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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Identifying Outside Influences as Latent Factors to Risk in Human Performance

During the Acquisition Life Cycle for a program, there are several opportunities for the system in design to be adjusted in accordance with its changing landscape as it is being shaped by evolving policy and organizational culture. Human Systems Integration is integral to identifying these opportunities of change as there are a set number of activities that may account for altered operational states, human performance deviations, and overall component engagement if HSI is enacted early enough in the life cycle. Some changes that occur in the operational environment may not be accounted for since the organizational culture and practices are not currently a part of the HSI focus. Likewise, policy changes themselves from a top-to-bottom analysis may not have the appearance of effecting human performance until having gone through a trail-and-error period. Workarounds to adjust for unforeseen policy affects become the system's solution that usually includes changes in the training and education of the operators, maintainers, and support personnel. A system full of workarounds and off-normal practices, that cause operators to disregard the purpose of the design, coupled with the false notion that these activities are proven for successful system operation, is the very definition of “an accident waiting to happen”. Unforeseen changes in policies and practices that cause new and unusual activities to successfully and keep the system running, should be considered latent factors that may cause a potential mishap, and not part of the resilience that humans provide to the successful operation of the system. This presentation will explore how latent factors may find their way into system operations and how they can be identified and addressed.

Human Systems Integration↗
NASA NTRS2013

Planetary Protection Bioburden Analysis Program

This program is a Microsoft Access program that performed statistical analysis of the colony counts from assays performed on the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) spacecraft to determine the bioburden density, 3-sigma biodensity, and the total bioburdens required for the MSL prelaunch reports. It also contains numerous tools that report the data in various ways to simplify the reports required. The program performs all the calculations directly in the MS Access program. Prior to this development, the data was exported to large Excel files that had to be cut and pasted to provide the desired results. The program contains a main menu and a number of submenus. Analyses can be performed by using either all the assays, or only the accountable assays that will be used in the final analysis. There are three options on the first menu: either calculate using (1) the old MER (Mars Exploration Rover) statistics, (2) the MSL statistics for all the assays, or This software implements penetration limit equations for common micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) shield configurations, windows, and thermal protection systems. Allowable MMOD risk is formulated in terms of the probability of penetration (PNP) of the spacecraft pressure hull. For calculating the risk, spacecraft geometry models, mission profiles, debris environment models, and penetration limit equations for installed shielding configurations are required. Risk assessment software such as NASA's BUMPERII is used to calculate mission PNP; however, they are unsuitable for use in shield design and preliminary analysis studies. The software defines a single equation for the design and performance evaluation of common MMOD shielding configurations, windows, and thermal protection systems, along with a description of their validity range and guidelines for their application. Recommendations are based on preliminary reviews of fundamental assumptions, and accuracy in predicting experimental impact test results. The software is programmed in Visual Basic for Applications for installation as a simple add-in for Microsoft Excel. The user is directed to a graphical user interface (GUI) that requires user inputs and provides solutions directly in Microsoft Excel workbooks. This work was done by Shannon Ryan of the USRA Lunar and Planetary Institute for Johnson Space Center. Further information is contained in a TSP (see page 1). MSC- 24582-1 Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Shield Ballistic Limit Analysis Program Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas Commercially, because it is so generic, Enigma can be used for almost any project that requires engineering visualization, model building, or animation. Models in Enigma can be exported to many other formats for use in other applications as well. Educationally, Enigma is being used to allow university students to visualize robotic algorithms in a simulation mode before using them with actual hardware. This work was done by David Shores and Sharon P. Goza of Johnson Space Center; Cheyenne