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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 379 records · Page 21
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Intrusion Detection for Cybersecurity of Power Electronics Dominated Grids: Inverters PQ Set-Points Manipulation

This work provides cybersecurity analytics for a high photovoltaic (PV) penetrated distribution network, representing future power electronics dominated grid (PEDG). Firstly, the impact of active and reactive power (PQ) set-points manipulation on the network is studied. Then, an intrusion detection system (IDS) is developed for identifying the potentially compromised PV inverters in the network. The proposed IDS is based on defining the normal, safe, and abnormal operation regions of the PV inverters from point of view of the steady state voltage stability of the network. These three-operation regions are identified by utilizing active power, reactive power, and voltage (PQV) limits of each specific grid-following inverter in the network. Each grid-following inverter's PQV contour includes the information of network topology, inverter ratings, and inverter controller. The developed PQ limits are integrated into the centralized secondary control layer for realization of the proposed IDS. Furthermore, the proposed secondary control layer is capable of providing remedial actions during an anomaly event to enhance the grid resiliency. The theoretical analyses are verified by several attack scenarios for a network of grid-following inverters.

41 EE - Solar Energy Technologies Office (EE-4S)↗
DOE OSTI2024

Elucidating the role of Cr migration in Ni-Cr exposed to molten FLiNaK via multiscale characterization

Structural materials used in nuclear reactor environments are subjected to coupled extremes such as high temperature, irradiation, and corrosion which act in concert to degrade their functional performance. Connecting alloy microstructure such as grain boundaries, and accumulating point defects with corrosion attack and pore morphology is critical to understanding underlying mechanisms. We uncover the compositional variations and morphology at multiple length scales in corrosion-damaged Ni-Cr alloy after exposure to oxidants in molten fluoride salts. A complex network of dense corrosion pores is detected by surface-level SEM observations. The corrosion pores take on a 1-dimensional morphology and are enriched with Ni and depleted of Cr 1–5 µm from the pore surface. STEM-EDS and 4D-STEM strain maps acquired simultaneously highlight the local variations in composition and structure of a ≤ 200 nm Cr-rich layer identified from a cross-section taken at the bottom of an isolated corrosion pore between the Ni-Cr alloy matrix and the embedded salt. However, the absence of an observed interface between the Ni-Cr alloy matrix and the FCC-structured Cr-rich layer suggests that Cr plating from the salt did not transpire. These findings support a proposed Cr lattice diffusion mechanism rather than Cr-precipitation from the salt to accommodate temperature transient conditions during sample cooling. Through the development of a 1D phase field model, these results are rationalized by formation energies for the Ni- and Cr-oxidation into the molten salt. This study reveals the locally altered microstructure caused by high temperature corrosion in non-steady-state molten salt nuclear reactor environments.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2025

Effects of PFOS on the behavior, growth, emergence, and predation susceptibility of larval mosquitoes ( Culex quinquefasciatus )

Per-/polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) have been commonly used over several decades for a variety of products and are very persistent in the environment. However, not much is known about their direct effects on aquatic invertebrates and their ecosystems. We examined the survival, behavior, development, and predation susceptibility of mosquito larvae Culex quinquefasciatus exposed to concentrations of perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (PFOS) ranging from 0.02 to 453.7 µg/L. PFOS exposure resulted in reduced larval survival, with a 48 hour LC50 (concentration with 50 % mortality) of 255.99 µg/L. PFOS exposure also resulted in reduced developmental success and slower maturation to adulthood (and thus slower emergence from the water) compared to control larvae. PFOS also resulted in delays in reaction to prodding stimuli, which were meant to simulate a predator attack, and longer reactions to prodding. Larvae exposed to PFOS also spent more time at the bottom of the water column, rather than at the surface where respiration takes place. Effects of larval mosquito PFOS exposure on predation by unexposed damselfly naiads (genus Ischnura) were not detected. Overall, this research suggests that PFOS impacts mosquito larvae survival, behavior, development, and adult emergence, which could have important implications for food webs or public health given the role of mosquitos as disease vectors.

