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At least 379 records · Page 21
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1977

Human-computer interaction in multitask situations

Human-computer interaction in multitask decisionmaking situations is considered, and it is proposed that humans and computers have overlapping responsibilities. Queueing theory is employed to model this dynamic approach to the allocation of responsibility between human and computer. Results of simulation experiments are used to illustrate the effects of several system variables including number of tasks, mean time between arrivals of action-evoking events, human-computer speed mismatch, probability of computer error, probability of human error, and the level of feedback between human and computer. Current experimental efforts are discussed and the practical issues involved in designing human-computer systems for multitask situations are considered.

Rouse, W. B.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Human Factors Process Task Analysis Liquid Oxygen Pump Acceptance Test Procedure for the Advanced Technology Development Center

A process task analysis effort was undertaken by Dynacs Inc. commencing in June 2002 under contract from NASA YA-D6. Funding was provided through NASA's Ames Research Center (ARC), Code M/HQ, and Industrial Engineering and Safety (IES). The John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Engineering Development Contract (EDC) Task Order was 5SMA768. The scope of the effort was to conduct a Human Factors Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (HF PFMEA) of a hazardous activity and provide recommendations to eliminate or reduce the effects of errors caused by human factors. The Liquid Oxygen (LOX) Pump Acceptance Test Procedure (ATP) was selected for this analysis. The HF PFMEA table (see appendix A) provides an analysis of six major categories evaluated for this study. These categories include Personnel Certification, Test Procedure Format, Test Procedure Safety Controls, Test Article Data, Instrumentation, and Voice Communication. For each specific requirement listed in appendix A, the following topics were addressed: Requirement, Potential Human Error, Performance-Shaping Factors, Potential Effects of the Error, Barriers and Controls, Risk Priority Numbers, and Recommended Actions. This report summarizes findings and gives recommendations as determined by the data contained in appendix A. It also includes a discussion of technology barriers and challenges to performing task analyses, as well as lessons learned. The HF PFMEA table in appendix A recommends the use of accepted and required safety criteria in order to reduce the risk of human error. The items with the highest risk priority numbers should receive the greatest amount of consideration. Implementation of the recommendations will result in a safer operation for all personnel.

Diorio, Kimberly A.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human Contribution to Safety: Human Performance is Not Just About Error

- When the only data that are available are about human failure, then data-driven designs only consider that humans fail. - Designs intended to "protect" the system from "error-prone" humans can design-out the capability for humans to effectively intervene/adapt, which is a far more common behavior.

Jon Holbrook↗
NASA NTRS2014

Human Reliability and the Cost of Doing Business

Most businesses recognize that people will make mistakes and assume errors are just part of the cost of doing business, but does it need to be? Companies with high risk, or major consequences, should consider the effect of human error. In a variety of industries, Human Errors have caused costly failures and workplace injuries. These have included: airline mishaps, medical malpractice, administration of medication and major oil spills have all been blamed on human error. A technique to mitigate or even eliminate some of these costly human errors is the use of Human Reliability Analysis (HRA). Various methodologies are available to perform Human Reliability Assessments that range from identifying the most likely areas for concern to detailed assessments with human error failure probabilities calculated. Which methodology to use would be based on a variety of factors that would include: 1) how people react and act in different industries, and differing expectations based on industries standards, 2) factors that influence how the human errors could occur such as tasks, tools, environment, workplace, support, training and procedure, 3) type and availability of data and 4) how the industry views risk & reliability influences ( types of emergencies, contingencies and routine tasks versus cost based concerns). The Human Reliability Assessments should be the first step to reduce, mitigate or eliminate the costly mistakes or catastrophic failures. Using Human Reliability techniques to identify and classify human error risks allows a company more opportunities to mitigate or eliminate these risks and prevent costly failures.

DeMott, Diana↗
NASA NTRS2011

Reliability Analysis and Standardization of Spacecraft Command Generation Processes

center dot In order to reduce commanding errors that are caused by humans, we create an approach and corresponding artifacts for standardizing the command generation process and conducting risk management during the design and assurance of such processes. center dot The literature review conducted during the standardization process revealed that very few atomic level human activities are associated with even a broad set of missions. center dot Applicable human reliability metrics for performing these atomic level tasks are available. center dot The process for building a "Periodic Table" of Command and Control Functions as well as Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models is demonstrated. center dot The PRA models are executed using data from human reliability data banks. center dot The Periodic Table is related to the PRA models via Fault Links.