McKeegan, Rick Easley, Janet Way, and Shonn Everett of MEI Technologies; Mark Manning of PTI; and Mark Guerra, Ray Kraesig, and William Leu of Tietronix Software, Inc. For further information, contact the JSC Innovation Partnerships Office at (281) 483-3809. MSC-24211-1 Spitzer Telemetry Processing System NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, California The Spitzer Telemetry Processing System (SirtfTlmProc) was designed to address objectives of JPL's Multi-mission Image Processing Lab (MIPL) in processing spacecraft telemetry and distributing the resulting data to the science community. To minimize costs and maximize operability, the software design focused on automated error recovery, performance, and information management. The system processes telemetry from the Spitzer spacecraft and delivers Level 0 products to the Spitzer Science Center. SirtfTlmProc is a unique system with automated error notification and recovery, with a real-time continuous service that can go quiescent after periods of inactivity. The software can process 2 GB of telemetry and deliver Level 0 science products to the end user in four hours. It provides analysis tools so the operator can manage the system and troubleshoot problems. It automates telemetry processing in order to reduce staffing costs. This work was done by Alice Stanboli, Elmain M. Martinez, and James M. McAuley of Caltech for NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory. For more information, contact iaoffice @jpl.nasa.gov. This software is available for commercial licensing. Please contact Dan Broderick at Daniel.F. Broderick@jpl.nasa.gov. Refer to NPO-47803. NASA Tech Briefs, September 2013 29 This rapid response computer program predicts Orbiter Wing Leading Edge (WLE) damage caused by ice or foam impact during a Space Shuttle launch (Program "IMPACT2"). The program was developed after the Columbia accident in order to assess quickly WLE damage due to ice, foam, or metal impact (if any) during a Shuttle launch. IMPACT2 simulates an impact event in a few minutes for foam impactors, and in seconds for ice and metal impactors. The damage criterion is derived from results obtained from one sophisticated commercial program, which requires hours to carry out simulations of the same impact events. The program was designed to run much faster than the commercial program with prediction of projectile threshold velocities within 10 to 15% of commercial-program values. The mathematical model involves coupling of Orbiter wing normal modes of vibration to nonlinear or linear springmass models. IMPACT2 solves nonlinear or linear impact problems using classical normal modes of vibration of a target, and nonlinear/ linear time-domain equations for the projectile. Impact loads and stresses developed in the target are computed as functions of time. This model is novel because of its speed of execution. A typical model of foam, or other projectile characterized by material nonlinearities, impacting an RCC panel is executed in minutes instead of hours needed by the commercial programs. Target damage due to impact can be assessed quickly, provided that target vibration modes and allowable stress are known. This work was done by Robert Clark, Jr., Paul Cotter, and Constantine Michalopoulos of The Boeing Company for Johnson Space Center. For further information, contact the JSC Innovation Partnerships Office at (281) 483-3809. MSC-24988-1 Wing Leading Edge RCC Rapid Response Damage Prediction Tool (IMPACT2) Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas (3) the MSL statistics for only the accountable assays. Other options on the main menu include a data editing form and utility programs that produce various reports requested by the microbiologists and the project, and tools to generate the groupings for the final analyses. The analyses can be carried out in three ways: Each assay can be treated separately, the assays can be collectively treated for the whole zone as a group, or the assays can be collected in groups designated by the JPL Planetary Protection Manager. The latter approach was used to generate the final report because assays on the same equipment or similar equipment can be assumed to have been exposed to the same environment and cleaning. Thus, the statistics are improved by having a larger population, thereby reducing the standard deviation by the square root of N. For each method mentioned above, three reports are available. The first is a detailed report including all the data. This version was very useful in verifying the calculations. The second is a brief report that is similar to the full detailed report, but does not print out the data. The third is a grand total and summary report in which each assay requires only one line. For the first and second reports, most of the calculations are performed in the report section itself. For the third, all the calculations are performed directly in the query bound to the report. All the numerical results were verified by comparing them with Excel templates, then exporting the data from the Planetary Protection Analysis program to Excel.

