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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2019

A Practical Approach of Mining Operational Risks in Cigeo - A field-test - 19349

Andra is currently completing the detailed engineering phase of the stepwise design development of Cigeo (the French HLW and IL-LLW Deep Geological Repository, aka DGR). Various technical issues are at stake, including the risk management requirements linked to the safety of 'Mining Operations' (i.e. occupational safety issues related to underground excavation/dismantling works at some 500 m of depth), at different stages of the DGR life cycle (i.e. from its construction start-up to its final closure and future monitoring/or conversely a decision of waste retrieval). These occupational safety requirements have a significant impact on Cigeo's design, its progressive construction and later closure. On a shorter term, one must demonstrate that the design bases are technically sound and that the solutions selected (to build, operate, close the DGR infrastructures or conversely retrieve the waste) are both feasible and safe. In that sense (and following an identification of operational risks during construction), Andra focused on two sensitive cases: - The construction of large diameter drift crossings, in particular those related to the connection between a transfer drift (main) and a IL-LLW disposal vault (i.e. during construction operations), - The partial dismantling of a drift concrete lining (made of concrete segment rings, erected and placed by a TBM) at time of construction of a horizontal seal (i.e. during closure operations). The discussion starts with a description of the geotechnical conditions prevailing at the (French) Bure site, in the Callovo-Oxfordian (COx) claystone formation. Then the paper presents the Cigeo underground architecture (at large) and the specific structural choices made (at the end of the detailed engineering phase) for drifts, disposal vaults and seals. The discussion on construction - deconstruction challenges for each of the critical issues cited above provides an opportunity to explain the operational sequences (and how the methodology selected enables to reduce the risks). The following part of the paper focuses the technological demonstration (an in-situ test to be planned in detail) of a partial dismantling of the concrete segments rings forming the support lining of two tunnels previously built in the Meuse/Haute-Marne URL (Underground Research Laboratory) infrastructures, combined with the construction of a specific drift crossing. In this dismantling and construction test, the technical demonstration objective is three-fold: - The capacity to lay down compressible arch segments and support (by bolts and mesh) the rock after the lining removal, - The capacity to excavate and line the drift crossing, - The structural / geomechanical behavior (evolution with time) of the rock and lining compared with that of 'neighboring' zones. This paper provides a timeline of the tests. Should the results obtained deliver some positive perspectives of technical feasibility (and convincing operational safety) Andra will incorporate this dismantling/construction solution in the 'design freeze' of the DGR underground infrastructures. The positive outcomes of this technical test campaign will also provide 'elements of proof' for the instruction of the Cigeo licensing (a process likely to take place between 2020 and 2024) by the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Overview and status of the Long-Baseline Neutrino Facility Far Site cryogenics system

The Sanford Underground Research Facility (SURF) will host the Far Detector of the Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE), an international multi-kiloton Long-Baseline neutrino experiment that will be installed about one and a half kilometers underground in Lead, SD. Detectors will be located inside four cryostats filled with almost 70,000 metric tons of ultrapure liquid argon, with a level of impurities lower than 100 parts per trillion of oxygen equivalent contamination. The cryogenics infrastructure supporting this experiment is provided by the Long-Baseline Neutrino Facility (LBNF). This contribution presents modes of operation, layout, and main features of the LBNF Far Site cryogenic system, which is composed of three subsystems: Infrastructure, Proximity, and Internal cryogenics. The Infrastructure cryogenics supports the needs of the cryostat and Proximity cryogenics. It includes the equipment to receive the argon in liquid phase, vaporize it and transfer it underground as a gas, the nitrogen system (composed of the refrigeration system, liquid nitrogen buffer tanks and liquid and gaseous nitrogen distribution), liquid and gaseous argon distribution and process controls. The Proximity cryogenics receives fluids from the Infrastructure cryogenics and delivers them to the Internal cryogenics at the required temperature, pressure, purity and mass flow rate. It includes the argon condensers, liquid and gaseous argon purification and regeneration systems, nitrogen and argon phase separators, piping, valves, and instrumentation. The Internal cryogenics comprises the liquid and gaseous argon distribution inside the cryostats for the commissioning, cool down, fill, and steady state operations of the cryostats and detectors. An international engineering team is designing these systems and will manufacture, install, commission, and qualify them. This contribution describes the main features, performance, functional requirements, and modes of operation of the LBNF Far Site cryogenics system. It also presents the status of the design, along with present and future needs to support the DUNE experiment.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

