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National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Radionuclide Emissions (Calendar Year 2018)

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons.The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61Subpart H) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by reporting environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] and DOE 1995). This method was approved by the EPA in 2001 and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations because no member of the public resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2. For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2018, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by air sampling data collected at the critical receptor air monitoring stations which had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values. Concentrations ranged from 0.1% to a maximum of 5.2% of the allowed NESHAP limit. Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88-PC) was used to model dose to the offsite public from all 2018 NNSS radionuclide emissions. The model showed the maximally exposed individual to be on the northern end of Amargosa Valley; this individual received a potential dose of 0.07 mrem/y. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.000008 mrem/y, over six orders of magnitude lower than the 10 mrem/y limit.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions (CY 2019)

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils because this source dominates the potential offsite dose. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2020

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. Radionuclides in air from NNSS activities have been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils because this sources dominates the potential offsite dose. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of manmade radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), specifically the National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities (40 CFR 61, Subpart H, 2020) limits the release of radioactivity from a DOE facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent (EDE) to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by reporting environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS. This alternative was proposed and formerly submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2001 (EPA 2001a) and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are closer to radionuclide releases than where the public resides so they act as protective substitutes for public receptor locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in Table 2 of 40 CFR 61, Appendix E. For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. The EPAapproved air transport model, called the Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88-PC) is also used to calculate the effective dose equivalent to the maximally exposed individual from NNSS air emissions. CAP88-PC was also used to calculate the population dose, or the collective EDE (expressed as person-rem [roentgen equivalent man] per year [person-rem/y]) for all individuals combined who reside within 80 kilometers (km) of NNSS emission sources. In 2020, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by both the air sampling data collected at critical receptor air monitoring stations and CAP88-PC modeling. The average concentrations of radioactivity at air critical receptor stations ranged from 0.2% to a maximum of 4.2% of the allowed NESHAP limit. CAP88-PC modeling of all 2020 NNSS radionuclide emissions showed the maximally exposed individual to be in Amargosa Valley and this individual received a potential dose of 0.063 mrem/y. The collective dose was calculated to be 0.29 person-rem/year for the 521,300 people who lived within 80 km of NNSS emission sources.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Recent results from a testbed for the reliability of the digital instrumentation and control systems and cybersecurity in nuclear power plants - 392

Transition from analog to digital instrumentation and control systems requires a systematic study of the modifications, and assessment of their reliability. Such studies are often carried out on a test bed. The test bed developed earlier includes a commercially available triple modular redundant (TMR) programmable logic controller (PLC) for testing not only the reliability of the digital I and C but also the cyber-security of the system during plant operation. This paper reports results of our preliminary analyses carried out using the test bed following the injection of faults mimicking faulty sensors. The fault injection tool generates faulty signals in single or multiple sensors located in the primary loop. These scenarios studied under steady-state operation conditions simulate a bad sensor, a cut wire, noise, etc. The faults injected can lead to information being displayed in the main control room (MCR) to not match the conditions in the plant. In addition to a fault injection module, a result analyzer module is also a part of this testbed. Operator actions can be based on information displayed in the MCR, or they can be informed by the result analyzer. Potential operator actions following these single- or multiple faulty signals are assessed. It is concluded that the result analyzer in some cases can be helpful in guiding operators to make the right decisions. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Apparatus, system and method for providing cryptographic key information with physically unclonable function circuitry

Techniques and mechanisms for providing a value from physically unclonable function (PUF) circuitry for a cryptographic operation of a security module. In an embodiment, a cryptographic engine receives a value from PUF circuitry and based on the value, outputs a result of a cryptographic operation to a bus of the security module. The bus couples the cryptographic engine to control logic or interface logic of the security module. In another embodiment, the value is provided to the cryptographic engine from the PUF circuitry via a signal line which is distinct from the bus, where any exchange of the value by either of the cryptographic engine and the PUF circuitry is for communication of the first value independent of the bus.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Safely Enabling UAS Operations in Low-Altitude Airspace

Flexibility where possible, and structure where necessary. Consider the needs of national security, safe airspace operations, economic opportunities, and emerging technologies. Risk-based approach based on population density, assets on the ground, density of operations, etc. Digital, virtual, dynamic, and as needed UTM services to manage operations.

