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At least 361 records · Page 20

Electrodynamic Dust Shield Housing for RASSOR Redesign and Fabrication

Abstract—An Electrodynamic Dust Shield (EDS) was to be mounted over the cameras of the Regolith Advanced Surface Systems Operations Robot (RASSOR) to mitigate the clouding effects and abrasive properties of lunar dust. This report discusses the redesign process and physical fabrication of the housing unit planned to attach the EDS to the RASSOR camera. The two-piece 3D-Printed design consists of a holder and cover unit. The EDS Holder seats the EDS near two live copper contacts that are to be wired into the main electronics housing. The EDS Cover seats two metal leaf spring tabs to bridge the connections between the copper contacts and EDS electrodes, as well as a centralized O-ring that is pressed flush against the EDS to mitigate dust intrusion. All components were modeled, printed, and checked for proper electrical contact and mechanical fit. The built-up assembly was subsequently tested in the Electrostatics and Surface Physics Laboratory (ESPL) and demonstrated good dust clearing performance.

Alexander Lacerna↗

The Challenger Tradgedy was Caused by an Apollo Mistake, Terminating Risk Analysis

NASA’s attitude toward risk changed drastically between the Apollo and Space Shuttle design. [1]Apollo engineers were seriously alarmed about riskbecause of the fatal Apollo 1 fire and the fact that the estimated probability of another fatal accident was extremely high. The predictions were so appalling thatmanagement terminated risk analysis to avoid public apprehension. Because risk analysis was not done, the Space Shuttle design accepted excessively high andunknown risk. The immediate cause of the Challengertragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in coldweather that impaired the O-ring seals, but the fundamental cause was the high risk of the shuttle design. Before Challenger, management asserted that the probability of a fatal accident was 1 in 100,000.Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a shuttle failure.

Harry W Jones↗

Passive Water Assurance Delivery System

This report provides an analysis and evaluation of proposed design improvements to the internal water delivery system of NASA’s passive vegetable growing system. The VEGGIE system is designed to provide fresh vegetables and psychological benefits for astronauts aboard the International Space Station. Preliminary testing conducted by NASA for the VEGGIE system revealed flaws in the water delivery system. In these tests, the interface between the plants and the water reservoir failed to provide passive water delivery through the system both in microgravity experiments and experiments conducted on Earth. Our team’s goal was to fix this interface such that water can be passively delivered from the water reservoir to the plant rooting pillows to grow vegetative crops from seed to harvest. The system requirements outlined by NASA include: minimal total mass, on-demand passive water delivery, same dimensions as existing fixtures, minimal pressure on system to prevent leaking, zero mold growth, minimal swelling or clogging for non-flammable capillary materials, pressure stabilization between the water reservoir and plant pillow bags, even dispersal of water during initial priming, minimal bubble obstruction of capillary interface, maximum gas availability to plant roots, growth in a mixed artificial media (50:50 Arcillite:Fafard #2), and to avoid overwatering and drought conditions for plants. The major proposed design improvements are to use a single-interface capillary cord design to directly connect the water reservoir to the plant-rooting pillows, and to alter the water reservoir to model a propellant management device (PMD) in order to ensure consistent and long term watering for the VEGGIE system. The plant rooting pillow required minimal changes outside of replacing the capillary mat on the bottom of the pillow with O-ring insertion points the single-interface capillary system. - Research was conducted to determine which materials are able to uptake water through capillary action to grow Outredgeous Lettuce plants from seed to harvest. The primary requirements to be met by the team's design and evaluation of the capillary interface were: continuous passive watering for 90 days using non-flammable capillary materials and a peak water delivery rate of 30 mL/hr./0.15 m 2 . The results of the team's experimentation showed that the capillary material Nomex displayed the highest capillary water delivery potential with a maximum flow rate of 3.6 mL/hr. The Nomex capillary systems were the only capillary material to consistently grow Outredgeous Lettuce plants from seed to harvest, and displayed the highest average flow rate for multiple experiment sets. The Nomex material was previously incorporated into the VEGGIE system using a matted version of the capillary material, though the team recommends using a cord configuration in the single-interface capillary system for greater system stability. Nomex has proven to be a promising material, as it has passed both health and fire standards for use aboard the International Space Station. PMDs are made of materials that utilize surface tension and adhesive forces to overcome adverse accelerations to improve stability and ensure fluid delivery. PMDs are typically used in fuel tanks to ensure fuel delivery. The team recommends using a sponge PMD in order to mitigate bubble obstruction, decrease system weight, and ensure reliable water delivery to the capillary interface. The PMD water reservoir requires a rigid water reservoir and a vent tube for pressure stabilization. Since PMD’s cannot be tested in 1-G (Earth conditions), further theoretical modeling and testing is required for the proposed water reservoir design. The intent of this proposed system is to passively water plants in microgravity, though the technology is not limited to microgravity applications. The testing at The Ohio State University has proven that the design is highly effective on Earth, demonstrating that it could serve as a simple water delivery system in home and office applications. This would make vegetative crops more accessible in all indoor applications, thereby improving indoor air quality and occupant comfort. Additionally, this technology has great potential to be utilized in greenhouse plant production, cutting back on more sophisticated watering system energy and time requirements.

