Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “radioactive”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 361 records · Page 20

Regulatory Design for Transport Security Regulations of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material

A cornerstone within a nuclear security regime of a country is a legislative and regulatory framework that both regulates the individuals using radioactive and nuclear materials, but also regulates the regulators for their commitments under International Law. When drafting nuclear law and regulations, both technical and legal expertise is needed to ensure the regulation meets the technical requirements for security, but also is legally enforceable within a country’s jurisdiction. While the Primary Nuclear Law, or Enabling Act provides establishes the Competent Authority and responsibilities for nuclear security, regulatory development is where the proverbial, rubber meets the road for requirements. The regulations provide instruction for inspections, authorizations, and managed activities, such as use storage, and transport. Transport Security regulatory development for radioactive and nuclear material is complex because the regulation maybe multi-jurisdictional, multi-modal, and involve multiple stakeholders. Development of transport security regulations requires coordination with other ministerial stakeholders, transport operators, and alignment to international treaties and conventions outside the nuclear domain. This paper provides a brief discussion of the challenges associated with regulatory development for transport security regulations for nuclear and other radioactive materials in transport. The paper will briefly identify key stakeholders, international law involved, and current efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in supporting Member States in regulatory development. While active in that regulations are necessary for a robust nuclear security regime, regulatory development is more a slow-burn than an active activity in nuclear security.

Fialkoff, Marc↗

Nuclear Security Interface Considerations for Regaining Control of Discovered Nuclear and Radioactive Materials

Recognizing that regaining control of orphan radioactive and nuclear material is challenging, the international community has developed requirements and guidance to support countries in addressing the problem. However, limited guidance is available on the practical nuclear security related issues that arise when nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control (MORC) is encountered and efforts are undertaken to regain control. For example, the IAEA Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-19, “National Strategy for Regaining Control over Orphan Sources and Improving Control over Vulnerable Sources”, provides recommendations on a methodology for establishing a national strategy for regaining control of orphan sources. However, except for Pu239 in radioactive sources, nuclear material is outside the scope of this safety guide, and practical safety and security measures below the level of national strategy are not discussed adequately.This paper discusses the interfaces between the stakeholder groups and the responsibilities of each when encountering common scenarios that deal with MORC transitioning to regulatory control. The stakeholders include but are not limited to individuals who encounter MORC, and providers of formal and informal transport systems, and traditional and ad hoc storage solutions. This paper explores practical legal, financial, and institutional issues that hinder implementation of required safety and security practices. This paper also offers strategies that can be implemented on the individual, organizational, national, and international level to regain control of MORC.

Shannon, Michael↗

Recent Radioactive Material Package Testing Experiences at Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) was a pioneer in the testing of radioactive material shipping packages and has been performing such tests for over 50 years. Currently, except for Type B thermal tests, testing is performed at the purpose-built Packaging Research Facility that is located at the National Transportation Research Center - a U.S. Department of Energy User Facility. Packages used for the transportation of Type B quantities of radioactive materials must be capable of meeting normal conditions of transportation (NCT) requirements and hypothetical accident conditions (HAC) requirements as defined in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 71. Evaluation of package designs to these criteria typically involves a combination of analysis and physical testing. Required physical tests include free drop, crush, puncture, penetration, compression, vibration, water spray, water immersion, and thermal. The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Packaging Evaluation Facility (PEF) at the National Transportation Research Center (NTRC) provides an inclusive testing capability for a wide variety of packages needed for shipment of radioactive materials. Since PATRAM 2019, ORNL has performed several sets of tests including testing of two designs of the Defense Program Package (DPP-3 and DPP-1) and several Special Form Capsules. This paper provides an overview of the testing performed as well as a summary of advancements made to the ORNL package testing program during that time.

Martinez, Oscar↗

Methods of isolating radioactive mercury and uses thereof

Provided herein are methods of isolating and using radioactive mercury. In particular, provided herein are methods of isolating radioactive mercury including the use of a thiacrown ether, and using the isolated radioactive mercury in therapeutic and/or imaging applications.