Beaudet, Robert A.↗
NASA NTRS2006

What Happened, and Why: Toward an Understanding of Human Error Based on Automated Analyses of Incident Reports

The objective of the Aviation System Monitoring and Modeling (ASMM) project of NASA s Aviation Safety and Security Program was to develop technologies that will enable proactive management of safety risk, which entails identifying the precursor events and conditions that foreshadow most accidents. This presents a particular challenge in the aviation system where people are key components and human error is frequently cited as a major contributing factor or cause of incidents and accidents. In the aviation "world", information about what happened can be extracted from quantitative data sources, but the experiential account of the incident reporter is the best available source of information about why an incident happened. This report describes a conceptual model and an approach to automated analyses of textual data sources for the subjective perspective of the reporter of the incident to aid in understanding why an incident occurred. It explores a first-generation process for routinely searching large databases of textual reports of aviation incident or accidents, and reliably analyzing them for causal factors of human behavior (the why of an incident). We have defined a generic structure of information that is postulated to be a sound basis for defining similarities between aviation incidents. Based on this structure, we have introduced the simplifying structure, which we call the Scenario as a pragmatic guide for identifying similarities of what happened based on the objective parameters that define the Context and the Outcome of a Scenario. We believe that it will be possible to design an automated analysis process guided by the structure of the Scenario that will aid aviation-safety experts to understand the systemic issues that are conducive to human error.

Maille, Nicolas P.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Safety Risk Knowledge Elicitation in Support of Aeronautical R and D Portfolio Management: A Case Study

Aviation is a problem domain characterized by a high level of system complexity and uncertainty. Safety risk analysis in such a domain is especially challenging given the multitude of operations and diverse stakeholders. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) projects that by 2025 air traffic will increase by more than 50 percent with 1.1 billion passengers a year and more than 85,000 flights every 24 hours contributing to further delays and congestion in the sky (Circelli, 2011). This increased system complexity necessitates the application of structured safety risk analysis methods to understand and eliminate where possible, reduce, and/or mitigate risk factors. The use of expert judgments for probabilistic safety analysis in such a complex domain is necessary especially when evaluating the projected impact of future technologies, capabilities, and procedures for which current operational data may be scarce. Management of an R&D product portfolio in such a dynamic domain needs a systematic process to elicit these expert judgments, process modeling results, perform sensitivity analyses, and efficiently communicate the modeling results to decision makers. In this paper a case study focusing on the application of an R&D portfolio of aeronautical products intended to mitigate aircraft Loss of Control (LOC) accidents is presented. In particular, the knowledge elicitation process with three subject matter experts who contributed to the safety risk model is emphasized. The application and refinement of a verbal-numerical scale for conditional probability elicitation in a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) is discussed. The preliminary findings from this initial step of a three-part elicitation are important to project management practitioners as they illustrate the vital contribution of systematic knowledge elicitation in complex domains.

Shih, Ann T.↗
NASA NTRS1998

Three-Dimensional Geometric Nonlinear Contact Stress Analysis of Riveted Joints

The problems associated with fatigue were brought into the forefront of research by the explosive decompression and structural failure of the Aloha Airlines Flight 243 in 1988. The structural failure of this airplane has been attributed to debonding and multiple cracking along the longitudinal lap splice riveted joint in the fuselage. This crash created what may be termed as a minor "Structural Integrity Revolution" in the commercial transport industry. Major steps have been taken by the manufacturers, operators and authorities to improve the structural airworthiness of the aging fleet of airplanes. Notwithstanding, this considerable effort there are still outstanding issues and concerns related to the formulation of Widespread Fatigue Damage which is believed to have been a contributing factor in the probable cause of the Aloha accident. The lesson from this accident was that Multiple-Site Damage (MSD) in "aging" aircraft can lead to extensive aircraft damage. A strong candidate in which MSD is highly probable to occur is the riveted lap joint.

