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Implementing Computer-Based Procedures: Thinking Outside the Paper Margins

In the past year there has been increased interest from the nuclear industry in adopting the use of electronic work packages and computer-based procedures (CBPs) in the field. The goal is to incorporate the use of technology in order to meet the Nuclear Promise requirements of reducing costs and improve efficiency and decrease human error rates of plant operations. Researchers, together with the nuclear industry, have been investigating the benefits an electronic work package system and specifically CBPs would have over current paper-based procedure practices. There are several classifications of CBPs ranging from a straight copy of the paper-based procedure in PDF format to a more intelligent dynamic CBP. A CBP system offers a vast variety of improvements, such as context driven job aids, integrated human performance tools (e.g., placekeeping and correct component verification), and dynamic step presentation. The latter means that the CBP system could only display relevant steps based on operating mode, plant status, and the task at hand. The improvements can lead to reduction of the worker’s workload and human error by allowing the work to focus on the task at hand more. A team of human factors researchers at the Idaho National Laboratory studied and developed design concepts for CBPs for field workers between 2012 and 2016. The focus of the research was to present information in a procedure in a manner that leveraged the dynamic and computational capabilities of a handheld device allowing the worker to focus more on the task at hand than on the administrative processes currently applied when conducting work in the plant. As a part of the research the team identified type of work, instructions, and scenarios where the transition to a dynamic CBP system might not be as beneficial as it would for other types of work in the plant. In most cases the decision to use a dynamic CBP system and utilize the dynamic capabilities gained will be beneficial to the worker. However, tasks that are reliant on the skill of the craft or have a short set of instructions may not provide a way or even need to utilize all the advanced capabilities in a dynamic CBP system. Therefore, a hybrid CBP system that could handle all the classifications of a CBP would be the best solution to take advantage of all that a CBP system offers. The implementation of a CBP system does not automatically improve the quality of procedures. Utilities should look into why each procedure is written the way it currently is on paper. Utilities should take the time before implementation to review, standardize format and update current procedures. Implementation of a CBP system can be a time to break out of traditional procedure writing processes and create new processes and procedures that take advantage of the capabilities a CBP system. This paper will summarize the research on CBPs and provide suggestions to take into consideration when implementing a CBP system.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Fluor Hanford ALARA Center is a D and D Resource

The mission at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation changed when the last reactor plant was shut down in 1989 and work was started to place all the facilities in a safe condition and begin decontamination, deactivation, decommissioning, and demolition (D and D). These facilities consisted of old shutdown reactor plants, spent fuel pools, processing facilities, and 177 underground tanks containing 53 million gallons of highly radioactive and toxic liquids and sludge. New skills were needed by the workforce to accomplish this mission. By 1995, workers were in the process of getting the facilities in a safe condition and it became obvious improvements were needed in their tools, equipment and work practices. The Hanford ALARA Program looked good on paper, but did little to help contractors that were working in the field. The Radiological Control Director decided that the ALARA program needed to be upgraded and a significant improvement could be made if workers had a place they could visit that had samples of the latest technology and could talk to experienced personnel who have had success doing D and D work. Two senior health physics personnel who had many years experience in doing radiological work were chosen to obtain tools and equipment from vendors and find a location centrally located on the Hanford site. Vendors were asked to loan their latest tools and equipment for display. Most vendors responded and the Hanford ALARA Center of Technology opened on October 1, 1996. Today, the ALARA Center includes a classroom for conducting training and a mockup area with gloveboxes. Two large rooms have a containment tent, several glove bags, samples of fixatives/expandable foam, coating displays, protective clothing, heat stress technology, cutting tools, HEPA filtered vacuums, ventilation units, pumps, hydraulic wrenches, communications equipment, shears, nibblers, shrouded tooling, and several examples of innovative tools developed by the Hanford facilities. See Figures I and II. The ALARA Center staff routinely researches and tests new technology, sponsor vendor demonstrations, and redistribute tools, equipment and temporary shielding that may not be needed at one facility to another facility that needs it. The ALARA Center staff learns about new technology in several ways. This includes past radiological work experience, interaction with vendors, lessons learned, networking with other DOE sites, visits to the Hanford Technical Library, attendance at off-site conferences and ALARA Workshops. Personnel that contact the ALARA Center for assistance report positive results when they implement the tools, equipment and work practices recommended by the ALARA Center staff. This has translated to reduced exposure for workers and reduced the risk of contamination spread. For example: using a hydraulic shear on one job saved 16 Rem of exposure that would have been received if workers had used saws-all tools to cut piping in twenty-nine locations. Currently, the ALARA Center staff is emphasizing D and D techniques on size-reducing materials, decontamination techniques, use of remote tools/video equipment, capture ventilation, fixatives, using containments and how to find lessons learned. The ALARA Center staff issues a weekly report that discusses their interaction with the workforce and any new work practices, tools and equipment being used by the Hanford contractors. Distribution of this weekly report is to about 130 personnel on site and 90 personnel off site. This effectively spreads the word about ALARA throughout the DOE Complex. DOE EM-23, in conjunction with the D and D and Environmental Restoration work group of the Energy Facility Contractors Organization (EFCOG) established the Hanford ALARA Center as the D and D Hotline for companies who have questions about how D and D work is accomplished. The ALARA Center has become a resource to the nuclear industry and routinely helps contractors at other DOE Sites, power reactors, DOD sites, and sites in England, Europe and Indonesia. Other ALARA Centers are located at the Savannah River Site and Los Alamos National Lab.

