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At least 379 records · Page 21
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2009

Dynamic Structural Fault Detection and Identification

Aircraft structures are designed to guarantee safety of flight in some required operational envelope. When the aircraft becomes structurally impaired, safety of flight may not be guaranteed within that previously safe operational envelope. In this case the safe operational envelope must be redefined in-flight and a means to prevent excursion from this new envelope must be implemented. A specific structural failure mode that may result in a reduced safe operating envelope, the exceedance of which could lead to catastrophic structural failure of the aircraft, will be addressed. The goal of the DFEAP program is the detection of this failure mode coupled with flight controls adaptation to limit critical loads in the damaged aircraft structure. The DFEAP program is working with an F/A-18 aircraft model. The composite wing skins are bonded to metallic spars in the wing substructure. Over time, it is possible that this bonding can deteriorate due to fatigue. In this case, the ability of the wing spar to transfer loading between the wing skins is reduced. This failure mode can translate to a reduced allowable compressive strain on the wing skin and could lead to catastrophic wing buckling if load limiting of the wing structure is not applied. The DFEAP program will make use of a simplified wing strain model for the healthy aircraft. The outputs of this model will be compared in real-time to onboard strain measurements at several locations on the aircraft wing. A damage condition is declared at a given location when the strain measurements differ sufficiently from the strain model. Parameter identification of the damaged structure wing strain parameters will be employed to provide load limiting control adaptation for the aircraft. This paper will discuss the simplified strain models used in the implementation and their interaction with the strain sensor measurements. Also discussed will be the damage detection and identification schemes employed and the means by which the damaged aircraft parameters will be used to provide load limiting that keeps the aircraft within the safe operational envelope.

Smith, Timothy↗
NASA NTRS1979

Experimental study of the flight envelope and research of safety requirements for hang-gliders

The flight mechanic computations were computed, providing both the flight envelopes with all sorts of limits and a fairly precise idea of the influence of several parameters, such as pilot's weight, wing settings, aeroelasticity, etc... The particular problem of luffing dives was thoroughly analyzed, and two kinds of causes were exhibited in both the rules of luffing and aeroelastic effects. The general analysis of longitudinal stability showed a strong link with fabric tension, as expected through Nielsen's and Twaites' theory. Fabric tension strongly depending upon aeroelasticity, that parameter was found to be the most effective design one for positive stability. Lateral stability was found to be very similar in all gliders except perhaps the cylindro-conical. The loss of stability happens in roll at low angle of attack, whereas it happens in yaw at high angle. Turning performance was a bit suprising, with a common maximum value of approximately 55 deg of bank angle for a steady turn.

Laburthe, C.↗
NASA NTRS1990

A pilot rating scale for evaluating failure transients in electronic flight control systems

A pilot rating scale was developed to describe the effects of transients in helicopter flight-control systems on safety-of-flight and on pilot recovery action. The scale was applied to the evaluation of hardovers that could potentially occur in the digital flight-control system being designed for a variable-stability UH-60A research helicopter. Tests were conducted in a large moving-base simulator and in flight. The results of the investigation were combined with existing airworthiness criteria to determine quantitative reliability design goals for the control system.

Hindson, William S.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Analysis of Observed Propulsion Failure Modes Following NASA’s Artemis I Mission

In 2022, NASA’s Artemis program returned the agency to lunar space, propelled by the Orion European Service Module (ESM). Through rigorous ground test campaigns for Artemis I and II and the collection and transmission of operational data during the Artemis I flight, the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) team created and maintained a robust database of component nonconformances. This study analyzes in-flight and ground processing findings on the Artemis ESM propulsion subsystem to track reliability and safety metrics, as well as comparing the data to that of previous human spaceflight programs, Apollo and Space Shuttle. In drawing a comparison to the Artemis I flight, recommendations can be made for the Artemis II crewed mission to ensure best practices for flight safety, including redundancy and failure tolerance in the system. The results reinforce a need for robust safety standards and caution against the complacency of a single successful test flight.

human spaceflight safety↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Analysis of Observed Propulsion Failure Modes Following NASA’s Artemis I Mission

In 2022, NASA’s Artemis program returned the agency to lunar space, propelled by the Orion European Service Module (ESM). Through rigorous ground test campaigns for Artemis I and II and the collection and transmission of operational data during the Artemis I flight, the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) team created and maintained a robust database of component nonconformances. This study analyzes in-flight and ground processing findings on the Artemis ESM propulsion subsystem to track reliability and safety metrics, as well as comparing the data to that of previous human spaceflight programs, Apollo and Space Shuttle. In drawing a comparison to the Artemis I flight, recommendations can be made for the Artemis II crewed mission to ensure best practices for flight safety, including redundancy and failure tolerance in the system. The results reinforce a need for robust safety standards and caution against the complacency of a single successful test flight.

