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At least 361 records · Page 20

Best Practices, Lessons Learned, and Examples on the Application of Damage Tolerance in Space Structures

Damage tolerance is an important consideration in space structures applications. The intent of damage tolerance is to demonstrate that the structure is robust to the presence of flaws over the service life of the space vehicle. Damage tolerance requirements in documents such as those in NASA, AIAA, and ISO can be challenging to implement. The intent of this paper is three-fold: (1) Provide best practices in the application of damage tolerance requirements for space applications, (2) Provide lessons learned for each of class of hardware, (3) Provide examples of challenging situations encountered in the application of damage tolerance. Examples cover additive manufacturing, composite overwrapped pressure vessels, pressurized structures, liquid rocket engines, thermal protection systems, and other classes of hardware. The philosophy and limitations of leak before burst and proof test logic are also discussed. Finally, a discussion on elastic-plastic fracture mechanics with comparisons to test data will be presented.

Best Practices↗

NASA’s Student Airborne Science Activation for Minority Serving Institutions: Inaugural Program, Educational Outcomes, and Lessons Learned

The NASA Student Airborne Science Activation (SaSa) for Minority Serving Institutions (MSIs) held its inaugural summer research program for early career undergraduates interested in the Geosciences. SaSa is a NASA Science Activation funded 8-week summer internship program. Twenty-four first- and second-year undergraduates from MSIs across the U.S. participated in the summer program - June 6 to July 29, 2022. Students had the opportunity to gain hands-on research experience in all components of an airborne science campaign including flying on-board a NASA research aircraft to collect atmospheric measurements. Students conducted independent research projects related to the atmosphere, ocean, and geosciences that feed into NASA’s broader Earth Science Division’s and Decadal Survey goals using air quality, meteorological, and oceanic measurements from surface, airborne, and satellite-based observations. The program split its time between partner institution, University of Maryland Baltimore County and NASA’s Wallops Flight Facility in Wallops Island, Virginia. Students also made site visits at partner institutions, including: Hampton University, University of Maryland Eastern Shore, Morgan State University, Howard University, and Coppin State University and attended lectures from visiting faculty and NASA Subject Matter Experts. Students were guided on their research projects by near-peer graduate mentors, SaSa program leadership, co-Is at partner institutions, and NASA scientists to address two major research themes: 1) how human-caused air pollution has human and environmental implications, and 2) how large-scale meteorological factors influence local weather conditions. Students sorted into research groups, based on sub-discipline areas in the Geosciences, including: “Clouds, Aerosols and Radiation”, “Meteorology and Planetary Boundary Layer”, “Air Quality: Particle Pollution and Trace Gases”, and “Air-Water-Land Interface”. Their research was presented as 3-minute lightning talks and in-person poster presentations at a close-out event at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland. The students’ inter- and trans-disciplinary research experiences centered in the use of multiple ground, airborne, and satellite remote sensing NASA Earth Science Division assets. Providing a unique experience aligned to recognize the societal benefits that NASA contributes in the areas of resource management, air quality monitoring and policy decisions, energy and weather predictions, and research on the Earth’s climate. The SaSa program aims to increase the number of students from MSIs that identify as underrepresented or underserved individuals in the Geosciences discipline, Earth System Science graduate programs, and the NASA workforce. A summary of the summer research program, educational, scientific, and programmatic outcomes, as well as lessons learned will be presented.

