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GRiP - A flexible approach for calculating risk as a function of consequence, vulnerability, and threat.

Get a GRiP (Gravitational Risk Procedure) on risk by using an approach inspired by the physics of gravitational forces between body masses! In April 2010, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Special Events staff (Protective Security Advisors [PSAs]) expressed concern about how to calculate risk given measures of consequence, vulnerability, and threat. The PSAs believed that it is not 'right' to assign zero risk, as a multiplicative formula would imply, to cases in which the threat is reported to be extremely small, and perhaps could even be assigned a value of zero, but for which consequences and vulnerability are potentially high. They needed a different way to aggregate the components into an overall measure of risk. To address these concerns, GRiP was proposed and developed. The inspiration for GRiP is Sir Isaac Newton's Universal Law of Gravitation: the attractive force between two bodies is directly proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the squares of the distance between them. The total force on one body is the sum of the forces from 'other bodies' that influence that body. In the case of risk, the 'other bodies' are the components of risk (R): consequence, vulnerability, and threat (which we denote as C, V, and T, respectively). GRiP treats risk as if it were a body within a cube. Each vertex (corner) of the cube represents one of the eight combinations of minimum and maximum 'values' for consequence, vulnerability, and threat. The risk at each of the vertices is a variable that can be set. Naturally, maximum risk occurs when consequence, vulnerability, and threat are at their maximum values; minimum risk occurs when they are at their minimum values. Analogous to gravitational forces among body masses, the GRiP formula for risk states that the risk at any interior point of the box depends on the squares of the distances from that point to each of the eight vertices. The risk value at an interior (movable) point will be dominated by the value of one vertex as that point moves closer and closer to that one vertex. GRiP is a visualization tool that helps analysts better understand risk and its relationship to consequence, vulnerability, and threat. Estimates of consequence, vulnerability, and threat are external to GRiP; however, the GRiP approach can be linked to models or data that provide estimates of consequence, vulnerability, and threat. For example, the Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Program/Infrastructure Survey Tool produces a vulnerability index (scaled from 0 to 100) that can be used for the vulnerability component of GRiP. We recognize that the values used for risk components can be point estimates and that, in fact, there is uncertainty regarding the exact values of C, V, and T. When we use T = t{sub o} (where t{sub o} is a value of threat in its range), we mean that threat is believed to be in an interval around t{sub o}. Hence, a value of t{sub o} = 0 indicates a 'best estimate' that the threat level is equal to zero, but still allows that it is not impossible for the threat to occur. When t{sub o} = 0 but is potentially small and not exactly zero, there will be little impact on the overall risk value as long as the C and V components are not large. However, when C and/or V have large values, there can be large differences in risk given t{sub o} = 0, and t{sub o} = epsilon (where epsilon is small but greater than a value of zero). We believe this scenario explains the PSA's intuition that risk is not equal to zero when t{sub o} = 0 and C and/or V have large values. (They may also be thinking that if C has an extremely large value, it is unlikely that T is equal to 0; in the terrorist context, T would likely be dependent on C when C is extremely large.) The PSAs are implicitly recognizing the potential that t{sub o} = epsilon. One way to take this possible scenario into account is to replace point estimates for risk with interval values that reflect the uncertainty in the risk components. In fact, one could argue that T never equals zero for a man-made hazard. This paper describes the thought process that led to the GRiP approach and the mathematical formula for GRiP and presents a few examples that will provide insights about how to use GRiP and interpret its results.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Evaluation of the Radioactive Material Released in the Harborview Research and Training Building and Some Implications for Emergency Response

On 2 May 2019, during the 137 Cs source recovery operation, a source capsule in a research irradiator containing approximately 77.1 TBq was breached. Based on a geometric reconstruction analysis of the damage to the capsule, approximately 46.3 GBq (0.04%) was impacted by the chop saw (grinder) inside a mobile hot cell on the loading dock at the University of Washington Harborview Research and Training (HRT) Building. A very small fraction of the material impacted, less than 1%, was released from the mobile hot cell and then to the rest of the HRT Building. The objectives of this project were to assess the accidental release of 137 CsCl and its implications related to emergency response methods and the ramifications of 137 CsCl transport. The phenomenology of this event was also compared with past alkali halide dispersal events. The vast number of measurements and samples collected by the remediation contractors, the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Emergency Support Team, and the small number of retrospective samples collected by the authors informed the analysis. The techniques included (1) autoradiography and electron microscopy of samples collected from the HRT Building and the irradiator, (2) 3D visualization of deposition on surfaces and within the ventilation system, and (3) a study of the damage to the source capsule to evaluate the Cs particle size and particle composition due to the grinding accident. Subsequently, the cesium contaminant transport through the numerous pathways in the building was reconstructed to assess the deposition on surfaces as a function of particle size. Furthermore, the implications for emergency response are relevant to data quality and management. A Data Quality Objective guides data collection methods so that they have appropriate accuracy and precision for the intended application. Recommendations were made with respect to the sample collection protocols and archiving of samples.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

A dataset of recorded electricity outages by United States county 2014–2022

In this Data Descriptor, we present county-level electricity outage estimates at 15-minute intervals from 2014 to 2022. By 2022 92% of customers in the 50 US States, Washington DC, and Puerto Rico are represented. These data have been produced by the Environment for Analysis of Geo-Located Energy Information (EAGLE-I TM ), a geographic information system and data visualization platform created at Oak Ridge National Laboratory to map the population experiencing electricity outages every 15 minutes at the county level. Although these data do not cover every US customer, they represent the most comprehensive outage information ever compiled for the United States. The rate of coverage increases through time between 2014 and 2022. We present a quantitative Data Quality Index for these data for the years 2018–2022 to demonstrate temporal changes in customer coverage rates by FEMA region and indicators of data collection gaps or other errors.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Radiological Verification for the Remediation of LLRW at the Port Granby Project - 19210

