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Thermal Modeling of the TN-32B Cask for the High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project

This report describes thermal modeling done for the High Burnup Dry Storage Research Project that is being performed by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) research and development (R&D) program. The purpose of this project to investigate the performance of high-burnup spent nuclear fuel in dry storage. Part of this project is a demonstration test being performed with a storage module in the North Anna Nuclear Power Station’s Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). The storage module selected for this demonstration is an Orano TN-32B High Burnup cask (Fig. S-1) which has been loaded with fuel assemblies from the North Anna spent fuel pool. The main goals of this test are to provide confirmatory data for model validation and potential improvement, support license renewals and new licenses for ISFSIs, and support transportation licensing for high burnup spent nuclear fuel (EPRI 2014).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Vacuum drying of spent fuel storage canisters/casks - 'just how much water could be left in there, anyway?' - 15233

The process of moving spent fuel assemblies from wet storage in the spent fuel pool to dry storage in an inert gas environment within a canister or cask typically involves two main stages. In the first stage, the bulk of the water is removed by a draining or siphoning operation, conducted with pressure inside the canister maintained at 1.3 to 2 atm. This process removes most of the water in the cask cavity, but residual water can be left behind, in three main regions. The largest region, typically, is the bottom of the cavity below the end of the siphon tube. A second general class of locations, also located at the bottom of the cask cavity, consists of the 'dashpots' at the ends of the various non-fuel tubular structures within the fuel assemblies. For PWR assemblies, these are the control rod guide sleeve tubes and instrumentation thimbles. For BWR assemblies, these are the water rods of various designs and control blade ends in some configurations. A third class of locations consists of porous material within the cavity that can absorb water, such as thin ceramic neutron poison plates, and ostensibly intact fuel rods that nevertheless might have pinholes or fine cracks in the cladding that could allow pool water to creep inside the fuel rod. To remove residual water from these locations, the second stage of drying operations utilizes vacuum drying, by reducing the pressure sufficiently to convert the water to vapor that can then be pumped out of the canister cavity. In this operation, the cask cavity pressure is slowly reduced from the nominal condition of (1.3-2.0 atm (1000-1520 torr), to a final target pressure below 3 torr (0.004 atm). This is typically accomplished in three to five stages, with prescribed 'hold' points defined in procedures or in the Technical Specifications, to preclude sudden pressure spikes due to flashing of water to steam, or development of large local temperature gradients in the fuel rods or other cask internal components. This paper discusses the various locations in the system where residual water may 'hang up' in the cask, and presents a discussion of the physical basis for the effectiveness of vacuum drying for removing it. Results and conclusions based on realistic qualitative and quantitative evaluations of the transient heat transfer behavior of the system are presented, based on detailed modeling of a range of spent fuel canister designs and decay heat loads, most notably the 24P Dry Shielded Canisters (DSCs) stored at the Rancho Seco Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), the NAC-MPC modules at Maine Yankee, the 24P DSCs stored at Calvert Cliffs, and the Holtec HI-STORM modules at Hope Creek. The evaluations presented here show that ice formation within a spent fuel canister is highly unlikely, due to the availability of a large thermal source term in the form of the decay heat load of the spent fuel. The formation of ice is an operational concern, since it mainly affects operation of equipment external to the canister (i.e., the hoses, valves, and fittings of the vacuum drying equipment.) Evaluations are presented for quantifying the amount of residual water that could remain in the cask cavity, even after successful drying operations, since vacuum drying is a limit process, and by definition, cannot remove all of the water from the cavity, no matter how long the operation goes on, even if all of it is in vapor form. (authors)

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Alternative Impact Limiter Designs for Used/Spent Nuclear Fuel Transportation Casks - 19496

With the need to eventually transport used/spent nuclear fuel (UNF/SNF) from existing storage sites to a consolidated interim storage facility, disposal site, and/or recycling facility, a preliminary evaluation was performed by the University of North Carolina at Charlotte (UNCC) in collaboration with Orano to examine the feasibility of an alternate impact limiter design for Used/Spent Nuclear Fuel Transportation Casks. Many of the previous designs involved complex designs and in some cases, utilized scarce materials, which resulted in expensive impact limiter systems to build and procure. The objective of this evaluation was to examine the availability of alternative materials which could be potentially implemented in simpler designs and result in significant cost savings over some of the current impact limiters designs. The project was divided into three phases: (1) performance of a comprehensive survey of the energy absorbing properties of composite materials that have become available since the original impact limiter designs were licensed; (2) designing and modeling of an impact limiter capable of meeting the hypothetical accident conditions (HAC) identified in 10CFR71.73; and (3) testing of the new materials identified for use in the newly designed impact limiter and feeding this test date to model of the new impact limiter. To design and model the new impact limiter, a specific transportation cask system was selected which was the Orano TN MP187. This paper provides details of the three phases of the project and the estimated cost savings from the new impact limiters. (authors)

