a prescribed number of training hours. Training should be prioritized for broad, translatable skills that have universal application across a variety of medical conditions. Repetition was deemed to be the key to achieving proficiency and emphasis should lie in procedural training which is known to extinguish more rapidly than diagnostic skills. Advanced tools, e.g., extended reality, can provide more realistic and effective training. Use of advanced probabilistic risk assessment tools will be essential to optimize the medical system capability while carefully balancing risk relative to mass/power/volume limitations. Importance of factoring use-life of medical supplies and maintaining awareness of redundancy and opportunity to re-purpose under off nominal situations was emphasized. Consideration of adopting optimized performance standards vs. “good-enough” performance thresholds is warranted. The use of legacy systems as opposed to creating new systems may be preferable. Managing task load and associated cognitive load will be essential to maintain operational safety and behavioral health. ExMC aspires to create a shared EIMO paradigm and strategic vision for advancing medical system design through novel technologies, training, protocols, and support capabilities, built upon the spirit of successful strategies and innovations over the past six decades of space medicine operations.

Jay Lemery↗
NASA NTRS2004

Explanation Constraint Programming for Model-based Diagnosis of Engineered Systems

We can expect to see an increase in the deployment of unmanned air and land vehicles for autonomous exploration of space. In order to maintain autonomous control of such systems, it is essential to track the current state of the system. When the system includes safety-critical components, failures or faults in the system must be diagnosed as quickly as possible, and their effects compensated for so that control and safety are maintained under a variety of fault conditions. The Livingstone fault diagnosis and recovery kernel and its temporal extension L2 are examples of model-based reasoning engines for health management. Livingstone has been shown to be effective, it is in demand, and it is being further developed. It was part of the successful Remote Agent demonstration on Deep Space One in 1999. It has been and is being utilized by several projects involving groups from various NASA centers, including the In Situ Propellant Production (ISPP) simulation at Kennedy Space Center, the X-34 and X-37 experimental reusable launch vehicle missions, Techsat-21, and advanced life support projects. Model-based and consistency-based diagnostic systems like Livingstone work only with discrete and finite domain models. When quantitative and continuous behaviors are involved, these are abstracted to discrete form using some mapping. This mapping from the quantitative domain to the qualitative domain is sometimes very involved and requires the design of highly sophisticated and complex monitors. We propose a diagnostic methodology that deals directly with quantitative models and behaviors, thereby mitigating the need for these sophisticated mappings. Our work brings together ideas from model-based diagnosis systems like Livingstone and concurrent constraint programming concepts. The system uses explanations derived from the propagation of quantitative constraints to generate conflicts. Fast conflict generation algorithms are used to generate and maintain multiple candidates whose consistency can be tracked across multiple time steps.

Narasimhan, Sriram↗
NASA NTRS2016

Modeling in the State Flow Environment to Support Launch Vehicle Verification Testing for Mission and Fault Management Algorithms in the NASA Space Launch System

