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The Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) participates in the Fuel Fabrication Pillar of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Office of Material Minimization and Management (M3) Office of Conversion Pillar. Y-12’s primary responsibility is to establish the fabrication process for the low-enriched uranium-molybdenum (U-10Mo) feedstock.
The NNSA Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) has investigated a set of minimal-infrastructure radiation detection systems as alternatives to fixed Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) for nuclear interdiction applications. These versatile and relocatable systems can improve nuclear security in missions or locations that do not warrant or support a standard fixed radiation detection system. Over 2019, a variety of relocatable detectors were characterized at the Interdiction Technologies Integration Laboratory at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). Evaluated detectors were diverse in their size and capabilities, ranging from backpack-sized systems to lane-spanning cargo scanning portals. Both spectroscopic and non-spectroscopic pedestrian and vehicle detection systems were characterized against uranium and plutonium sources. Signatures from the sources were modulated by both shielding and distance to quantify the performance of the relocatable systems as signal strength was decreased. Findings showed that relocatable spectroscopic detectors with isotope identification capabilities could reduce nuisance alarm rates compared to conventional fixed installation, gross-counting, radiation portal monitors. In vehicle scanning applications, detection ability generally trended with detection volume, regardless of spectral capability. In pedestrian scanning applications, several smaller backpack-sized detector systems were found to be more sensitive to detecting material than pedestrian portal monitors. The results of this characterization effort have helped inform the deployment of versatile equipment to improve nuclear security missions.
With its historical mission as the focal point for production of uranium components for the NNSA nuclear weapons program, the National Nuclear Materials Archive (NNMA) makes use of Y-12's wide range of uranium materials processing knowledge and onsite materials to identify, collect, and preserve sample materials for nuclear forensics purposes. In 2019, Y-12 took on the responsibility for identifying, subsampling, and shipping a total of 24 NNMA samples to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) for further forensics analysis. These were highly enriched uranium metal pieces representative of different weapon systems components produced by Y-12 from approximately 1963 to 1993. The purpose was to provide the NNMA program with higher precision analyses of these materials than what is currently available from historical Y-12 production stream data.
The Actinide Mixing Optimization Solver (AMOS) is a set of programs written in MATLAB that computes theoretical mixes of different uranium, plutonium, thorium, and other actinide materials given a list of isotopic reference materials. Constraints are applied depending on the desired product and a mixture is computed to meet the specified requirements. The optimal mixture consists of a product that uses the lowest possible number of initial actinide materials and has the lowest cost. AMOS is currently applied to particular reference material requests from the sponsoring agency (NNSA) on behalf of the IAEA.
This report details the data analysis results from data collected during the September-October 2019 joint survey series between the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Aerial Measuring System (AMS) asset, and the Government of India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). This joint survey series took place at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), areas of public land in Southern Nevada, and at the DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) Large Area Calibration Pads (LACP) at the Grand Junction Regional Airport in Grand Junction, CO. The data detailed in this report were gathered at the LACP. More details regarding the setup of these surveys and personnel involvement can be found in the AMS / BARC Joint Survey Summary Report. The data from the LACP collected by AMS are consistent with past data collection campaigns at the LACP. The AMS Bell 412 (B412) helicopter, equipped with both the standard AMS thallium-doped sodium iodide (NaI(Tl)) 2"x4"x16" 12-detector system and a subset of the BARC Aerial Gamma Spectroscopy System (AGSS) consisting of two independent 3"x3"cylindrical NaI(Tl) detectors, measured each of the five calibration pads for a minimum of 10 minutes. After the helicopter measurements, a pressurized ion chamber (PIC) was used to directly measure radiation exposure rates on each of the pads for a period 5 minutes. The geophysical calibration procedure published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Erdi-Krausz et al. 2003) was used to determine the spectral stripping sensitivity matrix for naturally occurring radiological material (NORM). The sensitivity matrix is consistent with the AMS long term average. Additionally, the PIC data was used to calibrate the AMS system for exposure rate. The results of the exposure rate analysis are also consistent with AMS long-term averages.