UTM↗

Cyber-Physical Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control for the Power Grid

Cyber security and resiliency of Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) applications is critically important to ensure secure, reliable, and economic operation of the bulk power system. WAMPAC relies heavily on the security of measurements and control commands transmitted over wide-area communication networks for real-time operational, protection, and control functions. Also, the current “N-1 security criteria” for grid operation is inadequate to address malicious cyber events and therefore it is important to fundamentally redesign WAMPAC and to enhance Energy Management System (EMS) applications to make them attack-resilient. In this paper, we propose an end-to-end defense-in-depth architecture for attack-resilient WAMPAC that addresses resilience at both the infrastructure layer and the application layers. Also, we propose an attack-resilient cyber-physical security framework that encompasses the entire security life cycle including risk assessment, attack prevention, attack detection, attack mitigation, and attack resilience. The overarching objective of this paper is to provide a broad scope that comprehensively describes most of the major research issues and potential solutions in the context of cyber-physical security of WAMPAC for the power grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Leveraging Safety Programs to Improve and Support Security Programs

There has been a long history of considering Safety, Security, and Safeguards (3S) as three functions of nuclear security design and operations that need to be properly and collectively integrated with operations. This paper specifically considers how safety programmes can be extended directly to benefit security as part of an integrated facility management programme. The discussion will draw on experiences implementing such a programme at Sandia National Laboratories’ Annular Research Reactor Facility. While the paper focuses on nuclear facilities, similar ideas could be used to support security programmes at other types of high-consequence facilities and transportation activities.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Securing Sensitive Flight and Engine Simulation Data Using Smart Card Technology

NASA Glenn Research Center has developed a smart card prototype capable of encrypting and decrypting disk files required to run a distributed aerospace propulsion simulation. Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) encryption is used to secure the sensitive intellectual property on disk pre, during, and post simulation execution. The prototype operates as a secure system and maintains its authorized state by safely storing and permanently retaining the encryption keys only on the smart card. The prototype is capable of authenticating a single smart card user and includes pre simulation and post simulation tools for analysis and training purposes. The prototype's design is highly generic and can be used to protect any sensitive disk files with growth capability to urn multiple simulations. The NASA computer engineer developed the prototype on an interoperable programming environment to enable porting to other Numerical Propulsion System Simulation (NPSS) capable operating system environments.

Blaser, Tammy M.↗

A study of space station needs, attributes and architectural options. Volume 2: Technical. Book 1: Mission requirements

The following types of space missions were evaluated to determine those that require, or will be benefited materially, by a manned space station: (1) science and applications, (2) commercial, (3) technology development, (4) space operations, and (5) national security. Integrated mission requirements for man-operated and man-tended free-flying missions were addressed. A manned space station will provide major performance and economic benefits to a wide range of missions planned for the 1990s.

Steinbronn, O.↗

Developing Concepts of Operations Using Multi-Step Tool Techniques With Large Language Models

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Air Mobility Pathfinders (AMP) project is developing and evaluating concepts of operations (ConOps) for safe, secure, and scalable Urban Air Mobility (UAM) operations. The AMP project’s Operational Concepts, Architecture, and Requirements Integration (OCARI) Team is using a Model Based System Engineering (MBSE) approach for integration, interoperability, and traceability of Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) ecosystems centered around urban air taxi services. The team’s goal is to define structures and behaviors needed for system feasibility, readiness, and interoperability, establish a UAM knowledge base, and trace and validate assumptions and requirements relevant to AAM. NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) is spearheading an innovative digital engineering approach to integrate, communicate, and facilitate the research of multi-modal transportation systems. The Knowledge-based Digital Platform (KbDP) is a concept being developed that ties the workflows of Project Managers (PM), Principal Investigators (PI), and System Engineers together across organizational boundaries. It does so through the management of an information database defined by mathematical, data science, and system engineering principles. Machine Learning (ML) algorithms play a key role in this concept by extracting meaningful knowledge from relational and graph databases, document repositories, and system artifacts, which the human user leverages to greatly improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their research. Recent advancements in the field of Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically models trained for tool use, such as Command-R , now allow for the reliable implementation of single-step and multi-step tool-centric systems. These techniques provide the LLM with a set of tools, in our case Python functions, that can be called on to answer a much wider range of questions compared to LLMs implemented using a traditional single-source or Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) approach. Through this method, the LLM can pull information from multiple data sources, such as relational or graph databases, document repositories, application programming interfaces (APIs), and SysML artifacts depending on the user’s question. The LLM can also output the information in a variety of different formats, using output generation tools, such as CSV, UML, or SysML artifacts. Additionally, tools can be assigned roles and can work together to provide answers to queries in an “agent” like approach, similar to that implemented by Microsoft’s AutoGen framework where different agents can converse with each other to accomplish tasks. Previously, our team developed a chatbot system with “agent like” functionality in the form of different “modes” the user could select from a user interface (UI), this architecture can be seen on the left in figure 1. Three different modes were implemented, the first mode allowed the LLM to utilize the structures and algorithms within a graph database to trace UAM requirements. The second mode gave the LLM access to a vector search capable of providing relevant information from thousands of document pages related to UAM ConOps and requirements. The third mode served as a general assistant where users could enter open-ended questions and custom prompts to utilize the LLM for different use-cases. This system improved the process surrounding generating and analyzing information related to UAM requirements, however, the implementation provided a clunky user experience. Users were required to know what mode to select within the UI in advance before entering their question to the selected tool. Moreover, the different tools were isolated from each other, they lacked bidirectional links that would allow for tools to collaborate to generate better responses. Our team is working on a new architecture, seen on the right in the below figure, with the goal to address many of the UX shortcomings of our original system while improving the accuracy and depth of responses from the LLM. This new system will automatically select the appropriate tool to use based off the user’s question. Each tool will be capable of calling on any of the other tools available to the LLM, resulting in a collaborative pipeline where tools can pass data between other tools until enough data is received to generate an answer to the user’s question. Using a locally deployed, open-source, LLM, the NASA OCARI team, in collaboration with Collins Aerospace, will implement a prototype application that will bridge knowledge across multiple sources to assist System Engineers (SEs) with requirements discovery and tracing, research question and use case identification, and assumption validation. Such a system will also allow SEs to more easily, and intuitively, explore the AAM ecosystem, ultimately improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the SE's research and decision-making processes surrounding ConOps development and validation. In this session, our team will provide a video demonstration of our new prototype architecture in action. We will also present an overview of our prototype system architecture and talk about its advantages over traditional LLM deployments along with how those advantages can provide additional value to the field of System Engineering.