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Lower Three Runs Remediation Safety Preparation Strategy - 13318

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a 310-square-mile United States Department of Energy (US DOE) nuclear facility located along the Savannah River near Aiken, South Carolina that contains six primary stream/river systems. The Lower Three Runs Stream (LTR) is one of the primary streams within the site that is located in the southeast portion of the Savannah River Site. It is a large blackwater stream system that originates in the northeast portion of SRS and follows a southerly direction before it enters the Savannah River. During reactor operations, secondary reactor cooling water, storm sewer discharges, and miscellaneous wastewater was discharged and contaminated a 20 mile stretch of Lower Three Runs Stream that narrows and provides a limited buffer of US DOE property along the stream and flood-plain. Based on data collected during the years 2009 and 2010 under American Recovery and Re-investment Act funding, the stream was determined to be contaminated with cesium-137 at levels that exceeded acceptable risk based limits. In agreement with the Environmental Protection Agency and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, three areas were identified for remediation [1] (SRNS April 2012). A comprehensive safety preparation strategy was developed for safe execution of the LTR remediation project. Contract incentives for safety encouraged the contractor to perform a complete evaluation of the work and develop an implementation plan to perform the work. The safety coverage was controlled to ensure all work was observed and assessed by one person per work area within the project. This was necessary due to the distances between the fence work and three transects being worked, approximately 20 miles. Contractor Management field observations were performed along with DOE assessments to ensure contractor focus on safe performance of the work. Dedicated ambulance coverage for remote worker work activities was provided. This effort was augmented with access to medical evacuation services. The areas where the work was performed were remote and difficult to get emergency vehicles to in a timely manner in case of an accident. Satellite phones were utilized due to intermittent phone coverage. High visibility vests were utilized to enable any hunters in the area to see the workers; due to the limited buffer areas along the stream route. An innovative approach to providing the necessary protection for workers during periods of extreme heat and humidity was also employed, which included the use of 'heat islands' with fans and crew trailers and ice vests for workers. (authors)

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'Radiotoxicity Index': An Inappropriate Discriminator for Advanced Fuel Cycle Technology Selection - 12276