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Results of stainless steel canister corrosion studies and environmental sample investigations

This progress report describes work being done at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to assess the localized corrosion performance of container/cask materials used in the interim storage of used nuclear fuel. The work involves both characterization of the potential physical and chemical environment on the surface of the storage canisters and how it might evolve through time, and testing to evaluate performance of the canister materials under anticipated storage conditions. To evaluate the potential environment on the surface of the canisters, SNL is working with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) to collect and analyze dust samples from the surface of in-service SNF storage canisters. In FY 13, SNL analyzed samples from the Calvert Cliffs Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI); here, results are presented for samples collected from two additional near-marine ISFSI sites, Hope Creek NJ, and Diablo Canyon CA. The Hope Creek site is located on the shores of the Delaware River within the tidal zone; the water is brackish and wave action is normally minor. The Diablo Canyon site is located on a rocky Pacific Ocean shoreline with breaking waves. Two types of samples were collected: SaltSmart™ samples, which leach the soluble salts from a known surface area of the canister, and dry pad samples, which collected a surface salt and dust using a swipe method with a mildly abrasive ScotchBrite™ pad. The dry samples were used to characterize the mineralogy and texture of the soluble and insoluble components in the dust via microanalytical techniques, including mapping X-ray Fluorescence spectroscopy and Scanning Electron Microscopy. For both Hope Creek and Diablo Canyon canisters, dust loadings were much higher on the flat upper surfaces of the canisters than on the vertical sides. Maximum dust sizes collected at both sites were slightly larger than 20 μm, but Phragmites grass seeds ~1 mm in size, were observed on the tops of the Hope Creek canisters. At both sites, the surface dust could be divided into fractions generated by manufacturing processes and by natural processes. The fraction from manufacturing processes consisted of variably-oxidized angular and spherical particles of stainless steel and iron, generated by machining and welding/cutting processes, respectively. Dust from natural sources consisted largely of detrital quartz and aluminosilicates (feldspars and clays) at both sites. At Hope Creek, soluble salts were dominated by sulfates and nitrates, mostly of calcium. Chloride was a trace component and the only chloride mineral observed by SEM was NaCl. Chloride surface loads measured by the Saltsmart™ sensors were very low, less than 60 mg m –2 on the canister top, and less than 10 mg m –2 on the canister sides. At Diablo Canyon, sea-salt aggregates of NaCl and Mg-SO 4 , with minor K and Ca, were abundant in the dust, in some cases dominating the observed dust assemblage. Measured Saltsmart™ chloride surface loads were very low (<5 mg m –2 ); however, high canister surface temperatures damaged the Saltsmart™ sensors, and, in view of the SEM observations of abundant sea-salts on the package surfaces, the measured surface loads may not be valid. Moreover, the more heavily-loaded canister tops at Diablo Canyon were not sampled with the Saltsmart™ sensors. The observed low surface loads do not preclude chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (CISCC) at either site, because (1) the measured data may not be valid for the Diablo Canyon canisters; (2) the surface coverage was not complete (for instance, the 45º offset between the outlet and inlet vents means that near-inlet areas, likely to have heavier dust and salt loads, were not sampled); and (3) CISCC has been experimentally been observed at salt loads as low as 5-8 mg/m 2 . Experimental efforts at SNL to assess corrosion of interim storage canister materials include three tasks in FY14. First, a full-diameter canister mockup, made using materials and techniques identical to those used to make interim storage canisters, was designed and ordered from Ranor Inc., a cask vendor for Areva/TN. The mockup will be delivered prior to the end of FY14, and will be used for evaluating weld residual stresses and degrees of sensitization for typical interim storage canister welds. Following weld characterization, the mockup will be sectioned and provided to participating organizations for corrosion testing purposes. A test plan is being developed for these efforts. In a second task, experimental work was carried out to evaluate crevice corrosion of 304SS in the presence of limited reactants, as would be present on a dustcovered storage canister. This work tests the theory that limited salt loads will limit corrosion penetration over time, and is a continuation of work carried out in FY13. Laser confocal microscopy was utilized to assess the volume and depth of corrosion pits formed during the crevice corrosion tests. Results indicate that for the duration of the current experiments (100 days), no stifling of corrosion occurred due to limitations in the amount of reactants present at three different salt loadings. Finally, work has been carried out this year perfecting an instrument for depositing sea-salts onto metal surfaces for atmospheric corrosion testing purposes. The system uses an X-Y plotter system with a commercial airbrush, and deposition is monitored with a quartz crystal microbalance. The system is capable of depositing very even salt loadings, even at very low total deposition rates.

