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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 361 records · Page 20
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2009

Some Improvements in Utilization of Flash Memory Devices

Two developments improve the utilization of flash memory devices in the face of the following limitations: (1) a flash write element (page) differs in size from a flash erase element (block), (2) a block must be erased before its is rewritten, (3) lifetime of a flash memory is typically limited to about 1,000,000 erases, (4) as many as 2 percent of the blocks of a given device may fail before the expected end of its life, and (5) to ensure reliability of reading and writing, power must not be interrupted during minimum specified reading and writing times. The first development comprises interrelated software components that regulate reading, writing, and erasure operations to minimize migration of data and unevenness in wear; perform erasures during idle times; quickly make erased blocks available for writing; detect and report failed blocks; maintain the overall state of a flash memory to satisfy real-time performance requirements; and detect and initialize a new flash memory device. The second development is a combination of hardware and software that senses the failure of a main power supply and draws power from a capacitive storage circuit designed to hold enough energy to sustain operation until reading or writing is completed.

Gender, Thomas K.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Failure Analysis at the Kennedy Space Center

History has shown that failures occur in every engineering endeavor, and what we learn from those failures contributes to the knowledge base to safely complete future missions. The necessity of failure analysis is at its apex at the end of one aged program and at the beginning of a new and untested program. The information that we gain through failure analysis corrects the deficiencies in the current vehicle to make the next generation of vehicles more efficient and safe. The Failure Analysis and Materials Evaluation Branch in the Materials Science Division at the Kennedy Space Center performs metallurgical, mechanical, electrical, and non-metallic materials failure analyses and accident investigations on both flight hardware and ground support equipment for the Space Shuttle, International Space Station, Constellation, and Launch Services Programs. This paper will explore a variety of failure case studies at the Kennedy Space Center and the lessons learned that can be applied in future programs.

Salazar, Victoria L.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Failure Analysis at the Kennedy Space Center

History has shown that failures occur in every engineering endeavor, and what we learn from those failures contributes to the knowledge base to safely complete future missions. The necessity of failure analysis is at its apex at the end of one aged program (i.e. Shuttle) and at the beginning of a new and untested program (i.e. Constellation). The information that we gain through failure analysis corrects the deficiencies in the current vehicle to make the next generation of vehicles more efficient and safe. The Failure Analysis and Materials Evaluation section in the Materials Science Division at the Kennedy Space Center performs metallurgical, mechanical, electrical, and non-metallic failure analysis and accident investigations on both flight hardware and ground support equipment (GSE) for the Shuttle, International Space Station, Constellation, and Launch Services Programs. This presentation will explore a variety of failure case studies at KSC and the lessons learned that can be applied in future programs.

Salazar, Victoria L.↗
NASA NTRS2013

SILHIL Replication of Electric Aircraft Powertrain Dynamics and Inner-Loop Control for V&V of System Health Management Routines

Software-in-the-loop and Hardware-in-the-loop testing of failure prognostics and decision making tools for aircraft systems will facilitate more comprehensive and cost-effective testing than what is practical to conduct with flight tests. A framework is described for the offline recreation of dynamic loads on simulated or physical aircraft powertrain components based on a real-time simulation of airframe dynamics running on a flight simulator, an inner-loop flight control policy executed by either an autopilot routine or a human pilot, and a supervisory fault management control policy. The creation of an offline framework for verifying and validating supervisory failure prognostics and decision making routines is described for the example of battery charge depletion failure scenarios onboard a prototype electric unmanned aerial vehicle.