Shivakumar, Kunigal N.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Development of NASA's Models and Simulations Standard

From the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation, there were several NASA-wide actions that were initiated. One of these actions was to develop a standard for development, documentation, and operation of Models and Simulations. Over the course of two-and-a-half years, a team of NASA engineers, representing nine of the ten NASA Centers developed a Models and Simulation Standard to address this action. The standard consists of two parts. The first is the traditional requirements section addressing programmatics, development, documentation, verification, validation, and the reporting of results from both the M&S analysis and the examination of compliance with this standard. The second part is a scale for evaluating the credibility of model and simulation results using levels of merit associated with 8 key factors. This paper provides an historical account of the challenges faced by and the processes used in this committee-based development effort. This account provides insights into how other agencies might approach similar developments. Furthermore, we discuss some specific applications of models and simulations used to assess the impact of this standard on future model and simulation activities.

simulation↗
NASA NTRS2015

Effects of Acute Stress on Aircrew Performance: Literature Review and Analysis of Operational Aspects

Situational stress can adversely affect the cognition and skilled performance of pilots, as well as experts in other domains. Emergencies and other threatening situations require pilots to execute infrequently practiced procedures correctly and to use their skills and judgment to select an appropriate course of action, often under high workload, time pressure, and ambiguous indications, all of which can be stressful. Our current study, consited of three parts, starting with a critical review of the research literature on the effects of stress on skilled performance, going back to World War II and continuing to recent and more sophisticated studies of the cognitive effects of anxiety. In the second part we analyzed the specific ways stress may have impaired the performance of airline crews in twelve major accidents, selected for diversity of the situations the crews encountered. The third part examined the operational significance and practical implications of the findings from the first two parts, suggested specific ways to reduce the harmful effects of stress on flight crews, and identified aspects requiring further research. Even thought this study focused on flight crews, the findings apply to the effects of stress on the skilled performance of experts in almost any domain.

stress↗
NASA NTRS2019

Gateway Modeling and Simulation Plan

This plan institutes direction across the Gateway Program and the Element Projects to ensure that Cross Program M&S are produced in a manner that (1) generate the artifacts required for NASA-STD-7009 compliance, (2) ensures interoperability of M&S exchanged and integrated across the program and, (3) drives integrated development efforts to provide cross-domain integrated simulation of the Gateway elements, space environment, and operational scenarios. This direction is flowed down via contractual enforcement to prime contractors and includes both the GMS requirements specified in this plan and the NASASTD- 7009 derived requirements necessary for compliance. Grounding principles for management of Gateway Models and Simulations (M&S) are derived from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report and the Diaz team report, “A Renewed Commitment to Excellence.” As an outcome of these reports, and in response to Action 4 of the Diaz team report, the NASA Standard for Models and Simulations, NASA-STD-7009 was developed. The standard establishes M&S requirements for development and use activities to ensure proper capture and communication of M&S pedigree and credibility information to Gateway program decision makers. Through the course of the Gateway program life cycle M&S will be heavily relied upon to conduct analysis, test products, support operations activities, enable informed decision making and ultimately to certify the Gateway with an acceptable level of risk to crew and mission. To reduce risk associated with M&S influenced decisions, this plan applies the NASA-STD-7009 requirements to produce the artifacts that support credibility assessments and ensure the information is communicated to program management.

NASA-STD-7009↗
NASA NTRS1999

National Transportation Safety Board Aircraft Accident Investigation Supported

The main purpose of this investigation was for NASA to help the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) gain better understanding of the events that led to the loss of Comair Flight 3272 over Monroe, Michigan, on January 9, 1997. In-flight icing was suspected as being the primary cause of this accident. Of particular interest to the Safety Board was what NASA could learn about the potential performance degradation of the wing of the Embraer EMB-120 twin-turboprop commuter aircraft with various levels of ice contamination. NASA agreed to undertake (1) ice-accretion prediction computations with NASA s LEWICE program to bound the kind of contaminations that the vehicle may have developed, (2) testing in the NASA Lewis Research Center's Icing Research Tunnel to verify and refine the ice shapes developed by LEWICE, (3) a two-dimensional Navier- Stokes analysis to determine the performance degradation that those ice shapes could have caused, and (4) an examination using three-dimensional Navier-Stokes codes to study the three-dimensional effects of ice contamination.