A radiotoxicity index (RI) is often used as a figure of merit for evaluating for evaluating the attractiveness of employing an advanced fuel cycle (i.e., a fuel cycle that uses some combination of separations and other reactor technologies, such as fast reactors), rather than continued use of the current 'once-through' fuel cycle. The RI is calculated by multiplying the amount of every radionuclide found in a waste form for some unit amount of waste times the drinking water dose conversion factor, DCF, for each radionuclide, then summing these together. Some argue that if the RI for an advanced fuel cycle is lower than the RI for a once-through fuel cycle, then implementation of the particular advanced fuel cycle has merit because it reduces the radiotoxicity of the waste. Use of an RI for justifying separations technologies and other components of advanced fuel cycles is not only inappropriate, but can be misleading with respect to judging benefits of advance fuel cycle options. The disposal system, through its use of multiple engineered and natural barriers to migration, eliminates most of the radionuclides contributing to the RI such that additional separations technologies will make little difference to peak dose rates. What must also be considered is the health/dose risk caused to workers and the public by the construction and operation of the separations facility itself. Thus, use of RI may lead to selection of separations technologies that may have a negligible effect on lowering the potential health risks associated with disposal, but will increase real worker and public health risks in the near term. The use of the radiotoxicity index (RI) as a figure of merit for justifying advanced fuel cycles involving separations technologies is not only inappropriate, but can be misleading with respect to judging benefits of advance fuel cycle options. The disposal system, through its use of multiple engineered and natural barriers to migration, eliminates most of the radionuclides contributing to the RI such that additional separations technologies will make little difference to peak dose rates. What must also be considered is the health/dose risk caused to workers and the public by the construction and operation of the separations facility itself. Thus, use of RI may lead to selection of separations technologies that may have a negligible effect on lowering the potential health risks associated with disposal, but will increase real worker and public health risks in the near term. (authors)

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Vertical Extraction Process Implemented at the 118-K-1 Burial Ground for Removal of Irradiated Reactor Debris from Silo Structures - 12431

The primary objective of a remediation project is the safe extraction and disposition of diverse waste forms and materials. Remediation of a solid waste burial ground containing reactor hardware and irradiated debris involves handling waste with the potential to expose workers to significantly elevated dose rates. Therefore, a major challenge confronted by any remediation project is developing work processes that facilitate compliant waste management practices while at the same time implementing controls to protect personnel. Traditional burial ground remediation is accomplished using standard excavators to remove materials from trenches and other excavation configurations often times with minimal knowledge of waste that will be encountered at a specific location. In the case of the 118-K-1 burial ground the isotopic activity postulated in historic documents to be contained in vertical cylindrical silos was sufficient to create the potential for a significant radiation hazard to project personnel. Additionally, certain reported waste forms posed an unacceptably high potential to contaminate the surrounding environment and/or workers. Based on process knowledge, waste management requirements, historic document review, and a lack of characterization data it was determined that traditional excavation techniques applied to remediation of vertical silos would expose workers to unacceptable risk. The challenging task for the 118-K-1 burial ground remediation project team then became defining an acceptable replacement technology or modification of an existing technology to complete the silo remediation. Early characterization data provided a good tool for evaluating the location of potential high exposure rate items in the silos. Quantitative characterization was a different case and proved difficult because of the large diameter of the silos and the potential for variable density of attenuating soils and waste forms in the silo. Consequently, the most relevant information supporting job planning and understanding of the conditions was the data obtained from the gross gamma meter that was inserted into each casing to provide a rough estimate of dose rates in the tubes. No added value was realized in attempting to quantify the source term and/or associate the isotopic activity with a particular actual waste form (e.g., sludge). Implementing the WRM system allowed monitoring of worker and boundary exposure rates from a distance, maintaining compliance with ALARA principles. This system also provided the project team early knowledge of items being removed that had high exposure rates associated with them, thus creating an efficient method of acknowledging an issue and arriving at a solution prior to having an upset condition. An electronic dosimeter with telemetry capability replaced the excavator mounted AMP-100 system approximately half way through remediation of the silos. Much higher connectivity efficiency was derived from this configuration. Increasing the data feed efficiency additionally led to less interruption of the remediation effort. Early in system testing process a process handicap on the excavator operator was acknowledged. A loss of depth perception resulted when maneuvering the excavator and bucket using the camera feed to an in-cab monitor. Considerable practice and mock-up testing allowed this handicap to be overcome. The most significant equipment failures involved the cable connection to the camera mounted between the clamshell bucket jaws and the video splitter in the excavator cab. Rotation of the clamshell bucket was identified as the cause of cable connection failures because of the cyclic twisting motion and continuous mechanical jarring of the connection. In-cab vibration was identified as the culprit in causing connection failures of the video splitter. While these failures were repaired, substantial production time was lost. Ultimately, the decision was made to purchase a second cable and higher quality video splitter eliminate the down time. An engineering improvement for future operations would be inserting cable pig tails at more stressed cable connection points to facilitate rapid change out of the cable should that be required. Overall, the system performed better than expected in a safe and efficient manner. (authors)