human spaceflight safety↗
NASA NTRS2010

NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Program: Generic Safety, Handling and Qualification Guidelines for Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) Batteries; Availability of Source Materials for Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) Batteries; Maintaining Technical Communications Related to Aerospace Batteries (NASA Aerospace Battery Workshop)

This NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group was chartered within the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). The Battery Working Group was tasked to complete tasks and to propose proactive work to address battery related, agency-wide issues on an annual basis. In its first year of operation, this proactive program addressed various aspects of the validation and verification of aerospace battery systems for NASA missions. Studies were performed, issues were discussed and in many cases, test programs were executed to generate recommendations and guidelines to reduce risk associated with various aspects of implementing battery technology in the aerospace industry. This document contains Part 1 - Volume I: Generic Safety, Handling and Qualification Guidelines for Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) Batteries, Availability of Source Materials for Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) Batteries, and Maintaining Technical Communications Related to Aerospace Batteries (NASA Aerospace Battery Workshop).

Manzo, Michelle A.↗
NASA NTRS2010

NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Program: Generic Safety, Handling and Qualification Guidelines for Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) Batteries; Availability of Source Materials for Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) Batteries; Maintaining Technical Communications Related to Aerospace Batteries (NASA Aerospace Battery Workshop)

This NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group was chartered within the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). The Battery Working Group was tasked to complete tasks and to propose proactive work to address battery related, agency-wide issues on an annual basis. In its first year of operation, this proactive program addressed various aspects of the validation and verification of aerospace battery systems for NASA missions. Studies were performed, issues were discussed and in many cases, test programs were executed to generate recommendations and guidelines to reduce risk associated with various aspects of implementing battery technology in the aerospace industry. This report contains the Appendices to the findings from the first year of the program's operations.

Manzo, Michelle A.↗
NASA NTRS2005

STS-114: Post Launch MMT Briefing

Bill Parsons, Space Shuttle Program Manager, and Wayne Hill, Deputy Manager of the Space Shuttle Program, and Chair of the Mission Management Team talks about the flight day 2 of the Discovery. Bill noted that flight operations are extremely going on well. He also explained an unexpected debris event on a power ramp little ways down where LH2 ramp begins. Before flight and based from technical data, slight modifications were done on the power ramp to ensure safety of return to flight. Bill also noted that STS-114 is a test flight; all data collected and brought back by the crew will be analyzed to ensure that all information needed is sufficient to work on faults and defects and to make appropriate repairs. Wayne discussed on flight safety. He emphasized the need to thoroughly inspect the thermal protection system of the Orbiter to ensure safe entry. Inspection of still photographs from the ISS and the boom sensor system scan are the primary means to understand engineering data in terms of the immediate flight safety. He also reported accomplishments for the day such as survey of the Orbiter boom system, all the wing leading edge, RCC panels and the nose cap, to make sure these are in good shape and working well, and re-emphasized that these are primary methods to clear the thermal protection system of the Orbiter to prove that it is safe to come home on this flight.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2001

Full-Span Tiltrotor Aeroacoustic Model (TRAM) Overview and 40- by 80-Foot Wind Tunnel Test

Most helicopter data trends cannot be extrapolated to tiltrotors because blade geometry and aerodynamic behavior, as well as rotor and fuselage interactions, are significantly different for tiltrotors. A tiltrotor model has been developed to investigate the aeromechanics of tiltrotors, to develop a comprehensive database for validating tiltrotor analyses, and to provide a research platform for supporting future tiltrotor designs. The Full-Span Tiltrotor Aeroacoustic Model (FS TRAM) is a dual-rotor, powered aircraft model with extensive instrumentation for measurement of structural and aerodynamic loads. This paper will present the Full-Span TRAM test capabilities and the first set of data obtained during a 40- by 80-Foot Wind Tunnel test conducted in late 2000 at NASA Ames Research Center. The Full-Span TRAM is a quarter-scale representation of the V-22 Osprey aircraft, and a heavily instrumented NASA and U.S. Army wind tunnel test stand. Rotor structural loads are monitored and recorded for safety-of-flight and for information on blade loads and dynamics. Left and right rotor balance and fuselage balance loads are monitored for safety-of-flight and for measurement of vehicle and rotor aerodynamic performance. Static pressure taps on the left wing are used to determine rotor/wing interactional effects and rotor blade dynamic pressures measure blade airloads. All of these measurement capabilities make the FS TRAM test stand a unique and valuable asset for validation of computational codes and to aid in future tiltrotor designs. The Full-Span TRAM was tested in the NASA Ames Research Center 40- by 80-Foot Wind Tunnel from October through December 2000. Rotor and vehicle performance measurements were acquired in addition to wing pressures, rotor acoustics, and Laser Light Sheet (LLS) flow visualization data. Hover, forward flight, and airframe (rotors off) aerodynamic runs were performed. Helicopter-mode data were acquired during angle of attack and thrust sweeps for a variety of tunnel speeds. Wake geometry images were acquired using LLS photographs and suggest dual tip vortex formation at low thrust conditions. The full paper will include comparisons to isolated-rotor TRAM data acquired at the Duits-Nederlandse Windtunnel (DNW) in 1998. The FS TRAM has been established as a valuable national asset for tiltrotor research. Data reduction and analysis of the 40- by 80-Foot Wind Tunnel test results are underway. Follow-on testing of the FS TRAM is currently being planned for the NASA Ames 80- by 120-Foot Wind Tunnel in late 2001.