Reehorst, Andrew L.↗
NASA NTRS1989

Human factors model concerning the man-machine interface of mining crewstations

The U.S. Bureau of Mines is developing a computer model to analyze the human factors aspect of mining machine operator compartments. The model will be used as a research tool and as a design aid. It will have the capability to perform the following: simulated anthropometric or reach assessment, visibility analysis, illumination analysis, structural analysis of the protective canopy, operator fatigue analysis, and computation of an ingress-egress rating. The model will make extensive use of graphics to simplify data input and output. Two dimensional orthographic projections of the machine and its operator compartment are digitized and the data rebuilt into a three dimensional representation of the mining machine. Anthropometric data from either an individual or any size population may be used. The model is intended for use by equipment manufacturers and mining companies during initial design work on new machines. In addition to its use in machine design, the model should prove helpful as an accident investigation tool and for determining the effects of machine modifications made in the field on the critical areas of visibility and control reach ability.

Rider, James P.↗
NASA NTRS2009

TRW - Lunar Descent Engine

As we went through the program, what we determined, and what we all agreed on, was that the thrust coefficient (Cf) of the nozzle, after you get past a certain point, is really an engineering parameter. It s not a fundamental parameter that is going to be highly variable. Once we knew what the contour of the nozzle was, and once we knew what its characteristic was out to 2:1, we could calculate what the 48:1 thrust coefficient was going to be. In every case that we made a test, the calculation was precise. We weren't looking for a problem out at 48:1. Once we crushed the nozzle and said, "Yeah, we can land on the boulder," and once we had the thermal profile of that columbium nozzle, we did not require a lot of effort there. The real characterization was done in throttling over the 10:1 with the injector and controlling the mixture ratio on that - the whole head-end assembly - out to 2:1. I think everybody at NASA and Grumman agreed that flying like you test is great, particularly if you are using an aircraft engine. But, in this case, the thrust coefficient of the nozzle was not an issue. We had the tandem configuration of the service module, the command module, and the LEM sitting out there, and we were to fire the LEM. On Apollo 5, we were firing the LEM to show how it would work. There was a problem. I can t remember where the problem was, but something caused a problem before that engine had finished its burn. It was not in the engine, but there was some other problem, and NASA made a controlled shutdown. Then, they came to us and asked, "Hey, we re up there. We want to finish this test program. Is it okay if we restart that engine again in space with this tandem configuration?" We said, "As long as it has been more than forty minutes since you shut down, our analysis says that you will be okay in terms of the thermal characteristics of the inside of that chamber." They restarted it and pushed that system around in orbit on Apollo 5. It turned out, that when it came to Apollo 13, we went back into the record, and said, "Hey, we have pushed this system around up there on Apollo 5, and we have also restarted this tandem configuration." The requirements on Apollo 13 were to put it back into play. The spacecraft was out of free return to the earth at the time of the accident. It would not have come back. NASA said, "Okay, we ll use the descent engine to put the spacecraft in a free trajectory; it will go around the moon and be on free trajectory back to Earth." Then, as it came around the far side of the moon, the guys found out that they had an oxygen problem. As you remember, things were getting pretty bad in there. They said, "We ve got to get it back as fast as we can. Is it okay if we re-fire the engine? Now, we re in a free trajectory, so we want to put as much delta-v (or change in velocity) in as we can. Can we re-fire right now?" We said, "Yes, the data says it has been this period of time." We could re-fire the engine, run the rest of the duty cycle up as far as we needed while preserving enough fluids to make the final correction as the spacecraft got near Earth, and restart the engine. It was pretty fortuitous that we could give them those answers.