The Port Granby Project is part of the Port Hope Area Initiative (PHAI) that Canadian Nuclear Laboratory (CNL) is using to manage long-term historic low level radioactive waste (LLRW) resulting from 60 years of uranium and radium processing operations in the urban setting of Port Hope, Ontario. Port Granby remediation scope includes constructing a new, secure long-term waste management facility (LTWMF) and supporting infrastructure and excavating and relocating LLRW and marginally contaminated soil from the Port Granby Waste Management Facility (PGWMF) which accepted waste until the 1980's to the newly constructed LTWMF. The PGWMF contains an estimated 450,000 cubic meters of LLRW deposited in unmarked and unlined trenches throughout the southern portion of the site that borders Lake Ontario. Project requirements include excavating contaminated material, verifying that the trench bottoms are below action levels using Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM) guidance, and final restoration. This paper describes challenges of meeting remediation verification requirements using traditional field and laboratory confirmation methods in areas of deep trench areas located in rugged terrain with ponded water and mud and presents a process that has expedited the traditional MARSSIM method for verification with greater productivity, and with enhanced safety and reliability as compared to the use of traditional methods alone. This enhanced process has been successfully employed for in-situ verification so that the excavated area can be backfilled and returned to a vegetative state. This enhanced process has been examined by federal regulatory staff through the course of their onsite audits and outcomes from these examinations have all been positive. The method involves a visual inspection and traditional walkover of the area to identify any areas with radiation measurements above the region's background followed by a full area survey performed using Wood's proprietary Orion ScanPlotSM system. The ScanPlotSM data is evaluated, mapped and overlaid on top of an aerial image of the surveyed area allowing remaining radiological material at surface or near surface to be quickly and easily identified for removal. Field staff then collect soil samples from evenly distributed points within the surveyed area and field screen the samples using an X-ray fluorescence (XRF) analysis for the three primary contaminates of potential concern (CoPCs) (arsenic, uranium and lead) that are indicative of the historical contamination. Samples passing XRF field screening are packaged and sent to a local laboratory for a full suite of analyses and checked against the CoPC list to assess whether the soil matches the profile for nearby native soils and passes the remediation goals. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Building a FAIR data ecosystem for incorporating single-cell transcriptomics data into agricultural genome to phenome research

Introduction The agriculture genomics community has numerous data submission standards available, but the standards for describing and storing single-cell (SC, e.g., scRNA- seq) data are comparatively underdeveloped. Methods To bridge this gap, we leveraged recent advancements in human genomics infrastructure, such as the integration of the Human Cell Atlas Data Portal with Terra, a secure, scalable, open-source platform for biomedical researchers to access data, run analysis tools, and collaborate. In parallel, the Single Cell Expression Atlas at EMBL-EBI offers a comprehensive data ingestion portal for high-throughput sequencing datasets, including plants, protists, and animals (including humans). Developing data tools connecting these resources would offer significant advantages to the agricultural genomics community. The FAANG data portal at EMBL-EBI emphasizes delivering rich metadata and highly accurate and reliable annotation of farmed animals but is not computationally linked to either of these resources. Results Herein, we describe a pilot-scale project that determines whether the current FAANG metadata standards for livestock can be used to ingest scRNA-seq datasets into Terra in a manner consistent with HCA Data Portal standards. Importantly, rich scRNA-seq metadata can now be brokered through the FAANG data portal using a semi-automated process, thereby avoiding the need for substantial expert curation. We have further extended the functionality of this tool so that validated and ingested SC files within the HCA Data Portal are transferred to Terra for further analysis. In addition, we verified data ingestion into Terra, hosted on Azure, and demonstrated the use of a workflow to analyze the first ingested porcine scRNA-seq dataset. Additionally, we have also developed prototype tools to visualize the output of scRNA-seq analyses on genome browsers to compare gene expression patterns across tissues and cell populations. This JBrowse tool now features distinct tracks, showcasing PBMC scRNA-seq alongside two bulk RNA-seq experiments. Discussion We intend to further build upon these existing tools to construct a scientist-friendly data resource and analytical ecosystem based on Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, and Reusable (FAIR) SC principles to facilitate SC-level genomic analysis through data ingestion, storage, retrieval, re-use, visualization, and comparative annotation across agricultural species.

Genetics & Heredity↗

Attribution of gamma-ray background collected by a mobile detector system to its surroundings using panoramic video

Mobile radiation detector systems are important tools for detecting radiological and nuclear sources outside of regulatory control, but due to their mobility, they are subject to complex and varying backgrounds in most realistic operational scenarios. Recent work has found correlations between non-radiological contextual information and gamma-ray spectral features that can be used to decrease false alarm rates, however a more complete understanding of background source terms has been elusive. A measurement campaign developed a full radiological characterization of a controlled facility that roughly corresponded to two city blocks. As part of the campaign, the Radiological Multi-sensor Analysis Platform (RadMAP) collected extensive multi-sensor data. In this work, RadMAP’s panoramic video data were used to visually identify several different materials and quantify the detector response to each material. A linear model was fit between the material responses and radiological features, and the results demonstrate reasonable agreement with ground truth flux measurements for each material. This paper will describe the data collection, processing, and analysis of the gamma-ray and video data from RadMAP. The paper will conclude with perspectives on the applicability of such a method to less controlled environments both with respect to achieving better understanding the sources of variability of background radiation in urban environments and whether such methods could be leveraged in operational scenarios.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Augmented Reality Tools for Nuclear Facilities - 18318