human errors.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Model-based VQ for image data archival, retrieval and distribution

An ideal image compression technique for image data archival, retrieval and distribution would be one with the asymmetrical computational requirements of Vector Quantization (VQ), but without the complications arising from VQ codebooks. Codebook generation and maintenance are stumbling blocks which have limited the use of VQ as a practical image compression algorithm. Model-based VQ (MVQ), a variant of VQ described here, has the computational properties of VQ but does not require explicit codebooks. The codebooks are internally generated using mean removed error and Human Visual System (HVS) models. The error model assumed is the Laplacian distribution with mean, lambda-computed from a sample of the input image. A Laplacian distribution with mean, lambda, is generated with uniform random number generator. These random numbers are grouped into vectors. These vectors are further conditioned to make them perceptually meaningful by filtering the DCT coefficients from each vector. The DCT coefficients are filtered by multiplying by a weight matrix that is found to be optimal for human perception. The inverse DCT is performed to produce the conditioned vectors for the codebook. The only image dependent parameter used in the generation of codebook is the mean, lambda, that is included in the coded file to repeat the codebook generation process for decoding.

Manohar, Mareboyana↗
NASA NTRS2001

Improved Quick Disconnect (QD) Interface Through Fail Safe Parts Identification

An extensive review of existing Quick Disconnects (QDs) mating and demating operations was performed to determine which shuttle part interface identifications and procedures contribute to human factor errors. The research methods used consisted of interviews with engineers and technicians, examination of incident reports, critiques of video and audio tapes of QD operations, and attendance of a Hyper QD operational course. The data strongly suggests that there are inherit human factor errors involved in QD operations. To promote fail-safe operations, QD interface problem areas and recommendations were outlined and reviewed. It is suggested that dialogue, investigations and recommendations continue.

Blanch-Payne, Evelyn↗
NASA NTRS1999

Human Reliability Analysis: An Overview

Human/process error is potentially a large contributor to failures of aerospace systems. For some systems, such as the space shuttle main engine, large amounts of data are available, and accurate failure rates can be determined empirically. For such systems, the human error is implicit in the empirical failure rate and does not need to be quantified separately. However, for other systems, such as the solid rocket boosters, large amounts of data are not available and the failure rates must be determined by more theoretical means. When empirical data is lacking, structural models and engineering judgment must be employed. In this case, the human/process error must be modeled explicitly. An extensive literature review was performed to determine what methods already exist for modeling human error for aerospace systems. No methods that apply directly were found, although there are a number of methods that have been developed specifically for the nuclear power industry that could probably be modified for space applications. The results of the literature review are presented, as well as recommendations for future research.

Navard, Sharon E.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Program Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program’s objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, more onboard systems autonomy and functionality will be needed to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with-audio, video, lighting, and crew controls. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program-especially crew controls which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error-especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA’s approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that embraces NASA’s Human-Rating Requirements-ensuring human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering, and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

Human-Rating↗
NASA NTRS2004

Development and Characterization of a Low-Pressure Calibration System for Hypersonic Wind Tunnels

Minimization of uncertainty is essential for accurate ESP measurements at very low free-stream static pressures found in hypersonic wind tunnels. Statistical characterization of environmental error sources requires a well defined and controlled calibration method. A calibration system has been constructed and environmental control software developed to control experimentation to eliminate human induced error sources. The initial stability study of the calibration system shows a high degree of measurement accuracy and precision in temperature and pressure control. Control manometer drift and reference pressure instabilities induce uncertainty into the repeatability of voltage responses measured from the PSI System 8400 between calibrations. Methods of improving repeatability are possible through software programming and further experimentation.

Green, Del L.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Statistical Characterization of Environmental Error Sources Affecting Electronically Scanned Pressure Transducers

Minimization of uncertainty is essential to extend the usable range of the 15-psid Electronically Scanned Pressure (ESP) transducer measurements to the low free-stream static pressures found in hypersonic wind tunnels. Statistical characterization of environmental error sources inducing much of this uncertainty requires a well defined and controlled calibration method. Employing such a controlled calibration system, several studies were conducted that provide quantitative information detailing the required controls needed to minimize environmental and human induced error sources. Results of temperature, environmental pressure, over-pressurization, and set point randomization studies for the 15-psid transducers are presented along with a comparison of two regression methods using data acquired with both 0.36-psid and 15-psid transducers. Together these results provide insight into procedural and environmental controls required for long term high-accuracy pressure measurements near 0.01 psia in the hypersonic testing environment using 15-psid ESP transducers.

