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An apparatus includes an electromechanical x-ray generator (MEXRAY) configured to charged capacitors using a small, high-voltage direct current. The apparatus also includes an ultraviolet (UV) light emitting diode (LED) driven photocathode device configured to control/modulate an electron dose rate of the MEXRAY or other vacuum DC, source.
The Advanced Reactor Terminology Graphite Research and Development program is currently measuring irradiated material property changes in several grades of nuclear graphite to predict behavior and operating performance within the core of these new high temperature reactor designs. The Advanced Graphite Creep (AGC) experiment, consisting of six irradiation capsules, will generate the irradiated graphite performance data for the Very High Temperature Reactor operating conditions. All six capsules in the experiment conducted at Idaho National Laboratory will be irradiated in the Advanced Test Reactor, disassembled in the Hot Fuel Examination Facility, and examined at the Idaho National Laboratory Research Center. This is the disassembly report describing the disassembly, shipment, post irradiation inspection, and storage of the graphite specimens contained within the AGC 4 irradiation test series capsule (the fourth irradiation capsule of the series). AGC 4 was irradiated in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) East Flux Trap (EFT) during ATR Cycle 157D, 158A, 162A, 162B, 164A, 164B, 166A, and Cycle 166B. Approximately 3.6 dpa was achieved. Desired experiment temperatures were exceeded by at least 100C during the second Cycle of irradiation due to the insertion of the KJRR experiment. The capsule was removed from the ATR and transferred to the Hot Fuel Examination Facility on May 15, 2020 and eventually unloaded into the Hot Fuel Examination Facility (HFEF) Decon Cell through Penetration 2D on February 26, 2021. It was moved to the HFEF Main Cell Window 3M for disassembly on March 15, 2021. Disassembly and specimen extraction began March 18, 2021, and packaging of the graphite specimens was completed on April 16, 2021. Several anomalies were noted, specifically that the radiological dose rates were nominally an order of magnitude higher than that of the previous AGC experiments. This report summarizes the disassembly of the AGC 4 experiment.
The Y-12 National Security Complex and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) selected the Mirion CAAS-3S as the Criticality Accident Alarm System for UPF and for Y-12 facilities replacing their legacy CAAS as part of efforts to extend the facility lifespans. As part of this process, the CAAS-3S system was exposed to a high radiation dose and dose rate during reactor testing with the Godiva-IV fast burst reactor. The reactor testing was designed around preliminary analyses that determined Y-12 and UPF requirements, and simulations of the radiation field within the reactor facility were used to determine reactor operating parameters, CAAS equipment locations, and the design of a neutron shield wall. This paper presents the design and results of the testing, and discusses how the test results were interpreted by criticality safety engineers at Y-12 and UPF.
The Advanced Reactor Terminology Graphite Research and Development program is currently measuring irradiated material property changes in several grades of nuclear graphite to predict behavior and operating performance within the core of these new high temperature reactor designs. The Advanced Graphite Creep (AGC) experiment, consisting of six irradiation capsules, will generate the irradiated graphite performance data for the Very High Temperature Reactor operating conditions. All six capsules in the experiment conducted at Idaho National Laboratory will be irradiated in the Advanced Test Reactor, disassembled in the Hot Fuel Examination Facility, and examined at the Idaho National Laboratory Research Center. This is the disassembly report describing the disassembly, shipment, post irradiation inspection, and storage of the graphite specimens contained within the AGC 4 irradiation test series capsule (the fourth irradiation capsule of the series). AGC 4 was irradiated in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) East Flux Trap (EFT) during ATR Cycle 157D, 158A, 162A, 162B, 164A, 164B, 166A, and Cycle 166B. Approximately 3.6 dpa was achieved. Desired experiment temperatures were exceeded by at least 100C during the second Cycle of irradiation due to the insertion of the KJRR experiment. The capsule was removed from the ATR and transferred to the Hot Fuel Examination Facility on May 15, 2020 and eventually unloaded into the Hot Fuel Examination Facility (HFEF) Decon Cell through Penetration 2D on February 26, 2021. It was moved to the HFEF Main Cell Window 3M for disassembly on March 15, 2021. Disassembly and specimen extraction began March 18, 2021, and packaging of the graphite specimens was completed on April 16, 2021. Several anomalies were noted, specifically that the radiological dose rates were nominally an order of magnitude higher than that of the previous AGC experiments. This report summarizes the disassembly of the AGC 4 experiment.