In this work we explore the possibility of improving nuclear facility operations through the use of emerging augmented reality technology. Specifically we focus on the use of augmented reality headsets. Augmented reality opens up the possibility for easy, on-the-fly access to documentation related to canisters, rooms, and carts. It also can be used to help plan complicated material moves in ways that do not violate nuclear criticality safety regulations. Modern augmented reality technology can also be interacted with using gaze, gesture and voice commands, thus making it particularly attractive for facilitating the documentation of nuclear material operations and work verification. An augmented reality-based nuclear facility criticality safety system would have a number of benefits for operations in nuclear facilities. This work could be used across the DOE complex to ensure technicians in gloveboxes work safely and securely. It could greatly reduce downtime associated with administrative criticality incidents. It would be a step forward in the process of improving the quality of documentation of the work that occurs in nuclear facilities while simultaneously increasing the ease with which this documentation can be collected. The augmented reality effectively endows the glovebox technicians with a sense for administrative nuclear criticality safety and the reactivity changes caused directly by their actions. Augmented reality also has great potential for facilitating inspections of nuclear infrastructure. Examples of Augmented Reality applications that facilitate infrastructure inspection and work verification will also be presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Date Release Report for Large Surface Explosion Coupling Experiment (LSECE) Nevada National Security Site

The DTRA sponsored 2020-2022 Large Surface Explosion Coupling Experiment (LSECE) consists of two large ground surface chemical explosions, data collection, analysis and modeling carried out in 2020-2022. The LSECE chemical explosions were carried out at the site of prior NNSA sponsored buried chemical explosions that were part of the Source Physics Experiment (SPE) Phase II in Dry Alluvium Geology (DAG). This report described the data collected under LSECE that is being made publicly available. The prior buried explosion DAG data are described in a separate report (https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1825534) and are also publicly available. The LSECE explosions, data analysis and numerical modeling work sponsored by DTRA were intended to address three objectives: 1) Generate seismo-acoustic data to test and improve numerical models of explosion energy coupling in dry alluvium geology; 2) To improve seismo-acoustic yield estimation techniques as a function of depth and medium properties; 3) To study and improve acoustic propagation modeling under two different atmospheric conditions. The LSECE data that were collected have expanded the prior DAG buried explosion dataset to include surface chemical explosions recorded on a common set of seismo-acoustic stations. They have allowed a more detailed study of above and below surface seismo-acoustic energy coupling with applications to explosion monitoring and assessment. The two approximately 1-ton TNT equivalent yield LSECE explosions were detonated at different times of the day to explore the effects of the different atmospheric conditions. The first chemical explosion “Artemis” was conducted before dawn when temperature inversions were present. The second chemical explosion “Apollo” was conducted on a sunny afternoon when the temperature gradient was more linear. The LSECE chemical explosion data were also collected across a variety of different sensor types to allow evaluation of their effectiveness in recovering useful information. The LSECE instrumentation included fiber optic or Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS), a dense array or Large-N array of seismometers, borehole accelerometers, DAS and a velocity meter, airborne acoustic instruments and a variety of visual and remote sensing data.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Data Intensive Architecture for Scalable Cyber Analytics

Cyber analysts are tasked with the identification and mitigation of network exploits and threats. These compromises are difficult to identify due to the characteristics of cyber communication, the volume of traffic, and the duration of possible attack. In this paper, we describe a prototype implementation designed to provide cyber analysts an environment where they can interactively explore a month’s worth of cyber security data. This prototype utilized On-Line Analytical Processing (OLAP) techniques to present a data cube to the analysts. The cube provides a summary of the data, allowing trends to be easily identified as well as the ability to easily pull up the original records comprising an event of interest. The cube was built using SQL Server Analysis Services (SSAS), with the interface to the cube provided by Tableau. This software infrastructure was supported by a novel hardware architecture comprising a Netezza TwinFin® for the underlying data warehouse and a cube server with a FusionIO drive hosting the data cube. We evaluated this environment on a month’s worth of artificial, but realistic, data using multiple queries provided by our cyber analysts. As our results indicate, OLAP technology has progressed to the point where it is in a unique position to provide novel insights to cyber analysts, as long as it is supported by an appropriate data intensive architecture.

Olsen, Bryan K.↗

Puck and Puck/SAW Loop Seals (Final Report)

Tamper-indicating devices (TIDs), also known as seals, play a crucial role in various sectors including international nuclear safeguards, arms control, domestic security, and commercial products, by ensuring that monitored or high-value items are not accessed undetected. These devices do not block access but alert to unauthorized tampering. With adversaries' capabilities evolving, there's a pressing need for seals to advance in terms of effectiveness (e.g., better tamper indication and unique identification), and new technology can improve the efficiency of installation and verification. Passive loop seals, widely used in international nuclear safeguards to ensure that continuity of knowledge is maintained on declared items, face stringent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements that surpass those met by commercial products. The metal cup seal (Figure 1, left), a staple IAEA seal, is robust but requires significant resources for post-use verification – specifically, the seal’s unique identity can only be verified at IAEA headquarters after removal from facilities. Further, the seal has been in use for decades and seal types should periodically be replaced to counter adversarial efforts for defeating seals. In 2020, the IAEA outlined about 40 requirements for a new passive loop seal, aiming for in-situ verification, minimal external tool use, unique identification (UID), and clear tamper indication. In response, research and development efforts focused on creating a new passive loop seal that meets these criteria and in 2022 the IAEA announced the completion of the Field Verifiable Passive Loop Seal (FVPS) (Figure 1, right). Concurrently to the IAEA’s efforts, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) designed, developed, and tested two seal versions – Puck and Puck/SAW, with Puck based on the IAEA’s requirements and including a novel visually-obvious tamper response, and Puck/SAW adding additional beneficial capabilities like the ability to receive a unique identifier from a standoff distance and monitoring the wire integrity. Puck/SAW was specifically designed and developed to address sealing applications in dry spent fuel storage facilities, where the number of sealed spent fuel containers results in heavy verification burden and inspector safety issues related to radiation exposure. These efforts are described in this Executive Summary.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Resilient U.S. Land Ports of Entry