Green, Del L.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Statistical Characterization of Environmental Error Sources Affecting Electronically Scanned Pressure Transducers

Minimization of uncertainty is essential to extend the usable range of the 15-psid Electronically Scanned Pressure [ESP) transducer measurements to the low free-stream static pressures found in hypersonic wind tunnels. Statistical characterization of environmental error sources inducing much of this uncertainty requires a well defined and controlled calibration method. Employing such a controlled calibration system, several studies were conducted that provide quantitative information detailing the required controls needed to minimize environmental and human induced error sources. Results of temperature, environmental pressure, over-pressurization, and set point randomization studies for the 15-psid transducers are presented along with a comparison of two regression methods using data acquired with both 0.36-psid and 15-psid transducers. Together these results provide insight into procedural and environmental controls required for long term high-accuracy pressure measurements near 0.01 psia in the hypersonic testing environment using 15-psid ESP transducers.

Green, Del L.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Review of Significant Incidents and Close Calls in Human Spaceflight from a Human Factors Perspective

This project aims to identify poor human factors design decisions that led to error-prone systems, or did not facilitate the flight crew making the right choices; and to verify that NASA is effectively preventing similar incidents from occurring again. This analysis was performed by reviewing significant incidents and close calls in human spaceflight identified by the NASA Johnson Space Center Safety and Mission Assurance Flight Safety Office. The review of incidents shows whether the identified human errors were due to the operational phase (flight crew and ground control) or if they initiated at the design phase (includes manufacturing and test). This classification was performed with the aid of the NASA Human Systems Integration domains. This in-depth analysis resulted in a tool that helps with the human factors classification of significant incidents and close calls in human spaceflight, which can be used to identify human errors at the operational level, and how they were or should be minimized. Current governing documents on human systems integration for both government and commercial crew were reviewed to see if current requirements, processes, training, and standard operating procedures protect the crew and ground control against these issues occurring in the future. Based on the findings, recommendations to target those areas are provided.

Silva-Martinez, Jackelynne↗
NASA NTRS1998

Errors in Aviation Decision Making: Bad Decisions or Bad Luck?

Despite efforts to design systems and procedures to support 'correct' and safe operations in aviation, errors in human judgment still occur and contribute to accidents. In this paper we examine how an NDM (naturalistic decision making) approach might help us to understand the role of decision processes in negative outcomes. Our strategy was to examine a collection of identified decision errors through the lens of an aviation decision process model and to search for common patterns. The second, and more difficult, task was to determine what might account for those patterns. The corpus we analyzed consisted of tactical decision errors identified by the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) from a set of accidents in which crew behavior contributed to the accident. A common pattern emerged: about three quarters of the errors represented plan-continuation errors, that is, a decision to continue with the original plan despite cues that suggested changing the course of action. Features in the context that might contribute to these errors were identified: (a) ambiguous dynamic conditions and (b) organizational and socially-induced goal conflicts. We hypothesize that 'errors' are mediated by underestimation of risk and failure to analyze the potential consequences of continuing with the initial plan. Stressors may further contribute to these effects. Suggestions for improving performance in these error-inducing contexts are discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗
DOE OSTI2023

Simulation-Based Recovery Action Analysis Using the EMRALD Dynamic Risk Assessment Tool

Recovery human action is defined as the action that prevents deviant conditions from producing unwanted effects. Analyzing recovery actions has been a critical part in human reliability analysis (HRA). However, there are a couple of limitations to treating recovery actions using only the current HRA methods available. Representatively, the existing recovery analysis does not specifically consider recovery actions as they have occurred in actual nuclear power plants (NPPs). To handle the challenges in the existing recovery analyses, this study suggests a way to analyze recovery actions under a dynamic HRA method, the Procedure-based Risk Investigation MEthod-Human Reliability Analysis (PRIME-HRA) method. The PRIME-HRA method suggests a way on how to develop dynamic simulation models using dynamic risk assessment tools such as the Event Modeling Risk Assessment Using Linked Diagram (EMRALD) [1] and the Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER) [2]. EMRALD and HUNTER are the dynamic probabilistic risk assessment and HRA tools developed at Idaho National Laboratory. In this paper, differences on analyzing recovery actions in the Technique for Human Error-Rate Prediction (THERP), the Cause-Based Decision Tree (CBDT) and the Korean Standard HRA (K-HRA) and challenges of these approaches are introduced. How we have developed the PRIME-HRA is also introduced in this paper. Then, the proposed approach to analyzing recovery human actions in dynamic context is partially discussed with an example.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS2018