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Facility Improvements and Modifications to Extend the Operational Life of the Modular Caustic-Side Solvent Extraction Process - 16082

Savannah River Remediation, LLC (SRR) is working to remove, stabilize, and dispose of approximately 36.7 million gallons (138.9 million liters) of liquid radioactive waste currently stored in 43 underground waste tanks, and ultimately close waste tanks. In 2008, as an interim salt treatment system to remove cesium from high level waste salt solutions prior to the Salt Waste Processing Facility start up, the Modular Caustic-Side Solvent Extraction Unit (MCU) initiated the removal of cesium from liquid radioactive salt waste prior to disposal. The MCU was designed and built for an expected three-year operational life and five-year design life. The first MCU cold runs began in June 2007 and hot startup was completed in April 2008. MCU remains in hot operation to this day, aiding in multiple, high-level tank closures. In an effort to continue liquid waste disposition at the Savannah River Site (SRS), equipment upgrades and operational improvements have been made to extend the life of the MCU beyond the original three years. Several pieces of fixed equipment have been converted into removable equipment which reduces the downtime associated with equipment change-outs and thereby reduces the dose to workers and processing impacts. Multiple pumps and filters have been upgraded to more robust designs. Process monitoring and controls have been upgraded to improve process performance. Redundant centrifugal contactor vibration equipment has been installed on each contactor in order to better assess the reliability, processing performance, and lifetime of the contactors. A new Solvent Hold Tank (SHT) Sampler has been installed to minimize the organic cross-contamination within the sampler, dose to workers, and sample analysis time. To increase processing availability and aid in visually obtained data, camera port has been added to the Salt Solution Feed Tank (SSFT). In order to decrease the overall background dose to the workers, the Process Vessel Ventilation (PVV) duct work now has the capability to be flushed to remove contamination. The caustic wash addition system has been modified to be a once-through system to improve equipment reliability, decrease downtime, and decrease dose to workers. In addition, the solvent that MCU utilizes to extract Cesium out of salt waste has been upgraded to Next Generation Solvent (NGS) which is based on MaxCalix extractant instead of a BobCalix extractant. Further, these upgrades and improvements have allowed MCU to be able to process at higher flow rates (up to 8.5 GPM) and with increased throughput (as high as 1.3 million gallons in FY13 and 5.3 million gallons since hot operations initiated) that have allowed SRR to continue the disposition of nuclear salt waste. The continued operation of MCU ensures more curies are stabilized into a glass matrix at SRS's Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) and less curies are retained within South Carolina at SRS's Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Unique challenges associated with modifying and improving a demonstration plant that is in hot operations and was designed to be temporary with a limited plant footprint have been successfully overcome. Further, creative strategies for removing old equipment have been utilized given the limited decontamination agents available for use that will not interfere with the organic solvent. This paper presents and discusses the deployment of these upgrades and operational improvements to MCU in order to allow continued, increased salt waste processing beyond the initial design life. (authors)

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iOS Heart Rate Monitor

The objective of this research project is to create a heart rate monitor mobile application (app) that allows the user to receive an accurate heart rate reading by placing their finger on the camera for about fifteen seconds. The app will be designed to read the heart rate through blood flow, and because blood flow is directly proportional with blood pressure, this app will also allow the user to get a blood pressure estimate. This enables anyone to have an understanding of their health issues if any are present. The overall goal to integrate this heart rate and blood pressure monitoring app with a personal dosimeter to build a comprehensive health monitoring app. The personal dosimeter Bluetooth connection function is being developed by another student group at Texas A and M University-Kingsville. This allows a user to transfer radiation readings from the Geiger counter to an iOS device while being able to monitor their health as they are exposed to radiation. This app's Bluetooth Geiger counter and heart rate/blood pressure monitor features would prove beneficial to individuals in the nuclear industry who are exposed to various levels of radiation. The combination of those functions will allow workers to measure their heart rate and blood pressure conveniently and within short periods of time. The people this app can help include nuclear power plant workers, radiology technicians, hazardous materials removal workers, and nuclear medicine technologists. We strive to create a mobile app that will allow a nuclear field worker to have a faster and more efficient health monitoring method. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Challenges and Solutions in Operation and Lay-Up of the Modular Caustic- Side Solvent Extraction Unit - 20078