The continued operation of Land Ports of Entry (LPOE), managed by the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and General Services Administration% is vital to the U.S. economy and security. Border faculties are included in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Government Facilities Sector2, one of the 16 critical infrastructures "whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.'" Specifically, disruptions to the flow of border crossing traffic, in the form of closures or increased border crossing wait times, impact the economy and security of all countries involved. This paper describes a process for analyzing and improving the resilience of U.S. Land Ports of Entry. For LPOE, the team believes that energy resilience is the primary objective due to the complete reliance on the e-manifest system and the increasing use of Multi-Energy Portals (MEPs). Emanifests are part of CPB's Automated Commercial Environment (ACE). They document several key pieces of information about cargo vehicles wishing to cross the border into the United States and are submitted before arriving at the port. Vehicles can be flagged for more invasive inspection based on the content of the e-manifest. MEPs are a non-intrusive inspection (NII) technology used to scan the contents of the cargo. Together MEPs and ACE serve an important role in aiding CBP with their mission to protect "the public from dangerous people and materials", and "enabling legitimate trade and travel.'" To analyze resilience of a port, the team would need to understand the port's current energy usage, which systems depend on energy and what backup systems exist, and any emergency operation plans that dictate how systems are operated in the event of a power outage. The team would also need to determine the design basis threats (DBTs) for the LPOE which could include natural disasters, manmade events, and accidents. The magnitudes of the DBTs are calculated and are then translated to expected impacts on the infrastructure and systems at the port. With this information gathered, existing LPOE models developed here at Sandia National Laboratories could be extended to support decisions about resilience. Current models are implemented in FlexSim, a 3rd party discrete event simulator. FlexSim provides 3-D visuals of physical layout that can reveal valuable insights, allows input to be variable (e.g. time it takes to interact with the CBP officer at primary inspection can vary) so that a whole range of possibilities can be captured in the results, and can be used to collect user-defined output metrics. Current LPOE models focus on cargo vehicle traffic, and process changes caused by the installation of new drive-through MEPs. Extending them to address resilience questions would require the addition of key pieces of information learned during the resilience analysis including critical systems, failure rates, and process changes for when failures occur. The primary output metric for current models is border crossing wait time. Additional metrics would also be added to the model to gain a more complete understanding of impacts related to resilience, for example, MEP scan rate. Once complete, the model could be used to analyze the effectiveness of mitigation strategies representing some future state.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Geologic Assessment of the Damage Zone from the Second Test at Source Physics Experiment-Nevada (SPE-N)

The National Center for Nuclear Security (NCNS), established by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, is conducting a series of explosive tests at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS; formerly the Nevada Test Site) that are designed to increase the understanding of certain basic physical phenomena associated with underground explosions. These tests will aid in developing technologies that might be used to detect underground nuclear explosions in support of verification activities for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The initial NCNS project is a series of explosive tests, known collectively as the Source Physics Experiment at the NNSS (SPE-N), being conducted in granitic rocks at the Climax stock in northern Yucca Flat. The SPE-N test series is designed to study the generation and propagation of seismic waves. The data will be used to improve the predictive capability of calculational models for detecting and characterizing underground explosions. The first SPE-N test (SPE-N-1) was a “calibration” shot conducted in May 2011, using 100 kilograms (kg) of explosives at the depth of 54.9 meters (m) (180 feet [ft]) in the U-15n source hole. SPE-N-2 was conducted in October 2011, using 1,000 kg of explosives at the depth of 45.7 m (150 ft) in the same source hole. Following the SPE-N-2 test, the core hole U-15n#10 was drilled at an angle from the surface to intercept the SPE-N-2 shot point location to obtain information necessary to characterize the damage zone. The desire was to determine the position of the damage zone near the shot point, at least on the northeast side, where the core hole penetrated it. The three-dimensional shape and symmetry of the damage zone are unknown at this time. Rather than spherical in shape, the dimensions of the damage zone could be influenced by the natural fracture sets in the vicinity. Geologic characterization of the borehole included geophysical logging, a directional survey, and geologic description of the core to document visual evidence of damage. Selected core samples were provided to Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) for laboratory tests (to be reported by SNL). A significant natural fault zone was encountered in the U-15n#10 angle core hole between the drilled depths of 149 and 155 ft (straight-line distance or range station [RS] from the shot point of 7.5 to 5.7 m). However, several of the fractures observed in the U-15n#10 hole are interpreted as having been caused by the explosion. These fractures are characterized by a “fresh,” mechanically broken look, with uncoated and very irregular surfaces. They tend to terminate against natural fractures and have orientations that differ from the previously defined natural fracture sets. The most distant fracture from the shot point that could be interpreted as having been caused by the explosion was seen at approximately RS 10.0 m. No other possibly explosion-induced fractures are apparent above the fault, but are common starting at RS 5.4 m, which is below the fault. It is unknown how the fault zone might have affected the propagation of seismic waves or how the materials in the fault zone (altered granite, breccia, gouge) were affected by the explosion. From RS 3.3 m to the end of the recovered core at RS 1.6 m, some of the core samples are softer and lighter in color, but do not appear to be weathered. It is thought this could be indicative of the presence of distributed microfracturing.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Lake Michigan Offshore Wind Feasibility Assessment