Verification and Validation↗
DOE OSTI2021

SMC 2021 Data Challenge: Analyzing Resource Utilization and User Behavior on Titan Supercomputer

Resource utilization statistics of submitted jobs on a supercomputer can help us understand how users from various scientific domains use HPC platforms and better design a job scheduler. We explore to generate insight regarding workload distribution and usage pattern domains from job scheduler trace, GPU failure information, and project-specific information collected from Titan supercomputer. Furthermore, we want to know how the scheduler performance varies over time and how the users' scheduling behavior changes following a system failure. These observations have the potential to provide valuable insight, which is helpful to prepare for system failures. These practices will help us develop and apply novel machine learning algorithms in understanding system behavior, requirement, and better scheduling of HPC systems. There are two datasets, RUR and GPU: RUR dataset is the job scheduler traces collected from the Titan supercomputer from 01/01/2015 to 07/31/2019 (2015.csv - 2019.csv). These were collected using resource Utilization Report (RUR), a Cray-developed resource-usage data collection and reporting system. It contains the usage information of its critical resources (CPU, Memory, GPU, and I/O) of each running job on Titan during that period (https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8891001). It includes ProjectAreas as additional information, every job is associated with a project ID. TheProjectAreas.csv dataset provides a mapping of the project ID to its domain science. GPU dataset has information regarding GPU failure on Titan. There have been some hardware-related issues in the GPUs in Titan that caused some GPUs to fail, sometimes irrecoverably during some job runs. This dataset provides information regarding these failures during the execution of the submitted jobs. GPUs on Titan are uniquely identified by a serial number (SN), and they are installed in a location. A GPU can be installed in a location, then removed from that location following a failure, and then re-installed in a different location after fixing the problem. If the failure can't be recovered, the GPU might be removed entirely from Titan. There are two prominent types of failures that resulted in the removal of GPUs from Titan: Double Bit Error (DBE) and Out of the Bus (OTB). The dataset (gc_full.csv) has seven attributes, we provided a short description of these attributes in the ReadMe file. To learn more about this dataset, please refer to the git repository https://github.com/olcf/TitanGPULife and the related publication (https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9355319).

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS1993

Evaluating Risk Of Failure With Limited Information

Report describes probabilistic failure assessment (PFA). Developed for application to spaceflight systems for sufficient testing of hardware to ensure reliability not feasible. However, must be ascertained that critical failure modes extremely unlikely to occur during service. PFA applied to any failure mode described by quantitative models of physics and mechanics of failure phenomena, such as fatigue crack in initiation or propagation in structures, leakage of seals, wear in bearings, and erosion of arcjet thrustor cathodes.

Moore, N. R.↗
DOE OSTI2026

Hardware Aware Mitigation of Timing Side-Channel Vulnerabilities in Critical Infrastructure Software

Program runtime/timing attacks exploit variations in a program’s execution times to extract sensitive information from the program (e.g. encryption keys, sensitive variable data, intellectual property). State-of-the-art solutions to runtime sidechannel attacks attempt to balance the execution time of the sensitive code for different control flow paths to eliminate the timing leakage. However, during the mitigation process, most techniques do not consider the underlying hardware/device on which the target program is supposed to run on. This can lead to over-fixing (unnecessary extra operations), under-fixing (not solving the imbalance properly), and even failures. We propose DISARM, a joint hardware-software methodology (unlike any existing solution) for mitigating runtime side-channel vulnerabilities that utilizes timing values from real embedded devices to generate targeted software fixes. We implement DISARM to support C/C++/Java source codes and validate it across 22 standard benchmarks. DISARM outperforms state-of-the-art solutions such as PENDULUM and DifFuzzAR in terms of execution time overhead (up to −46%), code size overhead (up to −10%), and correctness (no failures) on five different embedded/edge devices.

Suha, Tasneem [University of Maine]↗
NASA NTRS1992

Reliability training

Discussed here is failure physics, the study of how products, hardware, software, and systems fail and what can be done about it. The intent is to impart useful information, to extend the limits of production capability, and to assist in achieving low cost reliable products. A review of reliability for the years 1940 to 2000 is given. Next, a review of mathematics is given as well as a description of what elements contribute to product failures. Basic reliability theory and the disciplines that allow us to control and eliminate failures are elucidated.