McCluer, Megan S.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Online Prediction of Battery Discharge and Estimation of Parasitic Loads for an Electric Aircraft

Predicting whether or not vehicle batteries contain sufficient charge to support operations over the remainder of a given flight plan is critical for electric aircraft. This paper describes an approach for identifying upper and lower uncertainty bounds on predictions that aircraft batteries will continue to meet output power and voltage requirements over the remainder of a flight plan. Battery discharge prediction is considered here in terms of the following components; (i) online battery state of charge estimation; (ii) prediction of future battery power demand as a function of an aircraft flight plan; (iii) online estimation of additional parasitic battery loads; and finally, (iv) estimation of flight plan safety. Substantial uncertainty is considered to be an irremovable part of the battery discharge prediction problem. However, high-confidence estimates of flight plan safety or lack of safety are shown to be generated from even highly uncertain prognostic predictions.

Battery Discharge Prediction↗
NASA NTRS1980

Helicopter technology benefits and needs. Volume 2: Appendices

Vehicle design, avionics and flight systems; safety and reliability; navigation, guidance and flight control; propulsion; auxiliary systems; human factors; and monitoring and diagnostic systems are the technology areas involved in solving operational and technical problems related to the use of helicopters. Tables show the problems encountered and the proposed research and technology for helicopter use for search and rescue; emergency medical services; law enforcement; environmental control; fire fighting; and resource management.

Zuk, J.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Flight Test Hazard Planning Near the Speed of Light

A viewgraph presentation describing flight test safety near the speed of light is shown. The topics include: 1) Concept; 2) Portal Content; 3) Activity to Date; 4) FTS Database Updatd FAA Program; 5) FAA Flight Test Risk Management; 6) CFR 14 Part 21.35 Current and proposed changes; 7) An Online Resource for Flight Test Safety Planning; 8) Data Gathering; 9) NTPS Role; 10) Example Maturation; 11) Many Varied Inputs; 12) Matured Stall Hazards; 13) Loss of Control Mitigations; 14) FAA Access; 15) NASA PBMA Website Link; 16) FAR Reference Search; 17) Record Field Search; 18) Keyword Search; and 19) Results of FAR Reference Search.

Henwood, Bart↗
NASA NTRS2012

The Human Dimension of Closing the Training Gap for Fifth-Generation Fighters

Based on a review of the recent technical literature there is little question that a serious training gap exists for fifth-generation fighters, primarily arising from the need to provide their own red-air. There are several methods for reducing this gap, including injecting virtual and constructive threats into the live cockpit. This live-virtual-constructive (LVC) training approach provides a cost effective means for addressing training needs but faces several challenges. Technical challenges include data links and information assurance. A more serious challenge may be the human factors dimension of representing virtual and constructive entities in the cockpit while ensuring safety-of-flight. This also needs to happen without increasing pilot workload. This paper discusses the methods Rockwell Collins and the University of Iowa's Operator Performance Lab use to assess pilot workload and training fidelity measures in an LVC training environment and the research we are conducting in safety-of-flight requirements of integrated LVC symbology.

