Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Safety”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 379 records · Page 21

Criticality Safety Basics for INL FMHs and CSOs (Revision 1)

Nuclear power is a valuable and efficient energy alternative in our energy-intensive society. However, material that can generate nuclear power has properties that require this material be handled with caution. If improperly handled, a criticality accident could result, which could severely harm workers. This document is a modular self-study guide about Criticality Safety Principles. This guide's purpose it to help you work safely in areas where fissionable nuclear materials may be present, avoiding the severe radiological and programmatic impacts of a criticality accident. It is designed to stress the fundamental physical concepts behind criticality controls and the importance of criticality safety when handling fissionable materials outside nuclear reactors. This study guide was developed for fissionable-material-handler and criticality-safety-officer candidates to use with related web-based course 00INL189, BEA Criticality Safety Principles, and to help prepare for the course exams. These individuals must understand basic information presented here. This guide may also be useful to other Idaho National Laboratory personnel who must know criticality safety basics to perform their assignments safely or to design critically safe equipment or operations. This guide also includes additional information that will not be included in 00INL189 tests. The additional information is in appendices and paragraphs with headings that begin with 'Did you know,' or with, 'Been there Done that'. Fissionable-material-handler and criticality-safety-officer candidates may review additional information at their own discretion. This guide is revised as needed to reflect program changes, user requests, and better information. Issued in 2006, Revision 0 established the basic text and integrated various programs from former contractors. Revision 1 incorporates operation and program changes implemented since 2006. It also incorporates suggestions, clarifications, and additional information from readers and from personnel who took course 00INL189. Revision 1 also completely reorganized the training to better emphasize physical concepts behind the criticality controls that fissionable material handlers and criticality safety officers must understand. The reorganization is based on and consistent with changes made to course 00INL189 due to a review of course exam results and to discussions with personnel who conduct area-specific training.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE/EM Criticality Safety Needs Assessment

The issue of nuclear criticality safety (NCS) in Department of Energy Environmental Management (DOE/EM) fissionable material operations presents challenges because of the large quantities of material present in the facilities and equipment that are committed to storage and/or material conditioning and dispositioning processes. Given the uncertainty associated with the material and conditions for many DOE/EM fissionable material operations, ensuring safety while maintaining operational efficiency requires the application of the most-effective criticality safety practices. In turn, more-efficient implementation of these practices can be achieved if the best NCS technologies are utilized. In 2002, DOE/EM-1 commissioned a survey of criticality safety technical needs at the major EM sites. These needs were documented in the report Analysis of Nuclear Criticality Safety Technology Supporting the Environmental Management Program, issued May 2002. Subsequent to this study, EM safety management personnel made a commitment to applying the best and latest criticality safety technology, as described by the DOE Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP). Over the past 7 years, this commitment has enabled the transfer of several new technologies to EM operations. In 2008, it was decided to broaden the basis of the EM NCS needs assessment to include not only current needs for technologies but also NCS operational areas with potential for improvements in controls, analysis, and regulations. A series of NCS workshops has been conducted over the past years, and needs have been identified and addressed by EM staff and contractor personnel. These workshops were organized and conducted by the EM Criticality Safety Program Manager with administrative and technical support by staff at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). This report records the progress made in identifying the needs, determining the approaches for addressing these needs, and assimilating new NCS technologies into EM fissionable material operations. In addition, the report includes projections of future EM needs and associted recommendations.

