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DOE OSTI2020

Policy Considerations When Federating Facilities for Experimental and Observational Data Analysis

Today’s computational, experimental, and observational facilities afford us tremendous opportunities to couple theory and experiment at increasingly large scales. Empirical sensing capabilities are growing dramatically with beam line and detector improvements, and with advances in our ability to deploy large-scale data gathering observations of the natural world. The coupling of computational simulations and analysis to process the data from experimental and observational facilities is giving rise to cross-facility workflows. Such federations of facilities are in fact becoming an explicit requirement for large-scale scientific discovery. As we scale up these pipelines of scientific discovery, each participating facility needs to establish and align policies so that the federation can work seamlessly in an end-to-end manner. This chapter outlines specific policy considerations in enabling the federation of facilities for data analysis. Design choices and vital policy decisions cover the areas of data acquisition and storage, data transfer, computational resource allocation and co-scheduling, seamless federated user access, and cross-cutting governance. By highlighting the explicit and implicit interdependencies between facilities, we aim to provide facility designers and policymakers the information on policy issues to address early in a facility’s operations, thus enabling successful cross-facility federation and improved experimental and observational data analysis outcomes.

Shankar, Mallikarjun (Arjun)↗

DOE OSTI2021

Toward a Seamless Integration of Computing, Experimental, and Observational Science Facilities: A Blueprint to Accelerate Discovery

The Department of Energy, Office of Science operates world-leading facilities for experimental, observational, and computational science. DOE supercomputing facilities will reach performance at the scale of ExaFLOPs in the coming years, enabling new vistas of scale and precision for large scale simulations and data analysis. Experimental scientific facilities are undergoing similar upgrades that will lead to higher data rates and correspondingly larger computational demands, and will increase the need for near-real-time processing and resilient support for more complex workflows. A transformation of science is underway, with workloads at supercomputing facilities increasingly driven by this explosion of data from instruments and experimental facilities, as well as the accelerating use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as a tool for scientific discovery. A seamless integration of computing, networking, instruments, and experimental facilities is required to support these emerging workloads and open up a new frontier of U.S. leadership in scientific discovery. We propose to accomplish this by providing frictionless access to the ASCR supercomputing facilities. We describe our vision of combining the power of ASCR supercomputers and networking infrastructure into an integrated scalable fabric, available to end user scientists via interfaces that aim to automate and simplify access to high performance computing systems. This will enable unprecedented computational science capabilities for experimental and observational facilities, and will create new opportunities to combine large simulations and modeling with experimental facility data analysis. This blueprint for creating an integrated network of computational and experimental facilities will provide an enriched discovery environment and open doors for new scientific communities to access the DOE’s world-leading computing and networking capabilities.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

NASA NTRS1986

Orbital transfer vehicle launch operations study: Manpower summary and facility requirements, volume 5

All manpower numbers, number of heads (by skill), serial time and manhours have been accumulated and compiled on a per subtask basis in spreadsheet format for both the ground based and the space based data flows. To aid in identifying the facility resources required to process the Ground Based Orbital Transfer Vehicle (GBOTV) and/or the space based orbital transfer vehicle (SBOTV) through the ground facilities at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), a software application package was developed using a general purpose data base management system known as Data Flex. The facility requirements are used as the basic input to this software application. The resources of the KSC facility that could be used by orbital transfer vehicle program were digitized in the same format used to identify facility requirements. The facility capabilities were digitized in this format for subsequent, automated comparative analyses. Composite facility requirements are compared to each of the baseline facility capabilities and the system generates a relative score that indicates how each facility weighs against the composite requirements in relation to the other facilities in the set.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1988

Small engine components test facility turbine testing cell

NASA Lewis Research Center has designed and constructed a new state-of-the-art test facility. This facility, called the Small Engine Components Test Facility (SECTF), is used to test gas turbines and compressors at conditions similar to actual engine conditions. The SECTF is comprised of two separate facilities - a turbine test cell and a compressor test cell. The paper will describe the turbine test cell. The capabilities of the facility make it unique - no other facility of its kind is capable of combining its pressure, speed, and temperature ranges. Turbine inlet air ranges up to 9 atm (125 psig). The turbine exhaust pressure ranges from 0.15 atm (2 psia) to atmospheric pressure. Turbine inlet air temperatures range from ambient to 700 K (1260 deg R). The controllable speed of the turbine rotor ranges from 4000 to 60,000 rpm and the maximum power absorbed by the facility dynamometer is 1250 hp. The data acquisition system scans up to 2000 channels/sec. This paper will discuss in detail the capabilities of the facility, overall facility design, instrumentation used in the facility, and the data acquisition system. Actual research data is not discussed.