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Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Sites

In this paper, a preliminary evaluation of removing used nuclear fuel (UNF) from 12 shutdown sites was conducted. Shutdown sites are defined as those commercial nuclear power reactor sites where the nuclear power reactors have been shut down and the site has been decommissioned or is undergoing decommissioning. The shutdown sites were Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, and San Onofre. The evaluation was divided into four components: • characterization of the UNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory • a description of the on-site infrastructure and conditions relevant to transportation activities • an evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and experience relevant to shipping transportation casks containing UNF from the shutdown sites, including gaps in information • an evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove UNF and GTCC waste from the shutdown sites. The primary sources for the inventory of UNF and GTCC waste are the DOE RW-859 used nuclear fuel inventory database, industry sources such as StoreFUEL and SpentFUEL, and government sources such as the NRC. The primary sources for the information on the site conditions and near-site transportation infrastructure and experience include site visits to the Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, and Zion sites; information provided by managers at the shutdown sites; Facility Interface Data Sheets compiled for DOE in 2005; Services Planning Documents prepared for DOE in 1993 and 1994; industry publications such as Radwaste Solutions; and Google Earth. State and Regional Group representatives, a Tribal representative, and a Federal Railroad Administration representative participated in six of the shutdown site visits. All sites were found to have at least one off-site transportation mode option for removing their UNF and GTCC waste, and some sites have two options. Large component removals during reactor decommissioning provided an important source of information in determining transportation mode options. Especially important in conducting the evaluation were site visits, through which information was obtained that would not have been available otherwise. Extensive photographs taken during the site visits proved to be particularly useful in documenting the current conditions at or near the sites. Additional conclusions from this evaluation include: • Although there are common aspects, each site has some unique features and/or conditions. • The 12 sites use designs from 4 different suppliers, including 9 different (horizontal and vertical) storage systems that would require 8 different transportation cask designs. • Although some regulatory actions will be required, all UNF at the initial 9 shutdown sites (Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, and Zion) is in licensed systems that can be transported, including a small amount of high-burnup fuel. • Each site indicated that 2-3 years of advanced time is required for preparations prior to pick-up. • Most sites have multiple transportation options, e.g., rail, barge, or heavy haul truck, as well as constraints and preferences. It is expected that additional site visits will be conducted to update the information used in the evaluation. Additional sites may be added to the evaluation if further site closures are announced.

shutdown sites, used nuclear fuel, NFST, Nuclear F↗

Inerting of Casks Cavity Atmospheres - The GNS Approach to Treat Hydrogen Generation in Sealed ILW Packages - 16043

A new approach to deal with the issue of hydrogen generation in sealed packages for radioactive waste with organic content is presented. The so-called 'inerting' of the cask cavity atmosphere can be either executed after loading or after interim storage via a new facility introduced by GNS. This new approach is approved by the German competent authority and yield to the recent prolongation of the Type B(U) certificate of approval of the GNS MOSAIK{sup R} cask. (authors)

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Seismic design of a nuclear waste repository against an earthquake induced rock shear load - 15346