Methods, devices and systems for ultra-high dose radiotherapy are disclosed. The described techniques rely in-part on active switching control of a photoconductive switch during the time the accelerator is accelerating charged particles to produce the output radiation at the desired dose rates. One flash radiotherapy system includes an induction accelerator, and a controllable switch coupled to the induction accelerator. The switch is operable to produce a plurality of voltage pulses to drive the induction accelerator. The radiotherapy system also includes a radiation measurement device to measure output radiation produced by the radiotherapy system and provide feedback to the controllable switch. The controllable switch is operable to, based on the received feedback, modify an amplitude, shape, spacing, number or width of the voltage pulses that are supplied to the particle accelerator to deliver the desired output radiation.
Exposure of graphite targets to high intensity proton beams at neutrino production facilities causes changes in the target material that can result in a shortened operation lifetime. The dominant factors in this process are currently thought to be mechanical in nature resulting primarily from microstructural effects that lead to thermal and structural changes in bulk material properties. As currently planned beam facilities with increased proton energy and intensity begin to come online it will be important to thoroughly understand these processes, and ideally to be able to predict the effects of new beam designs on target properties. Direct analysis of targets exposed to existing high-energy proton beams is complicated by several factors, such as very limited access to proton beam facilities, high associated costs, irradiation times on the order of months, and the resulting radioactivity of irradiated samples that requires special facilities for post-irradiation examination. Much of the existing literature concerning irradiation damage in graphite has been focused on the needs of the nuclear engineering community, however high-energy proton targets operate in a much different environment. In comparison to graphite irradiated in a nuclear reactor, graphite used in proton beam targets receives a higher dose rate, have greater gas production, and experience short irradiation pulses as opposed to continuous irradiation. Low-energy ion irradiation offers a method of inducing similar levels of radiation damage to high-energy protons while avoiding many of the difficulties and limitations associated with high-energy proton beams and the corresponding activated specimen testing. My research described in this thesis focused on investigating how low-energy ion irradiation could be used to induce the same or similar types of microstructural alteration and mechanical property degradation as that seen in high-energy neutrino production target graphites by varying damage le vels and irradiation temperatures prior to post-irradiation characterisation.
The Inner Reflector Plug (IRP) is a central component of the Spallation Neutron Source target monolith, which houses the mercury target and four liter-sized neutron moderator units. It is exposed to high-level radiation fields during routine operation and builds up significant activity. The IRP needs to be replaced due to moderator neutron poison and decoupler burn-out, which is used for shaping neutron pulses. The first IRP exchange took place in March 2018. The old IRP was extracted from the target monolith, providing space for the new one. It was split into three segments, each of which was handled separately. The lowest section of the IRP is the largest segment in size and in activity and is temporarily stored on-site for cool down before conduction post irradiation examination. In support of planning the replacement activities, a wide range of activation and transport analyses were performed. This included calculating isotope inventories and the radiation fields for each segment as it is extracted in storage casks, and the radiation field from the empty IRP pit in the target monolith. While the replacement was taking place, measurements were performed and later on compared to the calculations. During these studies, it was discovered that a significant contributor to the radiation field from the lower IRP segment is from photo-neutrons. Photo-nuclear physics was added to the analyses and calculated results compared well with measured dose rates.