Nowlin, Brent C.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Small engine components test facility turbine testing cell

Nowlin, Brent C.↗

NASA NTRS1990

Space technology test facilities at the NASA Ames Research Center

The major space research and technology test facilities at the NASA Ames Research Center are divided into five categories: General Purpose, Life Support, Computer-Based Simulation, High Energy, and the Space Exploraton Test Facilities. The paper discusses selected facilities within each of the five categories and discusses some of the major programs in which these facilities have been involved. Special attention is given to the 20-G Man-Rated Centrifuge, the Human Research Facility, the Plant Crop Growth Facility, the Numerical Aerodynamic Simulation Facility, the Arc-Jet Complex and Hypersonic Test Facility, the Infrared Detector and Cryogenic Test Facility, and the Mars Wind Tunnel. Each facility is described along with its objectives, test parameter ranges, and major current programs and applications.

Gross, Anthony R.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Feasibility Investigation for a Solar Power Generation Facility

The Energy Policy Act of 2005 states that by fiscal year 2013, at least 7.5% of the energy consumed by the government must be renewable energy. In an effort to help meet this goal, Johnson Space Center (JSC) is considering installing a solar power generation facility. The purpose of this project is to conduct a feasibility investigation for such a facility. Because Kennedy Space Center (KSC) has a solar power generation facility, the first step in this investigation is to learn about KSC's facility and obtain information on how it was constructed. After collecting this information, the following must be determined: the amount of power desired, the size of the facility, potential locations for it, and estimated construction and maintenance costs. Contacts with JSC's energy provider must also be established to determine if a partnership would be agreeable to both parties. Lastly, all of this data must be analyzed to decide whether or not JSC should construct the facility. The results from analyzing the data collected indicate that a 200 kW facility would provide enough energy to meet 1% of JSC's energy demand. This facility would require less than 1 acre of land. In the map below, potential locations are shown in green. The solar power facility is projected to cost $2 M. So far, the information collected indicates that such a facility could be constructed. The next steps in this investigation include contacting JSC's energy provider, CenterPoint Energy, to discuss entering a partnership; developing a life cycle cost analysis to determine payback time; developing more detailed plans; and securing funding.

Nathan, Lakshmi↗

NASA NTRS2012

Life-Cycle Assessments of Selected NASA Ground-Based Test Facilities

In the past two years, two separate facility-specific life cycle assessments (LCAs) have been performed as summer student projects. The first project focused on 13 facilities managed by NASA s Aeronautics Test Program (ATP), an organization responsible for large, high-energy ground test facilities that accomplish the nation s most advanced aerospace research. A facility inventory was created for each facility, and the operational-phase carbon footprint and environmental impact were calculated. The largest impacts stemmed from electricity and natural gas used directly at the facility and to generate support processes such as compressed air and steam. However, in specialized facilities that use unique inputs like R-134a, R-14, jet fuels, or nitrogen gas, these sometimes had a considerable effect on the facility s overall environmental impact. The second LCA project was conducted on the NASA Ames Arc Jet Complex and also involved creating a facility inventory and calculating the carbon footprint and environmental impact. In addition, operational alternatives were analyzed for their effectiveness at reducing impact. Overall, the Arc Jet Complex impact is dominated by the natural-gas fired boiler producing steam on-site, but alternatives were provided that could reduce the impact of the boiler operation, some of which are already being implemented. The data and results provided by these LCA projects are beneficial to both the individual facilities and NASA as a whole; the results have already been used in a proposal to reduce carbon footprint at Ames Research Center. To help future life cycle projects, several lessons learned have been recommended as simple and effective infrastructure improvements to NASA, including better utility metering and data recording and standardization of modeling choices and methods. These studies also increased sensitivity to and appreciation for quantifying the impact of NASA s activities.