Concepts for isolation of spent nuclear fuel have been studied by organizations in countries that employ nuclear power. These concepts typically involve a deep geological repository in bedrock, with processed radioactive waste encased in deposition canisters emplaced in underground excavations and surrounded by clay-based buffer. This multi-barrier approach is intended to provide long-term isolation of the waste package from the biosphere. According to many statistics, there is a tendency toward increasing numbers of earthquakes in the Korean peninsula each year. If an earthquake induced rock shear load occurs at a repository site, the engineered barrier system (EBS) can be sheared, resulting in a pressure increased in the buffer material. This is expected to result in damage to the canisters. Therefore, because the damage, which can be fatal to a disposal canister, can be given in case an earthquake occurs, the method protecting the canisters safely is needed. In this paper, 'an earthquake-resistance type buffer' was proposed using a method for protection from earthquake damage. To aid in achieving this objective, we have developed a technique for estimating the behavior of the EBS affected by earthquake induced rock shear using an analysis method, such as finite element method. As a first step, experimental tests are performed for understanding the behavior of the buffer material. Comparing the results of the numerical simulations to the experimental results can be used to verity the reliability of the analysis model. Then we developed the real scale analysis model of a nuclear waste repository. The main parameter having an effect on the earthquake-resistant performance was analyzed and an earthquake-resistance proof type buffer was designed. To improve the earthquake-resistance performance, we designed the buffer by putting the low- density buffer between the canister and buffer. The simulation results show that the earthquake-resistant performance was improved by about 65%. (authors)

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Discussion on the merits of deep borehole disposal, especially with recycling - 15389

With the continued global expansion of the nuclear industry, disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high level waste (HLW) continues to be a largely unimplemented (but extensively studied) activity throughout the world and can continue to do so due to the safe practices of 'interim' SNF/used nuclear fuel (UNF) and HLW storage. However as the industry continues to operate and expand in both existing and new countries, the accumulated SNF/UNF and HLW will continue to grow in both quantity and locations across the globe; hence, requiring more effort to control and monitor. Countries with nuclear power programs, or are considering starting nuclear power programs, must consider the potential financial and the engineering burden associated with both the interim storage and the disposal of SNF/UNF and HLW produced by these programs: can the cost of disposal be reasonably captured in the cost of electricity produced from nuclear programs and are there suitable sites for disposal in their country, such as a mined-geologic site, for the expected accumulated quantity of SNF and HLW? Answering these questions may be particularly vexing for countries with small nuclear programs where establishing viable disposal sites for SNF and HLW and funding of the development of these sites may be a challenge. In an effort to establish an alternative to traditional, expensive, mined-geologic disposal sites, the deep borehole option has been (re-)considered by multiple countries and entities to be a relatively simple solution to disposal of SNF and HLW. However, disposal of SNF in deep boreholes must overcome several issues including: (1) limiting-sized borehole diameters; (2) limited ability for retrieval; and (3) potential hang-up issues associated with lowering longer (e.g., > 180 inches) canisters down into a deep borehole. Since most SNF is a resource when recycled (i.e., UNF) and to dispose of it in an irretrievable manner would be wasteful, a more optimal alternative that could overcome these issues and maximize the benefits of the UNF is to recycle the UNF and dispose of the resulting HLW into deep boreholes. The multiple and mutual benefits of this approach are elucidated in this paper. (authors)

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Chemical Analysis of Canister Surface Samples

Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. (EPRI) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) collaborated to analyze dust and surface deposits on spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dry storage canisters at interim storage sites. The U.S. currently has no clear pathway for the ultimate disposition of spent fuel, so spent fuel will continue to be stored in dry casks for an extended period of time, likely well beyond the current license period of 60 years. Data on the behavior of dry storage systems and the spent fuel inside them after some period of dry storage, particularly extended storage, are limited. Potential degradation mechanisms for the canisters and fuel need to be identified and addressed for extended storage of spent fuel in dry casks past the renewal period and beyond 60 years.

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System Analysis Modeling and Intermodal Transportation for Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has long term goals to develop solutions for managing the nation’s spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level waste (HLW) inventory. The Integrated Waste Management (IWM) program under the DOE office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) is employing system-level engineering and analysis principles to inform potential future waste management system architectures. Managing the spent nuclear waste requires the use of system-level analysis software that takes various aspects of the fuel cycle into account like waste generation, on-site/centralized storage, transportation infrastructure, and long-term disposal. The Next Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM) is an agent-based model that was developed to simulate the transportation and storage of SNF and HLW. As an agent-based model, NGSAM has the capability to detail the interaction and movement of individual components and groups, such as rail cars and casks. The SNF inventory from commercial nuclear reactors is currently in temporary storage at multiple locations spread across the United States. Shipping of SNF from these locations relies on one of three transportation modes: rail, heavy-haul truck, or barge. Out of the three modes identified, rail is generally the most preferred due to the size of the canisters and casks the SNF would be shipped in. However, under some scenarios, a direct rail route might not be readily available to a reactor site or improving the rail infrastructure at shutdown sites might be too cost-prohibitive for utilities to opt for a direct rail transfer. Under such scenarios, using a barge or heavy haul truck to de-inventory the site and transfer the SNF to a nearby intermodal transfer site with adequate rail infrastructure where the payload could be transferred to a rail car might prove to be an attractive option. This work initially presents the various intermodal transportation options that could be used to transfer SNF from reactor sites to rail cars. This is followed by exploring the operational steps in each of these modes to move the SNF from a reactor site and transfer it to a rail car. This work also presents the procedure of implementing the intermodal transfer methodology in NGSAM using various Java methods. Finally, the process times for accomplishing each of the individual steps are furnished. The implementation ideology, assumptions, and future steps are presented in this work.