The Modular Caustic-Side Solvent Extraction (CSSX) Unit (MCU) was designed and constructed to provide interim salt waste processing so that the Liquid Waste Disposition Program (LWDP) could continue waste removal and tank closure until start-up of the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). MCU processes Clarified Salt Solution (CSS), or salt solution (SS) that has undergone actinide removal/filtration, to produce two waste streams: the cesium laden Strip Effluent (SE), which is incorporated into glass at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), and the cesium depleted Decontaminated SS (DSS), which is incorporated into grout at the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF). MCU completed start-up in 2008 with an initial operating life of 3 years and design life of 5 years. Prior to reaching the end of the design life, multiple critical components were upgraded and/or replaced to mitigate risks associated with any delays in SWPF start-up. During the remainder of operation (until June 2019), MCU was challenged to maximize processing with minimal additional modifications to repair/improve aging infrastructure, while maintaining low levels of risk to workers and the environment. Notable challenges during the extended operating life of the facility involved both mechanical and operational issues. Two of the most significant issues were the increased frequency of Process Vessel Ventilation (PVV) High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filter change-outs and the biofouling of the SE coalescer (SEC). The major impacts of both issues were that replacement of these components 1) resulted in high exposure to workers, and 2) required substantial downtime, thus hindering achievement of processing goals. PVV HEPA filter replacements are required based on dose rate and differential pressure (dP) limits. After introducing a higher-curie feed to MCU, the operating time between change outs was reduced by approximately half. SEC replacements are required based on dP limits. After restarting from an extended outage, the operating life of the SEC was significantly reduced by more than half due to biofouling. As a result of extensive troubleshooting and process improvements, the facility was able to recover performance and extend the operating life of the PVV HEPA filters and the SEC media. Through troubleshooting both of these issues, the facility was also able to learn from prior experience and adapt in order to minimize down time and maintain throughput. Although the facility took advantage of short periods of downtime to perform nonintrusive troubleshooting and minor corrective/preventative maintenance activities, longer outages were periodically required for corrective maintenance involving process cell entry. During these outages, remote tools and specialized shield plates were employed to minimize dose to workers. Mock-ups of non-routine maintenance activities were critical to early identification of potential issues and improvements, which shortened outage duration. Consistent with the facility's operational strategy, evolutions needed for MCU layup were identified and sequenced to ensure safe conditions within the facility, meet pre-defined criteria for lay-up configuration, and protect workers, while minimizing the impact to SWPF integration. De-inventory and flushing of process areas was prioritized so that the total residual inventory was reduced as efficiently as possible. This paper discusses lessons learned and best practices from troubleshooting unique issues, performing complex maintenance activities, and implementing a layup strategy that best supports the overall system mission. (authors)

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Should WIPP Resume Unfiltered Discharge of Underground Ventilation?

On February 14, 2014 an incident in Panel 7, Room 7 of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) underground repository resulted in the release of americium and plutonium (mostly {sup 241}Am) into the environment and contaminated portions of the repository primarily along the ventilation path from the location of the incident. The WIPP uses a ventilation system to ensure that underground air is circulated throughout the repository and to ensure that conditions are safe for the workers. Since the air in the repository exits to the surface through an exhaust shaft, this shaft is the sole potential pathway for airborne radioactivity release from the repository. During normal operations, exhaust air is released to the environment unfiltered. However, since the radiation release event, the WIPP ventilation system has been, and will likely remain in what is called 'filtration mode', (i.e., exhaust air is routed through a HEPA filter system). Redirection of the ventilation system through the HEPA (High Efficiency Particulate Air) filter system was necessary at the peak of the radiation release event to protect aboveground workers at the site and the public in the surrounding areas. However, evaluation of more than two years of underground ventilation sampling data indicates that residual radioactivity levels in the underground no longer warrant HEPA filtration in order to meet either worker or environmental protection criteria. WIPP should consider resumption of the unfiltered discharge of underground ventilation to the environment. Recent sampling data indicate that there have been no detectable releases that would have resulted in a hypothetical dose to a worker or a member of the public in excess of the 0.1 mSv (10 mrem) per year limit for periodic confirmatory sampling as required for operating repositories by the Environmental Protection Agency (40 CFR 191)