Westfall, Robert Michael↗

Establishing and Promoting a Culture of Safety in Chemistry Laboratory Research

Recent serious and sometimes fatal accidents in chemical research laboratories at United States universities have driven government agencies, professional societies, industries, and universities themselves to examine the culture of safety in research laboratories. These incidents have triggered a broader discussion of how serious incidents can be prevented in the future and how best to train researchers and emergency personnel to respond appropriately when incidents do occur. As the priority placed on safety increases, many institutions have expressed a desire to go beyond simple compliance with regulations to work toward fostering a strong, positive safety culture: affirming a constant commitment to safety throughout their institutions, while integrating safety as an essential element in the daily work of laboratory researchers. The National Research Council report, Safe Science: Promoting a Culture of Safety in Academic Chemical Research, examines the culture of safety in research institutions and makes recommendations for university leadership, laboratory researchers, and environmental health and safety professionals to support safety as a core value of their institutions. While the report is focused primarily on academic chemistry laboratories, there are a wide variety of environments both in and outside academia that may benefit from the recommendations made herein.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

An Integrated Framework for Risk Assessment of Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants: Methodology Refinement and Exploration

This report documents activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a technical basis to support effective, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. A risk assessment-informed framework was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk informed capability to quantitatively estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for safety-related DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing risk informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of safety-related DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals, the LWRS-developed framework provides a means to address relevant technical issues by: (1) defining a risk informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade that integrates hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying risk informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies in nuclear power plants (NPPs). Adding diversity within a system or components is the primary means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases system complexity and may not address all sources of systematic failures. Optimization of diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the proposed framework provides: (a) A best-estimate, risk informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, focusing on software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; (b) A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems; (c) Technical bases and risk informed insights to assist users address the risk informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; and (d) A risk informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The research and development efforts of this project in FY 2023 are focused on refining current methods on software CCF modeling and estimation and exploring additional innovative approaches to risk assessment of DI&C systems to enable a more comprehensive and complete assessment of various safety-related DI&C design architectures. The primary audience of this report are DI&C designers, engineers, and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) practitioners. This includes stakeholders, such as the nuclear utilities and regulators who consider the deployment and upgrade of DI&C systems, DI&C software developers and reviewers, and cybersecurity specialists. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the methodology, not for the evaluation of an actual digital control system. Results are obtained based on limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Assessment of Modeling and Simulation Technical Gaps in Safety Analysis of High Burnup Accident-Tolerant Fuels

The United States nuclear industry is facing a strong challenge to maintain regulatory-required levels of safety while ensuring economic competitiveness to stay in business. Safety remains a key parameter for all aspects related to the operation of light water reactor (LWR) nuclear power plants (NPPs), and it can be achieved more economically by using a risk-informed ecosystem, such as that being developed by the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program. The LWRS Program is promoting a wide range of research and development activities to maximize both the safety and economically efficient performance of NPPs through improved scientific understanding, especially given that many plants are considering second license renewal. The RISA Pathway has two main goals: The deployment of methodologies and technologies that enable better representation of safety margins and the factors that contribute to cost and safety, and; The development of advanced applications that enable cost-effective plant operation. As part of the RISA Pathway, the Enhanced Resilient Plant (ERP) project refers to an NPP where safety is improved by implementing various measures, such as accident-tolerant fuels (ATF), diverse and flexible coping strategy (FLEX), enhancements to plant components and systems, incorporation of augmented or new passive cooling systems, and utilization of advanced battery technologies. The objective of the ERP research is to use novel methods and computational tools to enhance existing reactors’ safety while reducing operational costs. Many U.S. utilities are targeting implementation of ATFs instead of traditional fuel in the near future since ATFs offer benefits in terms of improved performance and cost savings. The robust properties of ATF make it possible to extend the refueling cycle from 18 to 24 months in addition to the opportunity to use less of fuel. Extensive safety assessments are required to support regulatory requirements and obtain the approvals to use ATFs and the ERP project support the industry by developing novel effective methodologies for safety evaluations. In this project, the technical gaps in the modeling and simulation of the high burnup (HBU) ATF were assessed in terms of the fuel cladding behavior during the postulated accident events. The issues were identified in modeling the cladding deformation, the hydrodynamic change due to cladding deformation and the critical heat flux (CHF). The RELAP5-3D cladding deformation model was assessed by multiple verification tests and validation with the instrumented fuel assembly (IFA) experiment.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Chemical Process Safety at TRISO-Based, Metal-Based, and Salt-Based Fuel Fabrication Facilities: Technical Assessment and Guidance Assessment