LBNF/DUNE Liquid Argon Roadmap

The Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE) is an international flagship venture to unlock the mysteries of neutrinos. Hosted at the Sanford Underground Research Facility (SURF) and supported by the Long-Baseline Neutrino Facility (LBNF), DUNE relies on nearly 75,000 tonnes of ultrapure liquid argon (LAr) housed in state-of-the-art cryostats. Transporting such vast quantities of LAr to its destination a mile underground in Lead, SD, is a logistical and engineering challenge. The process begins with securing large quantities of liquid argon from suppliers located far from the site, with major sources situated near Houston, TX and Chicago, IL. The receiving facility, located atop a mountain with steep, often snow-covered access roads, provides limited maneuverability for trucks and can only handle two deliveries simultaneously. The facility serves as an entry point for argon to the greater LBNF cryogenic system. It is furnished with truck unloading stations, limited buffer storage of some 280 tonnes capacity, and vaporizers. The last are crucial for converting liquid argon into gas for transfer down the Ross Shaft, eliminating the need for cryogens in the vertical pipeline. These constraints, along with other operational factors, cap the delivery rate at 70 tonnes per day. Once underground, the argon is purified and recondensed before filling the cryostats. This roadmap outlines the integrated supply chain and cryogenic systems that enable the delivery of LAr to support DUNE’s groundbreaking physics research.

Maciazka, Matt [Fermilab]↗
DOE OSTI2025

Complex surface topographic changes from explosive experiments at the Dry Alluvium Geology site, southern Nevada, United States

Understanding the surface topographic change that results from underground explosions is important for global security. Current techniques to relate the surface change to underground explosion characteristics usually involve assuming the earth has homogenous properties, leading to highly variable interpretations. Here we use an unoccupied aerial platform and a digital single lens reflex camera along with 200+ ground control points surveyed with a real-time kinematic global navigation satellite system to measure the surface topographic change resulting from two underground explosions at the Dry Alluvium Geology site in Yucca Flat, Nevada National Security Site, southern Nevada, United States. We find areas of 5–7 cm of subsidence that are not directly above the explosion source but rather 200–300 m away. For experiment DAG2, this zone is located south and west of the explosion, while for DAG4, there is a zone of subsidence located northeast of the explosion. In addition, late-time measurements show as much as 5 cm of horizontal change without measurable associated vertical change in the weeks following DAG4 but not DAG2. These indicate that the deformation resulting from underground chemical explosions can be very complex and bear little to no resemblance to predictions using half-space models. It is likely the tectonic environment plays a significant role in controlling the surface change, but the details are not fully understood.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2019

Effective Access Monitoring at Geological Repositories

Access points at a deep, mined geological repository (GR) for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and other nuclear wastes present potential diversion paths for nuclear material. Because C/S measures are not likely to be used underground, access to a GR will require unprecedented reliance on C/S measures to maintain continuity of knowledge (CoK) on SNF buried underground. We develop a model GR based on common features of GR designs from national programs in order to develop and optimize C/S measures for GR access points that maximize confidence that CoK is maintained on SNF underground. Critical access points identified in this study are surface entrances to (1) the GR ramp (2) the excavation shaft, (3) the main elevator shaft, and (4) the ventilation shaft. The first three are considered critical detection points (DPs), whereas the fourth is considered a non-critical DP. The reason for the distinction is due to the different design capabilities of shaft components: the first three (ramp, excavation shaft, main elevator) are all capable of being used to move material from the underground to the surface, whereas the ventilation shaft is not. Such capabilities are verified during periodic design information verification (DIV) inspections.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Contaminant Transport Parameters for the Groundwater Flow and Contaminant Transport Model of Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa, Nye County, Nevada, Revision 1

This document presents a summary and framework of available transport data and other information directly relevant to the development of the groundwater transport model for Central and Western Pahute Mesa (PM) corrective action units (CAU). This model is referred to as the “PM CAU transport model” in this document. Central and Western PM are two areas of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) that historically were used for underground nuclear testing. These nuclear tests resulted in groundwater contamination in the vicinity of the underground test areas. As a result, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program is currently conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) of the PM underground test areas. This work is a part of the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Hydrologic Data for the Groundwater Flow and Contaminant Transport Model of Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa, Nye County, Nevada, Revision 1