NASA↗

Lessons Learned With Risk Management: A Systems Engineer's Perspective

Risk management is a communications device that, when executed as an essential task, enables systems engineering to effectively balance risk across the project. Developing and baselining risks is an essential continuous task to ensure top project concerns both from bottom up and top down are being mitigated. Risk management provides the opportunity to avoid the consequence of the risk when mitigation steps start early enough. Just discussing risk with all the project flight elements during development, even if no risks are open, provides an excellent communication opportunity between systems engineering and those elements, ensuring concerns and worries have a platform for discussion. A well-managed risk identification process will identify concerns that are serious but not being clearly communicated, and it will enable mitigation of those potential problems before they cause a failure. Effective risk management requires considerable time and effort, but that effort will save time and money across the development. Risk management must be frequent enough to be useful and in depth enough to bring out emerging issues. It also requires a trusting relationship between the lead systems engineer and element and/or subsystem leads. The discussions need to be with the right number of individuals (typically a handful) and the right duration in time (typically an hour a month). Outside of these risk working groups, there is a formal management process to input, status, and disposition risks, and a monthly Risk Management Board meeting where key project stakeholders are informed. This paper provides good guidance on effective risk management from a systems engineering perspective and provides project lessons learned from the NASA spaceflight missions NICER, Landsat 9, LRO, and OSIRIS-REx to demonstrate the effectiveness of risk management.

Lessons Learned↗

Lessons Learned With Risk Management: A Systems Engineer’s Perspective

Risk management is a communications device that, when executed as an essential task, enables systems engineering to effectively balance risk across the project. Developing and baselining risks is an essential continuous task to ensure top project concerns both from bottom up and top down are being mitigated. Risk management provides the opportunity to avoid the consequence of the risk when mitigation steps start early enough. Just discussing risk with all the project flight elements during development, even if no risks are open, provides an excellent communication opportunity between systems engineering and those elements, ensuring concerns and worries have a platform for discussion. A well-managed risk identification process will identify concerns that are serious but not being clearly communicated, and it will enable mitigation of those potential problems before they cause a failure. Effective risk management requires considerable time and effort, but that effort will save time and money across the development. Risk management must be frequent enough to be useful and in depth enough to bring out emerging issues. It also requires a trusting relationship between the lead systems engineer and element and/or subsystem leads. The discussions need to be with the right number of individuals (typically a handful) and the right duration in time (typically an hour a month). Outside of these risk working groups, there is a formal management process to input, status, and disposition risks, and a monthly Risk Management Board meeting where key project stakeholders are informed. This paper provides good guidance on effective risk management from a systems engineering perspective and provides project lessons learned from the NASA spaceflight missions NICER, Landsat 9, LRO, and OSIRIS-REx to demonstrate the effectiveness of risk management.

Lessons Learned↗

Ideas for Applying Artificial Intelligence to NASA Lessons Learned

Artificial intelligence is it tool that has existed for many years. Recent developments in generative AI has rapidly expanded the applications for this tool across many domains such as writing, analyzing, summarizing, creating videos, creating graphics and others. Charts in this presentation will prompt attendees to discuss the pros and cons, and potential validation methodology for imbedding artificial intelligence tools in the NASA lessons learned knowledge sharing environment.

Knowledge Management↗

Lessons Learned from Particulate Characterization Laboratory Anomalies

The White Sands Test Facility chemistry laboratory provides quality control for cleanroom operations including cleanliness verification of aerospace hardware by particulate counts and non-volatile residue determinations, particulate counts for liquid hypergolic propellants, gaseous helium and nitrogen propellant pressurizing agents used for ground support equipment and flight test article valve actuation, gaseous oxygen primarily used for component testing, and deionized water for refurbished propellant hardware flushing. Cleanliness verification includes particulate counts and non-volatile residue determinations to industry standard, NASA, and program specifications and levels. Particulate counts are typically to customer-specified specifications and levels including JPR 5322.1H (2016) Levels 50 and 100, Orion (MPCV 70156. Revision H (2018)) Level 100, RPTSTD-8070-0001 Revision 3 (2022), and IEST-STD-CC1246E (2013) Levels 50 and 100. The laboratory issues high pressure filter holders containing membrane filters to test operations personnel, who collect samples by flowing the required volumes of fluid through the filter holder, and the filter holder is returned to the lab for counting. A passing particulate count is required before testing may proceed. Rapid data reduction and issuing of reports indicating a pass or fail of the particulate specification are required. Corrective action and resampling invariably occurs if a sample fails. Consequently, the laboratory must maintain the highest degree of reliability to facilitate quality data used to decide if testing may proceed. Experience and continual improvements have enabled reliability. However, anomalies attributed to lab processes and hardware including filter holders, membranes, and Petri dishes have been encountered. This paper presents a summary of problems, solutions, successes, and lessons learned from particle counting experience for over 35 years.