The purpose of this project was to conduct the first comprehensive offshore wind assessment over Lake Michigan and to advance the body of knowledge needed to support future commercial wind energy development on the Great Lakes. The project involved evaluation and selection of emerging wind measurement technology and the permitting, installation and operation of the first mid-lake wind assessment meteorological (MET) facilities in Michigan’s Great Lakes. In addition, the project provided the first opportunity to deploy and field test floating LIDAR and Laser Wind Sensor (LWS) technology, and important research related equipment key to the sitting and permitting of future offshore wind energy development in accordance with public participation guidelines established by the Michigan Great Lakes Wind Council (GLOW). The project created opportunities for public dialogue and community education about offshore wind resource management and continued the dialogue to foster Great Lake wind resource utilization consistent with the focus of the GLOW Council. The technology proved to be effective, affordable, mobile, and the methods of data measurement accurate. The public benefited from a substantial increase in knowledge of the wind resources over Lake Michigan and gained insights about the potential environmental impacts of offshore wind turbine placements in the future. The unique first ever hub height wind resource assessment using LWS technology over water and development of related research data along with the permitting, sitting, and deployment of the WindSentinel MET buoy has captured public attention and has helped to increase awareness of the potential of future offshore wind energy development on the Great Lakes. Specifically, this project supported the acquisition and operation of a WindSentinel (WS) MET wind assessment buoy, and associated research for 549 days over multiple years at three locations on Lake Michigan. Four research objectives were defined for the project including to: 1) test and validate floating LIDAR technology; 2) collect and access offshore wind data; 3) detect and measure bird and bat activity over Lake Michigan; 4) conduct an over water sound propagation study; 5) prepare and offer a college course on offshore energy, and; 6) collect other environmental, bathometric, and atmospheric data. Desk-top research was performed to select anchorage sites and to secure permits to deploy the buoy. The project also collected and analyzed data essential to wind industry investment decision-making including: deploying highly mobile floating equipment to gather offshore wind data; correlating offshore wind data with conventional on-shore MET tower data; and performing studies that can contribute to the advancement and deployment of offshore wind technologies. Related activities included: • Siting, permitting, and deploying an offshore floating MET facility; • Validating the accuracy of floating LWS using near shoreline cup anemometer MET instruments; • Assessment of laser pulse technology (LIDAR) capability to establish hub height measurement of wind conditions at multiple locations on Lake Michigan; • Utilizing an extended-season (9-10 month) strategy to collect hub height wind data and weather conditions on Lake Michigan; • Investigation of technology best suited for wireless data transmission from distant offshore structures; • Conducting field-validated sound propagation study for a hypothetical offshore wind farm from shoreline locations; • Identifying the presence or absence of bird and bat species near wind assessment facilities; • Identifying the presence or absence of benthic and pelagic species near wind assessment facilities; All proposed project activities were completed with the following major findings: • Floating Laser Wind Sensors are capable of high quality measurement and recordings of wind resources. The WindSentinel presented no significant operational or statistical limitations in recording wind data technology at a at a high confidence level as compared to traditional anemometer cup technology. • During storms, mean Turbulent Kinetic Energy (TKE) increases with height above water; • Sufficient wind resources exist over Lake Michigan to generate 7,684 kWh of power using a 850 kW rated turbine at elevations between 90 - 125 meters, a height lower than originally anticipated for optimum power generation; • Based on initial assessments, wind characteristics are not significantly different at distant (thirty-two mile) offshore locations as compared to near-shore (six mile) locations; • Significant cost savings can be achieved in generation wind energy at lower turbine heights and locating closer to shore. • Siting must be sufficiently distant from shore to minimize visual impact and to address public sentiment about offshore wind development; • Project results show that birds and bats do frequent the middle of Lake Michigan, bats more so than birds; • Based on the wind resource assessment and depths of Lake Michigan encountered during the project, future turbine placement will most likely need to incorporate floating or anchored technology; • The most appropriate siting of offshore wind energy locations will enable direct routing of transmission cables to existing generating and transmission facilities located along the Michigan shoreline; • Wind turbine noise propagation from a wind energy generating facility at a five mile offshore location will not be audible at the shoreline over normal background sound levels.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Geologic Assessment of the Damage Zone from the Second Test at Source Physics Experiment-Nevada (SPE-N)