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Reactivity effects at the Mayak production association, January 2, 1958 criticality accident using serpent 2 and openFOAM - 14444

The process nuclear criticality accident that occurred at the Mayak Production Association (Chelyabinsk-40) on January 2, 1958 involving a vessel of uranyl nitrate solution claimed the lives of three workers and left a fourth worker with continuing health problems. There are a myriad of uncertain parameters involved with this accident: What was the molarity of the solution? How much solution was in the vessel at the time of the accident? In what position was the vessel and the solution when it went critical? How important was the impact of reflection due to the workers and/or the floor? These uncertain parameters have made this accident particularly difficult to analyze in the past. This work aims to lower the uncertainty on some of these parameters. A most-probable solution composition is determined by comparing literature on the physical properties of uranyl nitrate solutions to those presented in LA-13638 [1], which describes the accident in question. Using this most-probable solution, the main contributions to the reactivity of the system and hence the eventual accident, are identified through Serpent 2 and OpenFOAM analyses. Serpent 2, a Monte Carlo software tool, is used to perform calculations of the reactivity effects of lowering the vessel toward the floor and the reactivity added by the close proximity of workers. OpenFOAM, a C++ partial differential equation solver toolkit, is used to simulate the fluid inside the vessel as the vessel is tipped. This is done by treating the solution and air inside the vessel as two incompressible, isothermal, and immiscible fluids using a volume of fluid (VoF) approach. The goal of this approach is simply to track the interface between the two fluids, and hence give an accurate description of the geometrical structure of the solution as the vessel is tipped. These two unique tools are then coupled to provide a time-dependent flow simulation to study the effect that the changing geometrical structure had on the criticality of the system, which is novel to the criticality safety field. This work provides a more accurate picture of the accident going forward. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Evaluation Of Elbow Exoskeleton in Glovebox Operations To Minimize Injuries – 25704

In nuclear facilities across the DOE, ergonomic injuries pose a significant occupational hazard for GB workers. Recent studies at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) have revealed concerning trends in worker health, with approximately 50% of GB workers reporting musculoskeletal symptoms after 25 years of service [1]. The current GB design, largely unchanged since the 1960s, presents several ergonomic challenges including inappropriate finger lengths, nonexistent joint angles, and incorrect thumb placement. These design flaws directly contribute to conditions such as lateral epicondylitis (tennis elbow) and De Quervain's tenosynovitis which causes pain and inflammation in the tendons at the base of the thumb. These are examples of conditions caused by workers performing repetitive precision tasks [2].

Ramon, Rodrigo N. [Savannah River National Laborat↗

Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) 241-Z Liquid Waste Treatment Facility Deactivation and Demolition