This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Transuranic (TRU) Waste Processing Center Mixed Low Level Waste (MLLW), FWORCHMLLW103, Revision 13 [TWPC 2021]), is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the TRU Waste Processing Center MLLW meets all performance objectives of DOE Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The TRU Waste Processing Center MLLW waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.
NNSA's FY 2021 - Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act gave NNSA authorities to protect facilities from unauthorized unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) that may pose threats to the safety or security of assets and personnel
The Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) participates in the fuel fabrication pillar of lhe National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA's) Office of Material Minimization and Management (M3) Office of Conversion Pillar. Y-12's primary responsibility is to establish a reliable fabrication process of low-enriched uranium-molybdenum (LEU-Mo) feedstock tor United States High Performance Research Reactors (US HPRRs). This update compares US HPRR LEU-Mo feedstock fabrication ettorts over the past several casting campaigns at Y-12 which vary in process methodologies and fabrication parameters. With recent changes to the latest feedstock casting campaign, Process Design Standard-2 (PD-STD-2). Y-12 has seen a significant decrease in isotopic uranium variability of the fuel feedstock fabricated.
Project Independent Assessment conducted by NNSA
Milestone report produced for the NNSA, NA-113 Office of Experimental Science by the Advanced Diagnostics program in the NNSS Stockpile Experimentation and Operations group with the Radiography and Advanced Imaging Development project.
Presentation to be presented during the NNSA Minority Serving Institution Partnership Program (MSIPP) Nuclear Security Science and Technology Consortium (NSSTC) seminar series.
Presentation to the Forefront22 Workshop in DC to NNSA DNN. Generalized presentation on Advanced Wireless Communications and areas where Nuclear Material Transportation may find interesting to investigate further for security and cybersecurity interests. Summary of the Forefront22 workshop Traditional wireless communication technologies, such as Wi-Fi and Cellular, have modernized industries worldwide. The Nuclear industry has also started to modernize its operations by utilizing wireless connectivity and is well poised to expand the use of wireless to an increasing number of use cases. The most recent cellular technology, called 5G for Fifth Generation, brings a transformation not only to wireless; but to industries worldwide by fueling the growth of Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial IoT (IIoT). Availability of additional spectrum e.g., use of millimeter wave (mmWave) spectrum bands, is a critical boost to wireless growth. These advanced wireless technologies bring multiplicative gains in data rates, latency reduction, capacity growth, and localization accuracy, that can be harnessed for Nuclear Nonproliferation activities along with other mission critical applications. However, using these functional advances securely is of utmost important specially for these critical applications. The functional capabilities of these advanced technologies including 5G & Wi-Fi 6, and the associated security issues and mitigations will be discussed in this session. The future technologies including 6G which will follow 5G and newer versions of Wi-Fi will be also introduced.