Lessons Learned↗

The Development of a Human Systems Simulation Laboratory at Idaho National Laoboratory: Progress, Requirements and Lessons Learned

Next generation nuclear power plants and digital upgrades to the existing nuclear fleet introduce potential human performance issues in the control room. Safe application of new technologies calls for a thorough understanding of how those technologies affect human performance and in turn, plant safety. In support of advancing human factors for small modular reactors and light water reactor sustainability, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has developed a reconfigurable simulation laboratory capable of testing human performance in multiple nuclear power plant (NPP) control room simulations. This paper discusses the laboratory infrastructure and capabilities, the laboratory’ s staffing requirements, lessons learned, and the researcher’s approach to measuring human performance in the simulation lab.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Operating Experience and Lessons Learned in the Use of Soft-Sided Packaging for Transportation and Disposal of Low Activity Radioactive Waste

This paper describes the operating experience and lessons learned at U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites as a result of an evaluation of potential trailer contamination and soft-sided packaging integrity issues related to the disposal of low-level and mixed low-level (LLW/MLLW) radioactive waste shipments. Nearly 4.3 million cubic meters of LLW/MLLW will have been generated and disposed of during fiscal year (FY) 2010 to FY 2015—either at commercial disposal sites or disposal sites owned by DOE. The LLW/MLLW is packaged in several different types of regulatory compliant packaging and transported via highway or rail to disposal sites safely and efficiently in accordance with federal, state, and local regulations and DOE orders. In 1999, DOE supported the development of LLW containers that are more volumetrically efficient, more cost effective, and easier to use as compared to metal or wooden containers that existed at that time. The DOE Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), working in conjunction with the plastic industry, tested several types of soft-sided waste packaging systems that meet U.S. Department of Transportation requirements for transport of low specific activity and surface contaminated objects. Since then, soft-sided packaging of various capacities have been used successfully by the decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) projects to package, transport, and dispose D&D wastes throughout the DOE complex. The joint team of experts assembled by the Energy Facility Contractors Group from DOE waste generating sites, DOE and commercial waste disposal facilities, and soft-sided packaging suppliers conducted the review of soft-sided packaging operations and transportation of these packages to the disposal sites. As a result of this evaluation, the team developed several recommendations and best practices to prevent or minimize the recurrences of equipment contamination issues and proper use of soft-sided packaging for transport and disposal of waste.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nuclear Criticality Safety Lessons Learned in the Design of the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex

The Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) is being built by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to replace aging uranium processes at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12 NSC) in Oak Ridge Tennessee. Specifically, the processes housed in building 9212 are being replaced as this facility dates to the World War II Manhattan Project days of Y-12. When the UPF Project is completed it will consist of three main facilities along with several support facilities. The Main Processing Building (MPB) will house oxide production and metal casting operations. The Salvage and Accountability Building (SAB) will house wet chemistry operations (examples include recovery evaporation and calcination of solutions). The Personnel Support Building will be connected to both the SAB and the MPB and will serve as a transition facility for materials and personnel between the two. The MPB will also be connected to the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Storage Facility (HEUMF) via a connector (HCON) to permit transfers from storage into UPF directly. This paper will summarize some of the more important lessons learned for the NCS practitioner working in a design environment rather than in a production or experimental environment. As the Chief NCS Engineer for the UPF Project I have been responsible for ensuring the technical evaluations produced on the project are high quality, technically accurate, and conform to the Y-12 NCS Program expectations. Ensuring nuclear criticality safety for processes that do not yet exist in reality is a challenge very different than that of ensuring subcriticality for processes in an operating facility. The biggest difference being that in design space – everything is imaginary whereas in the operating facility you have the benefit of being able to go out and look at the equipment and interview the operators. Ensuring that Nuclear Criticality Safety is integrated into design is a process that requires constant communication between the NCS staff and the broader engineering design team. Until the facility is constructed – nothing is physically stable and so rigorous documentation of decisions – to include any assumptions – is necessary to minimize errors. Non-NCS engineers will not understand the hazard or the physics of nuclear criticality. It is up to the NCS staff to provide training and communication to the team. The NCS staff must be patient and prepared to explain themselves many times and be as flexible as possible.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Lessons Learned for Rapid Decarbonization Of Power Sectors: Key Messages for Energy Ministers