systems engineering↗

An Evaluation of The Dynamic Physical Security Risk Assessment Methodology for Fleet-Wide Applications

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This integrated process for physical security analysis is named Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF). This document provides an update on the progress in applying the MASS-DEF process to an operating commercial nuclear power plant as well as additional industry feedback regarding use of the tool for other physical security risk-informed topics. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, and integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5 or MAAP. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report is an update the progress of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report also provides an update to the procedural guidance for the MASS-DEF process and an overview of the generic models available for use by utilities. This report does not contain any plant’s sensitive information and/or safeguards information. This study’s purpose was to verify that the results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Assessing Vulnerabilities, Risks, and Consequences of Damage to Critical Infrastructure

Since the publication of 'Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructure,' there has been a keen understanding of the complexity, interdependencies, and shared responsibility required to protect the nation's most critical assets that are essential to our way of life. The original 5 sectors defined in 1997 have grown to 18 Critical Infrastructures and Key Resources (CIKR), which are discussed in the 2009 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and its supporting sector-specific plans. The NIPP provides the structure for a national program dedicated to enhanced protection and resiliency of the nation's infrastructure. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) provides in-depth, multi-disciplinary assessments of threat, vulnerability, and consequence across all 18 sectors at scales ranging from specific facilities to infrastructures spanning multi-state regions, such as the Oil and Natural Gas (ONG) sector. Like many of the CIKR sectors, the ONG sector is comprised of production, processing, distribution, and storage of highly valuable and potentially dangerous commodities. Furthermore, there are significant interdependencies with other sectors, including transportation, communication, finance, and government. Understanding the potentially devastating consequences and collateral damage resulting from a terrorist attack or natural event is an important element of LLNL's infrastructure security programs. Our work began in the energy sector in the late 1990s and quickly expanded other critical infrastructure sectors. We have performed over 600 physical assessments with a particular emphasis on those sectors that utilize, store, or ship potentially hazardous materials and for whom cyber security is important. The success of our approach is based on building awareness of vulnerabilities and risks and working directly with industry partners to collectively advance infrastructure protection. This approach consists of three phases: The Pre-Assessment Phase brings together infrastructure owners and operators to identify critical assets and help the team create a structured information request. During this phase, we gain information about the critical assets from those who are most familiar with operations and interdependencies, making the time we spend on the ground conducting the assessment much more productive and enabling the team to make actionable recommendations. The Assessment Phase analyzes 10 areas: Threat environment, cyber architecture, cyber penetration, physical security, physical penetration, operations security, policies and procedures, interdependencies, consequence analysis, and risk characterization. Each of these individual tasks uses direct and indirect data collection, site inspections, and structured and facilitated workshops to gather data. Because of the importance of understanding the cyber threat, LLNL has built both fixed and mobile cyber penetration, wireless penetration and supporting tools that can be tailored to fit customer needs. The Post-Assessment Phase brings vulnerability and risk assessments to the customer in a format that facilitates implementation of mitigation options. Often the assessment findings and recommendations are briefed and discussed with several levels of management and, if appropriate, across jurisdictional boundaries. The end result is enhanced awareness and informed protective measures. Over the last 15 years, we have continued to refine our methodology and capture lessons learned and best practices. The resulting risk and decision framework thus takes into consideration real-world constraints, including regulatory, operational, and economic realities. In addition to 'on the ground' assessments focused on mitigating vulnerabilities, we have integrated our computational and atmospheric dispersion capability with easy-to-use geo-referenced visualization tools to support emergency planning and response operations. LLNL is home to the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) and the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC). NARAC/IMAAC has capabilities to respond to toxic industrial chemical spills, nuclear-power plant accidents, fires, chemical/biological agents, radiological/nuclear devices (RDDs, INDs), and other airborne hazards. Our web-based systems provide hazards assessments of critical infrastructure for defensive planning and can provide infrastructure operators and emergency responders with a baseline for planning and exercises. LLNL's infrastructure security web mapping services facilitate dissemination of technical information for all phases of disaster management. Examples of some of these products are shown in the Figure 1.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Plant-specific Model and Data Analysis using Dynamic Security Modeling and Simulation