Evaluation of Multiple Flow Constrained Area Capacity Setting Methods for Collaborative Trajectory Options Program

The purpose of this study was to compare flow constrained area (FCA) capacity setting methods for Collaborative Trajectory Options Program (CTOP) as they pertain to the Integrated Demand Management (IDM) concept. IDM uses flow balancing to manage air traffic across multiple FCAs with a common downstream constraint, as well as constraints at the respective FCA locations. FCA capacity rates can be set manually, but generating capacities for multiple, interdependent FCAs could potentially over-burden a user. A new enhancement to CTOP called the FCA Balance Algorithm (FBA) was developed at NASA Ames Research Center to improve the process of allocating capacity across multiple flow constrained segments in the airspace. The FBA evaluates the predicted demand and capacity across multiple FCAs and dynamically generates capacity settings for the FCAs that best meet capacity limits for all identified constraints. In a human-in-the-loop simulation study, both manual and automated capacity setting methods were evaluated in terms of their overall feasibility using measures of system performance, human performance, and qualitative feedback. Subject matter experts were asked to use three different methods to allocate capacity to three FCAs, either (1) by manually setting capacity for every 60-minute time window, (2) by manually setting capacity for every 15-minute time window, or (3) by using the FBA capability to automatically generate capacity settings. Results showed no significant differences in terms of overall system performance, indicated by similar ground delay and airport throughput numbers between methods. However, differences in individual strategies afforded by the manual methods allowed some participants to achieve system-wide delay that was much lower than the average. The FBA was the fastest method of capacity setting, and it received the lowest subjective rating scores on physical task load, mental task load, task difficulty and task complexity out of the three methods. Finally, participants explained through qualitative feedback that there were many benefits to using the FBA, such as ease of use, accuracy, and low risk of human input error. Participants did not experience the same limitations with the FBA that they did with the manual methods, such as reduced accuracy in the 60-minute manual condition, or high complexity in the 15-minute/manual condition. These results suggest that the FBA automation enhancement to CTOP maintains system performance while improving human performance. Therefore, the FBA could be introduced as a way to mitigate operator workload while planning a CTOP.

NextGen↗
NASA NTRS2018

Evaluation of Multiple Flow Constrained Area Capacity Setting Methods for Collaborative Trajectory Options Program

The purpose of this study was to compare flow constrained area (FCA) capacity setting methods for Collaborative Trajectory Options Program (CTOP) as they pertain to the Integrated Demand Management (IDM) concept. IDM uses flow balancing to manage air traffic across multiple FCAs with a common downstream constraint, as well as constraints at the respective FCA locations. FCA capacity rates can be set manually, but generating capacities for multiple, interdependent FCAs could potentially over-burden a user. A new enhancement to CTOP called the FCA Balance Algorithm (FBA) was developed at NASA Ames Research Center to improve the process of allocating capacity across multiple flow constrained segments in the airspace. The FBA evaluates the predicted demand and capacity across multiple FCAs and dynamically generates capacity settings for the FCAs that best meet capacity limits for all identified constraints. In a human-in-the-loop simulation study, both manual and automated capacity setting methods were evaluated in terms of their overall feasibility using measures of system performance, human performance, and qualitative feedback. Subject matter experts were asked to use three different methods to allocate capacity to three FCAs, either (1) by manually setting capacity for every 60-minute time window, (2) by manually setting capacity for every 15-minute time window, or (3) by using the FBA capability to automatically generate capacity settings. Results showed no significant differences in terms of overall system performance, indicated by similar ground delay and airport throughput numbers between methods. However, differences in individual strategies afforded by the manual methods allowed some participants to achieve system-wide delay that was much lower than the average. The FBA was the fastest method of capacity setting, and it received the lowest subjective rating scores on physical task load, mental task load, task difficulty and task complexity out of the three methods. Finally, participants explained through qualitative feedback that there were many benefits to using the FBA, such as ease of use, accuracy, and low risk of human input error. Participants did not experience the same limitations with the FBA that they did with the manual methods, such as reduced accuracy in the 60-minute manual condition, or high complexity in the 15-minute/manual condition. These results suggest that the FBA automation enhancement to CTOP maintains system performance while improving human performance. Therefore, the FBA could be introduced as a way to mitigate operator workload while planning a CTOP.

NextGen↗