Food web dynamics↗
DOE OSTI2024

Reactive Fe anode for electrolytic reduction of solid metal oxide in molten LiCl-Li 2 O

Iron metal was investigated for use as a consumable anode for electrolytic reduction of solid metal oxides in molten LiCl-Li 2 O (2.0 - 2.4 wt%). Tests were performed where the potential of Fe anodes was increased incrementally from 0.1 to 1.0 V (vs Ni/NiO). Oxide formation on the anode started at a potential of 0.4 V and was identified as FeO via X-ray diffraction. In the absence of a pre-formed oxide layer, severe attack of the anode started at a potential of 0.7 V and was accompanied by an increase in Fe concentration in the salt. When an oxide layer was allowed to form on the anode, the Fe concentration did not increase in the salt. O 2 was detected in the headspace gas at an anode potential of 1.0 V only when an oxide layer was present on the anode. Finally, the results of this study support the idea that an inexpensive sacrificial anode could be an ideal replacement for expensive Pt that is currently widely used for this process.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2023

A Cybersecurity Testbed for Smart Buildings

Smart buildings are equipped with a plethora of cyber-physical systems, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices and building automation systems. These devices, especially in commercial buildings, use legacy communications and hardware that were not designed with cybersecurity in mind. With increasing cyber threats in recent years, smart buildings have become an increasing target for attacks, but not enough published data are available from these incidents to study or replicate the scenarios to defend buildings. As part of the U.S. Department of Energy-funded project focusing on developing the Building Intelligence with Layered Defense Using Security-Constrained Optimization and Security Risk Detection (BUILD-SOS) platform, we developed a cybersecurity test bed for smart buildings. This test bed includes a building simulation tool, virtual devices, emulated operational technology networks, and remote hardware-in-the-loop. Using this test bed, we performed different cyberattacks on the smart building model and collected both physical building data, to understand the impacts on the building, and network data, to aid in separating mechanical faults from cyberattacks during the detection. This test bed is a significant tool in protecting smart buildings from cyberattacks because it can aid in both cybersecurity analysis and the evaluation of other cyberattack detection tools by testing the tools in a secure environment without impacting the building operations.

cyber-physical systems↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Cybersecurity Testbed for Smart Buildings

Smart buildings are equipped with a plethora of cyber-physical systems, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices and building automation systems. These devices, especially in commercial buildings, use legacy communications and hardware that were not designed with cybersecurity in mind. With increasing cyber threats in recent years, smart buildings have become an increasing target for attacks, but not enough published data are available from these incidents to study or replicate the scenarios to defend buildings. As part of the U.S. Department of Energy-funded project focusing on developing the Building Intelligence with Layered Defense Using Security-Constrained Optimization and Security Risk Detection (BUILD-SOS) platform, we developed a cybersecurity test bed for smart buildings. This test bed includes a building simulation tool, virtual devices, emulated operational technology networks, and remote hardware-in-the-loop. Using this test bed, we performed different cyberattacks on the smart building model and collected both physical building data, to understand the impacts on the building, and network data, to aid in separating mechanical faults from cyberattacks during the detection. This test bed is a significant tool in protecting smart buildings from cyberattacks because they can aid in both cybersecurity analysis and the evaluation of cyberattack detection tools by testing the tools in a secure environment without impacting the building operations.