Analysis methods and testing processes are essential activities in the engineering development and verification of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) new Space Launch System (SLS). Central to mission success is reliable verification of the Mission and Fault Management (M&FM) algorithms for the SLS launch vehicle (LV) flight software. This is particularly difficult because M&FM algorithms integrate and operate LV subsystems, which consist of diverse forms of hardware and software themselves, with equally diverse integration from the engineering disciplines of LV subsystems. M&FM operation of SLS requires a changing mix of LV automation. During pre-launch the LV is primarily operated by the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) organization with some LV automation of time-critical functions, and much more autonomous LV operations during ascent that have crucial interactions with the Orion crew capsule, its astronauts, and with mission controllers at the Johnson Space Center. M&FM algorithms must perform all nominal mission commanding via the flight computer to control LV states from pre-launch through disposal and also address failure conditions by initiating autonomous or commanded aborts (crew capsule escape from the failing LV), redundancy management of failing subsystems and components, and safing actions to reduce or prevent threats to ground systems and crew. To address the criticality of the verification testing of these algorithms, the NASA M&FM team has utilized the State Flow environment6 (SFE) with its existing Vehicle Management End-to-End Testbed (VMET) platform which also hosts vendor-supplied physics-based LV subsystem models. The human-derived M&FM algorithms are designed and vetted in Integrated Development Teams composed of design and development disciplines such as Systems Engineering, Flight Software (FSW), Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) and major subsystems and vehicle elements such as Main Propulsion Systems (MPS), boosters, avionics, Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C), Thrust Vector Control (TVC), liquid engines, and the astronaut crew office. Since the algorithms are realized using model-based engineering (MBE) methods from a hybrid of the Unified Modeling Language (UML) and Systems Modeling Language (SysML), SFE methods are a natural fit to provide an in depth analysis of the interactive behavior of these algorithms with the SLS LV subsystem models. For this, the M&FM algorithms and the SLS LV subsystem models are modeled using constructs provided by Matlab which also enables modeling of the accompanying interfaces providing greater flexibility for integrated testing and analysis, which helps forecast expected behavior in forward VMET integrated testing activities. In VMET, the M&FM algorithms are prototyped and implemented using the same C++ programming language and similar state machine architectural concepts used by the FSW group. Due to the interactive complexity of the algorithms, VMET testing thus far has verified all the individual M&FM subsystem algorithms with select subsystem vendor models but is steadily progressing to assessing the interactive behavior of these algorithms with LV subsystems, as represented by subsystem models. The novel SFE applications has proven to be useful for quick look analysis into early integrated system behavior and assessment of the M&FM algorithms with the modeled LV subsystems. This early MBE analysis generates vital insight into the integrated system behaviors, algorithm sensitivities, design issues, and has aided in the debugging of the M&FM algorithms well before full testing can begin in more expensive, higher fidelity but more arduous environments such as VMET, FSW testing, and the Systems Integration Lab7 (SIL). SFE has exhibited both expected and unexpected behaviors in nominal and off nominal test cases prior to full VMET testing. In many findings, these behavioral characteristics were used to correct the M&FM algorithms, enable better test coverage, and develop more effective test cases for each of the LV subsystems. This has improved the fidelity of testing and planning for the next generation of M&FM algorithms as the SLS program evolves from non-crewed to crewed flight, impacting subsystem configurations and the M&FM algorithms that control them. SFE analysis has improved robustness and reliability of the M&FM algorithms by revealing implementation errors and documentation inconsistencies. It is also improving planning efficiency for future VMET testing of the M&FM algorithms hosted in the LV flight computers, further reducing risk for the SLS launch infrastructure, the SLS LV, and most importantly the crew.

Trevino, Luis↗
NASA NTRS2005

Autonomous Medical Care for Exploration

The goal of Autonomous Medical Care (AMC) is to ensure a healthy, well-performing crew which is a primary need for exploration. The end result of this effort will be the requirements and design for medical systems for the CEV, lunar operations, and Martian operations as well as a ground-based crew health optimization plan. Without such systems, we increase the risk of medical events occurring during a mission and we risk being unable to deal with contingencies of illness and injury, potentially threatening mission success. AMC has two major components: 1) pre-flight crew health optimization and 2) in-flight medical care. The goal of pre-flight crew health optimization is to reduce the risk of illness occurring during a mission by primary prevention and prophylactic measures. In-flight autonomous medical care is the capability to provide medical care during a mission with little or no real-time support from Earth. Crew medical officers or other crew members provide routine medical care as well as medical care to ill or injured crew members using resources available in their location. Ground support becomes telemedical consultation on-board systems/people collect relevant data for ground support to review. The AMC system provides capabilities to incorporate new procedures and training and advice as required. The on-board resources in an autonomous system should be as intelligent and integrated as is feasible, but autonomous does not mean that no human will be involved. The medical field is changing rapidly, and so a challenge is to determine which items to pursue now, which to leverage other efforts (e.g. military), and which to wait for commercial forces to mature. Given that what is used for the CEV or the Moon will likely be updated before going to Mars, a critical piece of the system design will be an architecture that provides for easy incorporation of new technologies into the system. Another challenge is to determine the level of care to provide for each mission type. The level of care refers to the amount and type of care one will render based on perceived need and ability. This is in contrast to the standard of care which is the benchmark by which that care is provided. There are certainly some devices and procedures that have unique microgravity or partial gravity requirements such that terrestrial methods will not work. For example, performing CPR on Mars cannot be done in exactly the same way as on Earth because the reduced gravity causes too large a reduction in the forces available for effective compression of the chest. Likewise, fluid behavior in microgravity may require a specialized water filtration and mixing system for the creation of intravenous fluids. This paper will outline the drivers for the design of the medical care systems, prioritization and planning techniques, key system components, and long term goals.