The U.S. medical community depends on a reliable supply of the radioisotope molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) for nuclear medical diagnostic procedures. Mo-99's decay product, technetium-99m (Tc-99m), is used in over 40,000 medical procedures in the United States each day to diagnose heart disease and cancer, to study organ structure and function, and to perform other important medical applications. For example, patients undergoing a common procedure—the cardiac “stress test”—likely have benefited from Tc-99m. Historically, Mo-99 was primarily produced through the fission of uranium-235, in the form of highly enriched uranium (HEU) targets irradiated in research and test reactors. HEU is a proliferation-sensitive material that, if diverted or stolen, could be used as a component of a nuclear weapon. NNSA’s Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) manages the Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) Program as part of its mission to minimize the use of HEU in civilian applications. The Mo-99 Program assists global Mo-99 production facilities in converting to non-HEU processes and supports the establishment of domestic supplies of Mo-99 without the use of proliferation-sensitive HEU. As part of this program, M3 funds U.S. national laboratories to provide non-proprietary technical support to U.S. companies working to establish non-HEU-based Mo-99 production capabilities. The results of this research are published on OSTI.gov for the benefit of the Mo-99 community and the public. However, it can be difficult for readers without a scientific background to understand and interpret these publications. In order to increase public understanding of the work being done in M3’s Mo-99 Program, this paper aims to provide an overview of a key, recent national laboratory technical publication in terms that can be understood by readers without a technical background. To accomplish this, the paper first explains key scientific concepts—primarily related to chemistry—that provide a foundation for understanding research in this area. This includes chromatography, absorption vs. adsorption, dissolution and precipitation, and liquid-liquid extraction. Drawing on these concepts, the paper then provides an explanation for non-technical audiences of the Argonne National Laboratory publication entitled Recovery of High Specific Activity Molybdenum-99 from Accelerator-Induced Fission on Low-Enriched Uranium for Technetium-99m Generators (Brown, M.A. et al., 2021) and related article Separation and Purification of Mo-99 Produced from Natural U3O8 Targets via Photo-Fission (Brown, M.A. et al., 2021).
The High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is one of five high power research reactors the Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) Program, Office of Conversion is working to convert from using highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to using low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This effort stems from the primary objective within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to achieve permanent threat reduction by minimizing, and when possible, eliminating weapon-usable nuclear material around the world. Under M3’s Office of Conversion, the U.S. High Performance Research Reactor (USHPRR) Project is pursuing fuel qualification and licensing of LEU fuels to support the high-performance reactors. All high-performance reactors except HFIR will be converted to LEU monolithic uranium-molybdenum alloy fuel. HFIR will be evaluated for conversion to LEU using a uranium silicide fuel, namely, U3Si2-Al dispersion fuel. The mission of the USHPRR Project is to develop the technology needed to reduce, and eventually eliminate, worldwide use of HEU in civilian applications. The goal is to develop the technical means needed to use low enriched uranium (LEU) instead of HEU fuel in research and test reactors without significant penalties in performance, economics, or safety of the reactors. The USHPRR Project has four major elements, called Pillars: Fuel Qualification (FQ) managed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Fuel Fabrication (FF) managed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Reactor Conversion (RC) managed at Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne), and Cross-Cutting (CC) managed at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). FQ is responsible for the qualification of the fuel type. RC is responsible for supporting reactor conversion analysis and overseeing licensing submittals leading to conversions of domestic reactors to LEU fuel. For the FQ effort, FQ (INL) worked in collaboration with RC (Argonne) and ORNL to develop the plan for the uranium silicide fuel qualification for HFIR. The resulting HFIR Fuel Qualification Plan provides the general approach for the USHPRR team to move the selected uranium silicide fuel design for HFIR conversion through qualification. Authorization and use in HFIR will be approved through the DOE’s Office of Science. Uranium silicide fuel was previously qualified in NUREG-1313 at an approximate maximum heat flux of 1.4 MW/m2 and a maximum fuel section temperature of about 130°C. In addition to the different regulator process utilized by DOE, these upper limits will be exceeded in HFIR; therefore, further testing will be necessary to ensure the fuel can meet HFIR qualification requirements. The HFIR fuel loading may exceed 4.8 gU/cm3 which was determined in the NUREG-1313 safety evaluation to be acceptable for use in non-power NRC-licensed reactors provided there exist no other safety considerations. In addition, the uranium silicide fuel will need to be qualified in a HFIR-specific design. This plan includes the currently available information from the USHPRR Project Functions and Requirements document and expands these requirements to ensure that planned tests have traceable results providing evidence that the requirements have been met. Data collection methods are discussed as well as the process to show that the requirements have been met. This document is designed to provide a pathway for researchers to obtain data necessary and at the appropriate quality level for HFIR fuel qualification