The redox behavior of Cr(III) and Cr(VI) in nuclear environments were studied by analyzing aqueous irradiated chromium ions using UV-Visible spectroscopy. The formation of different chromium oxidation states can occur through gamma radiolysis of chromium solutions. Characterization of radiation-induced chromium is not well understood, and yet important as chromium can make its way into the primary coolant of reactors because of the corrosion of stainless steel reactor components. Furthermore, Cr(VI) is toxic and not suitable for environmental release, therefore Cr speciation is important. Fricke dosimetry was performed to collect doses rates, specific extinction coefficients were obtained from various analytical methods for the two oxidation states of chromium. Chromium samples--conditioned at various pH's and concentration to understand the effects--were then irradiated using a Coblat-60 gamma irradiator. Three optical spectroscopy analytical methods were used , including direct oxidation state measurements and complexation by either EDTA or DPC. Complexation by EDTA was found to not be a reliable method. Radiolytic oxidation of Cr(III) to Cr(VI), and reduction of Cr(VI) to Cr(III) were clearly seen, except for Cr(III) samples were a pH less than or equal to 2, where no change occurred.
The Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) for the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) provides coverage for two primary processing facilities. For UPF, detailed documentation and drawings of the design are readily available. While this design information allows for some CAAS modeling features to match the actual design with a high level of accuracy, assumptions and simplifications are necessary as it is unrealistic and unnecessary to replicate many aspects of the design. A set of modeling guidelines and techniques were used to develop consistency between the MCNP6 models. While ensuring conservatism, overly conservative choices must be avoided to demonstrate the minimum accident of concern can be detected. To ensure proper modeling choices were made for the final models, a group of parametric studies were performed to evaluate the impact on the dose rates detected at the individual detectors. Some of these modeling choices and/or associated parametric studies include: - Modeling the grid steel area above the detectors as homogeneous stainless steel and determining the impact on detectability with an increasing density. - Modeling the presence of equipment in close proximity to the CAAS detectors. - Determining an appropriate material density to represent miscellaneous items not specifically modeled. - Evaluating the impact of sprinkler activation. The results of UPF CAAS analyses show that the modeling assumptions made based on the detailed design and parametric studies are appropriate and demonstrate accurate yet conservative models have been developed for detecting minimum accident of concern within the UPF.
Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is preparing to host several microreactor experiments through 2030 and beyond. Two new test beds currently under development will operate as microreactor or nuclear system experiment user facilities. Test bed experiments will be performed in series, with each nuclear experiment installed, operated, and removed before installation of the subsequent experiment. The necessarily brief transition period between experiments introduces unique equipment removal and radioactive waste disposal challenges. This paper evaluates equipment removal and radioactive waste management topics associated with tight sequencing of nuclear experiments and presents some of the solutions and approaches currently planned to meet these special considerations for one such experiment, the Molten Chloride Reactor Experiment (MCRE), slated for operation at INL’s Laboratory for Operation and Testing in the United States (LOTUS). The MCRE project is a collaboration between Southern Company Services, TerraPower, and INL, among others, to provide integral nuclear data that will advance molten salt fast reactor technology. MCRE will be the first critical fast-spectrum circulating fuel system ever operated and the first experiment operated in the LOTUS test bed. The experiment will nominally operate at zero power with planned low power excursions as part of operational planning for MCRE has been to minimize at-power operations to limit fission product formation while still achieving experimental objectives. After the experiment is complete, MCRE will be allowed to radioactively decay for a short period (nominally 90 days) prior to system defueling, flushing, removal, and disposal of all MCRE equipment, readying the test bed for the next nuclear experiment. Equipment removal and radioactive waste disposal have been integral to MCRE project planning since the Cooperative Research and Development Agreement was formalized in 2021. Due to requirements for future use of the test bed, the MCRE system, of necessity, must be removed in a much shorter time frame than typical for historic reactor decommissioning projects at INL. This results in minimal time for radioactive decay, resulting in not only elevated radiation dose rates but also the presence of short-to-medium-lived isotopes not typically encountered in the reactor decommissioning and radioactive waste management space. Additional unique constraints placed on the project include lack of intrinsic remote-operations capabilities in the test bed, space constraints in the test bed once MCRE has been installed, and contamination minimization requirements to return the test bed to as-found conditions to enable future use. This paper discusses planned solutions to these challenges. Approaches for implementing remote or semi-remote technologies in a non-hot cell environment with limited space availability are discussed. The paper also summarizes the systems engineering approach for concept development and design of equipment removal systems, which are being implemented concurrent with the MCRE design phase, providing feedback to system designers to incorporate features enabling efficient and safe equipment removal approaches. The timing of this paper at a relatively early phase of the project is meant to highlight the importance of early planning for nuclear system decommissioning while reactor design is ongoing to allow design feedback on componentry driven from decommissioning system needs. As new, innovative nuclear reactor technologies enter the nuclear market sector, reactor experiments are crucial for providing new integral nuclear data that establish safe operational margins for technology advancement. Microreactor experiments at INL will require safe, effective, and timely decommissioning approaches, which in turn require nuclear systems designed to expedite decommissioning. In addition to the advancement of nuclear reactor technologies, these nuclear experiments provide an opportunity to demonstrate, deploy, and test new removal and disposal capabilities to support the next generation of nuclear reactor technology.