This hydrologic data document (HDD) has been prepared for Corrective Action Units (CAUs) 101 and 102, Central and Western Pahute Mesa, in order to support the development of a groundwater flow and contaminant transport model. Central and Western Pahute Mesa are two of the five CAUs on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site [NTS]) used for underground nuclear testing (Figure 1-1). The nuclear tests resulted in groundwater contamination in the vicinity of the underground test areas. As a result, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program is currently conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) of the Pahute Mesa underground test areas. This work is a part of the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). The CAU groundwater flow and transport model is composed of two pieces, a flow model and a transport model, that together provide the contaminant boundary forecasts required by the FFACO. The hydrologic data necessary for the flow model portion of the CAU model are presented in this report. The transport data necessary for the transport model portion of the CAU model will be provided in a separate report.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

The LBNF/DUNE Complex for Neutrino Science

The Long Baseline Neutrino Facility (LBNF) provides the underground detector caverns, the beamline to deliver a 1.2MW proton beam, and a target station to produce neutrinos for the international Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE). A mile underground, caverns are being excavated and outfitted at the Sanford Underground Research Facility in South Dakota. The beamline facility and an additional near detector facility will be constructed on the Fermilab site in Illinois. DUNE will make precision neutrino oscillation physics measurements and will be sensitive to neutrinos from supernova bursts, nucleon decay, and beyond-standard-model physics.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗
DOE OSTI2024

LBNF/DUNE Nitrogen Refrigeration System Update

The Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE) is supported by the infrastructure of the Long Baseline Neutrino Facility (LBNF). The central feature of DUNE is the liquid argon filled cryostats, which house the neutrino detector components. In order to maintain the argon in a liquid state, heat must be continuously removed. Argon condensers will remove this heat, and liquefy the argon, through the evaporation of liquid nitrogen. The supply of liquid nitrogen relies heavily on a near-industrial scale nitrogen refrigeration/liquefaction system. The nitrogen system will be a closed loop, in which the liquid nitrogen is supplied to users and, after being vaporized, is recycled to the nitrogen liquefaction units to be liquefied again. The system will also include nitrogen generation, to increase inventory in the closed loop, as well as to make up for losses. All of this will be installed nearly one mile underground (1.5km) on the 4850 level of the Sanford Underground Research Facility (SURF). The final DUNE vision requires 400kW of liquid nitrogen cooling capacity. Based on the operation modes and phased installation of the experiment, modularity of this cooling capacity is required. Nitrogen liquefaction will occur in four units which will afford a wide operational range of production (nominally 100kW each). Due to the experiment’s location deep underground in an inactive gold mine, there are unique and challenging constraints. These include limited access, footprint, and utilities. This poster describes the engineering effort, and provides an overview of the refrigeration system. The design includes a unique compressor arrangement which is covered in detail. Pictures and models are included where possible to help visualize the system.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Calibrating the DUNE LArTPC detectors for precision physics

The Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE) is an international collaboration focused on studying neutrino oscillation over a long baseline (1300 km). DUNE will make use of a near detector and $\mathcal{O}$(GeV) neutrino beam originating at Fermilab in Batavia, IL, and a far detector operating 1.5 km underground at the Sanford Underground Research Facility in Lead, South Dakota. The near and far detectors will use the LArTPC (Liquid Argon Time Projection Chamber) technology to image neutrino interactions. In order to make precise physics measurements at DUNE, such as the amount of CP violation in the neutrino sector, it is essential to be able to accurately reconstruct particle energies and other kinematic quantities; this in turn necessitates an extensive calibration program for DUNE s LArTPC detectors. In this presentation, we describe the requirements for calibrating the DUNE detectors, emphasizing the challenges of massive multi-kiloton LArTPC detectors which are to operate for multiple years deep underground. A preliminary DUNE detector calibration program, including use of both dedicated calibration hardware and cosmogenic/beam-induced calibration sources, is presented. First results on detector calibration at the ProtoDUNE-SP prototype detector located at CERN, and associated impact on calibrations at the DUNE far detector, are also emphasized.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