alfalfa↗
DOE OSTI2022

Speaker-targeted Synthetic Speech Detection

Text-to-speech technologies are evolving quickly towards realistic-sounding human-like voices. As this technology improves, so does the opportunity for malpractice in speaker identification (SID) via spoofing, the process of impersonating a voice biometric via synthesis. More data typically equates to a more realistic voice model, which poses an issue for well-known subjects, such as politicians and celebrities, who have vast amounts of multimedia available online. Detection of synthetic speech has relied on signal processing techniques that focus on the generation of new acoustic features and train deep learning models to detect when an audio file has been manipulated through the characterization of unnatural changes or artifacts. However, these techniques do not use any information from the speaker they are evaluating. This paper proposes to incorporate information from the speaker-of-interest (SoI) into the models to avoid specific spoofing attacks for certain vulnerable people. The wealth of data for well-known people can also be used to train a speaker-specific spoofing detector with a higher level of accuracy than a speaker-independent model. The paper proposes a new xResNet-PLDA system and compares it to three different baseline systems: a state-of-the-art speaker identification system, an xResNet system trained to discriminate between bona fide and fake speech, and a speaker identification system in which the PLDA and calibration models were trained with bona fide and fake speech. We evaluated the systems in two different scenarios — a cross-validation scenario and a hold-out scenario — with three different databases. We show how the proposed system outperforms dramatically the baseline systems in each scenario and for each database. Finally, we show how using a small amount of the SoI’s speech to adapt global calibration parameters improves the performance of the system, especially in unseen conditions.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗
DOE OSTI2025

Responsible Artificial Intelligence for Insider Threat Mitigation

This report examines the application of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies for insider threat mitigation (ITM) programs in nuclear security facilities. Insider threat detection presents unique challenges due to the subtle and adaptive nature of these threats, the complex signatures involved, and the scarcity of available data for analysis. Traditional human-centered approaches, while essential, face limitations in processing large amounts of data continuously and detecting subtle patterns across multiple systems. AI technologies can potentially address these limitations by providing 24/7 monitoring capabilities, identifying complex patterns that might escape human observation, and offering consistent application of security criteria. However, the deployment of AI in nuclear security contexts introduces significant new risks, including workflow disruption, expanded attack surfaces, potential for misuse, and ethical concerns regarding privacy, fairness, transparency, safety, and security. The high-consequence nature of nuclear security decisions demands careful consideration of these risks and systematic approaches to their mitigation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

PathTrace and MPVEASI: A Path Analysis Comparative Validation Study

Developed in 2018, PathTrace is a software package built with the intention of making path analysis simple and intuitive. PathTrace is a top-down pathway analysis software where a user is able to explore vulnerable pathways into a facility. The intention of utilizing a software tool like PathTrace is to characterize an existing physical protection system (PPS) and to upgrade the system to achieve a high level of response interruption, or probability of interruption (P I ) of the adversary. There are four steps for conducting path analysis using PathTrace. The first step is to identify an image to use to build the model and scale the model within PathTrace using a section of known distance (wall or fence perimeter, for example). The scaling process will produce a grid of cells through which the user is able to build a model. The second step is to fill out the grid of cells with four categories of materials: Barriers, Detection Areas, Jumps, and Targets. These materials apply associated delay and detection values to the cells in which they are applied. The third step is to represent the adversary and response forces. The adversaries are represented by their capabilities in interacting with the materials identified in step two, and the response is represented by how quickly they will be able to respond to an adversary attack. Finally, the user is able to take all of the information from the previous three steps and perform a Most Vulnerable Path (MVP) analysis. In this stage, the user is able to visualize vulnerable adversary pathways and reason about how to upgrade these pathways to provide a high level of P I .

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Securing The Future: 2026 Manufacturing & Critical Infrastructure Threat Landscape

This report outlines the current state of manufacturing weaknesses introduced by the complexities of modern environments, including cloud services and Internet of Things (IoT) devices, with particular attention paid to the unique vulnerabilities encountered by SMMs. It also highlights CyManII’s strategic initiatives and collaborative solutions to mitigate these risks and strengthen the cybersecurity posture of the manufacturing ecosystem. Utilizing data from 2025 to inform forward-looking mitigation strategies, this report provides manufacturers with a clear understanding of both current and emerging cybersecurity threats, as well as practical opportunities to strengthen their cyber ecosystems. The following sections detail key vulnerabilities and threat vectors, along with actionable mitigation strategies, many of which have been developed or piloted through CyManII-led efforts. A thorough understanding of these risks and mitigation strategies is essential for manufacturers seeking to strengthen the security and resilience of their manufacturing operations.