Fluor Hanford, Inc. (FH) is proud to submit the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) 241-Z liquid Waste Treatment Facility Deactivation and Demolition (D&D) Project for consideration by the Project Management Institute as Project of the Year for 2008. The decommissioning of the 241-Z Facility presented numerous challenges, many of which were unique within the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex. The majority of the project budget and schedule was allocated for cleaning out five below-grade tank vaults. These highly contaminated, confined spaces also presented significant industrial safety hazards that presented some of the most hazardous work environments on the Hanford Site. The 241-Z D&D Project encompassed diverse tasks: cleaning out and stabilizing five below-grade tank vaults (also called cells), manually size-reducing and removing over three tons of process piping from the vaults, permanently isolating service utilities, removing a large contaminated chemical supply tank, stabilizing and removing plutonium-contaminated ventilation ducts, demolishing three structures to grade, and installing an environmental barrier on the demolition site. All of this work was performed safely, on schedule, and under budget. During the deactivation phase of the project between November 2005 and February 2007, workers entered the highly contaminated confined-space tank vaults 428 times. Each entry (or 'dive') involved an average of three workers, thus equaling approximately 1,300 individuals confined -space entries. Over the course of the entire deactivation and demolition period, there were no recordable injuries and only one minor reportable skin contamination. The 241-Z D&D Project was decommissioned under the provisions of the 'Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order' (the Tri-Party Agreement or TPA), the 'Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976' (RCRA), and the 'Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980' (CERCLA). The project completed TPA Milestone M-083-032 to 'Complete those activities required by the 241-Z Treatment and Storage Unit's RCRA Closure Plan' four years and seven months ahead of this legally enforceable milestone. In addition, the project completed TPA Milestone M-083-042 to 'Complete transition and dismantlement of the 241-2 Waste Treatment Facility' four years and four months ahead of schedule. The project used an innovative approach in developing the project-specific RCRA closure plan to assure clear integration between the 241-Z RCRA closure activities and ongoing and future CERCLA actions at PFP. This approach provided a regulatory mechanism within the RCRA closure plan to place segments of the closure that were not practical to address at this time into future actions under CERCLA. Lessons learned from th is approach can be applied to other closure projects within the DOE Complex to control scope creep and mitigate risk. A paper on this topic, entitled 'Integration of the 241-Z Building D and D Under CERCLA with RCRA Closure at the PFP', was presented at the 2007 Waste Management Conference in Tucson, Arizona. In addition, techniques developed by the 241-Z D&D Project to control airborne contamination, clean the interior of the waste tanks, don and doff protective equipment, size-reduce plutonium-contaminated process piping, and mitigate thermal stress for the workers can be applied to other cleanup activities. The project-management team developed a strategy utilizing early characterization, targeted cleanup, and close coordination with PFP Criticality Engineering to significantly streamline the waste- handling costs associated with the project . The project schedule was structured to support an early transition to a criticality 'incredible' status for the 241-Z Facility. The cleanup work was sequenced and coordinated with project-specific criticality analysis to allow the fissile material waste being generated to be managed in a bulk fashion, instead of individual waste packages. This approach negated the need for real-time assay of individual waste packages, greatly improving the efficiency of the cleanup operation. The cleanup and stabilization of the 241-2 Liquid Effluent Treatment Facility reduced radiological risks to the environment and Hanford site workers. It was recognized as a success by regulatory agencies, the media, the DOE-client, and stakeholders. The 241-Z D&D Project demonstrated management excellence in adapting to significant changes in project direction, fostered a safety culture that amassed impressive results on this high-hazard job, maintained excellent communications with the client and stakeholders, and developed and implemented unique cleanup techniques.

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USING 3-D MODELING TO IMPROVE THE EFFICIENCY FOR REMOVING PLUTONIUM PROCESSING EQUIMENT FROM GLOVEBOXES AT THE PLUTONIUM FINISHANG PLANT

The Plutonium Finishing Plant at the Department of Energy's Hanford Site in southeastern Washington State began operations in 1949 to process plutonium and plutonium products. Its primary mission was to produce plutonium metal, fabricate weapons parts, and stabilize reactive materials. These operations, and subsequent activities, were performed in production lines, consisting primarily of hundreds of gloveboxes. Over the years, these gloveboxes and attendant processes have been continuously modified. The plant is currently inactive and Fluor Hanford has been tasked with cleaning out contaminated equipment and gloveboxes from the facility so it can be demolished in the near future. Approximately 100 gloveboxes at PFP have been cleaned out in the past four years and about 90 gloveboxes remain to be cleaned out. Because specific commitment dates for this work have been established with the State of Washington and other entities, it is important to adopt work practices that increase the safety and speed of this effort. The most recent work practice to be adopted by Fluor Hanford D and D workers is the use of 3-D models to make the process of cleaning out the radioactive gloveboxes more efficient. The use of 3-D models has significantly improved the work-planning process by giving workers a clear image of glovebox construction and composition, which in turn is used to determine cleanout methods and work sequences. The 3-D visual products also enhance safety by enabling workers to more easily identify hazards and implement controls. Further, the ability to identify and target the removal of radiological material early in the D and D process provides substantial dose reduction for the workers.