Gadey, Harish Reddy↗

The New TN{sup R} MW Cask System Focused on Facilities End-of-Life Waste Management - 16627

When preparing for the decommissioning of a nuclear facility, during its 'end of life' management and while performing the actual dismantling operations, one has to consider a large diversity of nuclear waste in term of types, volumes and activities. Customers are frequently faced with the obligation to undertake multiple and costly waste management operations including handling, reconditioning or re-transferring from one package to another, for example when moving from on-site storage to transportation. To address this issue, a new - highly flexible - cask system named TN{sup R} MW is being developed. This cask has a total weight of 10 T and is compliant with the 2012 IAEA regulations. It is developed on a flexible concept basis, adaptable to the various nuclear needs, including: from IP2 to B(U) / B(U)F; onsite/ international transportation; long term interim storage. Licensing and manufacturing of number of items of this TN{sup R} MW family is underway. (authors)

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The High Capacity Type B Waste Transport Cask to Serve Dismantling Project - 18344

The United States have already announced around 20 reactor shutdown and many more in the next 10 year. Financial constraints on plant operators and the low cost of fossil energy contribute to accelerate the shutdown of additional reactors. The industry has been gaining experience with reactor dismantling and is continuously trying to improve the cost efficiency of the upcoming projects. To do so, larger and more capacitive transport casks are needed to transport increasing volume of Low Level Waste (LLW) at a more attractive cost. Waste disposal is also a major cost element in a dismantling project. Consequently, the capacity to segment, package and transport the waste in the most optimized configuration will result in significant cost savings. While for LLW, the constraints for package requirements are limited, activated waste resulting mainly from reactor vessel and vessel internals segmentation require additional shielding to meet disposal and transportation regulations. The key element to succeed is the availability on the market of a licensed type B transport package with a larger payload that allows at the same time an optimization of the waste segmentation. AREVA TN has designed and licensed versatile high capacity type B casks for the transport of spent fuel canisters as part of the NUHOMS{sup R} system that can also be used to transport radioactive waste. While it will take a few more years to transport spent fuel to a consolidated interim storage facility and even more to a repository, the type B casks can be used to transport activated LLW from dismantled reactors to disposal sites. A first of a kind project will be performed with AREVA's partner NorthStar at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. AREVA's team will perform the reactor segmentation and package the material into an AREVA's large capacity type B cask. This unmatched cask capacity is expected to significantly decrease the LLW disposal costs, as well as the onsite operations costs, while optimizing the schedule. The package will be transported by rail to waste disposal facilities. This paper will present the main characteristics of the package, provide an update of the overall schedule, and explain the innovations that contribute to simpler and more cost effective transport and operation. Finally, it will emphasize the benefits of using larger type B casks for immediate and future transportation needs. (authors)

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Probability of Pinching Failure in PWR SNF after Long-Term Storage