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large on-site physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an update on the progress in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available force-on-force simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework or MASS-DEF. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report does not contain any plant's sensitive information and/or Safeguards Information. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Security Category I/II SNM De-Inventory Status

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is in the process of reducing the amount of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) to below the Security Category I/II levels at the Plutonium Facility. This action has been taken as part of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) “Complex Transformation” effort. The NNSA Administrator. Thomas D’Agostino has defined “Complex Transformation” as NNSA’s vision for a smaller, safer, more secure, and less expensive nuclear weapons complex that leverages the scientific and technical capabilities of the workforce and meets national security requirements. Part of Complex Transformation entails reducing or eliminating SNM storage at certain sites and consolidating materials and Security Category I/II operations at a minimal number of sites. LLNL has developed a plan to de-inventory to a Security Category III level by October 1, 2012. Security Level III means that there will be less than 400 grams of plutonium metal.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle Value Proposition Study - Final Report

PHEVs have been the subject of growing interest in recent years because of their potential for reduced operating costs, oil displacement, national security, and environmental benefits. Despite the potential long-term savings to consumers and value to stakeholders, the initial cost of PHEVs presents a major market barrier to their widespread commercialization. The study Objectives are: (1) To identify and evaluate value-added propositions for PHEVs that will help overcome the initial price premium relative to comparable ICEs and HEVs and (2) to assess other non-monetary benefits and barriers associated with an emerging PHEV fleet, including environmental, societal, and grid impacts. Study results indicate that a single PHEV-30 on the road in 2030 will: (1) Consume 65% and 75% less gasoline than a comparable HEV and ICE, respectively; (2) Displace 7.25 and 4.25 barrels of imported oil each year if substituted for equivalent ICEs and HEVs, respectively, assuming 60% of the nation's oil consumed is imported; (3) Reduce net ownership cost over 10 years by 8-10% relative to a comparable ICE and be highly cost competitive with a comparable HEV; (4) Use 18-22% less total W2W energy than a comparable ICE, but 8-13% more than a comparable HEV (assuming a 70/30 split of E10 and E85 use in 2030); and (5) Emit 10% less W2W CO{sub 2} than equivalent ICEs in southern California and emits 13% more W2W CO{sub 2} than equivalent ICEs in the ECAR region. This also assumes a 70/30 split of E10 and E85 use in 2030. PHEVs and other plug-in vehicles on the road in 2030 may offer many valuable benefits to utilities, business owners, individual consumers, and society as a whole by: (1) Promoting national energy security by displacing large volumes of imported oil; (2) Supporting a secure economy through the expansion of domestic vehicle and component manufacturing; (3) Offsetting the vehicle's initial price premium with lifetime operating cost savings (e.g., lower fuel and maintenance costs); (4) Supporting the use of off-peak renewable energy through smart charging practices. However, smart grid technology is not a prerequisite for realizing the benefits of PHEVs; and (5) Potentially using its bidirectional electricity flow capability to aid in emergency situations or to help better manage a building's or entire grid's load.

02 PETROLEUM↗