Design of the DUNE APATF cryogenic system

Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (FNAL) is developing the international Long- Baseline Neutrino Facility (LBNF) and Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE) to advance neutrino science. The flagship of the DUNE project consists of a large particle detector constructed one-mile (1.6 km) beneath the surface at the Sanford Underground Research Facility (SURF) in Lead, SD. The SURF detector is the largest of its type ever built and is comprised of four cryostats totaling 70,000 tons of liquid argon (LAr) to record neutrino interactions with unprecedented precision. Each cryostat houses a detector, the first includes 150 Anode Panel Assemblies (APA) submersed within 17,500 tons of LAr. Before installing 150 APA within the SURF detector they will be cryogenically cooled to nominally 90 K at the APA Test Facility (APATF) utilizing nitrogen flows. The APATF cryogenic system is entirely located one-mile underground at the SURF facility and includes nominally 13 kW of refrigeration at 80 K, cryogenic transfer lines, APA test cryostats, a cryogenic control system, and various control and pressure safety elements to ensure performance and safety requirements are achieved. The APATF preliminary design is in progress and major considerations include an efficient, costeffective mechanism to deliver the required refrigeration to the APATF underground, support of rigid testing intervals to support the DUNE operating schedule, temperature stability of the APA and electronics within cryostats, efficient cryogenic system operation to minimize heat leak and/or liquid nitrogen consumption, thermo-mechanical stability and flexibility of components, and pressure safety of the APATF cryogenic system. Installation and integration of the APATF cryogenic system within the footprint and to adjacent sub-systems is also discussed.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Remote monitoring system

A remote monitoring system for monitoring parameters of an underground asset, such as an electric cable system, a pipeline serving as a conduit for water, gas, oil, sewage, or the like. Parameter detectors, such as sensors that measure temperature, voltage, current, moisture, etc., are distributed along the asset to provide electrical signals that represent respective monitored parameters of the asset. An underground hub disposed in an underground vault, or manhole, through which the asset passes is coupled to the parameter detectors to acquire the signals provided by the parameter detectors. The hub includes a controller to provide data derived from the acquired signals, the data being transmitted to a remote central location by a transceiver, or modem, via LP-WAN communication. Signals from the transceiver are transmitted directly from underground.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2019

Lessons Learned from the Development of the DGR Konrad - 19619

The Federal Republic Germany builds the deep geological repository Konrad. The repository is suitable for low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste (LAW and MAW) and it is the first German repository site, which is not located in a salt geological formation. Konrad is a former iron ore mine in Salzgitter (in southeast Lower Saxony) with an active production time between 1961 and 1976. In 2007, the BGE started with the conversion of the mine infrastructure above and underground to build the repository while using the shafts and some roadways of the former mine. The experiences gained from ten years project progress with its complexities and difficulties can be used for similar repository projects in the future. The Konrad repository is designed for 303,000 m{sup 3} of LAW and MAW, which will be emplaced in chambers. The emplacement chambers are located outside of the existing mine, so an impairment by the old mine workings can be excluded. So far, the first area with emplacement chambers has been excavated. In order to be able to start repository operations in 2027, a wide range of work in building construction, civil engineering, shaft sinking and infrastructure development above and below ground has been necessary and will be completed in the next years. The main activities are focused on the Konrad 1 and 2 sites and the part of the infrastructure located in the future control area, which is used for repository operations. There are still many challenges to overcome in the Konrad repository project, although many processes have been put on the right track in recent years. Looking back on past activities and in the cautious preview, this paper gives some indications from which lessons can be drawn and should be applied to similar projects in the future. - Prefer small dimensions for the infrastructure, such as insets and roadway cross-section, and the appropriate machinery and handling equipment; - Detailed process planning for construction in existing infrastructure in the run-up to implementation; - Intensive communication with contracted partners on the preparation of planning documents for nuclear examination procedures and ensuring an excellent contract management; - Early start of the implementation planning for projects under nuclear law, taking into account the relevant boundary conditions; - Ensuring the support of the project by the local community and other stakeholders. Overall, the use of parts of the existing above and underground infrastructure for the construction of a new repository is more difficult than for a complete new construction. But using the shafts of an existing mine delivers the advantage of very good knowledge about the underground environment. In addition, the areas necessary for the construction and operation of the buildings and facilities are already available and secured and do not compete with other projects.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