Despotopulos, John↗

Evaluating and Countering the Insider Threat to the Radioactive Source Supply Chain

The modern supply chain is a global enterprise and little drove this home more than the global COVID-19 pandemic which sent economic shockwaves throughout the world. Many goods became scarce, as products were delayed, in limited supply, or simply not available. The suddenly diminished supply collided with still high demand and led to greatly increased costs. This was particularly true for the radioactive source supply chain. The pandemic introduced extensive delays for construction projects, slowed the transport of radiological materials to facilities, interrupted treatment deliveries, and impaired the mobility of contractors across the industry. All of these concerns not only adversely affected the economy, but also impacted the safety and security of radiological material, potentially raising national security concerns. The vulnerability of the supply chain, a critical element in an increasingly interconnected world, was exposed. One example that challenged the adaptive capacity of the overall supply chain is the Ever Given container ship, which became stuck in the Suez Canal in 2020. This accident immediately shut down shipments that accounted for 12% of global trade, with long-term impacts estimated to be much larger. Developing the ability to anticipate and react in real-time to sudden changes has quickly become a necessity, particularly in industries that deal with the transport of hazardous material. The reaction to these dramatic incidents was to largely focus attention and resources on protecting the supply chain from external threats. However, the threat to the radioactive material supply chain from insiders intimately involved in the process may be even greater and remains a blind spot that requires increased attention. Recent events revealed the blueprint for targeting and disrupting that supply chain, so the potential for a malicious insider—or a manipulated, unwitting insider—to take advantage of this vulnerability is elevated, creating security concerns for radiological industries. This paper examines and analyzes the potential insider threat to the radioactive source supply chain and recommends steps to take to counter this possibility.

Kinney, Justin↗

Low-Radioactivity Argon for Rare-Event Searches

39Ar and 42Ar produce irreducible backgrounds for several argon-based dark matter and neutrino experiments. The use of low-radioactivity underground argon (UAr) could be a solution to the problem. The DarkSide-50 experiment demonstrated that argon derived from underground sources can contain a much lower concentration of 39Ar than atmospheric argon. Following this success, the Global Argon Dark Matter Collaboration (GADMC) is procuring hundreds of tons of UAr for the DarkSide-20k detector. To serve the broader community need, it is increasingly important to identify new sources of low-radioactivity argon. In addition, understanding the underground production mechanisms of argon radioisotopes and devising methods to measure them at ultra-low levels is necessary. The use of low-radioactivity argon could be crucial to expanding the physics goals and sensitivity of next-generation large-scale argon-based experiments.

Radioargon isotopes, Underground argon, Isotope pr↗

Development of a Helical Closure for Radioactive Material Shipping Packages

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) Packaging Technology group proposed a closure design for the outer packaging of a prototype Type B shipping package being developed for the Department of Energy (DOE). The closure design provides an efficient means of securing the containment vessel (CV) within the radioactive material packaging. This design has a simplified operation, requires less components, and less maintenance when compared to current radioactive material package closure methods. This paper will review and discuss the materials, designs, processes, and testing activities that were considered and pursued in the development of the novel closure for the outer packaging of new radioactive material shipping packages.

Housley, William M. [Savannah River National Labor↗

Reconstruction of radionuclide intakes for the residents of East Urals Radioactive Trace (1957–2011)

The East Urals Radioactive Trace (EURT) was formed after a chemical explosion in the radioactive waste-storage facility of the Mayak Production Association in 1957 (Southern Urals, Russia) and resulted in an activity dispersion of 7.4 × 10 16 Bq into the atmosphere. Internal exposure due to ingestion of radionuclides with local foodstuffs was the main factor of public exposure at the EURT. The EURT cohort, combining residents of most contaminated settlements, was formed for epidemiological study at the Urals Research Center for Radiation Medicine, Russia (URCRM). For the purpose of improvement of radionuclide intake estimates for cohort members, the following data sets collected in URCRM were used: (1) Total β-activity and radiochemical measurements of 90 Sr in local foodstuffs over all of the period of interest (1958–2011; n = 2200), which were used for relative 90 Sr intake estimations. (2) 90 Sr measurements in human bones and whole body ( n = 338); these data were used for average 90 Sr intake derivations using an age- and gender-dependent Sr-biokinetic model. Non-strontium radionuclide intakes were evaluated on the basis of 90 Sr intake data and the radionuclide composition of contaminated foodstuffs. Validation of radionuclide intakes during the first years after the accident was first carried out using measurements of the feces β-activity of EURT residents ( n = 148). The comparison of experimental and reconstructed values of feces β-activity shows good agreement. 90 Sr intakes for residents of settlements evacuated 7–14 days after the accident were also obtained from 90 Sr measurements in human bone and whole body. Furthermore, the results of radionuclide intake reconstruction will be used to estimate the internal doses for the members of the EURT cohort.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Emergency department management of patients internally contaminated with radioactive material