Alexandria Jensen↗

EFFECTS OF TRITIUM GAS EXPOSURE ON POLYMERS

Effects of tritium gas exposure on various polymers have been studied over the last several years. Despite the deleterious effects of beta exposure on many material properties, structural polymers continued to be used in tritium systems. Improved understanding of the tritium effects will allow more resistant materials to be selected. Currently polymers find use mainly in tritium gas sealing applications (eg. valve stem tips, O-rings). Future uses being evaluated including polymeric based cracking of tritiated water, and polymer-based sensors of tritium.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Advanced Remote Maintenance Design for Pilot-Scale Centrifugal Contactors

Advanced designs of used nuclear fuel recycling processes and radioactive waste treatment processes are expected to include more ambitious goals for aqueous based separations including; higher separations efficiency, high-level waste minimization, and a greater focus on continuous processes to minimize cost and footprint. Therefore, annular centrifugal contactors are destined to play a more important role for such future processing schemes. Pilot-scale testing will be an integral part of development of many of these processes. An advanced design for remote maintenance of pilot-scale centrifugal contactors has been developed and a prototype module fabricated and tested for a commercially available pilot-scale centrifugal contactor (CINC V-02, 5-cm rotor diameter). Advanced design features include air actuated clamps for holding the motor-rotor assembly in place, an integral electrical connection, upper flange o-rings, a welded bottom plate, a lifting bale, and guide pins. These design features will allow for rapid replacement of the motor rotor assembly, which can be accomplished while maintaining process equilibrium. Hydraulic testing of a three-stage prototype unit was also performed to verify that design changes did not impact performance of the centrifugal contactors. Details of the pilot-scale remote maintenance design, results of testing in a remote mockup test facility, and results of hydraulic testing of the advanced design are provided.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

9975 SHIPPING PACKAGE LIFE EXTENSION SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM RESULTS SUMMARY

Results from the 9975 shipping package Storage and Surveillance Program at the Savannah River Site (SRS) are summarized for justification to extend the life of the 9975 packages currently stored in the K-Area Complex (KAC). This justification is established with the stipulation that surveillance activities will continue throughout the extended time to ensure the continued integrity of the 9975 materials of construction and to further understand the currently identified degradation mechanisms. The 10 year storage life justification was developed prior to storage. A subsequent report was later used to validate the qualification of the 9975 shipping packages for 10 years in storage. However the qualification for the storage period was provided by the monitoring requirements of the 9975 Storage and Surveillance Program. This report summarizes efforts to determine a new safe storage limit for the 9975 shipping package based on the surveillance data collected since 2005 when the 9975 Storage and Surveillance Program began. The Program has demonstrated that the 9975 package has a robust design that can perform under a variety of conditions. The primary emphasis of the on-going 9975 Storage and Surveillance Program is an aging study of the 9975 Viton{reg_sign} containment vessel O-rings and the Celotex{reg_sign} fiberboard thermal insulation at bounding conditions of radiation, elevated temperatures and/or elevated humidity.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Investigating Low Temperature Properties of Rubber Seals - 13020