Hoke, Jaclyn↗
NASA NTRS1990

The vortex flap F-106B, overcoming safety and data problems in flight testing

A NASA, F-106B airplane equipped with a vortex flap is establishing a data base for calibration of design and analysis tools for this vortical flow control concept. Some of the problems in safely and precisely flying to research data points were caused by the modified airplane's low longitudinal stability and low margin of structural strength. These characteristics are, in part, a consequence of the program's low cost approach which utilizes a bolt-on, ground-adjustable flap attached to a minimally modified airplane. Presently, the 40-degree flap deflection flight research is being concluded with a flow visualization phase. A similar pattern of flight envelope expansion, pressure distribution, performance, and flow visualization phases remain to be accomplished for the 30-degree flap setting. To date, good research flight data has followed resolution of the safety and data problems described.

Brown, Philip W.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Debris/ice/TPS assessment and integrated photographic analysis for Shuttle Mission STS-62

A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle was conducted on 2 March 1994. The detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39B and MLP-1 also included the primary flight elements OV-102 Columbia (16th flight), ET-62 (LWT 55), and BI-064 SRB's. There were no significant facility or vehicle anomalies. After the launch on March 4th, a debris inspection of Pad 39B was performed. Damage to the pad overall was minimal. On-orbit photographs taken by the flight crew and two films from the ET/ORB umbilical cameras of the External Tank after separation from the Orbiter revealed no major damage or lost flight hardware that would have been a safety of flight concern. Orbiter performance on final approach appeared normal. Infrared imagery of landing gear deployment showed the loss of thermal barrier from the nose gear wheel well. The missing thermal barrier material was not recovered. The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after retrieval. Both frustums had a combined total of 44 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners. Significant amounts of BTA had been applied to closeouts on the RH frustum, forward skirt, and aft skirt. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas were the BTA had been applied. The underlying BTA was not sooted (IFA STS-62-B-1). Investigation of this condition has concluded there was insufficient heat rates to cause blistering of the Hypalon until late in the ascent phase. A post landing inspection of OV-102 was conducted after the landing at KSC. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 97 hits, of which 16 had a major dimension of 1 inch or larger. The Orbiter lower surface had a total of 36 hits, of which 7 had a major dimension of 1 inch or larger. Based on these numbers and comparison to statistics from previous missions of similar configuration, both the total number of debris hits and the number of hits 1 inch or larger was less than average. Six thermal barriers, total size approximately 36 in. x 3 in. x 1.5 in., and one corner tile piece 4 in. x 4 in., were missing from the nose landing gear doors. Runway infrared cameras recorded these objects falling from the Orbiter when the nose landing gear doors were opened on final approach. A search of the area under the flight path failed to recover the missing thermal batteries, which may be submerged in the large body of water south of the runway. The cause for the loss of the material was attributed to the way the substrate was prepared for bonding at the vendor. Orbiter post landing microchemical sample results revealed a variety of residuals in the Orbiter window samples. These were attributed to SRB BSM exhaust, Orbiter TPS, window protective covers and processing, natural landing site products, and paints/primers from various sources. The residual sampling data do not indicate a single source of damaging debris and all of these materials have been documented previously in analyses for post landing sample reports. Data from residual sampling also showed no trends when compared to previous mission data. A total of ten Post Launch Anomalies, including one IFA, were observed during the STS-62 mission assessment.

Katnik, Gregory N.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Adaptive Flight Control for Aircraft Safety Enhancements

This poster presents the current adaptive control research being conducted at NASA ARC and LaRC in support of the Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control (IRAC) project. The technique "Approximate Stability Margin Analysis of Hybrid Direct-Indirect Adaptive Control" has been developed at NASA ARC to address the needs for stability margin metrics for adaptive control that potentially enables future V&V of adaptive systems. The technique "Direct Adaptive Control With Unknown Actuator Failures" is developed at NASA LaRC to deal with unknown actuator failures. The technique "Adaptive Control with Adaptive Pilot Element" is being researched at NASA LaRC to investigate the effects of pilot interactions with adaptive flight control that can have implications of stability and performance.

Nguyen, Nhan T.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Human Systems Integration (HSI) for Safety- Critical Range Operations at Wallops Flight Facility (WFF)

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Human Factors (HF) Technical Discipline Team (TDT) funded a preliminary study in 2017 that was narrowly focused within the Range Data Display System (RDDS) scope of display design requirements based on schedule and resources. Wallops Flight Facility (WFF) personnel involved in the previous study asked for a broader Human Systems Integration (HSI) involvement that would span both the RDDS and Flight Termination System (FTS) projects and assist with identifying HSI best practices, via appropriate standards and guidelines, that if properly implemented should result in a more effective and efficient Range Safety Operations. WFF Range Safety Operations has expressed a need to assess the roles, responsibilities, and functions of the various personnel on console during launches to identify existing and potential efficiencies and incorporate them in the new system design. This assessment addresses that need.

Cynthia H Null↗