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At least 379 records · Page 21

An Interior-Point Solver for Optimal Power Flow Problem Considering Distributed FACTS Devices

In this paper, we propose an AC optimal power flow (ACOPF) model considering distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices, in which the reactance of D-FACTS equipped lines are introduced as decision variables. This is motivated by increasing interests in using D-FACTS devices to address system operational and cyber-security concerns. First, D-FACTS devices can be incorporated in real-time operations for economic benefits such as managing power congestions and reducing system losses. Second, D-FACTS devices can be utilized by moving target defense (MTD), an emerging concept against cyber-attacks, to prevent attackers from knowing true system configurations. Therefore, system operators can use the proposed ACOPF model to achieve economic benefits and provide the setpoints of D-FACTS devices for MTD at the same time. In addition, we rigorously derive the gradient and Hessian matrices of the objective function and constraints, which are further used to build an interior-point solver of the proposed ACOPF. Numerical results on the IEEE 118-bus transmission system show the validity of the proposed ACOPF model as well as the efficacy of the interior-point solver in minimizing system losses and generation costs.

Liu, Bo↗

Field Programmable Gate Array-Based Reactor Protection Systems and Potential for Inclusion of Secure Elements to Improve Cybersecurity

For acceptable implementations of technologies like wireless communications, remote monitoring, etc., strong mitigations must be developed and evaluated to ensure that new attack pathways do not increase risk for Advanced Reactors. Secure Elements can be adopted and adapted for this purpose based on tamper resistance and cryptographic abilities, but research must be done to properly integrate into critical components such as FPGA-based Important to Safety systems in conjunction with current and future regulations on cyber security features in Advanced Reactors. Typically, the integration of a Secure Element happens during the POST and UEFI boot of a computing platform, performed by the Operating System, which is not possible with FPGAs because they do not include these firmware components. Work must be done to identify a reliable and secure method for integration in FPGA-based systems which lack Operating Systems and therefore complex boot procedures, system calls, etc.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Field Programmable Gate Array-Based Reactor Protection Systems and Potential for Inclusion of Secure Elements to Improve Cybersecurity

For acceptable implementations of technologies like wireless communications, remote monitoring, etc., strong mitigations must be developed and evaluated to ensure that new attack pathways do not increase risk for Advanced Reactors. Secure Elements can be adopted and adapted for this purpose based on tamper resistance and cryptographic abilities, but research must be done to properly integrate into critical components such as FPGA-based Important to Safety systems in conjunction with current and future regulations on cyber security features in Advanced Reactors. Typically, the integration of a Secure Element happens during the POST and UEFI boot of a computing platform, performed by the Operating System, which is not possible with FPGAs because they do not include these firmware components. Work must be done to identify a reliable and secure method for integration in FPGA-based systems which lack Operating Systems and therefore complex boot procedures, system calls, etc.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Analysis of System and Interoperability Impact from Securing Communications for Distributed Energy Resources

As the power grid incorporates increasing amounts of distributed energy resources (DER) that provide new generation sources, new opportunities are created for improving operation of the grid while large challenges also arise for preserving grid reliability and security. To improve grid performance, DERs can be utilized to provide important support functionality, such as supporting frequency and voltage levels, especially if they are assisted by communication schemes as part of an advanced distribution management system (ADMS). Unfortunately, such connectivity and grid support functionality also creates additional cyber security risk with the potential for degradation of grid services, especially under conditions with high amounts of distributed generation. This paper will first discuss the communications needed by DERs to support system and interoperability objectives, as well as the security requirements and impact of securing these communications. Some common security mechanisms are discussed in relation to DERs, and a simulated 15-bus model of a distribution feeder is used to demonstrate aspects of the DER communications and impact to grid performance. These results help to advance understanding of the benefits, requirements, and mechanisms for securely implementing DER communications while ensuring that grid reliability is maintained.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cyber-Resilient Design Methodology for Microgrids

Recent advancement in tools has helped with microgrid design, development, planning and operation. Microgrids offer a unique application based on users with different requirements for tools. The process of designing, constructing, commissioning, and assessing a microgrid is not always straightforward due to these distinct requirements. Additionally, metrics are needed for performance evaluation. This panel will offer an overview and description of tools that helps with microgrid design, construction, planning, operation, cyber security, and metrics-driven performance assessment driven by multiple diverse applications and use cases.