Elverum, Gerard W.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Comparison of current Shuttle and pre-Challenger flight suit reach capability during launch accelerations

The Challenger accident prompted the creation of a crew escape system which replaced the former Launch Entry Helmet (LEH) ensemble with the current Launch Entry Suit (LES). However, questions were raised regarding the impact of this change on crew reach capability. This study addressed the question of reach capability and its effects on realistic ground-based training for Space Shuttle missions. Eleven subjects performed reach sweeps in both the LEH and LES suits during 1 and 3 Gx acceleration trials in the Brooks AFB centrifuge. These reach sweeps were recorded on videotape and subsequently analyzed using a 3D motion analysis system. The ANOVA procedure of the Statistical Analysis System program was used to evaluate differences in forward and overhead reach. The results showed that the LES provided less reach capability than its predecessor, the LEH. This study also demonstrated that, since there was no substantial difference between 1 and 3 Gx reach sweeps in the LES, realistic Shuttle launch training may be accomplished in ground based simulators.

Bagian, James P.↗
NASA NTRS2015

An Empirical Non-TNT Approach to Launch Vehicle Explosion Modeling

In an effort to increase crew survivability from catastrophic explosions of Launch Vehicles (LV), a study was conducted to determine the best method for predicting LV explosion environments in the near field. After reviewing such methods as TNT equivalence, Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) theory, and Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD), it was determined that the best approach for this study was to assemble all available empirical data from full scale launch vehicle explosion tests and accidents. Approximately 25 accidents or full-scale tests were found that had some amount of measured blast wave, thermal, or fragment explosion environment characteristics. Blast wave overpressure was found to be much lower in the near field than predicted by most TNT equivalence methods. Additionally, fragments tended to be larger, fewer, and slower than expected if the driving force was from a high explosive type event. In light of these discoveries, a simple model for cryogenic rocket explosions is presented. Predictions from this model encompass all known applicable full scale launch vehicle explosion data. Finally, a brief description of on-going analysis and testing to further refine the launch vehicle explosion environment is discussed.

Blackwood, James M.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Development of a Flexible Framework of Common Hypersonic Navier-Strokes Meshes for the Space Shuttle Orbiter

A flexible framework for the development of block structured volume grids for hypersonic Navier-Stokes flow simulations was developed for analysis of the Shuttle Orbiter Columbia. The development of the flexible framework, resulted in an ability to quickly generate meshes to directly correlate solutions contributed by participating groups on a common surface mesh, providing confidence for the extension of the envelope of solutions and damage scenarios. The framework draws on the experience of NASA Langely and NASA Ames Research Centers in structured grid generation, and consists of a grid generation process that is implemented through a division of responsibilities. The nominal division of labor consisted of NASA Johnson Space Center coordinating the damage scenarios to be analyzed by the Aerothermodynamics Columbia Accident Investigation (CAI) team, Ames developing the surface grids that described the computational volume about the orbiter, and Langely improving grid quality of Ames generated data and constructing the final volume grids. Distributing the work among the participants in the Aerothermodynamic CIA team resulted in significantly less time required to construct complete meshes than possible by any individual participant. The approach demonstrated that the One-NASA grid generation team could sustain the demand for new meshes to explore new damage scenarios within a aggressive timeline.

Alter, Stephen J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Analysis of Launch Vehicle Liftoff Debris: Historical Perspective from Space Shuttle and Application to Artemis I