A probabilistic assessment was performed on pinching failure of PWR SNF rod cladding under accidental SNF cask transport conditions. a set of 3,000 rod pinching scenarios was analyzed, with different geometrical, material, and loading parameters, using a Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS). The investigated accidents include train derailments leading to cask collisions or cask drops. Pinching failure was related to cladding offset strain, defined as the plastic deformation interval in radial cladding direction normalized with respect to the outer cladding diameter. Finite element (FE) models were used to compute SNF rod deformations and the offset strain demand OSD in each of the assessed pinching scenarios. The numerical models account for the contribution of the degraded fuel pellets to rod pinching stiffness. The offset strain capacity OSC was computed using regression and interpolation models based on ring compression (RCT) test results, and account for hydride-related effects on cladding ductility. The results show a low probability of pinching failure. Hydride-related cladding embrittlement affects the structural integrity of PWR SNF rods after long-term dry storage of up to 300 years. Radial hydride patterns or large amounts of circumferentially oriented hydrides reduce the cladding ductile deformation capability when pinched at low material temperatures. The probability of hydride-related pinching failure of PWR cladding is estimated after long-term dry storage to address: How do PWR SNF rod conditions like hydrogen content, vacuum drying peak cladding hoop stress σ{sub θ}, and cladding material temperature affect cladding ductility? Is hydride-related cladding embrittlement a material degradation mechanism that affects the structural integrity of PWR SNF rods under pinching loading? What are the controlling parameters for deformation demands in PWR SNF rods under pinching loading? Is the pinching load amplitude an important parameter that controls the probability of pinching failure? How do parameters like pellet-cladding gap or fuel pellet degradation affect the pinching loading capacity of PWR SNF rods? Statistical modelling of PWR SNF rod conditions in U.S. inventory: A pseudo rod database was generated based on EIA database. Analysis of train accident scenarios: a probability density function (pdf) of a pinching load distribution P{sub 9m} of a 9-m cask drop is linearly scaled to generate a more representative: distribution P{sub AS}. The new distribution considers train collision velocities, cask drops for on- and off-bridge accidents, and cask impact orientation. LHS generates 3,000 rod pinching scenarios based on nine independent geometrical, material, and loading parameters. Probabilistic FE Analysis: The LHS realizations are used to generate 3,000 FE models. The FE analysis is conducted for P{sub 9m}, and P{sub AS}. The workflow is automatized. The OSC is computed with regression and interpolation models, as a function of the hydrogen content C{sub H}, vacuum drying peak σ{sub θ}, and SNF temperature T{sub FR}: The regression data was obtained in RCTs on PWR cladding. The OSD is derived from the cladding deformations in the FE models. Cladding failure was identified via a comparison of OSC and OSD. A 300 and a 30 years-of-dry-storage duration is investigated: The dry-storage period affects the expected SNF temperature and consequently, the OSC and the OSD. The material temperature LHS population is adapted to account for a SNF temperature variation. The probability of hydride-related, ductile cladding failure during a severe transportation accident is not significantly affected by the pinching load amplitude: The probability is slightly reduced from a range of less than 0.0333% to 0.1667% for P{sub 9m}, to a range of less than 0.0333% to 0.1333% for P{sub AS}, depending on the vacuum drying peak cladding hoop stress modelling assumptions. Further, the SNF dry-storage duration does not significantly affect the probability of ductile pinching failure. Based on available train accidents data, the pinching failure probability for a 5,000 km long transportation route ranges from less than 1.62 E-7 to a value of 6.47 E-7, depending on the vacuum drying peak cladding hoop stress modelling assumptions. The pinching load amplitude is not a controlling parameter for the probability of ductile cladding pinching failure, and does not control the cladding deformations once pellet-cladding contact is established, The pellet-cladding gap width, however, plays a key role. Fuel pellet degradation only affects the deformation capacity, if the pellet stiffness is significantly reduced (more than 90%). Only highly embrittled cladding is likely to fail. The deformation demands on the cladding under pinching loading are small.

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The Relationship Between Dose Rate and Decay Heat for Spent Nuclear Fuel Casks