As part of efforts to prepare for potential and ongoing safety reviews for licensing of advanced non-light-water reactor fuel cycles, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) tasked Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to prepare an assessment on the state of knowledge of potential chemical processes at fuel cycle facilities supporting the front end of these fuel cycles, and to assess the associated regulatory guidance. This report provides a technical assessment of chemical process safety considerations to support NRC licensing reviews of fabrication processes for tri-structural isotropic (TRISO) based, metallic-based, and salt-based fuels. The assessments involved collecting publicly available information on the fuel fabrication processes to (i) identify the operational process steps, characteristics and chemicals involved, (ii) identify the physical safety considerations and health safety considerations during licensing reviews of the various process steps, and (iii) collect information to support assessments of severity of accidents and potential mitigative measures to be implemented. The assessment provides a foundational basis on chemical process safety considerations for advanced fuel fabrication activities, although it is recognized that licensing reviews may necessitate design-specific considerations. The specific conditions under which chemical hazards emerge will require process-specific considerations, highlighting the importance of process-informed interpretation. The assessment also determined that exposure guidelines and limits to assess the consequences of acute exposures are limited for some chemicals, although alternative limits and supplementary information from databases or safety data sheets provide sufficient information to evaluate consequences of acute exposures. In addition, it was identified that metallic and salt fuel fabrication processes may involve beryllium, which is an exposure hazard. The regulatory framework for the licensing of advanced fuel cycle facilities, per 10 CFR Part 70 Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material, is deemed robust and flexible to address the chemical safety considerations in this report. A review was conducted on various regulatory guidance and technical basis documents. This included reviewing NUREG-1520, Revision 2, Standard Review Plan for Fuel Cycle Facilities License Applications – Final Report and the process descriptions in Appendix A of NUREG/CR-6410, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facility Accident Analysis Handbook, to address advanced fuel types. As new fuels will involve process-specific chemical uses, process-specific considerations are provided in this report. Additionally, it is noted that the U.S. Department of Energy protective action criteria database includes Temporary Emergency Exposure Limits (TEELs) for process-specific chemicals. This report provides technical information to support chemical safety assessments of new advanced fuel cycle facilities and identifies technical and safety information to support licensing reviews. No regulatory barriers were identified for the licensing of advanced fuel cycle facilities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

An interagency space nuclear propulsion safety policy for SEI - Issues and discussion

An interagency Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group (NSPWG) was chartered to recommend nuclear safety policy, requirements, and guidelines for the Space Exploration Initiative nuclear propulsion program to facilitate the implementation of mission planning and conceptual design studies. The NSPWG developed a top level policy to provide the guiding principles for the development and implementation of the nuclear propulsion safety program and the development of Safety Functional Requirements. In addition, the NSPWG reviewed safety issues for nuclear propulsion and recommended top level safety requirements and guidelines to address these issues. Safety topics include reactor start-up, inadvertent criticality, radiological release and exposure, disposal, entry, safeguards, risk/reliability, operational safety, ground testing, and other considerations. In this paper the emphasis is placed on the safety policy and the issues and considerations that are addressed by the NSPWG recommendations.

Marshall, A. C.↗

Nuclear safety

Topics dealing with nuclear safety are addressed which include the following: general safety requirements; safety design requirements; terrestrial safety; SP-100 Flight System key safety requirements; potential mission accidents and hazards; key safety features; ground operations; launch operations; flight operations; disposal; safety concerns; licensing; the nuclear engine for rocket vehicle application (NERVA) design philosophy; the NERVA flight safety program; and the NERVA safety plan.