CCE↗

Defining a Metric Space of Host Logs and Operational Use Cases

Host logs, in particular, Windows Event Logs, are a valuable source of information often collected by security operation centers (SOCs). The semi-structured nature of host logs inhibits automated analytics, and while manual analysis is common, the sheer volume makes manual inspection of all logs impossible. Although many powerful algorithms for analyzing time-series and sequential data exist, utilization of such algorithms for most cyber security applications is either infeasible or requires tailored, research-intensive preparations. In particular, basic mathematic and algorithmic developments for providing a generalized, meaningful similarity metric on system logs is needed to bridge the gap between many existing sequential data mining methods and this currently available but under-utilized data source. In this paper, we provide a rigorous definition of a metric product space on Windows Event Logs, providing an embedding that allows for the application of established machine learning and time-series analysis methods. We then demonstrate the utility and flexibility of this embedding with multiple use-cases on real data: (1) comparing known infected to new host log streams for attack detection and forensics, (2) collapsing similar streams of logs into semantically-meaningful groups (by user, by role), thereby reducing the quantity of data but not the content, (3) clustering logs as well as short sequences of logs to identify and visualize user behaviors and background processes over time. Overall, we provide a metric space framework for general host logs and log sequences that respects semantic similarity and facilitates a wide variety of data science analytics to these logs without data-specific preparations for each.

Verma, Miki↗

From Dr. Steven Ashby, Director of PNNL

Powered by the creativity and imagination of more than 4,000 exceptional scientists, engineers and support professionals, at PNNL we advance the frontiers of science and address some of the most challenging problems in energy, the environment and national security. As DOE’s premier chemistry, environmental sciences and data analytics laboratory, we provide national leadership in four areas: deepening our understanding of climate science; inventing the future power grid; preventing nuclear proliferation; and speeding environmental remediation. Other areas where we make important contributions include energy storage, microbial biology and cyber security. PNNL also is home to EMSL (the Environmental Molecular Sciences Laboratory), one of DOE’s scientific user facilities. We apply these science strengths to address both national and international problems in complex adaptive systems that are too difficult for one institution to tackle alone. Take earth systems, for instance. The earth is a complex adaptive system because it involves everything from climate and microbial communities in the soil to emissions from cars and coal-powered industrial plants. All of these factors and others ultimately influence not only our environment and overall quality of life, but cause the earth to adapt in ways that must be further addressed. PNNL researchers are playing a vital role in finding solutions across every area of this complex adaptive system.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

ReACT Methodology Proof of Concept Final Report

The Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE-OE) funded INL Researchers to evaluate a novel process for assessing and mitigating cyber security risks. The proof of concept level of the method was tested in an industry environment. This case study, plus additional case studies will support the further development of the method into a tool to assist industry in securing their critical networks. This report provides an understanding of the process developed in the Response Analysis and Characterization Tool (ReACT) project. This report concludes with lessons learned and a roadmap for final development of these tools for use by industry.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Multilevel Cybersecurity for Photovoltaic Systems

The motivation behind this project is to protect critical infrastructure in electric power generation pertaining to solar photovoltaic (PV) systems. This growing renewable energy resource is becoming a more vital part of the nation’s energy portfolio, particularly since it has achieved grid-parity to existing generation methods in terms of cost. It is thus vital that steps be taken to ensure the cybersecurity of these assets. The project goal was to devise a multilevel cybersecurity solution to address PV security gaps at the inverter and system levels, and field test the solution under the supervision and review of a US-based solar inverter manufacturer and PV installer/operator. A two-level cyberattack defense approach was formulated whereby the first level, the solar inverter level, hardens individual devices and achieves a deeply cyber-secure inverter. The inverter level security involves a multi-layer defense-in-depth approach for securing the inverter while also providing data for the system level algorithms. The second level, the system level, addresses intrusion detection and restoration involving an ensemble of inverters and relevant systems.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Implications of the 2015 and 2016 Ukrainian electric grid cyber attacks to nuclear power plants - 113

Nuclear plants can be vulnerable from electric grid cyber attacks. In December 2015 and December 2016, cyber attackers attacked the Ukrainian electric grid and 'turned off the lights' by opening substation protective relays. The 2015 cyber attacks targeted electric distribution systems and the 2016 cyber attacks targeted electric transmission systems. In order to accomplish the attacks, the cyber attackers compromised field control system devices to inject malware and then open protective relays in substations. There are some very significant implications to nuclear plant operations from hacking the substations and switchyard breakers that serve nuclear plants. The nuclear plant operational concerns are compromising protective relays to prevent relay protection that would result in damage to large electric equipment; spurious actuation of protective relays causing loss-of-offsite power (LOOP) conditions; and the closing and then reopening of protective relays out-of-phase with the grid causing the Aurora vulnerability damaging generators, Alternating Current (AC) motors, and transformers. All of these protective relay conditions have already occurred in actual or test conditions. The common thread to these scenarios are that switchyard and substation protective relays are out-of-scope of existing nuclear cyber security regulations yet, when compromised, have demonstrated impacts to nuclear plant operations and challenged safety systems. There is one other issue about an attack originating from a protective relay. That is, it would be irrelevant whether the nuclear plant system that would be impacted would have analog or digital instrumentation and control (I and C) systems because the impact is upstream of the I and C. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A High-Fidelity Cyber-Physical Testbed-Based Benchmarking Dataset For Testing Operational Technology Specific Intrusion Detection Systems