Lalli, Vincent R.↗
NASA NTRS1984

The implementation and use of Ada on distributed systems with high reliability requirements

The use and implementation of Ada in distributed environments in which reliability is the primary concern is investigated. Emphasis is placed on the possibility that a distributed system may be programmed entirely in ADA so that the individual tasks of the system are unconcerned with which processors they are executing on, and that failures may occur in the software or underlying hardware. The primary activities are: (1) Continued development and testing of our fault-tolerant Ada testbed; (2) consideration of desirable language changes to allow Ada to provide useful semantics for failure; (3) analysis of the inadequacies of existing software fault tolerance strategies.

Knight, J. C.↗
NASA NTRS2018

A Prognostic Launch Vehicle Probability of Failure Assessment Methodology for Conceptual Systems Predicated on Human Causal Factors

Create an improved method to calculate reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle system prior to fabrication by using historic data of actual root causes of failures. While failures have unique "proximate causes", there are typically a finite amount of common "root causes". Heretofore launch vehicle reliability evaluation typically hardware-centric statistical analyses, while most root causes of failures are been shown to be human-centric. A method based on human-centric root causes can be used to quantify reliability assessments and focus proposed actions to mitigate problems. Existing methods have been optimistic in their projections of launch vehicle reliability compared to actuals. Hypothesis: reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle can be more accurately evaluated based on a rational, probabilistic approach using past failure assessment teams' findings predicated on human-centric causes."Human Reliability Analysis Methods Selection Guidance for NASA"Chandler F.T., et al., NASA HQ/OSMA study group, July 2006. Outside HRA experts from academia, other federal labs, and the private sector. 50 system reliability methods considered, fourteen selected for further study, four finally selected as best suited for human spaceflight. Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) + Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) enabled incorporating effects and probabilities of human errors. While four down-selected methods deemed appropriate for failure assessment, it did not appear that these methods could be concisely applied to perform major system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy."Engineering a Safer World", Detailed, comprehensive study external to NASA Leveson N. G., MIT, 2011.Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP). All-encompassing accident model based on systems theory analyzed accidents after they occurred and created approaches to prevent occurrence in developing systems not focused on failure prevention per se, but rather reducing hazards by influencing human behavior through use of constraints, hierarchical control structures, and process models to improve system safetySystem Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) addresses predictive part of problem (a "hazard analysis"). Includes all causal factors identified in STAMP: "...design errors, software flaws, component interaction accidents, cognitively complex human decision-making errors, and social organizational and management factors contributing to accidents" can guide design process rather than require it to exist before-hand did not appear capable of concise application for system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy.

Williams, Craig H.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Qualification Testing of Engineering Camera and Platinum Resistance Thermometer (PRT) Sensors for Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) Project under Extreme Temperatures to Assess Reliability and to Enhance Mission Assurance

Package Qualification and Verification (PQV) of advanced electronic packaging and interconnect technologies and various other types of qualification hardware for the Mars Exploration Rover/Mars Science Laboratory flight projects has been performed to enhance the mission assurance. The qualification of hardware (Engineering Camera and Platinum Resistance Thermometer, PRT) under extreme cold temperatures has been performed with reference to various project requirements. The flight-like packages, sensors, and subassemblies have been selected for the study to survive three times (3x) the total number of expected temperature cycles resulting from all environmental and operational exposures occurring over the life of the flight hardware including all relevant manufacturing, ground operations and mission phases. Qualification has been performed by subjecting above flight-like qual hardware to the environmental temperature extremes and assessing any structural failures or degradation in electrical performance due to either overstress or thermal cycle fatigue. Experiments of flight like hardware qualification test results have been described in this paper.

package reliability↗
NASA NTRS1985

The implementation and use of Ada on distributed systems with high reliability requirements

The use and implementation of Ada in distributed environments in which reliability is the primary concern were investigated. In particular, the concept that a distributed system may be programmed entirely in Ada so that the individual tasks of the system are unconcerned with which processors they are executing on, and that failures may occur in the software or underlying hardware was examined. Progress is discussed for the following areas: continued development and testing of the fault-tolerant Ada testbed; development of suggested changes to Ada so that it might more easily cope with the failure of interest; and design of new approaches to fault-tolerant software in real-time systems, and integration of these ideas into Ada.