To achieve the required tightness levels of containers for low and intermediate level radioactive wastes rubbers are widely applied as main sealing materials. The save encapsulation of the radioactive container contents has to be guaranteed according to legislation and appropriate guidelines for long storage periods as well as down to temperatures of -40 deg. C during transportation. Therefore the understanding of failure mechanisms that lead to leakage at low temperatures is of high importance. It is known that the material properties of rubbers are strongly influenced by temperature. At low temperatures this is caused by the rubber-glass transition (abbr. glass transition). During continuous cooling the material changes from rubber-like entropy-elastic to stiff energy-elastic behaviour, that allows nearly no strain or retraction. Therefore, rubbers are normally used above their glass transition but the minimum working temperature limit is not defined precisely, what can cause problems during application. The temperature range where full functionality is possible is strongly dependent on the application conditions and the material. For this investigation mainly ethylene propylene diene (EPDM) and fluorocarbon rubbers (FKM) were selected as they are often used for radioactive waste containers. Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC) and Dynamic Mechanical Analysis (DMA) are typically used for the determination of the temperature range of the glass transition process. The standardized compression set measurement according to ISO 815 is common for investigation of rubber sealing materials as the test simulates the seal behaviour after release. To reduce the test time of the standard tests a faster technique giving the same information was developed. Additionally, the breakdown temperature of the sealing function of complete O-ring seals is measured in a component test setup to compare it with the results of the other tests. The experimental setup is capable of measuring the leakage rate at low temperatures by the pressure rise method. A model was developed that allows calculating the minimum working temperature limit of a seal by combining the results of the applied methods. (authors)

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Thermal Analysis of a Pipe Over-pack Container with a Combustible Waste Matrix for Los Alamos National Laboratory - 17307

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Technical Area 55 (TA 55) utilizes several different container types to store and transfer special nuclear material and waste for numerous programs. The Nuclear Process Infrastructure - Infrastructure Operations Group (NPI-2) analyzes and certifies containers to meet the specifications for distinct processes and storage. Engineering analysis performed on these containers include but are not limited to: leak testing, filter efficiency testing, pressure drop test, drop testing, water penetration testing, polymer (o-ring) hardness testing, and thermal steady state testing. Of all of these tests, thermal steady-state testing is most crucial to ensure critical components for specific containers do not fail under an internal heat payload. This testing provides data for setting heat payload limits for different containers. The Pipe Over-pack Container (POC) is a vented carbon steel container with a removable lid designed for storing or transferring nuclear waste. Additionally, TA 55 has been tasked to manage and store all of its Transuranic (TRU) waste for the foreseeable future. Being able to place more material into a single container conserves the physical storage space available at TA 55. The Pipe Over pack Handling and Operations Manual requires each user to ensure that the maximum temperature of each component in the POC is not exceeded. Conducting a thermal steady-state test with a combustible waste matrix on the POC can benefit stakeholders on increasing the material limits of the container. The results of these measurements will establish new wattage limits to meet LANL's transportation requirements. The current LANL Transportation Safety Document (TSD) limits the amount of heat source plutonium to 10 grams per POC, corresponding to approximately 5 Watts of heat. The result of this test was provided to the Packaging and Transportation (OS-PT) group to evaluate new wattage limits that can satisfy the needs of TA 55, while maintaining a safe packaging configuration. (authors)

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Reviewing Spent Nuclear Fuel Dry Cask Storage Programs to Identify Challenges for an Integrated Waste Management System - 17535

Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has responsibility for removing commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from nuclear power plant sites and disposing of the SNF in a deep geologic repository. However, the methods used by commercial nuclear power plants for onsite storage of their SNF define the starting conditions for DOE efforts to develop a waste management system that includes packaging, transportation, storage, and disposal of commercial SNF. The NWPA (as amended) also charges the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (Board) with evaluating the technical and scientific validity of DOE activities related to the management and disposal of SNF and high-level radioactive wastes (HLW). DOE's efforts related to developing an integrated program for storing, transporting, and disposing of SNF and HLW were the focus of a public meeting held by the Board on August 24, 2016, in Washington, D.C. To prepare for the public meeting, the Board's staff compiled information on the dry cask storage systems in service at nuclear power plant sites in order to identify issues that would need to be addressed by DOE in planning to transport SNF away from the sites. This paper is based on a briefing presented to the Board members by the Board's staff before the public meeting. Post-meeting findings and recommendations of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board are documented in the Board letter to the Department of Energy dated December 8, 2016. A note about terminology: in this paper, the phrase 'dry cask storage system' is generic and applies to a complete system used for dry storage of commercial SNF.Within these storage systems, commercial SNF is sealed inside a container called either a cask or a canister depending upon the specific type of storage system used. This distinction is discussed in more detail in the body of this paper. When referring to the containers holding SNF in particular systems, this paper uses the terms 'casks' or 'canisters,' as appropriate. When discussing the collective group of all containers, this paper uses the phrase 'casks and canisters'. Dry cask storage of SNF is a widespread practice throughout the U.S. commercial nuclear industry. As of August 1, 2016, more than 2300 storage casks and canisters were loaded at U.S. commercial nuclear power plant sites. This number is expected to increase by more than 200 casks and canisters annually, reaching a total of approximately 4500 by 2025. Multiple vendors have developed their own unique designs of dry cask storage and transportation systems. The majority of storage system designs (75 percent) feature SNF loaded in welded stainless steel canisters that are stored in ventilated concrete overpacks that allow for convection cooling. Some older dry cask storage system designs do not include a welded stainless steel canister; instead, SNF is loaded directly into a heavily shielded metal cask to minimize radiation exposure to workers and prevent atmospheric release of radionuclides. These types of systems are sealed by O-rings compressed under a bolted lid. After loading, dry cask storage systems are located on concrete pads at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI) at nuclear power plant sites and will remain there until the time when they will be transported to a consolidated interim storage facility or a deep geologic repository. Eventual transportation of canistered SNF will include removing the stainless steel canisters from the concrete overpacks, possibly repackaging the SNF, and loading the canisters into specially designed transportation casks for shipment by truck, rail, or barge. In the case of the non-canistered casks, some are approved for transportation and can be shipped after impact limiters are installed on the casks. SNF will need to be removed from casks not approved for transportation and transferred to transport-approved casks. This paper highlights five issues and challenges presented by the nuclear industry's use of dry cask storage systems that will need to be addressed by DOE in developing an integrated waste management system. One example, among the five, is that several dry-storage casks and canisters have received Nuclear Regulatory Commission certificates of compliance for storage only and do not have certificates of compliance for transportation. This will pose a challenge when the SNF must be moved to a consolidated interim storage facility or a deep geologic repository. Another example is that, when loaded with SNF, the total weight of new, larger transportation cask designs will exceed 142 metric tonnes (156 tons) which, when combined with the weight of the rail-car, will exceed the gross weight limit for unrestricted operation on some rail lines. This will also affect future transportation planning for shipments of SNF. All five issues and challenges are discussed in detail in the body of the paper. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Testing and Versatility of the SAVY 4000 Nuclear Material Container - 15634

The SAVY 4000 container was designed by Nuclear Filter Technology, Inc. to meet DOE M441.1-1 requirements for safe storage of nuclear material, and it is currently being used at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Livermore National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory and Nevada National Security Site. The 316L stainless steel container can be manufactured in a range of sizes from 1 quart to 10 gallon capacity, it can be opened and closed easily by hand, it is sealed with a Viton{sup R} O-ring, and the filter retains particulates and resists liquid water entry while allowing hydrogen gas to escape. This innovative design has proven to provide benefits and uses beyond its original intent. For example, the container was tested in a simulated facility design basis accident involving high temperatures, fuel fire, and subsequent drop, and the damage ratio was measured. This has allowed the LANL plutonium facility to take credit for a material-at-risk reduction of approximately two orders of magnitude for material stored in the SAVY 4000 container. In addition, the water resistant filter allows the nuclear facility to credit the container as a safety feature to mitigate the risk of a criticality accident in the event of facility sprinkler system activation. The container has also been approved to transfer small quantities of solid nuclear material by hand carry between Los Alamos facilities, and it has been approved and used as a waste container for transuranic waste destined for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. The 1 quart capacity container and the future 2 quart design both fit inside the 9977 shipping container, and this has facilitated the transport of nuclear material from Idaho National Laboratory to Nevada Nuclear Security Site, obviated the need for repackaging the material for storage upon arrival. Finally, Los Alamos has recently contracted with Nuclear Filter Technology, Inc. to perform testing to certify the SAVY 4000 container as a DOT Type A liquid transport container. This paper will provide an overview of the various testing regimes and describe the resulting versatility of the container for nuclear material containment. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Testing and certification of the SAVY 4000 nuclear material container for DOT Type A liquid transport - 15636