Decay heat and dose rate are two important limits used for determining the allowable contents of spent fuel (SNF) in dry storage systems and transportation packages. While the decay heat limit is used to maintain fuel cladding integrity and ensure retrievability, dose rates are used to demonstrate compliance with regulatory requirements on radiation protection. Because both dose rate and decay heat result from decay of radioisotopes in SNF, this study is an attempt to examine the relationship between dose rate and decay heat for a given cask design. Dose rates were evaluated for 198 cask configurations, that include various SNF system designs (e.g., storage, transfer, transport), SNF characteristics (e.g., fuel types, burnup, cooling time), and loading maps (e.g., uniform loading, zone loading), while a constant decay heat was maintained. The decay heat was calculated using US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide (RG) 3.54, Revision 2, and verified using ORIGEN sequence within SCALE code system. The ORIGEN outputs were used as source terms in the dose analysis using 198 different configurations. A computer script was developed to calculate the cooling time necessary to achieve a given decay heat for a given enrichment, assembly average burnup, assembly mass, and in-core history using a rootfinder algorithm. Initially the computer script was developed to provide cooling time and burnup calculations directly to the analysis of dose rates and decay heats, so a comparison between Used Nuclear Fuel-Storage Transportation and Disposal Analysis Resource Data System (UNF-ST&DARDS) results and RG3.54 data was made; results are included in the appendix to this document. However, an iterative approach was used to compute cooling time, and its accuracy did not depend on the results of the RG3.54r2 algorithm, although the algorithm was still used. The results of the evaluation presented herein clearly demonstrate that a given decay heat does not correspond to a unique dose rate for a variety of cask and package designs. There is no clear pattern to develop a correlation between decay heat and the source terms. Depending on burnup, enrichment, cask type, and loading pattern, dose rates varied for the exact same decay heat—in some cases by 400% for a given cask. For cases in which decay heat was held constant through selection of the appropriate cooling time, dose rates would decrease with increasing burnup, and in other cases, dose rates would increase. The large variation in dose rates for a constant decay heat indicates that casks loaded based on decay heat—that is allowing any burnup, cooling time, and enrichment combinations that yield the qualified decay heat limit(s) —cannot ensure that an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation or a spent fuel transportation package will meet the regulatory limits set forth by the respective regulations, i.e., 10 CFR 72 or 10 CFR 71.

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Uncertainty in Thermal Modeling of Spent Nuclear Fuel Casks

Uncertainty is a key metric in computational modeling that must be evaluated for results to have wide ranging applicability. A well characterized uncertainty range is ideal with clear error bars on results that can be presented to stakeholders. In the field of spent fuel cask modeling, this ideal has been historically difficult to achieve in practice because of the computationally intensive nature of the models used and the difficulty assigning reasonable uncertainties to quantities in as-built systems. The work in this report has been conducted to evaluate the overall state of uncertainty and sensitivity in spent fuel cask models and develop methodologies for evaluating these uncertainties. These methodologies must be practical for engineering applications. They should not require excessive computational resources or calendar time to achieve results. In engineering, the model must be on a scale such that it can be changed and adapted throughout a project as new information is discovered and project goals evolve. This report covers three major modeling task areas that provide an overview of the types of sensitivity and uncertainty present in a spent fuel storage and transportation system. Section 3 discusses sensitivity and uncertainty analysis in the effective thermal conductivity model for the fuel region and applies these results to a single assembly model. Section 4 shows sensitivity analysis of a full cask model in the TN-32B and Section 5 demonstrates the overall uncertainty workflow using Coolant Boiling in Rod Arrays – Spent Fuel Storage and STAR-CCM+ developed from the sensitivity work in the preceding sections.

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Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Sites

A preliminary evaluation of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from 13 shutdown nuclear power plant sites was performed. At these shutdown sites the nuclear power reactors have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The shutdown sites were Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, and Vermont Yankee. The evaluation was divided into four components: Characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory A description of the on-site infrastructure at the shutdown sites An evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and transportation experience at the shutdown sites An evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. The primary sources for the inventory of SNF and GTCC waste were the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel inventory database, industry publications such as StoreFUEL, and government sources such as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The primary sources for information on the conditions of on-site infrastructure and near-site transportation infrastructure and experience included information collected during site visits, information provided by managers at the shutdown sites, Facility Interface Data Sheets compiled for DOE in 2005, Services Planning Documents prepared for DOE in 1993 and 1994, industry publications such as Radwaste Solutions, and Google Earth. State staff, State Regional Group representatives, a Tribal representative, and a Federal Railroad Administration representative have participated in nine of the shutdown site visits. Every shutdown site was found to have at least one off-site transportation mode option for removing its SNF and GTCC waste; some have multiple options. Experience removing large components during reactor decommissioning provided an important source of information used to identify the transportation mode options for the sites. Especially important in conducting the evaluation were site visits, through which information was obtained that would not have been available otherwise. Extensive photographs taken during the site visits proved to be particularly useful in documenting the current conditions at or near the sites. Additional conclusions from this evaluation include: The 13 shutdown sites use designs from 4 different suppliers involving 11 different (horizontal and vertical) dry storage systems that would require the use of 9 different transportation cask designs to remove the SNF and GTCC waste from the shutdown sites. Although some changes to transportation certificates of compliance will be required, the SNF at the initial 9 shutdown sites (Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, and Zion) is in dual purpose dry storage canisters that can be transported, including a small amount of high-burnup fuel. Most sites indicated that 2-3 years of advance time would be required for its preparations before shipments could begin. Some sites could be ready in less time. As additional sites such as Fort Calhoun, Clinton, Quad Cities, Pilgrim, Oyster Creek, and Diablo Canyon shut down, these sites will be included in updates to the evaluation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Sites