The article describes two robot platfoems built at RSLA that provides a capability of unmanned radiation measurements in contaminated areas where human presence is restricted. The system collects radiation dose rates, gamma energy spevtra and send the data to the cloud using a smart phone. Data can be analyzed in the cloud
Development of new structural materials that can withstand the extreme environments of nuclear reactors where the materials are exposed to high dose rate of ~ 30 200 dpa, high temperatures of the order of 500 1000 o C and tens of years of operation is vital for exploiting the “smallest carbon footprint energy source” to its fullest, in order to deal with the energy crisis worldwide. Recently, HEAs have shown superior irradiation properties over conventional alloys like higher resistance to defect formation, lower void swelling, limited irradiation hardening and higher microstructural stability under irradiation, making them potential structural material candidates for reactors. Proper characterization and testing of these materials are essential before they can replace the conventional alloys.
This presentation presents a preliminary description of a concept of operations to incorporate advanced-reactor spent nuclear fuel (SNF) into an integrated waste-management system (IWMS). The evaluation includes SNF from four advanced-reactor concepts with the following fuel types: (1) small modular reactors using oxide fuels, (2) tristructural-isotropic (TRISO) fuels, (3) metallic fuels, and (4) fuel salts. To provide context for the proposed concept of operations for advanced reactors, a comparison is made with traditional light-water reactors (LWRs) to identify potential gaps in the IWMS. The technical differences between advanced reactors and LWRs are assessed to determine the feasibility of managing advanced-reactor waste streams using existing operations and technology. This presentation emphasizes fuel types from Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program reactors: Xe 100, which uses TRISO fuel and Natrium, with its metallic fuels while also analyzing management options for molten-salt reactors and advanced light-water reactors (ALWRs). Understanding the storage, transportation, and disposal requirements of SNF is dependent on both the quantity and characteristics of the SNF generated by nuclear reactors. This presentation provides a high level overview, comparing the anticipated concept of operations for different SNFs from advanced reactors. The IWMS includes at-reactor storage, transportation, potential off-site storage, potential treatment, and disposition. To assess the potential effect of advanced-reactor concept of operations on the IWMS, estimates were made for fuel characteristics that contribute to storage, transportation, disposal, and possible treatment of advanced-reactor SNF. These include canister heat load, dose rates, and criticality-control limits, which are important for determining the condition and configuration of the advanced reactor SNF. At-reactor storage of LWR SNF traditionally involves a spent-fuel pool (SFP) before transfer to an independent spent-fuel storage installation. However, some advanced-reactor concepts, particularly those using TRISO and salt fuels, do not anticipate the use of an SFP. This difference in at-reactor storage could impact the IWMS. Additionally, transportation of advanced-reactor SNF may include additional processes tied to potential off gassing, and transportation of microreactor SNF may occur within the reactor vessel. Some advanced-reactor SNF could also undergo treatment to meet requirements of an acceptable waste form for disposition, and the treatment location will be a major contributor to efficiently performing IWMS responsibilities. Moreover, the quantity of SNF generated is an important consideration for IWMS because it could affect the size of the transportation fleet and potential off-site storage requirements. Additionally, volume and heat load are the primary drivers for SNF disposition. This presentation compares potential packaging options for advanced reactor SNF with traditional LWR packaging to provide a high-level comparison for the needs of the IWMS for advanced-reactor SNF.