Los Alamos National Laboratory has contracted with Nuclear Filter Technology, Inc. to perform testing and certification of the SAVY 4000 container for DOT Type A liquid transport. The container was originally designed to meet DOE M441.1-1 requirements for safe storage of nuclear material, and it is currently being used for storage at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Livermore National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory and Nevada National Security Site. The SAVY 4000 container is manufactured from 316L stainless steel in a range of sizes from 1 quart to 10 gallon capacity, it can be opened and closed easily by hand, it is sealed with a Viton{sup R} O-Ring, and the filter retains particulates and resists liquid water entry while allowing hydrogen gas to escape. Finite element analysis has been used to guide the development of a testing regime that includes a 30 foot drop, bar penetration, vibration, water spray and stacking for the 5 quart capacity container. The results of the tests will be compared with the finite element analysis to validate the model. The validated model is being used to extend the Type A certification to the other container sizes. This poster will describe the results of the Type A liquid testing, the finite element analysis, and the benefits of broadening the use and versatility of the container. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Polymer Lifetime in Plutonium Storage Containers - 18508

The plutonium facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory utilizes stainless steel containers for interim storage of plutonium compounds, metals, alloys, and process residues. Various polymer materials are used in these containers, including neoprene rubber gaskets, Viton O-rings, polytetrafluoroethylene membranes, and polyvinyl chloride bags. The DOE Manual, M441.1-1, requires storage containers to have a technically justified design life, and these polymer components play a key role in the determination of the overall design life for the containers. The capabilities at Los Alamos for monitoring degradation and estimating the design life of polymer materials used in plutonium storage containers will be described, along with the results of the lifetime determination studies for the polymer components used in SAVY-4000 and Hagan containers and some proposed alternatives. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Closure Device For a Containment Vessel in a Small Gram Quantity Shipping Package

SRNL has been chartered by DOE Environmental Management (DOE-EM) to develop a new Type B shipping package for Small Gram Quantities (SGQ) of radioactive material. Design a containment vessel (CV) closure device that will reduce the operation time and improve the ease-of- use for Operations Personnel. The Containment Vessel (CV) includes a closure lid cap with spring shaft and locking tabs, multiple disc springs, and vessel with integral locking ring. The CV is assembled by aligning the tabs on the lid cap with the openings in the locking ring. Next, the lid cap is pushed down to compress the disc springs. Finally, the lid is rotated 45-degrees to locking location. When released, the tabs are secured against the locking ring. Disc springs (e.g. Belleville washers, coned-disc springs, Belleville spring, etc.) exert axial loads on the mating parts when compressed. The orientation of the disc springs can be configured to change the deflection and axial loads for specific designs. In addition to securing the lid cap to the vessel, the compressed disc springs can be used to apply a load to a containment seal (e.g. o-ring). A prototype of the CV closure was 3D printed to evaluate the locking mechanism design and functionality. A test plan will be developed to evaluate the mechanical properties (i.e. compression forces) and functionality of the CV closure design.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Accelerated Aging and Evaluation of Hose-In-Hose Transfer Lines in the Hanford Waste Transfer System - 20312