3D Printing↗
DOE OSTI2021

FedADMP: A Joint Anomaly Detection and Mobility Prediction Framework via Federated Learning

With the proliferation of mobile devices and smart cameras, detecting anomalies and predicting their mobility are critical for enhancing safety in ubiquitous computing systems. Due to data privacy regulations and limited communication bandwidth, it is infeasible to collect, transmit, and store all data from mobile devices at a central location. To overcome this challenge, we propose FedADMP, a federated learning based joint Anomaly Detection and Mobility Prediction framework. FedADMP adaptively splits the training process between the server and clients to reduce computation loads on clients. To protect the privacy of user data, clients in FedADMP upload only intermediate model parameters to the cloud server. We also develop a differential privacy method to prevent the cloud server and external attackers from inferring private information during the model upload procedure. Extensive experiments using real-world datasets show that FedADMP consistently outperforms existing methods.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Analysis of Organophosphorus-Based Nerve Agent Degradation Products by Gas Chromatography-Mass Spectrometry (GC-MS): Current Derivatization Reactions in the Analytical Chemist’s Toolbox

The field of gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS) in the analysis of chemical warfare agents (CWAs), specifically those involving the organophosphorus-based nerve agents (OPNAs), is a continually evolving and dynamic area of research. The ever-present interest in this field within analytical chemistry is driven by the constant threat posed by these lethal CWAs, highlighted by their use during the Tokyo subway attack in 1995, their deliberate use on civilians in Syria in 2013, and their use in the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Great Britain in 2018 and Alexei Navalny in 2020. These events coupled with their potential for mass destruction only serve to stress the importance of developing methods for their rapid and unambiguous detection. Although the direct detection of OPNAs is possible by GC-MS, in most instances, the analytical chemist must rely on the detection of the products arising from their degradation. To this end, derivatization reactions mainly in the form of silylations and alkylations employing a vast array of reagents have played a pivotal role in the efficient detection of these products that can be used retrospectively to identify the original OPNA.

sarin↗
DOE OSTI2026

Watching for light: An enterprise roadmap for trustworthy laser threat warning (LTW) to protect national assets

Comprehensive space force protection must include effective and trustworthy laser threat warning (LTW). Effective LTW will detect and characterize threats to space assets and thus enhance space deterrence. LTW must be trustworthy: able to categorize threats and non-threats by being both sensitive to true events and resistant to false alarms. Outside of the laboratory, the statistics and even the roles of lasers become unclear. In the chain of events leading to an attack, the laser may be the last link to be understood. Human situational awareness and informal reasoning must blend statistics with circumstantial evidence to visualize these chains before they are clear. This paper sets out an industrial model for an enterprise that will routinely produce trustworthy LTW. By incorporating psychology and economics, this enterprise can overcome the difficulties and perils of cooperation in networked defense and intelligence. This roadmap suggests how the enterprise can incentivize distracted actors with different goals to share what they know and coordinate what they do.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Dynamic concurrent learning method to neutralize cyber attacks and faults for industrial asset monitoring nodes

Input signals may be received from monitoring nodes of the industrial asset, each input signal comprising time series data representing current operation. A neutralization engine may transform the input signals into feature vectors in feature space, each feature vector being associated with one of a plurality of overlapping batches of received input signals. A dynamic decision boundary may be generated based on the set of feature vectors, and an abnormal state of the asset may be detected based on the set of feature vectors and a predetermined static decision boundary. An estimated neutralized value for each abnormal feature value may be calculated based on the dynamic decision boundary and the static decision boundary such that a future set of feature vectors will be moved with respect to the static decision boundary. An inverse transform of each estimated neutralized value may be performed to generate neutralized signals comprising time series data that are output.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Using Structured Intelligence Graph (STIG) to protect our critical infrastructure against cyber attacks [Poster]

STIG is a revolutionary cybersecurity tool developed by researchers at the U. S. Department of Energy's Idaho National Laboratory and it is a software that allows utility owners and operators to easily visualize, create, and edit cyberthreat intelligence information. STIG uses Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX) and converts complex data on cybersecurity vulnerabilities into a visualization that is easy to understand and act on. With STIG, utility owners and operators have a common system for sharing threat intelligence information, thus increasing the chances of detecting and mitigating cyber exploits before they lead to a cyberattack.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