Human exploration-class launch vehicles are inherently prone to debris due to the extreme environments generated during pre-launch operations, liftoff, and flight. The use of cryogenic propellants often requires thermal protection system (TPS) coatings, typically foam, to maintain the propellant conditions in the tank and prevent an accumulation ice on the external surface of the vehicle. Some ice growth is to be expected at umbilical interfaces, vents, flanges, or brackets where it is difficult to apply TPS. This ice may come loose at any time due to wind on the launch pad, structural vibration and acoustics after rocket ignition, or aerodynamic forces during flight. This phenomena is especially apparent on vehicles with no TPS, such as the Saturn V rockets used in the Apollo Program, see Figure 1. During propellant tanking, the thermal contraction of the underlying substrate may generate cracks in the TPS (Figure 1). Chunks of TPS can release due to the expansion of ingested gas from cryopumping or from aerodynamic forces if the crack creates an offset surface. Most foams will also have a certain amount of “popcorning” where small pieces of foam will pop off during flight because of the differential between the static surface pressure and the pressure of the gas trapped in the foam cell structure. There are a number of other coating or closeout materials that may be shed from the vehicle and become debris. During pre-launch operations and liftoff, the vehicle may also be exposed to debris originating from the launch pad or ground support equipment. This debris is separate from foreign object debris, or FOD, which is not intended to be present and is strictly controlled through operations and maintenance procedures. In this case, debris is generated from hardware and materials that are necessary for launch and are subject to the intense vibration, acoustics, and direct plume impingement of the launch environment. Examples include ice from umbilicals, tape and tie wraps that protect cables, and rust or corrosion from the launch platform. While NASA has historically been aware of debris as a potential issue that could cause a failure resulting in loss of mission, loss of vehicle, or loss of crew, the likelihood and severity of that risk was not always well understood or given sufficient weight in program and flight decisions. After the Space Shuttle Columbia accident (STS-107), the investigation found that foam TPS debris shed from the external tank was the proximate cause of the damage to the orbiter wing. Six previous observations of debris released from the foam ramp that covered the bipod connecting the forward end of the orbiter to the external tank resulted in minor changes or were determined to be accepted flight risks. Two occurrences of bipod ramp foam loss were not identified until the STS-107 investigation. Despite the damage inflicted by these debris strikes, the Shuttle Program Requirements Control Board deemed the vehicle safe to fly. During the Return to Flight effort following the Columbia disaster, NASA Engineering developed a process for the assessment of debris transport, impact, and damage tolerance to support independent assessments of risk by NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA). Under this system, each element (vehicle or ground system) defines a catalog of all expected debris based on launch history, component testing, or analysis. Debris transport analysis (DTA) is conducted using the debris catalog characteristics and potential flow transport mechanisms (e.g., vehicle aerodynamics, gravity, wind, plume-driven). The predicted debris impact locations and velocities are provided to the hardware owners, who use available test data and analysis to determine whether each component can withstand the impacts. In cases where the element hardware may be severely damaged or fail, the options are to mitigate the debris source through some change in design or operation, or to work with S&MA to try to characterize the probability of the impact and damage for program risk acceptance. Because of the differences in debris characteristics and transport, the DTA has been divided between the Liftoff and Ascent regimes. The development and application of Liftoff DTA methodology from the Shuttle Program to the current Artemis Program is the subject of this paper. Liftoff DTA covers the time from the start of pre-launch operations at the launch pad, up until the vehicle clears the launch tower and there is no longer any interaction with ground systems. Debris transport during this period is broadly classified as either gravity, wind, and plume-entrained (GWPE) or plume driven (PD). GWPE debris is generally lower speed, travelling in a forward-to-aft direction. PD transport includes flow features from the rocket ignition transient, as well as plume impingement and recirculation that occur as the vehicle lifts off the launch platform. In these cases, the debris typically moves in an aft-to-forward direction at higher speeds. The applicable transport mechanisms must be considered for each piece of debris depending on the material, and release location and time. For example, rust or metallic debris from the tower could fall (GWPE) and impact the vehicle before landing on the launch platform deck where it could be also be transported by plume impingement (PD). However, falling ice (GWPE) from an umbilical is unlikely to survive impact with the vehicle or launch platform and be available for PD transport. Modeling of debris transport is accomplished using a set of DTA tools which simulate debris trajectories subject to a reference frame acceleration (i.e., gravity) and aerodynamic drag. Where the trajectory encounters a solid surface, the debris is allowed to rebound with a specified coefficient of restitution. The drag is calculated by interpolating the fluid state at each point in the debris trajectory from high-fidelity computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations of the launch vehicle and pad. The CFD data may either be static (steady state or time averaged), typically for GWPE transport, or dynamic (time-accurate) for PD flow features like the ignition transient. Examples of the CFD flow field solutions for the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket and launch pad are shown in Figure 2. Typical SLS debris trajectory predictions from DTA are illustrated in Figure 3. The final version of this paper will include a more detailed examination of the Liftoff DTA process developed during the Shuttle Program, and how it has been augmented and applied to the SLS rocket under the Artemis Program. Comparisons with debris observations from the Artemis I launch will demonstrate validation of the tools and methodology.