Knight, J. C.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Framework for a space shuttle main engine health monitoring system

A framework developed for a health management system (HMS) which is directed at improving the safety of operation of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) is summarized. An emphasis was placed on near term technology through requirements to use existing SSME instrumentation and to demonstrate the HMS during SSME ground tests within five years. The HMS framework was developed through an analysis of SSME failure modes, fault detection algorithms, sensor technologies, and hardware architectures. A key feature of the HMS framework design is that a clear path from the ground test system to a flight HMS was maintained. Fault detection techniques based on time series, nonlinear regression, and clustering algorithms were developed and demonstrated on data from SSME ground test failures. The fault detection algorithms exhibited 100 percent detection of faults, had an extremely low false alarm rate, and were robust to sensor loss. These algorithms were incorporated into a hierarchical decision making strategy for overall assessment of SSME health. A preliminary design for a hardware architecture capable of supporting real time operation of the HMS functions was developed. Utilizing modular, commercial off-the-shelf components produced a reliable low cost design with the flexibility to incorporate advances in algorithm and sensor technology as they become available.

Hawman, Michael W.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Terrestrial Sources of X-Ray Radiation and Their Effects on NASA Flight Hardware

X-rays are an energetic and penetrating form of ionizing electromagnetic radiation, which can degrade NASA flight hardware. The main concern posed by such radiation is degradation of active electronic devices and, in some cases, diodes. Non-electronic components are only damaged at doses that far exceed the point where any electronic device would be destroyed. For the purposes of this document, flight hardware can be taken to mean an entire instrument, the flight electronics within the instrument or the individual microelectronic devices in the flight electronics. This document will discuss and describe the ways in which NASA flight hardware might be exposed to x-rays, what is and isn't a concern, and how to tell the difference. First, we must understand what components in flight hardware may be vulnerable to degradation or failure as a result of being exposed to ionizing radiation, such as x-rays. As stated above, bulk materials (structural metals, plastics, etc.) are generally only affected by ionizing radiation at very high dose levels. Likewise, passive electronic components (e.g. resistors, capacitors, most diodes) are strongly resistant to exposure to x-rays, except at very high doses. The main concerns arise when active components, that is, components like discrete transistors and microelectronic devices, are exposed to ionizing radiation. Active components are designed to respond to minute changes in currents and voltages in the circuit. As such, it is not surprising that exposure to ionizing radiation, which creates ionized and therefore electrically active particles, may degrade the way the hardware performs. For the most part, the mechanism for this degradation is trapping of the charges generated by ionizing radiation by defects in dielectric materials in the hardware. As such, the degree of damage is a function of both the quantity of ionizing radiation exposure and the physical characteristics of the hardware itself. The metric that describes the level of exposure to ionizing radiation is total ionizing dose (TID). The unit of TID is the rad, which is defined as 100 ergs absorbed per gram of material. Dose can be expressed in other units, for example grays (gy), where 1 gy = 100 rads. The actual fluence of radiation needed to deliver a rad depends on the absorbing material, so units of dose are usually stated in reference to the material of interest. That is, for microelectronic devices, the unit of dose is generally rad (Si) or rad (SiO2). However, the definition of absorbed dose in this fashion has the advantage that the type of radiation causing the ionization can be normalized so that a realistic and adequate comparison can be made. The sensitivity of microelectronic parts to TID varies over many orders of magnitude. (Note: Doses to humans are typically expressed in rems-or roentgen-equivalent-man-which measures tissue damage, and depends on the type of radiation, as well as the dose in rads.) Thus far, the "softest" parts tested at NASA showed damage at 500 rads (Si), while parts that are radiation-hardened by design can remain functional to doses on the order of 107 rads (Si). This broad range of sensitivity highlights one of the most important considerations when considering the effects of radiation on electronic parts: In order to determine whether a radiation exposure is a concern for a particular part, one must understand the technologies used in the part and their vulnerabilities to TID damage. A NASA radiation expert should be consulted to obtain such information.