Nonmetallic materials are used in the United States Department of Energy's Hanford Site Tank Farm waste transfer system. These materials include the inner primary hoses in the hose-in-hose transfer lines (HIHTLs), Garlock{sup R} gaskets, ethylene propylene diene monomer (EPDM) O-rings, and other nonmetallic materials. These nonmetallic materials are exposed to β and γ radiation, caustic solutions as well as high temperature and pressure stressors. How the nonmetallic components react to each of these stressors individually has been well established. However, simultaneous exposure of these stressors has not been evaluated and is of great concern to Hanford Site engineers. Florida International University's Applied Research Center engineers worked closely with key Hanford's Washington River Protection Solutions personnel to develop an experimental test plan that determines how these nonmetallic components react to various simultaneous stressor exposures. In this paper, research on the experimental testing of the hose-in-hose transfer lines used in the Hanford tank farm waste transfer system under simultaneous stressor exposures is presented. The stressor exposure experiments consisted of various combinations of simultaneous stressor exposure of caustic solution, high temperature and high pressure stressors. Research efforts focused on evaluating the aging behavior of EPDM by exposing samples of HIHTLs as well as EPDM dog bone shaped specimens to a 25% NaOH solution at (38 deg. C), operating (54 deg. C) and design temperatures (77 deg. C) for 6 months and 12 months. In addition, HIHTL and the EPDM dog-bone specimens were exposed to only hot water at 77 deg. C for a duration of one year. The mechanical and material properties of the samples were characterized and compared with those of the unexposed samples (baseline). Evaluations included burst pressure tests of the EPDM hose-in-hose transfer lines and material tensile strength test of EPDM dog-bone coupons. Both the tensile strength of the EPDM material dog bones and the burst pressure of the HIHTLs significantly decreased with the increasing temperature and increasing exposure time. When compared with the baseline samples, the burst pressure decreased by 28.75% for the sample aged at 77 deg. C after 12 months, in comparison to sample aged at 38 deg. C and 54 deg. C which had about 1.34% and 5.70% loss in burst pressures, respectively, after 12-month exposure. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Y-12 National Security Complex, Model ES-3100 Package with Bulk HEU Contents

This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) presents the results of the safety analysis prepared in support of the Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) request for licensing of the Model ES-3100 package with bulk highly enriched uranium (HEU) contents and issuance of a Type B(U) Fissile Material Certificate of Compliance. This SARP, published in the format specified in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 7.9 and using information provided in UCID-21218 and NRC Regulatory Guide 7.10, demonstrates that the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) ES-3100 package with bulk HEU contents meets the established NRC regulations for packaging, preparation for shipment, and transportation of radioactive materials given in Title 10, Part 71, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) [10 CFR 71] as well as U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations for packaging and shipment of hazardous materials given in Title 49 CFR. To protect the health and safety of the public, shipments of radioactive materials are made in packaging that is designed, fabricated, assembled, tested, procured, used, maintained, and repaired in accordance with the provisions cited above. Safety requirements addressed by the regulations that must be met when transporting radioactive materials are containment of radioactive materials, radiation shielding, and assurance of nuclear subcriticality.

42 ENGINEERING↗

RH Packaging Program Guidance (Rev. 3.1)

The purpose of this program guidance document is to provide the technical requirements for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of the Remote-Handled Transuranic (RH-TRU) 72-B Waste Shipping Package (also known as the "RH-TRU 72-B") and directly related components. This document complies with the requirements as specified in the RH-TRU 72-B Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificate of Compliance (C of C) 9212. If there is a conflict between this document and the SARP and/or C of C, the C of C shall govern. The C of C states, "each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, Operating Procedures, of the application." It further states: "…each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the Application." Chapter 9.0 of the SARP tasks the Department of Energy Carlsbad Field Office or the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Management and Operating (M&O) Contractor with assuring the packaging is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. Because the packaging is NRC approved, users need to be familiar with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) §71.8, "Deliberate Misconduct." Any time a user suspects or has indications that the conditions of approval in the C of C were not met, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) shall be notified immediately. The CBFO will evaluate the issue and notify the NRC if required. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 71, "Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material," certificate holders, packaging users, and contractors or subcontractors who use, design, fabricate, test, maintain, or modify the packaging shall post copies of (1) 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliances," regulations, (2) Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and (3) NRC Form 3, Notice to Employees. These documents must be posted in a conspicuous location where the activities subject to these regulations are conducted. This document details the instructions to be followed to operate, maintain, and test the RH-TRU 72-B packaging. This Program Guidance standardizes instructions for all users. Users shall follow these instructions or equivalent approved instructions. Following these instructions assures that operations meet the requirements of the SARP.

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RH Packaging Maintenance Manual (Rev. 0)

This document provides instructions for performing (1) Inner containment vessel (IV) and outer containment vessel (OC) maintenance leakage rate test on packaging seals and corresponding seal surfaces using a nondestructive helium (He) leak test; (2) IV and OC periodic leakage rate test using nondestructive He leak test; and (3) IV and OC structural pressure tests.

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NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletins 2007-2023

An NESC Technical Bulletin captures critical knowledge in the form of new engineering information or best practices in a one-page format that have resulted from NESC independent testing, analysis, and assessments. This document contains all NESC Technical Bulletins from 2007 through 2023.

additive manufacturing, battery, braycote, capacit↗