Johnson-Throop, Kathy A.↗
NASA NTRS2006

A Case for Developing a Ground Based Replication of the Earth, Moon and Mars Spaceflight Infrastructure

When the systems are developed and in place to provide the services needed to operate en route and on the Lunar and Martian surfaces, an Earth based replication will need to be in place for the safety and protection of mission success. The replication will entail all aspects of the flight configuration end to end but will not include any closed loop systems. This would replicate the infrastructure from Lunar and Martian robots, manned surface excursions, through man and unmanned terrestrial bases, through the various types of communication systems and technologies, manned and un-manned space vehicles (large and small), to Earth based systems and control centers. An Earth based replicated infrastructure will enable checkout and test of new technologies, hardware, software updates and upgrades and procedures without putting humans and missions at risk. Analysis of events, what ifs and trouble resolution could be played out on the ground to remove as much risk as possible from any type of proposed change to flight operational systems. With adequate detail, it is possible that failures could be predicted with a high probability and action taken to eliminate failures. A major factor in any mission to the Moon and to Mars is the complexity of systems, interfaces, processes, their limitations, associated risks and the factor of the unknown including the development by many contractors and NASA centers. The need to be able to introduce new technologies over the life of the program requires an end to end test bed to analyze and evaluate these technologies and what will happen when they are introduced into the flight system. The ability to analyze system behaviors end to end under varying conditions would enhance safety e.g. fault tolerances. This analysis along with the ability to mine data from the development environment (e.g. test data), flight ops and modeling/simulations data would provide a level of information not currently available to operations and astronauts. In this paper we will analyze the beginnings of such a replication and what it could do in terms of reducing risk in the near term for development. We will analyze the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) test lab which has to a large extent accomplished this replication for the SSME and has been highly successful in analyzing hardware and software problems and changes. The cost of replicating the flight system as proposed here could be very high if attempted as an afterthought. We will describe the initial steps for the development of a replication of this infrastructure starting with the communication infrastructure. The Constellation of Labs (CofL) under the Command, Control, Communication and Information (C3I) project for the NASA Exploration Initiative will provide the initial foundation upon which to base this replication. Simply put, there is very little margin for error in high latency situations e.g. en-route to/from Mars or in an autonomous process on the Lunar far side. Any thought out approach to reduce risk and increase safety needs to be accomplished end to end with the actual systems configuration.

Bradford, Robert N.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Supporting Crew Medical Decisions on Deep Space Missions: A Real-Time Performance Monitoring

Crewed missions into deep space will require astronauts to respond autonomously to safety- and time-critical anomalies. These and other potential issues will require the continuous monitoring and recognition of potentially subtle, but complex, anomalous data patterns. NASA continues to investigate real-time metrics for Extravehicular Operations1 and for providing feedback to improve performance2. Since it is unknown how long-term exposure to deep space will affect crew health, continuous monitoring of clinical and subclinical status is warranted. NASA is characterizing crew medical decision-support needs and identifying the recommended requirements of a Clinical Decision Support System (CDSS) within the Exploration Medical Capability Element (ExMC) of the Human Research Program3. Early detection, and continuous monitoring, of performance may provide an effective prognostic capability for assessing crew health state, and the identified requirements could be provided for an in-vehicle CDSS that acts as an assistant for delivering optimal health and performance and medical care during exploration missions. There is evidence to suggest that automatic, unobtrusive collection of keystroke features, such as alphanumeric key latencies, backspaces or typing rhythm, could be a valuable performance screening tool. Keystroke features show significant differences between control subjects and patients with overt clinical illness, such as multiple sclerosis4 and Parkinson’s disease5, as well as behavioral health and performance issues, such as mild cognitive impairment6 and depression7. This work is exploring a capability for the assessment of early task performance decline in crew as they perform daily activities. Timestamped keyboard entries are continuously collected and stored. Nominal keystroke interactions are compared to those obtained after exposure to spaceflight stressors, e.g., fatigue, to determine the methods sensitivity. This work will pave the way toward an objective detection tool that may be deployed in a spaceflight setting.