The High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is one of five high power research reactors the Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) Program, Office of Conversion is working to convert from using highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to using low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This effort stems from the primary objective within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to achieve permanent threat reduction by minimizing, and when possible, eliminating weapon-usable nuclear material around the world. Under M3’s Office of Conversion, the U.S. High Performance Research Reactor (USHPRR) Project is pursuing fuel qualification and licensing of the high-performance reactors to operate with LEU fuels. All high-performance reactors except HFIR will be converted to LEU monolithic uranium-molybdenum alloy fuel. HFIR will be evaluated for conversion to LEU using a uranium silicide fuel, namely, U3Si2-Al dispersion fuel.The mission of the USHPRR Project is to develop the technology needed to reduce, and eventually eliminate, worldwide use of HEU in civilian applications. The goal is to develop the technical means needed to use low enriched uranium (LEU) instead of HEU fuel in research and test reactors without significant penalties in performance, economics, or safety of the reactors. The USHPRR Project has four major elements, called Pillars: Fuel Qualification (FQ) managed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Fuel Fabrication (FF) managed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Reactor Conversion (RC) managed at Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne), and Cross-Cutting (CC) managed at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). FQ is responsible for the qualification of the fuel type. RC is responsible for supporting reactor conversion analysis and overseeing licensing submittals leading to conversions of domestic reactors to LEU fuel. For the FQ effort, FQ (INL) worked in collaboration with RC (Argonne) and ORNL to develop the plan for the uranium silicide fuel qualification for HFIR.The resulting HFIR Fuel Qualification Plan provides the general approach for the USHPRR team to move the selected uranium silicide fuel design for HFIR conversion through qualification. Authorization and use in HFIR will be approved through the DOE’s Office of Science. Uranium silicide fuel was previously qualified in NUREG-1313 at an approximate maximum heat flux of 1.4 MW/m2 and a maximum fuel section temperature of about 130°C. In addition to the different regulator process utilized by DOE, these upper limits will be exceeded in HFIR; therefore, further testing will be necessary to ensure the fuel can meet HFIR qualification requirements. The HFIR fuel loading may exceed 4.8 gU/cm3 which was determined in the NUREG-1313 safety evaluation to be acceptable for use in non-power NRC-regulated reactors provided there exist no other safety considerations. In addition, the uranium silicide fuel will need to be qualified in a HFIR-specific design. This plan includes the currently available information from the USHPRR Project Functions and Requirements document and expands these requirements to ensure that planned tests have traceable results providing evidence that the requirements have been met. Data collection methods are discussed as well as the process to show that the requirements have been met. This document is designed to provide a pathway for researchers to obtain data necessary and at the appropriate quality level for HFIR fuel qualification.
This panel session provided a fast-paced, high-energy and thought-provoking session on how to do business with the US DOE. Representatives from the Office of EM and the NNSA gave attendees insight on how to market and seek opportunities within their program offices, sites and laboratories, along with suggestions from a successful small business in the DOE market. Panelists with presentations: Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management (EM) (Norbert Doyle); Indian Eyes, LLC - What We Learned (video, Roxie Schescke)
Overview on the Energy Facility Contractor Group's (EFCOG) most recent work in partnership with DOE to improve performance and EFCOG's mission is to ensure safety, security, and quality across the US DOE complex. Best practices were highlighted in discussions with US DOE/ NNSA leaders and key project executives. EFCOG's key priorities for 2020 were featured in the panel discussions to include: addressing human capital issues to ensure future mission needs can be met; addressing supply chain issues for nuclear projects; improving the data quality and performance assurance; and improving risk communication and stakeholder relations. EFCOG accomplishes its mission through working groups that provide forums to address common challenges and exchange proven techniques and other management and technical information among member contractors. Panelists with presentations: WM EFCOG Panel Slides (Morgan Smith); EFCOG DOE Supply Chain Initiative (SCI) - Enabling The DOE Mission - (Darrell Graddy); Data Quality and Performance Assurance (JD Dowell); Risk Communication - Different Events - Very Different Responses from the Community (Rick McLeod); Current State of Cybersecurity (Liz Porter)