Buden, D.↗

NSPWG-recommended safety requirements and guidelines for SEI nuclear propulsion

An interagency Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group (NSPWG) was chartered to recommend nuclear safety policy, requirements, and guidelines for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) nuclear propulsion program to facilitate the implementation of mission planning and conceptual design studies. The NSPWG developed a top-level policy to provide the guiding principles for the development and implementation of the nuclear propulsion safety program and the development of safety functional requirements. In addition, the NSPWG reviewed safety issues for nuclear propulsion and recommended top-level safety requirements and guidelines to address these issues. Safety requirements were developed for reactor start-up, inadvertent criticality, radiological release and exposure, disposal, entry, and safeguards. Guidelines were recommended for risk/reliability, operational safety, flight trajectory and mission abort, space debris and meteoroids, and ground test safety. In this paper the specific requirements and guidelines will be discussed.

Marshall, Albert C.↗

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This Annual Report of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) presents results of activities during calendar year 2001. The year was marked by significant achievements in the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs and encouraging accomplishments by the Aerospace Technology Enterprise. Unfortunately, there were also disquieting mishaps with the X-43, a LearJet, and a wind tunnel. Each mishap was analyzed in an orderly process to ascertain causes and derive lessons learned. Both these accomplishments and the responses to the mishaps led the Panel to conclude that safety and risk management is currently being well served within NASA. NASA's operations evidence high levels of safety consciousness and sincere efforts to place safety foremost. Nevertheless, the Panel's safety concerns have never been greater. This dichotomy has arisen because the focus of most NASA programs has been directed toward program survival rather than effective life cycle planning. Last year's Annual Report focused on the need for NASA to adopt a realistically long planning horizon for the aging Space Shuttle so that safety would not erode. NASA's response to the report concurred with this finding. Nevertheless, there has been a greater emphasis on current operations to the apparent detriment of long-term planning. Budget cutbacks and shifts in priorities have severely limited the resources available to the Space Shuttle and ISS for application to risk-reduction and life-extension efforts. As a result, funds originally intended for long-term safety-related activities have been used for operations. Thus, while safety continues to be well served at present, the basis for future safety has eroded. Section II of this report develops this theme in more detail and presents several important, overarching findings and recommendations that apply to many if not all of NASA's programs. Section III of the report presents other significant findings, recommendations and supporting material applicable to specific program areas. Appendix A presents a list of Panel members. Appendix B contains the reaction of the ASAP to NASA's response to the calendar year 2000 findings and recommendations. In accordance with a practice started last year, this Appendix includes brief narratives as well as classifications of the responses as 'open,' 'closed,' or 'continuing.' Appendix C details the Panel's activities during the reporting period.

Source record↗

Certification Processes for Safety-Critical and Mission-Critical Aerospace Software

This document is a quick reference guide with an overview of the processes required to certify safety-critical and mission-critical flight software at selected NASA centers and the FAA. Researchers and software developers can use this guide to jumpstart their understanding of how to get new or enhanced software onboard an aircraft or spacecraft. The introduction contains aerospace industry definitions of safety and safety-critical software, as well as, the current rationale for certification of safety-critical software. The Standards for Safety-Critical Aerospace Software section lists and describes current standards including NASA standards and RTCA DO-178B. The Mission-Critical versus Safety-Critical software section explains the difference between two important classes of software: safety-critical software involving the potential for loss of life due to software failure and mission-critical software involving the potential for aborting a mission due to software failure. The DO-178B Safety-critical Certification Requirements section describes special processes and methods required to obtain a safety-critical certification for aerospace software flying on vehicles under auspices of the FAA. The final two sections give an overview of the certification process used at Dryden Flight Research Center and the approval process at the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL).