Quality datasets serve a critical purpose in cyber security research. Data is needed to understand system behavior and develop security controls to protect critical systems. However, for critical infrastructure operational environments there is a lack of available datasets to study because of the high cost and specialized capabilities necessary to generate them. This paper documents the development of a dataset of high fidelity hardware in the loop laboratory simulated models of electric and natural gas distribution systems with real cyber attack test cases. A deep dive discussion for the experimental setup and controls for generating the data is provided along with observations from using the data in evaluating intrusion detection approaches.

Ashok, Aditya↗

Resilient Energy Platform. Fact Sheet: Power Sector Cybersecurity Building Blocks

The Power Sector Cybersecurity Building Blocks, developed through the USAID-NREL Partnership and the Resilient Energy Platform, are designed to help a variety of stakeholders improve security for the electrical grid. This effort grows out of USAID and NREL's discussions with utilities around the world, as well as past cybersecurity assessments performed by NREL on dozens of utilities and government agencies, with a focus on the cybersecurity challenges faced by small and under-resourced utilities. This document outlines eleven building blocks for power sector cyber security. It functions as a guide to help organizations develop a robust, balanced cybersecurity defense program. Individually, each building block represents a cluster of related activities within cybersecurity on which an organization should focus. Using the building blocks, organizations can effectively prioritize their cybersecurity efforts to best thwart a wide range of potential cyberattacks.

building blocks↗

Protecting water and wastewater utilities from cyber‐physical threats

Abstract Recent events have highlighted the need to address cybersecurity threats to systems supporting critical infrastructure and federal information systems which are evolving and growing. These threats have become ubiquitous in the United States, and throughout the world. Many information and communications technology (ICT) devices and other components are interdependent so that disruption of one component may have a negative, cascading effect on others. In the United States, the Federal role in cyber‐security has been debated for more than a decade but creating a policy is complicated because in the United States, State and local governments are the major institutions responsible for providing services to their populations. It is important that critical infrastructure such as Publically Owned Treatment Works (POTWs) and Public Water Systems (PWSs) adopt suitable countermeasures to prevent or minimise the consequences of cyber‐attacks. This paper discusses both technological and procedural techniques that can be used to protect against cyber‐threats.

Clark, Robert M.↗

PAS: Privacy Algorithms in Systems

Today we face an explosion of data generation, ranging from health monitoring to national security infrastructure systems. More and more systems are connected to the Internet that collects data at regular time intervals. These systems share data and use machine learning methods for intelligent decisions, which resulted in numerous real-world applications (e.g., autonomous vehicles, recommendation systems, and heart-rate monitoring) that have benefited from it. However, these approaches are prone to identity thief and other privacy related cyber-security attacks. So, how can data privacy be protected efficiently in these scenarios? More dedicated efforts are needed to propose the integration of privacy techniques into existing systems and develop more advanced privacy techniques to address the complex challenges of multi-system connectivity and data fusion. Therefore, we have introduced Privacy Algorithms in Systems (PAS) at CIKM which provides a venue to gather academic researchers and industry researchers/practitioners to present their research in an effort to advance the frontier of this critical direction of privacy algorithms in systems.

Kotevska, Olivera↗

A Community-Based Approach to Leading the Nation in Smart Energy Use

Project Objectives The AEP Ohio gridSMART® Demonstration Project (Project) achieved the following objectives: • Built a secure, interoperable, and integrated smart grid infrastructure in northeast central Ohio that demonstrated the ability to maximize distribution system efficiency and reliability and consumer use of demand response programs that reduced energy consumption, peak demand, and fossil fuel emissions. • Actively attracted, educated, enlisted, and retained consumers in innovative business models that provided tools and information reducing consumption and peak demand. • Provided the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) information to evaluate technologies and preferred smart grid business models to be extended nationally. Project Description Ohio Power Company (the surviving company of a merger with Columbus Southern Power Company), doing business as AEP Ohio (AEP Ohio), took a community-based approach and incorporated a full suite of advanced smart grid technologies for 110,000 consumers in an area selected for its concentration and diversity of distribution infrastructure and consumers. It was organized and aligned around: • Technology, implementation, and operations • Consumer and stakeholder acceptance • Data management and benefit assessment Combined, these functional areas served as the foundation of the Project to integrate commercially available products, innovative technologies, and new consumer products and services within a secure two-way communication network between the utility and consumers. The Project included Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), Distribution Management System (DMS), Distribution Automation Circuit Reconfiguration (DACR), Volt VAR Optimization (VVO), and Consumer Programs (CP). These technologies were combined with two-way consumer communication and information sharing, demand response, dynamic pricing, and consumer products, such as plug-in electric vehicles and smart appliances. In addition, the Project incorporated comprehensive cyber security capabilities, interoperability, and a data assessment that, with grid simulation capabilities, made the demonstration results an adaptable, integrated solution for AEP Ohio and the nation.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Basic Research Needs for Microelectronics: Report of the Office of Science Workshop on Basic Research Needs for Microelectronics, October 23 – 25, 2018