Debris↗
NASA NTRS2005

Airflow Hazard Visualization for Helicopter Pilots: Flight Simulation Study Results

Airflow hazards such as vortices or low level wind shear have been identified as a primary contributing factor in many helicopter accidents. US Navy ships generate airwakes over their decks, creating potentially hazardous conditions for shipboard rotorcraft launch and recovery. Recent sensor developments may enable the delivery of airwake data to the cockpit, where visualizing the hazard data may improve safety and possibly extend ship/helicopter operational envelopes. A prototype flight-deck airflow hazard visualization system was implemented on a high-fidelity rotorcraft flight dynamics simulator. Experienced helicopter pilots, including pilots from all five branches of the military, participated in a usability study of the system. Data was collected both objectively from the simulator and subjectively from post-test questionnaires. Results of the data analysis are presented, demonstrating a reduction in crash rate and other trends that illustrate the potential of airflow hazard visualization to improve flight safety.

Aragon, Cecilia R.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Material Modeling of Space Shuttle Leading Edge and External Tank Materials For Use in the Columbia Accident Investigation

Upon the commencement of the analytical effort to characterize the impact dynamics and damage of the Space Shuttle Columbia leading edge due to External Tank insulating foam, the necessity of creating analytical descriptions of these materials became evident. To that end, material models were developed of the leading edge thermal protection system, Reinforced Carbon Carbon (RCC), and a low density polyurethane foam, BX-250. Challenges in modeling the RCC include its extreme brittleness, the differing behavior in compression and tension, and the anisotropic fabric layup. These effects were successfully included in LS-DYNA Material Model 58, *MAT_LAMINATED_ COMPOSITE_ FABRIC. The differing compression and tension behavior was modeled using the available damage parameters. Each fabric layer was given an integration point in the shell element, and was allowed to fail independently. Comparisons were made to static test data and coupon ballistic impact tests before being utilized in the full scale analysis. The foam's properties were typical of elastic automotive foams; and LS-DYNA Material Model 83, *MAT_FU_CHANG_FOAM, was successfully used to model its behavior. Material parameters defined included strain rate dependent stress-strain curves for both loading and un-loading, and for both compression and tension. This model was formulated with static test data and strain rate dependent test data, and was compared to ballistic impact tests on load-cell instrumented aluminum plates. These models were subsequently utilized in analysis of the Shuttle leading edge full scale ballistic impact tests, and are currently being used in the Return to Flight Space Shuttle re-certification effort.

Carney, Kelly↗
NASA NTRS2006

Status of Thermal NDT of Space Shuttle Materials at NASA

Since the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, NASA has focused on improving advanced NDE techniques for the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels that comprise the orbiter's wing leading edge and nose cap. Various nondestructive inspection techniques have been used in the examination of the RCC, but thermography has emerged as an effective inspection alternative to more traditional methods. Thermography is a non-contact inspection method as compared to ultrasonic techniques which typically require the use of a coupling medium between the transducer and material. Like radiographic techniques, thermography can inspect large areas, but has the advantage of minimal safety concerns and the ability for single-sided measurements. Details of the analysis technique that has been developed to allow insitu inspection of a majority of shuttle RCC components is discussed. Additionally, validation testing, performed to quantify the performance of the system, will be discussed. Finally, the results of applying this technology to the Space Shuttle Discovery after its return from the STS-114 mission in July 2005 are discussed.

Cramer, K. Elliott↗