Nelson, Stacy↗

Certification Processes for Safety-Critical and Mission-Critical Aerospace Software

This document is a quick reference guide with an overview of the processes required to certify safety-critical and mission-critical flight software at selected NASA centers and the FAA. Researchers and software developers can use this guide to jumpstart their understanding of how to get new or enhanced software onboard an aircraft or spacecraft. The introduction contains aerospace industry definitions of safety and safety-critical software, as well as, the current rationale for certification of safety-critical software. The Standards for Safety-Critical Aerospace Software section lists and describes current standards including NASA standards and RTCA DO-178B. The Mission-Critical versus Safety-Critical software section explains the difference between two important classes of software: safety-critical software involving the potential for loss of life due to software failure and mission-critical software involving the potential for aborting a mission due to software failure. The DO-178B Safety-critical Certification Requirements section describes special processes and methods required to obtain a safety-critical certification for aerospace software flying on vehicles under auspices of the FAA. The final two sections give an overview of the certification process used at Dryden Flight Research Center and the approval process at the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL).

Nelson, Stacy↗

Synthesizing Safety Conditions for Code Certification Using Meta-Level Programming

In code certification the code consumer publishes a safety policy and the code producer generates a proof that the produced code is in compliance with the published safety policy. In this paper, a novel viewpoint approach towards an implementational re-use oriented framework for code certification is taken. It adopts ingredients from Necula's approach for proof-carrying code, but in this work safety properties can be analyzed on a higher code level than assembly language instructions. It consists of three parts: (1) The specification language is extended to include generic pre-conditions that shall ensure safety at all states that can be reached during program execution. Actual safety requirements can be expressed by providing domain-specific definitions for the generic predicates which act as interface to the environment. (2) The Floyd-Hoare inductive assertion method is refined to obtain proof rules that allow the derivation of the proof obligations in terms of the generic safety predicates. (3) A meta-interpreter is designed and experimentally implemented that enables automatic synthesis of proof obligations for submitted programs by applying the modified Floyd-Hoare rules. The proof obligations have two separate conjuncts, one for functional correctness and another for the generic safety obligations. Proof of the generic obligations, having provided the actual safety definitions as context, ensures domain-specific safety of program execution in a particular environment and is simpler than full program verification.

Eusterbrock, Jutta↗

Space-Based Range Safety and Future Space Range Applications

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Space-Based Telemetry and Range Safety study is a multiphase project to demonstrate the performance, flexibility and cost savings that can be realized by using space-based assets for the Range Safety (global positioning system metric tracking data, flight termination command and range safety data relay) and Range User (telemetry) functions during vehicle launches and landings. Phase 1 included flight testing S-band Range Safety and Range User hardware in 2003 onboard a high-dynamic aircraft platform at Dryden Flight Research Center (Edwards, California) using the NASA Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System as the communications link. The current effort, Phase 2, includes hardware and packaging upgrades to the S-band Range Safety system and development of a high data rate Ku-band Range User system. The enhanced Phase 2 Range Safety Unit provided real-time video for three days during the historic GlobalFlyer (Scaled Composites, Mojave, California) flight in March, 2005. Additional Phase 2 testing will include a sounding rocket test of the Range Safety system and aircraft flight testing of both systems. Future testing will include a flight test on a launch vehicle platform. This report discusses both Range Safety and Range User developments and testing with emphasis on the Range Safety system. The operational concept of a future space-based range is also discussed.

Whiteman, Donald E.↗

Mitigating Motion Base Safety Issues: The NASA LaRC CMF Implementation

The NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC), Cockpit Motion Facility (CMF) motion base design has taken advantage of inherent hydraulic characteristics to implement safety features using hardware solutions only. Motion system safety has always been a concern and its implementation is addressed differently by each organization. Some approaches rely heavily on software safety features. Software which performs safety functions is subject to more scrutiny making its approval, modification, and development time consuming and expensive. The NASA LaRC's CMF motion system is used for research and, as such, requires that the software be updated or modified frequently. The CMF's customers need the ability to update the simulation software frequently without the associated cost incurred with safety critical software. This paper describes the CMF engineering team's approach to achieving motion base safety by designing and implementing all safety features in hardware, resulting in applications software (including motion cueing and actuator dynamic control) being completely independent of the safety devices. This allows the CMF safety systems to remain intact and unaffected by frequent research system modifications.