The National Center for Nuclear Security, established by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), is conducting a series of explosive tests at the Nevada National Security Site that are designed to increase the understanding of certain basic physical phenomena associated with underground explosions. These tests will aid in developing technologies that might be used to detect underground nuclear explosions in support of verification activities for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The initial project is a series of explosive tests, known collectively as the Source Physics Experiment-Nevada (SPE-N), being conducted in granitic rocks. The SPE-N test series is designed to study the generation and propagation of seismic waves. The results will help advance the seismic monitoring capability of the United States by improving the predictive capability of physics-based modeling of explosive phenomena. The first SPE N (SPE-N-1) test was conducted in May 2011, using 100 kg of explosives at the depth of 54.9 m in the U 15n source hole. SPE-N-2 was conducted in October 2011, using 1,000 kg of explosives at the depth of 45.7 m in the same source hole. The SPE-N-3 test was conducted in the same source hole in July 2012, using the same amount and type of explosive as for SPE-N-2, and at the same depth as SPE-N-2, within the damage zone created by the SPE-N-2 explosion to investigate damage effects on seismic wave propagation. Following the SPE-N-2 shot and prior to the SPE-N-3 shot, the core hole U-15n#10 was drilled at an angle from the surface to intercept the SPE-N-2 shot point location to obtain information necessary to characterize the damage zone. The objective was to determine the position of the damage zone near the shot point, at least on the northeast, where the core hole penetrated it, and obtain information on the properties of the damaged medium. Geologic characterization of the post-SPE-N-2 core hole included geophysical logging, a directional survey, and geologic description of the core to document visual evidence of damage. Selected core samples were provided to Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) for measurement of physical and mechanical properties. A video was also run in the source hole after it was cleaned out. A significant natural fault zone was encountered in the angle core hole between 5.7 and 7.5 m from the shot point. However, several of the fractures observed in the core hole are interpreted as having been caused by the explosion. The fractures are characterized by a “fresh,” mechanically broken look, with uncoated and very irregular surfaces. They tend to terminate against natural fractures and have orientations that differ from the previously defined natural fracture sets; they are common starting at about 5.4 m from the shot point. Within about 3.3 m of the shot point to the end of the recovered core at 1.6 m from the shot point, some of the core samples are softer and lighter in color, but do not appear to be weathered. It is thought this could be indicative of the presence of distributed microfracturing.

SPE, Source Physics Experiment, geology↗

Data Summary Report for Soil and Slab Sampling at Former Building 175

Lawrence Livermore National Security (LLNS) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) are in the process of returning the area where Building 175 existed to beneficial use for future site development. The completed assessment will help LLNS and DOE to outline project scope and costs associated with the removal, characterization, and disposal of materials generated when the concrete slab for the former building and any associated remaining subsurface structures are demolished. Slab removal under the Transition & Disposition process requires full screening for potential site contamination to determine appropriate future land use. Borehole locations and depths were designed to correctly assess DOE’s future liability for characterizing residual vadose zone contamination. If a residual source area is identified at depth, DOE will need to evaluate the additional cost of future subsurface cleanup (with limited access) due to planned development. This is necessary to leave the location in a “ready-to-build” status. As a result, Phase II sampling requirements may in some cases extend beyond the construction zone required for slab removal to ensure the necessary due diligence. To avoid the potential spread of contamination and/or the creation of an environmental release by impacting the integrity of known contamination areas (e.g., pit within room 102 and the east to west boundary seam), these locations were not sampled for this project. During demolition of the slab, these locations and their underlying soils should be further evaluated. The assessment was conducted in accord with the May 2022 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Former Building 175 Assessment Soil Sampling and Analysis Plan / Quality Assurance Plan. Thirty-six, direct-push borings were advanced, along with collecting concrete (where present) and soil samples for laboratory analyses. Thirty-two of the borings were advanced to a depth of 25 feet below ground (bgs), and four borings were advanced to a depth of 55 feet bgs. The concrete slab for former Building 175 ranged from approximately 8 inches to over two feet in thickness. Soils encountered during the investigation consisted primarily of clayey silt, with interbeds of sandy gravel and silty sand to the total depth explored of 55 feet bgs. Field photoionization detector readings – checking for volatile organic compound (VOC) vapors in soils, ranged from zero (0) to a peak of 33 parts per million at 25 feet bgs in boring PC-B175- 028. The cause for the peak reading is unknown, however, no visually discolored or odorous soils were encountered during the assessment and all VOC results were below Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s (LLNL’s) Soil Screening and Management Plan (SSMP) soil screening levels (SSL). Groundwater was not encountered during the assessment and is expected to occur at roughly 65 feet bgs in the project area. No metals were detected at concentrations of concern in the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. Low gross alpha and beta activity concentrations were detected in the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. The detected activity concentrations would appear to be from naturally occurring radioactive isotopes, i.e., potassium 40, present in the raw materials used to make concrete and not artificially added. Tritium was not detected above the testing laboratory's Method Detection Limit (MDL) in any of the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. The radioactive isotopes - actinium 228, bismuth 214, lead 212, lead 214, potassium 40, radium 226, radium 228, and thallium 208, were detected at low activity concentrations in the concrete core samples analyzed. Based on the detected activity concentrations, the isotopes would appear to be naturally occurring in the raw materials used to make concrete and not artificially added. Acetone – a common laboratory contaminant, was detected in nine of the soil samples collected and analyzed. Concentrations of two other volatile organic compounds (benzene and tetrachloroethene) were detected in five of the soil samples analyzed. All concentrations were below SSLs. Total petroleum hydrocarbons as diesel range organics were detected at 43.9 milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg) in the 20-foot bgs duplicate sample from boring PC-B175-007. Total petroleum hydrocarbons as motor oil were detected at 7.20 mg/kg in the 15-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-001, and at 20.7 mg/kg in the 20-foot bgs duplicate sample from boring PC-B175-007. The SSL for diesel-range TPHs is 260 mg/kg. LLNL does not have an SSL for motor oil range TPHs. No indications of a release, e.g., visibly stained, or odorous soil, were present at the boring locations. No samples collected contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in concentrations above the laboratory reporting limit. Arsenic was detected above its SSL of 8.51 mg/kg in the 25-foot bgs routine sample collected from boring PC-B175-023. Nickel was detected above its SSL of 86.0 mg/kg in the 10-foot bgs routine sample from boing PC-B175-005, the 20-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-025, and the 25-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-034. The detected concentrations, however, were well below ten times (10x) their respective STLCs. Gross alpha and/or gross beta were detected above their respective SSL activity concentrations in three routine soil samples. Retesting (two per sample) of the samples showed that the initial reported activity concentrations were anomalous. Tritium was not detected in any of the routine or duplicate soil samples collected and analyzed during the investigation. The radioactive isotopes - actinium 228, bismuth 212 and 214, lead 212 and 214, potassium 40, radium 224, 226 and 228, thallium 208, thorium 234 and uranium, were detected at low activity concentrations in the soil samples analyzed for radioactive constituents. The detected isotopes and their associated activity concentrations are typical of those naturally occurring in the marine-type sedimentary deposits underlying the Livermore Valley. No radiological controls are necessary for the soil evaluated.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Final Report to the National Energy Technology Laboratory on FY14- FY15 Cooperative Research with the Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions

The Power System Engineering Research Center (PSERC) engages in technological, market, and policy research for an efficient, secure, resilient, adaptable, and economic U.S. electric power system. PSERC, as a founding partner of the Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions (CERTS), conducted a multi-year program of research for U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) to develop new methods, tools, and technologies to protect and enhance the reliability and efficiency of the U.S. electric power system as competitive electricity market structures evolve, and as the grid moves toward wide-scale use of decentralized generation (such as renewable energy sources) and demand-response programs. Phase I of OE’s funding for PSERC, under cooperative agreement DE-FC26-09NT43321, started in fiscal year (FY) 2009 and ended in FY2013. It was administered by DOE’s National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) through a cooperative agreement with Arizona State University (ASU). ASU provided sub-awards to the participating PSERC universities. This document is PSERC’s final report to NETL on the activities for OE, conducted through CERTS, from September 2015 through September 2017 utilizing FY 2014 to FY 2015 funding under cooperative agreement DE-OE0000670. PSERC is a thirteen-university consortium with over 30 industry members. Since 1996, PSERC has been engaged in research and education efforts with the mission of “empowering minds to engineer the future electric energy system.” Its work is focused on achieving: • An efficient, secure, resilient, adaptable, and economic electric power infrastructure serving society • A new generation of educated technical professionals in electric power • Knowledgeable decision-makers on critical energy policy issues • Sustained, quality university programs in electric power engineering. PSERC core research is funded by industry, with a budget supporting approximately 30 principal investigators and some 70 graduate students and other researchers. Its researchers are multi-disciplinary, conducting research in three principal areas: power systems, power markets and policy, and transmission and distribution technologies. The research is collaborative; each project involves researchers typically at two universities working with industry advisors who have expressed interest in the project. Examples of topics for recent PSERC research projects include grid integration of renewables and energy storage, new tools for taking advantage of increased penetration of real-time system measurements, advanced system protection methods to maintain grid reliability, and risk and reliability assessment of increasingly complex cyber-enabled power systems. A PSERC’s objective is to proactively address the technical and policy challenges of U.S. electric power systems. To achieve this objective, PSERC works with CERTS to conduct technical research on advanced applications and investigate the design of fair and transparent electricity markets; these research topics align with CERTS research areas 1 and 2: Real-time Grid Reliability Management (Area 1), and Reliability and Markets (Area 2). The CERTS research areas overlap with the PSERC research stems: Power Systems, Power Markets, and Transmission and Distribution Technologies, as described on the PSERC website (see http://www.pserc.org/research/research_program.aspx). The performers were with Arizona State University (ASU), Cornell University (CU), University of California at Berkeley (UCB), and University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC). PSERC research activities in the area of reliability and markets focused on electric market and power policy analyses. The resulting studies suggest ways to frame best practices using organized markets for managing U.S. grid assets reliably and to identify highest priority areas for improvement. PSERC research activities in the area of advanced applications focused on mid- to long-term software research and development, with anticipated outcomes that move innovative ideas toward real-world application. Under the CERTS research area of Real-time Grid Reliability Management, PSERC has been focused on Advanced Applications Research and Development (AARD), a subgroup of activities that works to develop advanced applications and tools to more effectively operate the electricity delivery system, by enabling advanced analysis, visualization, monitoring and alarming, and decision support capabilities for grid operators.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

NBIC Biofeeds: A Digital Tool for Open Source Biosurveillance across Federal Agencies