X-ray↗
NASA NTRS2019

Electrified Aircraft Propulsion Systems: Potential Failure Modes and Failure Mitigation Strategies

Electrified aircraft propulsion (EAP) systems hold great potential for the reduction of aircraft fuel burn, emissions, and noise. Currently, NASA and other organizations are actively working to identify and mature technologies necessary to bring EAP designs to reality. A requirement for the development of any civil aircraft and its systems is to ensure that potential hazards in the design are identified and appropriately mitigated to ensure that the system is safe. During aircraft development, a system safety assessment that consists of a functional hazard assessment is conducted to identify all potential failure conditions of each function, and classify those failures according to the severity of their effects on the aircraft or its occupants. The more severe a function's failure condition classification, the greater the development assurance level required for the function to ensure that the probability of the hazard is acceptably low. Today, aircraft engines and their control systems receive type certificate approval as a stand-alone system to signify their airworthiness. However, the complex coupling and distributed nature of EAP designs are expected to place added challenges on the certification of these systems. This presentation will provide an initial high-level review of the potential failure modes and hazards posed by a generic EAP system along with potential mitigation strategies for those failures. The EAP system is assumed to be a hybrid design consisting of gas turbine engines, mechanical drives, electric machines, power electronics and distribution systems, energy storage devices, and motor driven propulsors. The functionality provided by each of these EAP subsystems will be discussed along with the potential failure modes they may encounter. This will include a discussion of coupled failure effects, where a fault in one EAP subsystem effects the operation of other subsystems in the architecture. Next, potential failure mitigation strategies are discussed including both software-based and hardware-based mitigation strategies. The presentation will conclude with an example evaluation of the potential failure modes and mitigation strategies for a concept EAP system proposed by NASA.

Simon, Donald L.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Determining Component Probability using Problem Report Data for Ground Systems used in Manned Space Flight

During the shuttle era NASA utilized a failure reporting system called the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) it purpose was to identify and track system non-conformance. The PRACA system over the years evolved from a relatively nominal way to identify system problems to a very complex tracking and report generating data base. The PRACA system became the primary method to categorize any and all anomalies from corrosion to catastrophic failure. The systems documented in the PRACA system range from flight hardware to ground or facility support equipment. While the PRACA system is complex, it does possess all the failure modes, times of occurrence, length of system delay, parts repaired or replaced, and corrective action performed. The difficulty is mining the data then to utilize that data in order to estimate component, Line Replaceable Unit (LRU), and system reliability analysis metrics. In this paper, we identify a methodology to categorize qualitative data from the ground system PRACA data base for common ground or facility support equipment. Then utilizing a heuristic developed for review of the PRACA data determine what reports identify a credible failure. These data are the used to determine inter-arrival times to perform an estimation of a metric for repairable component-or LRU reliability. This analysis is used to determine failure modes of the equipment, determine the probability of the component failure mode, and support various quantitative differing techniques for performing repairable system analysis. The result is that an effective and concise estimate of components used in manned space flight operations. The advantage is the components or LRU's are evaluated in the same environment and condition that occurs during the launch process.

Monaghan, Mark W.↗
NASA NTRS2004

International Space Station (ISS) Low Pressure Intramodule Quick Disconnect Failures

A failure of an ISS intermodule Quick Disconnect (QD) during protoflight vibration testing of ISS regenerative Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) hardware led to the discovery of QD design, manufacturing, and test flaws which can yield the male QD susceptible to failure of the secondary housing seal and inadequate housing assembly locking mechanisms. Discovery of this failure had large implications when considering that currently there are 399 similar units on orbit and approximately 1100 units on the ground integrated into flight hardware. Discovery of the nature of the failure required testing and analysis and implementation of a recovery plan requiring part screening and review of element level and project hazard analysis to determine if secondary seals are required. Implementation also involves coordination with the Nodes and MPLM project offices, Regenerative ECLS Project, ISS Payloads, JAXA, ESA, and ISS Logistics and Maintenance.

Lewis, John F.↗