This report covers key lessons learned for the rapid decarbonization of power systems, emphasizing best practices in planning, building, and operating power systems. This report is the result of a collaborative effort among various Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM) workstreams and partner initiatives: 21st Century Power Partnership (21CPP); Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage (CCUS); Global Power System Transformation Consortium (G-PST), a partner to CEM; Industrial Deep Decarbonization Initiative (IDDI); International Energy Agency Digital Demand-Driven Electricity Networks Initiative (IEA 3DEN), a partner to CEM; International Smart Grid Action Network (ISGAN); Long Term Scenarios for the Energy Transition (LTES); Nuclear Innovation: Clean Energy Future (NICE Future); Super-Efficient Equipment and Appliance Deployment (SEAD). The contents are not intended to be comprehensive of all power sector topics, and there may be overlap between content in each section due to the nature of this first-of-its-kind collaborative effort to deliver unified messaging on power sector decarbonization to energy ministers. This work is intended to complement other work at the Clean Energy Ministerial and offers options for consideration, not specific policy recommendations.

21CPP↗

Lessons Learned from the Energy to Communities (E2C) Peer-Learning Cohort on Engaging with Electric Utilities for Successful Local Partnerships

NLR designed and led a six-month peer-learning cohort from July through December 2025 on “Engaging With Electric Utilities for Successful Local Partnerships” as part of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy to Communities (E2C) program. Representatives from 15 local and regional governments from across the United States participated in monthly workshops covering best practices for engaging with their utilities to advance their own energy goals. This document shares key takeaways, lessons learned, and resources from the cohort that may be useful to local governments, regional governments, or Tribes.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

A step towards the final frontier: Lessons learned from acceptance testing of the first HPE/Cray EX 3000 system at ORNL

Summary In this article, we summarize the deployment of the Air Force Weather (AFW) HPC11 system at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) including the process followed to successfully complete acceptance testing of the system. HPC11 is the first HPE/Cray EX 3000 system that has been successfully released to its user community in a federal facility. HPC11 consists of two identical 800‐node supercomputers, Fawbush and Miller, with access to two independent and identical lustre parallel file systems. HPC11 is equipped with Slingshot 10 interconnect technology and relies on the HPE Performance Cluster Manager software for system configuration. ORNL has a clearly defined acceptance testing process used to ensure that every new system deployed can provide the necessary capabilities to support user workloads. We worked closely with HPE and AFW to develop a set of tests that used the United Kingdom's Meteorological Office's Unified Model and 4‐dimensional variational data assimilation. We also included benchmarks and applications from the Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility portfolio to fully exercise the HPE/Cray programming environment and evaluate the functionality and performance of the system. Acceptance testing of HPC11 required parallel execution of each element on Fawbush and Miller. In addition, careful coordination was needed to ensure successful acceptance of the newly deployed lustre file systems alongside the compute resources. In this work, we present test results from specific system components and provide an overview of the issues identified, challenges encountered, and the lessons learned along the way.

Melesse Vergara, Verónica G.↗