Structural alloys under irradiation develop radiation-induced segregation (RIS) at point defect sinks, which lead to undesired changes in the alloy's properties. Additively manufactured austenitic stainless steels are expected to yield a distinct response to irradiation damage owing to their unique as-printed dislocation cell structure. In this talk, we present the development of a mesoscale model for dislocation cell structure evolution coupled with RIS using the MOOSE framework. The evolution of network dislocations within spatially distinct cells and cell walls are modeled using climb-mediated edge annihilation and generation processes. Starting with initial microstructures of as-printed non-equilibrium segregations at dislocation cell walls, our 2D and 3D simulations explore the effects of irradiation temperature, dose rate, dislocation sink bias, and specimen thickness on microstructure evolution. The results will be compared against experimental characterizations of in-situ and ex-situ ion-irradiated samples, and the implications of evolving cell structure on irradiation damage response will be discussed.
The Molten Chloride Reactor Experiment (MCRE) will be the first reactor featuring a fast-spectrum molten chloride circulating nuclear fuel system in the world. Planning for equipment removal and disposal (ERD) of MCRE has identified several technology gaps due to the unique environment of this nuclear experiment. Some of the gaps arise from the application of existing disassembly and/or sizing methods to novel material forms or in novel configurations. Others arise from unknown material behavior. This paper summarizes proposed test plans for ERD validation experiments to address these complicated or unknown equipment removal procedures. At the Waste Management Symposia in 2024, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) MCRE ERD team presented the challenges associated with hosting multiple nuclear experiments in series with only brief transition periods between systems. Such difficulties include higher dose rates, the presence of radioisotopes infrequently encountered in reactor decommissioning and radioactive waste management, lack of intrinsic remote-operations infrastructure in the test bed, space constraints in the test bed, and contamination minimization requirements. To address these challenges, remote or semi-remote technologies are planned to be implemented in a non-hot cell environment with limited space availability. The team also discussed how a systems engineering approach is being used for conceptual development and design of equipment removal systems to address these challenges. For example, to reduce constraints for the removal of more difficult components, non-activated, noncontaminated elements are planned to be taken out first where possible. Still, there are complexities associated with the remaining components. In this work, the operational framework for MCRE ERD was reviewed for technical gaps and open questions, and test plans were drafted to address these areas. The tests plans were written for the following categories: vision systems, pipe cutting, drill/grout/filler, flush salt, and miscellaneous, with the miscellaneous group consisting of tests like techniques for removing bearings and reflector bricks. The test plans explore material, infrastructure, and staffing requirements needed for test execution. The test plans additionally focus on the evaluation of success. Determining the outcome of a test is imperative - as these explorative actions have the potential to rearrange or re-scope planned ERD activities. Success criteria identified thus far include required tool output, required area(s), debris production and mitigation, and repeatability. Test plans are an essential aspect of the systems engineering approach to MCRE ERD. They are used as the beginning steps in defining use cases for the ERD system. Performance of the validation tests is expected to begin in the summer of 2025 and will take approximately 9 to 12 months to complete. Execution of these plans will be expedited by specifying test needs ahead of time, facilitating efficient interactions with any subcontractors tasked with running the requested tests. Evaluating the outcomes of these tests will inform MCRE ERD procedures and timing and will also identify additional technical constraints for the MCRE ERD System. This upfront process optimization effort will help the project save time and resources at the end of the experiment.