Bryant, Richard B., Jr.↗

Space-Based Range Safety and Future Space Range Applications

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Space-Based Telemetry and Range Safety (STARS) study is a multiphase project to demonstrate the performance, flexibility and cost savings that can be realized by using space-based assets for the Range Safety [global positioning system (GPS) metric tracking data, flight termination command and range safety data relay] and Range User (telemetry) functions during vehicle launches and landings. Phase 1 included flight testing S-band Range Safety and Range User hardware in 2003 onboard a high-dynamic aircraft platform at Dryden Flight Research Center (Edwards, California, USA) using the NASA Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) as the communications link. The current effort, Phase 2, includes hardware and packaging upgrades to the S-band Range Safety system and development of a high data rate Ku-band Range User system. The enhanced Phase 2 Range Safety Unit (RSU) provided real-time video for three days during the historic Global Flyer (Scaled Composites, Mojave, California, USA) flight in March, 2005. Additional Phase 2 testing will include a sounding rocket test of the Range Safety system and aircraft flight testing of both systems. Future testing will include a flight test on a launch vehicle platform. This paper discusses both Range Safety and Range User developments and testing with emphasis on the Range Safety system. The operational concept of a future space-based range is also discussed.

Whiteman, Donald E.↗

Implementation of Programmatic Quality and the Impact on Safety

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the implementation of a programmatic quality assurance discipline within the International Space Station Program and the resulting impact on safety. NASA culture has continued to stress safety at the expense of quality when both are extremely important and both can equally influence the success or failure of a Program or Mission. Although safety was heavily criticized in the media after Col~imbiaa, strong case can be made that it was the failure of quality processes and quality assurance in all processes that eventually led to the Columbia accident. Consequently, it is possible to have good quality processes without safety, but it is impossible to have good safety processes without quality. The ISS Program quality assurance function was analyzed as representative of the long-term manned missions that are consistent with the President s Vision for Space Exploration. Background topics are as follows: The quality assurance organizational structure within the ISS Program and the interrelationships between various internal and external organizations. ISS Program quality roles and responsibilities with respect to internal Program Offices and other external organizations such as the Shuttle Program, JSC Directorates, NASA Headquarters, NASA Contractors, other NASA Centers, and International Partner/participants will be addressed. A detailed analysis of implemented quality assurance responsibilities and functions with respect to NASA Headquarters, the JSC S&MA Directorate, and the ISS Program will be presented. Discussions topics are as follows: A comparison of quality and safety resources in terms of staffing, training, experience, and certifications. A benchmark assessment of the lessons learned from the Columbia Accident Investigation (CAB) Report (and follow-up reports and assessments), NASA Benchmarking, and traditional quality assurance activities against ISS quality procedures and practices. The lack of a coherent operational and sustaining quality assurance strategy for long-term manned space flight. An analysis of the ISS waiver processes and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) process implemented as quality functions. Impact of current ISS Program procedures and practices with regards to operational safety and risk A discussion regarding a "defense-in-depth" approach to quality functions will be provided to address the issue of "integration vs independence" with respect to the roles of Programs, NASA Centers, and NASA Headquarters. Generic recommendations are offered to address the inadequacies identified in the implementation of ISS quality assurance. A reassessment by the NASA community regarding the importance of a "quality culture" as a component within a larger "safety culture" will generate a more effective and value-added functionality that will ultimately enhance safety.

Huls, Dale Thomas↗

C-Band Airport Surface Communications System Engineering-Initial High-Level Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed C-band (5091- to 5150-MHz) airport surface communication system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents an initial high-level safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the C-band communication system after the profile is finalized and system rollout timing is determined. A security risk assessment has been performed by NASA as a parallel activity. While safety analysis is concerned with a prevention of accidental errors and failures, the security threat analysis focuses on deliberate attacks. Both processes identify the events that affect operation of the system; and from a safety perspective the security threats may present safety risks.

Zelkin, Natalie↗