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Improving Efficiency with 3-D Imaging: Technology Essential in Removing Plutonium Processing Equipment from Plutonium Finishing Plant Gloveboxes

The Plutonium Finishing Plant at Hanford, Washington began operations in 1949 to process plutonium and plutonium products. Its primary mission was to produce plutonium metal, fabricate weapons parts, and stabilize reactive materials. These operations, and subsequent activities, were performed in remote production lines, consisting primarily of hundreds of gloveboxes. Over the years these gloveboxes and processes have been continuously modified. The plant is currently inactive and Fluor Hanford has been tasked to clean out contaminated equipment and gloveboxes from the facility so it can be demolished in the near future. Approximately 100 gloveboxes at PFP have been cleaned out in the past four years and about 90 gloveboxes remain to be cleaned out. Because specific commitment dates for this work have been established with the State of Washington and other entities, it is important to adopt work practices that increase the safety and speed of this effort. The most recent work practice to be adopted by Fluor Hanford D&D workers is the use of 3-D models to improve the efficiency of cleaning out radioactive gloveboxes at the plant. The use of 3-D models has significantly improved the work planning process by providing workers with a clear image of glovebox construction and composition, which is then used to determine cleanout methods and work sequences. The 3-D visual products enhance safety by enabling workers to more easily identify hazards and implement controls. In addition, the ability to identify and target the removal of radiological materials early in the D&D process provides substantial dose reduction for the workers.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Determination of an Environmental Background Level of Sr-90 in Urine for the Hanford Bioassay Program Determination of an Environmental Background Level of Sr-90 in Urine for the Hanford Bioassay Program

During the decommissioning and maintenance of some of the facilities at the U.S. Department of Energy Hanford Site in Washington State, workers have potential for a 90Sr intake. However, because of worldwide radioactive fallout, 90Sr is present in our environment, and can be detectable in routine urine bioassay samples. It is important for the Hanford Site bioassay program to discern an occupational intake from a non-occupational environmental one. A detailed study of the background 90Sr in the urine of unexposed Hanford workers was performed. A survey of the Hanford Site bioassay database found 128 Hanford workers who were hired between 1997 and 2002 and who had a very low potential for an occupational exposure prior to the baseline strontium urinalysis. Each urinalysis sample represented excretion during an approximate 24-hr period. The arithmetic mean value for the 128 pre-exposure baselines was 3.6 ± 5.1 mBq d-1. The 90Sr activities in urine varied from -12 to 20 mBq. The 99th percentile result was 16.4 mBqd-1, which was interpreted to mean that 1% of Hanford workers not occupationally exposed to strontium might exceed 16.4 mBq d-1.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

2007 East Tennessee Technology Park Annual Illness and Injury Surveillance Report

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) commitment to assuring the health and safety of its workers includes the conduct of illness and injury surveillance activities that provide an early warning system to detect health problems among workers. The Illness and Injury Surveillance Program monitors illnesses and health conditions that result in an absence, occupational injuries and illnesses, and disabilities and deaths among current workers.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

2007 Idaho National Laboratory Annual Illness and Injury Surveillance Report

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) commitment to assuring the health and safety of its workers includes the conduct of illness and injury surveillance activities that provide an early warning system to detect health problems among workers. The Illness and Injury Surveillance Program monitors illnesses and health conditions that result in an absence, occupational injuries and illnesses, and disabilities and deaths among current workers.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

2007 Hanford Site Annual Illness and Injury Surveillance Report

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) commitment to assuring the health and safety of its workers includes the conduct of illness and injury surveillance activities that provide an early warning system to detect health problems among workers. The Illness and Injury Surveillance Program monitors illnesses and health conditions that result in an absence, occupational injuries and illnesses, and disabilities and deaths among current workers.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