An Overview of R and D on Retrievability and Retrieval Technology in Germany - 20462

Retrievability is a term that is included in most radioactive waste management programs around the world. Although national definitions vary, the overall understanding of retrievability concerns the ability to recover waste packages from the repository mine after their emplacement. Different countries may implement retrievability in very different ways, ranging from a built-in reversibility into the emplacement process to the stipulation that retrievability may in no way impede passive safety in the post-closure phase. Germany takes a middle course such that retrievability in a HLW repository (repository for high level radioactive waste) may have no significant detrimental effect on passive safety. In Germany, the current siting process considers rock salt, clay rock, and crystalline rock as potential host rocks. Therefore, Research and Development (R and D) has been investigating repository concepts and retrievability in all host rocks. After introduction of retrievability in 2010, existing repository concepts were modified to facilitate retrieval. The changes made comprised, for example, equipping boreholes with steel liners, developing new technologies, and modifying existing emplacement devices. Apart from retrieval of HLW, retrieval of other wastes from underground repositories that were designed and operated without retrievability in mind, poses major technical and scientific challenges. Currently, studies are under way to investigate the feasibility and costs of partial retrieval of waste from an underground repository for hazardous and highly toxic waste in France, Stocamine. With regard to retrieval, the rock-mechanical conditions are deteriorating rapidly, so time is of the essence. In the Asse II mine in Germany, about 126,500 waste casks with low and intermediate level waste await retrieval. The repository mine suffers from difficult rock-mechanical conditions and inflow of brine, locally into emplacement areas. The Federal Company for Radioactive Waste Disposal (BGE) is legally required to retrieve all wastes from the Asse. Due to the specific challenges, R and D is needed to develop technical solutions for the safe retrieval from each of the emplacement chambers. R and D on retrievability and retrieval technology does not only address challenges in radioactive or toxic waste retrieval but may also help to germinate innovation to better master complex underground situations in general, e.g. in deep mining, tunneling, or repository construction. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Subsurface cosmogenic and radiogenic production of 42 Ar

Radioactive decays from 42 Ar and its progeny 42 K are potential background sources in large-scale liquid-argon-based neutrino and dark matter experiments. In the atmosphere, 42 Ar is produced primarily by cosmogenic activation on 40 Ar. The use of low radioactivity argon from cosmogenically shielded underground sources can expand the reach and sensitivity of liquid-argon-based rare event searches. We estimate 42 Ar production underground by nuclear reactions induced by natural radioactivity and cosmic-ray muon-induced interactions. At 3,000 mwe, 42 Ar production rate is 1.8×10 -3 atoms per ton of crust per year, 7 orders of magnitude smaller than the 39 Ar production rate at a similar depth in the crust. In conclusion, by comparing the calculated production rate of 42 Ar to that of 39 Ar for which the concentration has been measured in an underground gas sample, we estimate the activity of 42 Ar in gas extracted from 3,000 mwe depth to be less than two decays per ton of argon per year.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2019

The Historic Water, Sewer, and Steam/HTHW Systems in Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Appendix B - Resource Forms)

This report provides documentation intended to satisfy the mitigation requirements for a substantial portion of the above- and belowground utilities in Mercury on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) outlined in the associated Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) manages the property and anticipates conducting activities in the future that will affect these resources. These structures are entirely within the Mercury Historic District, which is eligible to the National Register of Historic Places. The district is considered eligible under Criteria A and C for the theme of nuclear testing, with a period of significance from 1951 through 1992. The utilities addressed here include the systems related to potable water and steam/high temperature hot water distribution, as well as the sewage system. More specifically, this documentation covers these underground utilities that were installed in Mercury from 1951 through 1977 and above-ground components installed from 1951 through 1992. Introduction The information in this report is intended to meet the requirements of the Memorandum of Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Water and Sewer Upgrades at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada (MOA) signed on January 30, 2018. The purpose of the MOA is to mitigate the adverse effects of proposed activities on utilities in the Mercury Historic District. The MOA covers the potable water, sewage, and steam/high temperature hot water (HTHW) systems in Mercury. A historic context related to the district as a whole is documented in Reno et al. The State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) has concurred with NNSA/NFO’s determination that the district is eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A and C at the national level, with a period of significance of 1951 to 1992, which encompasses the period of nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site. The utility systems are not considered individually eligible for the National Register, but are contributing components to the eligibility of the district. This report combines information from an unpublished preliminary historic context on the underground utilities written prior to the initiation of recording activities and included as an attachment to the MOA and new data acquired during the course of meeting the MOA requirements. In addition to documenting the underground utility components exposed during excavation of discovery holes to verify pipe locations, Desert Research Institute (DRI) also recorded numerous above-ground elements and equipment in accessible vaults to develop a more complete representation of the historic utilities in Mercury. The information below is organized in the order it is discussed in the MOA.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