clinical↗
NASA NTRS1998

The Deontic Transaction Model in Multi-Agent Normative Systems

In the area of multi-agent systems, much research is devoted to the coordination of the agents. There exist several issues, two of which are summarized. The first is that, although agents are said to be autonomous, they always react in a predictable way to each message, and they cannot decide to violate the conventions that are hard-wired into the protocol. In fact, there might be circumstances in which the agent violates a convention in order to realize a private goal that it considers to be more important. Another issue is that, if the protocols that agents use to react to the environment are fixed, they have no way to respond to changes. However, an important characteristic of agents is that they eon react to a changing environment. Although transaction models ([BOH92], [GR93]) evolved from the database domain, they establish a general execution paradigm that ideally covers all the subsystems invoked in a sequence of transactions. So transaction models apply to multi-agent systems. Recently, some research has been devoted to overcoming the limitations of the traditional transaction models which are suitable for conventional systems and focus on system integrity, e,g., [SJ97]. Here we solve above issues by turning to a deontic concept: obligation. In multi-agent systems, agents interact with each other according to norms, We use deontic logic ([And58], [Aqv84], [B C96], [JS94], [MW93]) to model norms. Here the norms prescribe how the agents ought to behave, but-- and this is essential-- they do not exclude the possibility of "bad" behavior (i.e., the actual behavior may deviate from the ideal), and so they also prescribe what should be done in circumstances of norm violation. Thus, we propose a new approach --- a deontic transaction model for multi-agent normative systems. Our approach improves the protocol of "abort/commit" of traditional transaction models to a protocol of "abort/exception/commit". In multi-agent normative systems, we can see the violation of a norm as an exception and how the other agents react to the violation as exception handling. This paper concentrates on our formal model.

Huang, Yonghua↗
NASA NTRS2005

Trusted Autonomy for Space Flight Systems

NASA has long supported research on intelligent control technologies that could allow space systems to operate autonomously or with reduced human supervision. Proposed uses range from automated control of entire space vehicles to mobile robots that assist or substitute for astronauts to vehicle systems such as life support that interact with other systems in complex ways and require constant vigilance. The potential for pervasive use of such technology to extend the kinds of missions that are possible in practice is well understood, as is its potential to radically improve the robustness, safety and productivity of diverse mission systems. Despite its acknowledged potential, intelligent control capabilities are rarely used in space flight systems. Perhaps the most famous example of intelligent control on a spacecraft is the Remote Agent system flown on the Deep Space One mission (1998 - 2001). However, even in this case, the role of the intelligent control element, originally intended to have full control of the spacecraft for the duration of the mission, was reduced to having partial control for a two-week non-critical period. Even this level of mission acceptance was exceptional. In most cases, mission managers consider intelligent control systems an unacceptable source of risk and elect not to fly them. Overall, the technology is not trusted. From the standpoint of those who need to decide whether to incorporate this technology, lack of trust is easy to understand. Intelligent high-level control means allowing software io make decisions that are too complex for conventional software. The decision-making behavior of these systems is often hard to understand and inspect, and thus hard to evaluate. Moreover, such software is typically designed and implemented either as a research product or custom-built for a particular mission. In the former case, software quality is unlikely to be adequate for flight qualification and the functionality provided by the system is likely driven largely by the need to publish innovative work. In the latter case, the mission represents the first use of the system, a risky proposition even for relatively simple software.