Moore’s Law — realized via a combination of device physics advances, technology investments, and economic returns— allowed the number of transistors on a chip to double roughly every two years for over five decades. During those five decades, the cost of a unit of computing dropped by eight orders of magnitude. Those declines and the associated computing advances have dramatically affected every aspect of society, from science and technology through business and health to national security. Today, further computing advances are limited by the economics of chip fabrication and the physical limits on transistors, electrical interconnects, and memory elements at the nanoscale. If we are to evolve new generations of computing systems over the next decades that are both faster and more energy efficient, a complete reorganization of the science and technology underlying computing is needed. Within the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) mission, which includes a pivotal and historical role in the evolution of computing, the needs are critical as well. Advanced computing and simulation underpin all aspects of DOE missions in energy, the environment, and national security, requiring energy-efficient computing beyond the exascale range. Edge computing, low-power computing technologies, and computers optimized for artificial intelligence are key to next-generation scientific facilities for high-energy physics research, as well as neutron and x-ray facilities. Finally, microelectronics will also play a major role in reshaping the U.S. electricity grid: from its current state to one that is cleaner, more efficient, cyber-secure, and resilient to widespread events, both natural and manmade. Realizing this vision will require advancements in both system architecture and power electronics. To enable continued advances in computing technologies, a fundamental rethinking is needed of the science behind the materials, synthesis and placement technologies, architectures, and algorithms. This cannot be modular and linear, as it has been in the past. Rather, these advances must be developed collectively, in a spirit of co-design, where each scientific discipline informs and engages the other to achieve orders of magnitude improvements in system-level performance. To explore these challenges, the Office of Science convened a Basic Research Needs Workshop for Microelectronics in October 2018 and charged workshop participants to conduct a thorough assessment of the scientific issues associated with advanced microelectronics technologies for applications relevant to the DOE mission. The workshop examined research relevant to the extension of complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) and beyond CMOS technologies; however, topics of direct relevance to quantum information science and quantum computing were outside the scope of this workshop.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance, Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS) Model Advancements for Resilience Analysis (Version 3, July 2023)

Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS) is a co-simulation platform developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The primary high-level use-case for ACCESS is to study existing or new cyber-physical critical infrastructure systems, with a heavy emphasis on 1) systems that utilize communication networks, and 2) studies that seek to understand cyber-related system impacts. ACCESS is currently used for several energy system resilience projects at LLNL. In the Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance (ERMA) project, ACCESS is used in the Mod eling for Metric Calculation task (specifically, subtask 4.3, Communications and Cyber Modeling) to model and simulate the cyber and communication system aspects of Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure (DCEI) systems, with a focus on computing specific communication system metrics that can impact system resilience and mission performance. Simulated communication system per formance will be fed back to other ERMA system components so that mission performance can be evaluated holistically. This report describes several enhancements to the ACCESS platform that were implemented during the execution of the ERMA project in support of reslience analysis. This includes the addition of new models and subsystems, enhancements to existing models, and integration with external systems. The remainder of this report is structured as follows. In Section 2, a brief background description of the ACCESS platform is provided, including an outline of ACCESS components, example use cases, and a set of communication network resilience metrics that can be computed with ACCESS. Section 3 describes the ACCESS model enhancements for ERMA in detail. Finally, Section 4 briefly outlines future integration opportunities between ACCESS and project participant capabilities identified during the progression of the project.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

A Survey on Next-generation Power Grid Data Architecture

The operation and control of power grids will increasingly rely on data. A high-speed, reliable, flexible and secure data architecture is the prerequisite of the next-generation power grid. This paper summarizes the challenges in collecting and utilizing power grid data, and then provides reference data architecture for future power grids. Based on the data architecture deployment, related research on data architecture is reviewed and summarized in several categories including data measurement/actuation, data transmission, data service layer, data utilization, as well as two cross-cutting issues, interoperability and cyber security. Research gaps and future work are also presented.

You, Shutang↗