A New Method for High Resolution Surface Change Detection: Data Collection and Validation of Measurements from UAS at the Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, USA

The use of uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) increases the opportunities for detecting surface changes in remote areas and in challenging terrain. Detecting surface topographic changes offers an important constraint for understanding earthquake damage, groundwater depletion, effects of mining, and other events. For these purposes, changes on the order of 5–10 cm are readily detected, but sometimes it is necessary to detect smaller changes. An example is the surface changes that result from underground explosions, which can be as small as 3 cm. Previous studies that described change detection methodologies were generally not aimed at detecting sub-5-cm changes. Additionally, studies focused on high-fidelity accuracy were either computationally modeled or did not fully provide the necessary examples to highlight the usability of these workflows. Detecting changes at this threshold may be critical in certain applications, such as global security research and monitoring for high-consequence natural hazards, including landslides. Here we provide a detailed description of the methodology we used to detect 2–3 cm changes in an important applied research setting—surface changes related to underground explosions. This methodology improves the accuracy of change detection data collection and analysis through the optimization of pre-field planning, surveying, flight operations, and post-processing the collected data, all of which are critical to obtaining the highest output data resolution possible. We applied this methodology to a field study location, collecting 1.4 Tb of images over the course of 30 flights, and location data for 239 ground control points (GCPs). We independently verified changes with orthoimagery, and found that structure-from-motion, software-reported root mean square errors (RMSEs) for both control and check points underestimated the actual error. We found that 3 cm changes are detectable with this methodology, thereby improving our knowledge of a rock’s response to underground explosions.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2019

Execution of an Alternative Modeling Strategy for Closure of the Rainier Mesa Corrective Action Unit at the Nevada National Security Site - 19099

The Underground Test Area (UGTA) Project of the U.S Department of Energy (DOE) is investigating radionuclide contaminant movements in groundwater derived from a decades-long period of underground nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) to support regulatory corrective action and closure requirements. The project is built around an integrated campaign of drilling and sampling, data interpretation, computer modeling, and broader monitoring activities conducted under a joint Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order (1996 as amended) (FFACO) between the State of Nevada, the DOE, and the U.S. Department of Defense. The FFACO strategy is applied to individual Corrective Action Units (CAUs) that roughly envelop disparate geographic testing areas at the NNSS. The Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RMSM) CAU is a geologically and hydrologically complex system lying in a remote up-gradient section of the NNSS. It was the site of 67 underground tests conducted between 1957 and 1992, 61 at Rainier Mesa proper, and 6 at Shoshone Mountain, isolated to its south. The original strategy to close the RMSM CAU required a simulation-based investigation to define the evolution of contaminated volumes of groundwater (in 3D) under uncertainty as a means to define a surface-projected contaminant boundary and to serve as a basis for longer term monitoring activities. Early models developed under this strategy proved to be quite complex and difficult to calibrate. Additional costs required to better characterize the system were judged to be out of balance with the low risks associated with this particular CAU. As a result, an Alternative Modeling Strategy (AMS) was adopted. The AMS removes the requirement for developing ensembles of 3D simulations and replaces it with a simpler one requiring the generation of multiple 1D streamline models. These are meant to encompass a range of alternative, yet plausible release and transport scenarios as a means to bound the overall lateral extent of contaminant transport. This paper will review the modeling approach developed under the AMS and its application to the Rainier Mesa portion of the CAU. Preliminary model results made under different parametric assumptions and boundary condition scenarios will be presented. Additional refinements of the model and its further application will be discussed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