After a radiation emergency that involves the dispersal of radioactive material, patients can become externally and internally contaminated with one or more radionuclides. Internal contamination can lead to the delivery of harmful ionizing radiation doses to various organs and tissues or the whole body. The clinical consequences can range from acute radiation syndrome (ARS) to the long term development of cancer. Estimating the amount of radioactive material absorbed into the body can guide the management of patients. Treatment includes, in addition to supportive care and long term monitoring, certain medical countermeasures like Prussian blue, Calcium DTPA and Zinc DTPA.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Transient thermal analysis for radioactive liquid mixing operations in a large-scaled tank

A transient heat balance model was developed to assess the impact of a Submersible Mixer Pump (SMP) on radioactive liquid temperature during the process of waste mixing and removal for the high-level radioactive materials stored in Savannah River Site (SRS) tanks. The model results will be mainly used to determine the SMP design impacts on the waste tank temperature during operations and to develop a specification for a new SMP design to replace existing longshaft mixer pumps used during waste removal. The present model was benchmarked against the test data obtained by the tank measurement to examine the quantitative thermal response of the tank and to establish the reference conditions of the operating variables under no SMP operation. The results showed that the model predictions agreed with the test data of the waste temperatures within about 10%.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Transport of radioactive ion beams and related safety issues: The {sup 132}Sn{sup +} case study

The transport of intense radioactive ion beam currents requires a careful design in order to limit the beam losses, the contamination and thus the dose rates. Some investigations based on numerical models and calculations have been performed in the framework of the SPIRAL 2 project to evaluate the performance of a low energy beam transport line located between the isotope separation on line (ISOL) production cell and the experiment areas. The paper presents the results of the transverse phase-space analysis, the beam losses assessment, the resulting contamination, and radioactivity levels. They show that reasonable beam transmission, emittance growth, and dose rates can be achieved considering the current standards.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

On feasibility of a closed nuclear power fuel cycle with minimum radioactivity

Practical implementation of a closed nuclear fuel cycle implies solution of two main tasks. The first task is creation of environmentally acceptable operating conditions of the nuclear fuel cycle considering, first of all, high radioactivity of the involved materials. The second task is creation of effective and economically appropriate conditions of involving fertile isotopes in the fuel cycle. Creation of technologies for management of the high-level radioactivity of spent fuel reliable in terms of radiological protection seems to be the hardest problem.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Milestones for Selection, Characterization, and Analysis of the Performance of a Repository for Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain.

This report presents a concise history in tabular form of events leading up to site identification in 1978, site selection in 1987, subsequent characterization, and ongoing analysis through 2009 of the performance of a repository for spent nuclear fuel and high - level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain in southern Nevada. The tabulated events generally occurred in five periods: (1) commitment to mined geologic disposal and identification of sites; (2) site selection and analysis, based on regional geologic characterization through literature and analogous data; (3) feasibility analysis demonstrating calculation procedures and importance of system components, based on rough measures of performance using surface exploration, waste process knowledge, and general laboratory experiments; (4) suitability analysis demonstrating viability of disposal system, based on environment - specific laboratory experiments, in - situ experiments, and underground disposal system characterization; and (5) compliance analysis, based on completed site - specific characterization . The current sixth period beyond 2010 represents a new effort to set waste management policy in the United States. Because the relationship is important to understanding the evolution of the Yucca Mountain Project , the tabulation also shows the interaction between the policy realm and technical realm using four broad categories of events : (a) Regulatory requirements and related federal policy in laws and court decisions, (c) Presidential and agency directives, (c) technical milestones of implementing institutions, and (d) critiques of the Yucca Mountain Project and pertinent national and world events related to nuclear energy and radioactive waste. Preface The historical progression of technical milestones for the Yucca Mountain Project was originally developed for 10 journal articles in a special issue of Reliability Engineering System Safety on the performance assessment for the Yucca Mountain license application [1-10]. The listing of mile stones, a distinct feature of those articles, has been collected and tabulated here. A lthough a brief description is presented here (based on the summaries in the 10 journal articles), the emphasis remains on the tabulation because of its usefulness in providing a comprehensive but concise history of the Yucca Mountain Project. The tabulation presented here is more elaborate than originally presented in that many of the interactions that occurred between the technical realm and policy realm can be depicted in separate columns. The usefulness of the milestones table is due in part to L.A. Connolly, for editorial and reference support, and S.K. Best, Raytheon, and L. Mays, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), for illustration support. Reviewers P.N. Swift, SNL, and K. Gupta, University of Oklahoma, helped improve the discussion. The historical perspective presented is that of the author and is not necessarily held by reviewers, Sandia National Laboratories , and the US Department of Energy. As a historic perspective, the author is reporting on the work of others; however, any interpretative error s of the documentation are those of the author alone. The characterization and modeling of the Yucca Mountain disposal system required numerous participants with expertise in many areas of science and technology, as evident from the extensive reference list. Their diligent efforts are generally acknowledged here and through the many references to their impressive work, but the 10 journal articles acknowledge by name many of the numerous participants that contributed to the Yucca Mountain Project .