1. Physical Security Engineering by Design for Nuclear Facilities; 2. Nuclear Power Plant Site Security Management – A Security Strategy; 3. The UAE Women in Nuclear Energy Security

1. Security by design, or SeBD, is a comprehensive approach that integrates the physical protection system of a nuclear plant into every stage of its existence. This includes planning, designing, constructing, commissioning, and operating the facility, using a combination of analytical, physical, technological, and procedural measures. Essentially, SeBD involves intentionally applying and incorporating security into all aspects of design and operation throughout the entire lifecycle of a facility. By implementing this methodology throughout various phases such as program development, process implementation, staff training and procedures management in conjunction with plant equipment, facilities can be optimized to minimize security risks without compromising functional design requirements. This ultimately improves the overall security posture of the site and reduces the need for costly modifications or additional security resources post-design. 2. A site security strategy is a living document that is revised on a periodic or event-driven basis, ensuring that site security operations and corresponding procedures provide long-term, effective protection for the entire nuclear power plant (NPP) site. A site security strategy aims to mitigate threats across the entire NPP site via in-depth defense approaches and mutual support; therefore, if a layer is omitted or altered, then the effect across all layers must be re-evaluated. Therefore, the aim of the site security strategy is to provide an appropriate, scalable security regime that deters, denies, delays, and detects incidents and, equally importantly, reassures legitimate users and the regulator that due diligence and regulatory compliance have been achieved, ensuring that the site is safe and secure. Robust access control for vehicles and pedestrians is at the heart of the strategy. Vehicle and pedestrian searching and screening are seen as the strongest mitigation methods against vehicle- and pedestrian-borne attacks. The security strategy must also be supported through comprehensive staff training and the development of robust processes, procedures, and planning. If all these measures are to be effective, then training must be implemented during each phase of construction, partial operation/commissioning, and full operation. No single element of site security is completely isolated from the influence of other elements. Ideally, consideration of all key elements will result in a security strategy that is integrated and proportional to the threat and that does not over specify individual security solutions through the application of isolated measures but rather applies a holistic, all-encompassing approach. 3. When women enter the labor force, numerous positive outcomes emerge, including increased GDP, educational gains, and decreased maternal mortality. Despite these benefits, women's employment rates and equality vary significantly worldwide as does support for women in the workforce. This paper will explore the multifaceted benefits of women's employment, the factors influencing labor force participation rates, and the urgency to achieve gender equality as outlined in the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It will then examine the emerging presence of women in the traditionally male-dominated nuclear field, specifically within the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a testament to their resilience and determination to break social norms and advance gender equality.

Zineddin, Dr. Z.↗
DOE OSTI2020

SEDONA: SpEctroscopic Detection of Nerve Agents

Los Alamos National Laboratory developed the only portable screener to accurately detect the chemical nerve agents, providing results in seconds. Current airport detection system cannot scan for the threat of organophosphorus nerve agents and insecticides. Small quantities of these toxic chemicals can very quickly cause widespread exposure and severe symptoms. SEDONA screens through an unopened bottle using the principles of nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy. The system could be deployed and operated with minimal training. SEDONA dramatically reduces the likelihood of a successful nerve agent attack at airports, government buildings, embassies, sporting events, concerts, and political rallies.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Malware Analysis Report for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll

SolarWinds Orion is a software suite designed to provide “single pane of glass” monitoring of network devices and applications. On December 13 2020, FireEye revealed that SolarWinds Orion was the victim of a supply chain attack and that the SolarWinds signed file SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll contained a backdoor. SolarWinds deployed the back-doored patch to customers beginning in March 2020. FireEye first identified this backdoor and labeled it SUNBURST. The backdoor is composed of roughly 4,000 lines1 of lightly obfuscated .NET within the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.OrionImprovementBusinessLayer class of the malicious dll. The backdoor’s capabilities include: the ability to detect and potentially disable antivirus and forensics tools, basic command and control via DNS, and more advanced command and control via HTTP.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