A preliminary evaluation of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from 14 shutdown nuclear power plant sites was performed. At these shutdown sites the nuclear power reactors have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The shutdown sites were Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, Vermont Yankee, and Fort Calhoun. The evaluation was divided into four components: (1) characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory, (2) a description of the on-site infrastructure at the shutdown sites, (3) an evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and transportation experience at the shutdown sites, and (4) an evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. The primary sources for the inventory of SNF and GTCC waste were the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel inventory database, industry publications such as StoreFUEL, and government sources such as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The primary sources for information on the conditions of on-site infrastructure and near-site transportation infrastructure and experience included information collected during site visits, information provided by managers at the shutdown sites, Facility Interface Data Sheets compiled for DOE in 2005, Services Planning Documents prepared for DOE in 1993 and 1994, industry publications such as Radwaste Solutions, and Google Earth. State representatives, State Regional Group representatives, Tribal representatives, and a Federal Railroad Administration representatives have participated in eleven of the shutdown site visits. Every shutdown site was found to have at least one off-site transportation mode option for removing its SNF and GTCC waste; some have multiple options. Experience removing large components during reactor decommissioning provided an important source of information used to identify the transportation mode options for the sites. Especially important in conducting the evaluation were site visits, through which information was obtained that would not have been available otherwise. Extensive photographs taken during the site visits proved to be particularly useful in documenting the current conditions at or near the sites. Additional conclusions from this evaluation include: The 14 shutdown sites use designs from 4 different suppliers involving 11 different (horizontal and vertical) dry storage systems that would require the use of 9 different transportation cask designs to remove the SNF and GTCC waste from the shutdown sites. Although some changes to transportation certificates of compliance will be required, the SNF at the initial 9 shutdown sites (Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, and Zion) is in dual purpose dry storage canisters that can be transported, including a small amount of high-burnup fuel. Most sites indicated that 2-3 years of advance time would be required for its preparations before shipments could begin. Some sites could be ready in less time. As additional sites such as Palisades, Pilgrim, Three Mile Island, Oyster Creek, Indian Point, and Diablo Canyon shut down, these sites will be included in updates to the evaluation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Measurement of radiolytic hydrogen generation and impact of drying treatments on reactor exposed and surrogate aluminum materials

Technical challenges associated with dry storage of Aluminum-clad Spent Nuclear Fuel (ASNF) include a need to better understand the potential extent of gaseous molecular hydrogen (H 2 ) production through radiolytic degradation of the aluminum (oxy)hydroxide films present on ASNF. The characterization of radiolytic gas generation from ASNF (oxy)hydroxide layers has been identified as a key knowledge gap which poses a technical challenge to the long-term storage of ASNF. Task 2 of the action plan for the extended (>50 years) dry storage of ASNF addresses this gap. Previous radiolysis studies performed under Task 2 established baseline estimates of H 2 generation rates from the attendant hydrated oxides. The results confirmed that net radiolytic H 2 production has a dependency on absorbed gamma dose, as well as relative humidity and cover gas composition (air, nitrogen, and argon). Further experiments revealed that the physisorbed water on the samples may significantly impact the radiolytic H 2 yield. This phenomenon complicates the determination of H 2 generation rates for hydrated oxides, which may lead to inaccurate modeling predictions of the long-term H 2 yields in sealed storage systems containing ASNF, particularly when compared to spent fuel casks which have undergone some drying process intended to remove physically- and chemically-bound water. This report describes the testing methods utilized and the hydrogen generation results obtained in an investigation of the effects of gamma irradiation on aluminum materials for a variety of (oxy)hydroxide surface compositions and drying conditions. The testing methods included small-area aluminum material testing in ampules, and large-area aluminum material testing in steel vessels. Test material preparation, irradiation, and radiolytic H 2 measurement methods are summarized. The measured H 2 concentrations, which reflect the variable initial hydrated inventory and drying treatments, are compared to one another as well as to previously published data, to identify the primary factors affecting radiolytic H 2 generation rates and potential equilibrium H 2 concentrations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