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Milestones for Selection, Characterization, and Analysis of the Performance of a Repository for Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain

This report presents a concise history in tabular form of events leading up to site identification in 1978, site selection in 1987, subsequent characterization, and ongoing analysis through 2008 of the performance of a repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain in southern Nevada. The tabulated events generally occurred in five periods: (1) commitment to mined geologic disposal and identification of sites; (2) site selection and analysis, based on regional geologic characterization through literature and analogous data; (3) feasibility analysis demonstrating calculation procedures and importance of system components, based on rough measures of performance using surface exploration, waste process knowledge, and general laboratory experiments; (4) suitability analysis demonstrating viability of disposal system, based on environment-specific laboratory experiments, in-situ experiments, and underground disposal system characterization; and (5) compliance analysis, based on completed site-specific characterization. Because the relationship is important to understanding the evolution of the Yucca Mountain Project, the tabulation also shows the interaction between four broad categories of political bodies and government agencies/institutions: (a) technical milestones of the implementing institutions, (b) development of the regulatory requirements and related federal policy in laws and court decisions, (c) Presidential and agency directives and decisions, and (d) critiques of the Yucca Mountain Project and pertinent national and world events related to nuclear energy and radioactive waste.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

2014 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada: Review of the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses

This report summarizes the results and conclusions of the annual review of the performance assessments (PAs) and composite analyses (CAs) of the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs). The Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs were issued Disposal Authorization Statements (DASs) in accordance with U.S. Department of Energy Order DOE O 435.1 “Radioactive Waste Management” (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] 2001). The Area 3 RWMS and Area 5 RWMS DASs (DOE 1999a, 2000) require preparation of an annual summary report and a determination of the continuing adequacy of the PAs and CAs. The requirement to prepare an annual summary report is implemented in the Maintenance Plan for the PAs and CAs (National Security Technologies, LLC [NSTec] 2007a). The annual summary report is submitted to the DOE Office of Environmental Management for review and approval.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Special Analysis for the Disposal of the Materials and Energy Corporation Sealed Sources at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site

This special analysis (SA) evaluates whether the Materials and Energy Corporation (M&EC) Sealed Source waste stream (PERM000000036, Revision 0) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the M&EC Sealed Source waste meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999). The M&EC Sealed Source waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Public Preferences Related to Radioactive Waste Management in the United States: Methodology and Response Reference Report for the 2016 Energy and Environment Survey.

This report presents the questions and responses to a nationwide survey taken June 2016 to track preferences of US residents concerning the environment, energy, and radioactive waste management. A focus of the 2016 survey is public perceptions on different options for managing spent nuclear fuel, including on-site storage, interim storage, deep boreholes, general purpose geologic repositories, and geologic repositories for only defense-related waste. Highlights of the survey results include the following: (1) public attention to the 2011 accident and subsequent cleanup at the Fukushima nuclear facility continues to influence the perceived balance of risk and benefit for nuclear energy; (2) the incident at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in 2014 could influence future public support for nuclear waste management; (3) public knowledge about US nuclear waste management policies has remined higher than seen prior to the Fukushima nuclear accident and submittal of the Yucca Mountain application; (6) support for a mined disposal facility is higher than for deep borehole disposal, building one more interim storage facilities, or continued on-site storage of spent nuclear fuel; (7) support for a repository that comingles commercial and defense related waste is higher than for a repository for only defense related waste; (8) the public’s level of trust accorded to the National Academies, university scientists, and local emergency responders is the highest and the level trust accorded to advocacy organizations, public utilities, and local/national press is the lowest; and (9) the public is willing to serve on citizens panels but, in general, will only modestly engage in issues related to radioactive waste management.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