An innovative Mobile Hot Cell (MHC) has been developed for conditioning Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources (DSRS) category 1 and 2 for storage or transportation. The MHC is designed to provide both Radiological and Biological containment with a maximum capacity of 1000 Ci Co60 or 5000Ci Cs137 source and can be transported via standard cargo containers. This project has been supported through the National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) Offsite Source Recovery Program (OSRP). The project is intended for the international community rather than domestic although domestic use is a possibility. Many countries have significant stockpiles of these devices that are often stored in less-than-optimal circumstances. This necessitates that these devices be addressed expeditiously, and the sources secured. The MHC utilizes robotics, automation, and other non-traditional methods for disassembling, characterizing, and packaging these sources that have reached end of life or are otherwise not needed. These innovative approaches are necessary to facilitate an expedited timeline to efficiently and safely secure these sources in a non-proliferation effort. Conditioning efforts include disassembling the device such as a teletherapy head used for cancer treatment, or blood/research irradiators such that the radioactive sources may be removed safely. The sources are then characterized. Leak checks are performed, dimensions are verified, and serial numbers are confirmed. Upon completion, the sources are typically placed into a Standard Forms Capsule which is seal welded closed. It is leak tested and placed into a Long-Term Storage Shield (LTSS) which can either be secured for storage directly or loaded into an appropriate cask for transportation. Further innovations include multiple deployment scenarios that include a full deployment of MHC components, deployment of the MHC automation internal components to an existing hot cell, deployment of minimally required MHC components and incorporation of sand for shielding, and integration of the MHC for Silo Storage, or Bore Hole Storage efforts. The MHC has evolved from a very specific use case to a “Swiss Army Knife” type of a tool in that it can be readily adapted to a large variety of situations. Innovative approaches such as the use of robotics, Computer Numeric Control (CNC) machining centers, automated welding equipment, HDMI Cameras, and LED lighting are some of the developed technologies incorporated into the MHC design. Shielding is accomplished with a steel walled Base Box which is surrounded by four nesting doll shield shells which when combined limits the external dose rate to 5mr/hr when a 1000 Ci Co60 source is exposed inside.
This evaluation determines the expected service lifetime for the Stirling Engines in the Power Generation Subsystem (PGS) based on the radiation resistance of the organic materials, electrical components, and magnets, along with the projected radiation dose rate. Components that are not projected to last for a six-month operational period are discussed in more detail, including their associated risk due to failure and possible remedial actions.
This report documents the results of preliminary nuclear criticality and radiation shielding assessments during transfer and dry storage of irradiated Microreactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation (MARVEL) reactor fuel at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The assessments focus on transfer casks and storage canisters that are currently in use at INL, which may be compatible with the irradiated MARVEL reactor fuel. The criticality assessments were performed using the radiation transport code MCNP6 with 37 MARVEL reactor fuel elements in various configurations and scenarios. All transfer and storage configurations under dry conditions were below the assumed criticality safety limit of 0.93. Some storage and transfer configurations under wet conditions exceeded the criticality safety limit. This suggests that the appropriate administrative and engineering controls, in addition to reducing the number of MARVEL reactor fuel elements per transfer cask or storage canister, can be expected to ensure criticality safety under all scenarios. The radiation shielding assessments were performed by generating conservative neutron and photon source terms using the ORIGEN module in the SCALE suite of codes. These source spectra were used to estimate the dose equivalent rates using the radiation transport code MCNP6, both on contact and 1 m away from the fuel and transfer casks. The maximum estimated dose equivalent rate of 37 unshielded MARVEL reactor fuel elements on contact is approximately 42000 R/hr. The maximum estimated dose equivalent rates on contact to the ATR transfer cask, HFEF-5 transfer cask, and high load charger were approximately 233 mR/hr, 171 mR/hr, and 201 mR/hr, respectively. This suggests that with the appropriate administrative and engineering controls, all three transfer casks analyzed can be expected to provide sufficient radiation shielding to workers during transfer of irradiated MARVEL reactor fuel. These calculations are performed to support the planning and strategy for the MARVEL project and will demonstrate the technical viability of the different configurations discussed and help identify where engineered or administrative controls may be necessary. A complete criticality safety analysis and radiation shielding analysis, including validation and contingency and accident analysis must be completed by licensed and authorized personnel before any transfer or storage of MARVEL reactor nuclear fuel.