Freed, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2019

Safe2Ditch Steer-To-Clear Development and Flight Testing

This paper describes a series of small unmanned aerial system (sUAS) flights performed at NASA Langley Research Center in April and May of 2019 to test a newly added Steer-to-Clear feature for the Safe2Ditch (S2D) prototype system. S2D is an autonomous crash management system for sUAS. Its function is to detect the onset of an emergency for an autonomous vehicle, and to enable that vehicle in distress to execute safe landings to avoid injuring people on the ground or damaging property. Flight tests were conducted at the City Environment Range for Testing Autonomous Integrated Navigation (CERTAIN) range at NASA Langley. Prior testing of S2D focused on rerouting to an alternate ditch site when an occupant was detected in the primary ditch site. For Steer-to-Clear testing, S2D was limited to a single ditch site option to force engagement of the Steer-to-Clear mode. The implementation of Steer-to-Clear for the flight prototype used a simple method to divide the target ditch site into four quadrants. An RC car was driven in circles in one quadrant to simulate an occupant in that ditch site. A simple implementation of Steer-to- Clear was programmed to land in the opposite quadrant to maximize distance to the occupant’s quadrant. A successful mission was tallied when this occurred. Out of nineteen flights, thirteen resulted in successful missions. Data logs from the flight vehicle and the RC car indicated that unsuccessful missions were due to geolocation error between the actual location of the RC car and the derived location of it by the Vision Assisted Landing component of S2D on the flight vehicle. Video data indicated that while the Vision Assisted Landing component reliably identified the location of the ditch site occupant in the image frame, the conversion of the occupant’s location to earth coordinates was sometimes adversely impacted by errors in sensor data needed to perform the transformation. Logged sensor data was analyzed to attempt to identify the primary error sources and their impact on the geolocation accuracy. Three trends were observed in the data evaluation phase. In one trend, errors in geolocation were relatively large at the flight vehicle’s cruise altitude, but reduced as the vehicle descended. This was the expected behavior and was attributed to sensor errors of the inertial measurement unit (IMU). The second trend showed distinct sinusoidal error for the entire descent that did not always reduce with altitude. The third trend showed high scatter in the data, which did not correlate well with altitude. Possible sources of observed error and compensation techniques are discussed.

Petty, Bryan J.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Health Management and Prognostics for Electric Aircraft Powertrain

W and c Any air borne vehicle needs incorporating safety as key parameter of measure, and inclusion of autonomy raises the critical need for safety under autonomous operations. Management of faults and component degradation is key as complexity in autonomous operations grow over the period of time. Therefore, in addition to basic operational requirements, an autonomous electric vehicle should be able to make accurate estimates of its current system health and take the correct decisions to complete its mission successfully. Real-time safety and state-awareness tools are therefore essential for the vehicle to be able to reach its destination in a safe and successful manner. The need for safety assurance and health management capabilities is particularly relevant for aircraft electric propulsion systems, which are relatively new and with limited historical to learn. They are critical systems requiring high power density along with reliability, resilience, efficient management of weight, and operational costs. A model- based fault diagnosis and prognostics approach of complex critical systems can successfully accomplish the safety and state awareness goal for such electric propulsion systems, enabling autonomous decision making capability for safe and efficient operation. To identify critical components in the system a Qualitative Bayesian approach using FMECA is implemented. This requires the assessment of some quantities representing the state of the electric unmanned aerial systems (e-UAS), as well as look-ahead forecasts of such states during the entire flight, presented in form of safety metrics (SM). In-service data and performance data gathered from degraded components sup- ports diagnostic and prognostic methods for these systems, but this data can be difficult to obtain as weight and packaging restrictions reduce redundancy and instrumentation on-board the vehicle. Therefore, an model-based framework should be capable or operating with limited data. In addition to data scarcity, the variability of such complex critical systems re- quires the model-based framework to reason in the presence of uncertainty, such as sensor noise, and modeling imperfections. Quantification of errors and uncertainties in the measured states and quantities is therefore a fundamental step for a precise estimation of such SMs; un-modeled uncertainty may result in erroneous state assessment and un- reliable predictions of future states of e-UAVs. Typical, centralized model-based schemes suffer from inherent disadvantages such as computational complexity, single point of failure, and scalability issues, and therefore may fail in such a complex scenario. This paper presents a methodology for developing a system level diagnostics and prognostics approach using a Qualitative Bayesian FMECA approach along with a formal uncertainty management framework for an e-UAS. In this work we demonstrate the efficacy of the framework to predict effects of sub-system level degradation on vehicle operation incorporating uncertainty management to predict future behavior under different operating conditions.

Kulkarni, Chetan↗