The National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) is developing a scalable, flexible open source data collection, analysis, and dissemination tool to support biosurveillance operations by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its federal interagency partners. The NBIC integrates, analyzes, and distributes key information about health and disease events to help ensure the nation’s responses are well-informed, save lives, and minimize economic impact. NBIC serves as a bridge between Federal, State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal entities to conduct biosurveillance across human, animal, plant, and environmental domains. The integration of information enables early warning and shared situational awareness of biological events to inform critical decisions directing response and recovery efforts. To meet its mission objectives, NBIC utilizes a variety of datasets, including open source information, to provide comprehensive coverage of biological events occurring across the globe. NBIC Biofeeds is a digital tool designed to improve the efficiency of reviewing and analyzing large volumes of open source reporting by biosurveillance analysts on a daily basis; moreover, the system provides a mechanism to disseminate tailored feeds allowing NBIC to better meet the specific information needs of individual, interagency partners. The tool is currently under development by the Department of Energy (DOE), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)and it is in a testing and evaluation phase supported by NBIC biosurveillance subject matter experts. Integration with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Biosurveillance Ecosystem(BSVE) is also underway. NBIC Biofeeds Version 1 is expected to be fully operational in Fiscal Year 2017. The PNNL is applying agile methodology to streamline the build of NBIC Biofeeds to specifications required for operational use by NBIC and its federal interagency partners. Biosurveillance, analytics, and system engineering subject matter experts provide guidance on the implementation of features in the tool to ensure functionality aligns with operational workflows and production support. PNNL is leveraging software from a previous government effort to repurpose the technology to meet NBIC needs. NBIC Biofeeds incorporates the open source, document-orientated MongoDB database to capture user- and system-generated metadata on hundreds of thousands of records, in part, to establish baselines to aid prospective and retrospective analysis on emerging biological events. NBIC Biofeeds integrates a biosurveillance taxonomy (uniquely developed by NBIC),which includes input from interagency partners to recognize critical characteristics of a biological event. In NBIC Biofeeds Version1, metadata capture of reported events is done manually by NBIC analysts; however, moving forward in Version 2, the tool will be further automated to flag significant reporting on biological events with a human remaining in the loop to confirm the validity of the system-generated tags. To serve as a one-stop tool for open source biosurveillance, NBIC Biofeeds automatically harvests information from thousands of websites, utilizing third party aggregators, paid subscriptions to data feeds, and scraping of high priority sources. Users can develop desired queries for automatic updating, leverage a unique review and curation mechanism, and further analyze data from topical, geographic, and temporal visualization features in the tool. To meet NBIC’s information sharing needs, the tool allows for design of tailored RSS feeds and electronic message-based delivery of analysis on biological events, intended for recipients in the government with unique missions around human, animal, plant, and environmental health. Through current testing and evaluation – underway by biosurveillance subject matter experts – NBIC Biofeeds is demonstrating value in supporting open source biosurveillance by the Center for more rapid recognition and sharing of key event characteristics. Centralizing access and analysis of this data set into a single system is increasing the efficiency of daily, global biosurveillance, while enhancing the value of information identified through use of the querying, curation, and production support features in the tool.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Evaluation of Low-cost, Full HD, CMOS Cameras for Use in the Calcine Retrieval Project - 19530

This paper describes results from radiation testing conducted on low-cost, commercial off-the-shelf, full high-definition (HD) resolution (1920 x 1080 p), complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) camera sensors. The purpose of the testing was to evaluate the sensors' suitability for use in the Calcine Retrieval Project by determining their image quality and life expectancy while operating in an ionizing radiation field of 20.0 Gy/h. The two camera sensors tested were the Axis FA1105 and Axis FA1125. These commercial camera sensors were designed for retail security surveillance and have no radiation-hardened (rad-hard) components. In addition to radiation testing, the sensors' field-of-view, resolution, and low-light image quality were tested at several target distances to ensure they meet project requirements. Testing was divided into two phases. During Phase 1, four FA1105 sensors and four FA1125 sensors were tested simultaneously without any shielding in radiation fields of 25.5 Gy/h and 49.3 Gy/h. In Phase 2, three FA1105 and five FA1125 sensors were shielded by 22.2 mm of lead and tested simultaneously in radiation fields of 26.8 Gy/h, 52.3 Gy/h, 143.0 Gy/h, 200.7 Gy/h, 404.6 Gy/h, and 2,317.5 Gy/h. Dose rate values were established using film dosimetry readings. Apertures in the shielding allowed for a 40-degree field of view while shielding all parts of the sensor except for directly in front of the CMOS sensor array. All testing was conducted at the Idaho Accelerator Center in Pocatello, Idaho, using a 450 keV X-ray generator. Sensor images were automatically captured at regular intervals throughout the testing for qualitative evaluation by the test team. Film dosimetry was placed near the sensors to record actual dose totals. The 450 keV setting generates X-ray radiation with an energy level close to the primary gamma energy level produced by the Cesium-137 isotope in the calcine, which is 662 keV. Results from Phase 1 indicate the sensors failed at an average cumulative dose of 226.3 Gy. For a given 20.0 Gy/h field this results in a mean time to failure (MTTF) of 11.3 hours. Recorded images from all sensors showed minimal image degradation due to radiation-induced noise. When the sensors finally failed, the failure mode was an abrupt loss of video. The image went black suggesting some other component in the sensor head besides the CMOS sensor array was responsible for the failure. During a portion of Phase 1 testing, a commercial, rad-hard camera was irradiated in the 25.5 Gy/h field along with the eight Axis FA series sensors. Image quality from the FA series sensors significantly outperformed the image quality of the rad-hard camera in radiation-induced noise tolerance, image resolution, and dynamic range. During Phase 2 testing, all sensors produced excellent images in radiation fields as high as 404.6 Gy/h. One FA1125 sensor was tested at the highest dose rate of 2,317.5 Gy/h. At this dose rate, the image was color shifted towards red and contained a significant amount radiation-induced noise. The sensor did not fail and was producing usable imagery after one hour, at which time the test was ended due to allotted beam-time at the test facility. Eighteen hours after X-rays were shut off, the sensor image returned to normal color and all eight sensors continued to operate without any visible, permanent image degradation. For Phase 2 testing, it was not possible to establish a MTTF since none of the shielded sensors failed during the allotted test time. However, given the highest cumulative dose of 4,142.1 Gy received by a shielded FA1125 sensor, a minimum life expectancy of 207 hours (8.6 days) is predicted while operating in a 20.0 Gy/h field. Test results indicate the radiation tolerance of the FA series sensor's CMOS array, along with the small form factor, full HD image quality, wide dynamic range, and Ethernet standard makes it suitable for short-term use in monitoring and visually documenting waste remediation efforts for the Calcine Retrieval Project at the INL. The sensor's low-cost of about $140 US, compared to commercial rad-hard cameras costing between $5,000 and $7,000 US each, allow them to be used as an affordable, disposable resource for many short-duration, radioactive waste remediation efforts where decontamination of an expensive, commercial rad-hard camera is undesirable or not possible. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