Sydnor, George Honeycutt↗

DOE OSTI2015

The transportation factor in site evaluations for spent nuclear fuel storage and disposal facilities - 15460

New facility siting studies will be necessary to fulfill the Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) on America's Nuclear Future 2012 recommendation to develop consolidated interim storage (CIS) for spent nuclear fuel in the next decade. Future site evaluations for used nuclear fuel (UNF) storage and disposal facilities must address transportation requirements, especially access to mainline railroads, early in the site selection process. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in 2013 proposed a strategy for managing spent nuclear fuel in accordance with the BRC recommendations by establishing a pilot interim storage facility by 2021 and a consolidated interim storage facility by 2025. The authors demonstrate that currently available geographic information systems and already adopted siting criteria (defining favorable and unfavorable conditions) allow the identification of the transportation portion of a storage facility siting process to begin without delay. Ready access to the mainline rail system is absolutely critical since existing rail access, or easily constructed access, is a highly favorable condition for successful siting. Despite widespread rail abandonments over the past three decades, vast areas of the United States retain mainline rail service or could connect to existing mainlines by building new rail spurs of less than 25-50 miles. This precondition for transportation planning is critical. Planners need to start with the beginning - availability of rail transportation to and from the interim storage facility/facilities. A second step in transportation screening would be to evaluate those potential site locations within 50 miles of existing mainline railroads using other appropriate variables. This effort could begin with the application of the 1984 repository siting guidelines for transportation (10 CFR 960.5-2-7)[1]. Repository surface facilities have essentially the same transportation requirements as storage facilities. The guidelines in 10 CFR 960 provide a readily available template for evaluating sites based on transportation risks, impacts and costs. Initial site screening, after considering proximity to mainline railroads as the precursory step, should evaluate: 1) proximity to highly populated areas; 2) proximity to interstate highways; 3) proximity to environmentally sensitive areas and lands protected by federal, state, or tribal governments; and 4) proximity to military installations, hazardous materials facilities, or other facilities that might impact transportation safety and security.Several challenges exist which prevent effective transportation planning. The diversity of canister and cask types and SNF characteristics and conditions, the increasingly limited rail access at the shipping sites and the ease with which public attention can be marshalled against a waste management program, all suggest that future efforts need to identify potential storage sites that reduce transportation impacts and costs by reducing near-site transportation construction and reduce total system transportation impacts. This can most easily be accomplished by reducing shipping distances in a process that is easily defined and implemented. The paper concludes that the DOE should develop a site screening and evaluation program with transportation as a central consideration. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2015

U.S. department of energy safety design strategy review and approval beyond critical decision 3 for the high-level waste facility - 15525

The Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) in Hanford, Washington, is the nation's largest environmental remediation construction project. In 2012, at the WTP's High-Level Waste (HLW) Facility, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection (ORP) restricted construction work at the Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility because of unresolved technical issues associated with the facility and of misalignment of the design and nuclear safety basis. By 2013, as additional issues were discovered, ORP limited HLW design and procurement activities. Addressing the technical issues and the misalignment of the design basis with the Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis (PDSA) is a priority for ORP. A proposal was developed to use the concept of a safety design strategy (SDS), as documented in DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process, as a planning mechanism to support facility design and PDSA alignment. The standard provides the processes to develop an SDS that will ensure safety is integrated into design early in the project, by the start of preliminary design. Ultimately, as design progresses, an SDS is intended to support development of the project's PDSA. However, in this unique case, the HLW Facility design and construction phase has progressed beyond Critical Decision 3 and DOE-STD-1189-2008 was issued in 2008; 6 years after ORP approved the first WTP PDSA. In July 2013, ORP and the contractor recognized that the unresolved technical issues and design - safety basis misalignment should be addressed through a renewed look at nuclear safety requirements, and agreed that developing an SDS tailored to the criteria in DOE-STD-1189-2008 provided the best path forward to better integrate design and safety. Development of the SDS for the HLW Facility was one of many goals ORP established in a plan that describes how ORP will determine whether, and under what conditions, the contractor should be authorized to proceed with production engineering, procurement, and construction activities for the HLW Facility. Over the next several months, the contractor developed the draft SDS, identifying design basis accidents and control strategies for those accidents. ORP monitored progress and, when appropriate, provided recommendations. In April 2014, the contractor provided a draft SDS to ORP for initial review by an independent DOE Review Team. The Review Team was comprised of representatives from nuclear safety, criticality safety, engineering, fire protection, the Office of Environmental Management, the Assistant Manager WTP, and the DOE Chief of Nuclear Safety. A unique draft document review and interactive review process, facilitated through work sessions and continuous communication with the contractor, culminated in the development of 147 technical comments on topics varying from SDS implementation to hydrogen deflagration in vessels. Comment resolution sought to improve project clarity, delineation of control strategies, and, holistically, facilitate integration of safety into design in the SDS, as it will guide the restart of the HLW Facility production engineering and limited procurement and construction activities. All comments were resolved in support of a contractor submission of the final SDS to ORP at the end of June 2014. Successful resolution of these comments was achieved by continuing the real-time response and incorporation interaction with the contractor to ensure that mutual objectives were satisfied. The response times were facilitated through telephone, E-mail, and a shared file server accessible to contractor and DOE reviewers across the DOE complex. As a measure of success of this process, the Safety Basis Approval Authority (ORP Manager) and the WTP Federal Project Director approved the SDS on August 1, 2014, with no conditions of approval. DOE and the contractor recognized that it would be difficult to implement the SDS without changes to the existing contractor's engineering and nuclear safety processes. Accordingly, the contractor developed or revised a significant number of engineering and nuclear safety plans and procedures to implement the SDS into the design process. Over the coming year, the contractor will conduct a gap analysis between the SDS and the presently approved PDSA to incorporate the design basis accidents and preferred control strategies developed from the SDS into the PDSA. In addition, ORP will conduct an assessment of the contractor's implementation of the SDS into the design process at the appropriate stage of implementation, within 6 to 12 months of approval. Although the SDS was developed late in the HLW project timeline, the document will facilitate alignment of design and the safety basis, and is a key step in the return to full production engineering for the HLW Facility. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2019

Investigation and Recovery Following the Drum Event at INL's ARP-V Facility - 19517

Contractors working under the Department of Energy's (DoE's) Idaho Field Office have been exhuming and processing buried legacy waste from early weapons development and productions operations since 1984. Since operations began, nearly 400,000 drums have passed through this process. On April 11, 2018, repackaged drums were staged in an airlock (radiological buffer area) awaiting transfer to another facility for characterization. Late in the evening after operations had ended, four of the drums over pressurized causing an energetic displacement of their lids. A significant fraction of drum contents was ejected and dispersed throughout the airlock. The event activated the fire detection system in the facility initiating an emergency response from the site fire department, radiological protection, and operations. Initial intervention by fire department personnel was unsuccessful at quenching the reaction, so the responders egressed to a safe distance and monitored the situation. After determining the event had terminated and it was safe to enter, the facility was assessed revealing significant contamination in the airlock from the ejected waste. The area surrounding the facility was surveyed and it was determined that no contamination was released outside the facility. The Fluor Idaho, LLC (Fluor Idaho) Program Manager commissioned an investigation and recovery effort, which focused on three aspects: (1) technical investigation, (2) event and causal analysis, and (3) facility recovery. A team of highly qualified individuals from around the DOE Complex was assembled to support the technical investigation. The team included representatives from several Fluor Idaho, Fluor Corporate, Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (INL), LANL, SRNL, South West Research Institute, DOE Carlsbad Field Office, and Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board, and DOE-Headquarters. This team addressed the reaction mechanism of the event by guiding the sampling activities and coordinating analysis and testing by the analytical laboratories. Independent and experienced investigators were brought in to conduct a rigorous event and cause analysis. The Causal Analysis Team pursued direct, root, and contributing causes. Interviews were conducted, and documents were reviewed to develop an event and causal analysis. The Accelerated Retrieval Project V Operations team mobilized to decontaminate and recover the facility. Significant progress has been made in this effort, area and airborne contamination levels have been significantly reduced allowing limited activities to resume. In addition, this group supported sample collection efforts as directed by the Technical Investigation Team. This paper reviews key findings and milestones from the technical investigation, the event and causal analysis, and facility recovery operations. From these elements of the investigation, lessons learned are identified that would benefit other organizations involved with legacy waste management and disposition. Waste management is common to all sites in the DOE Complex and the events and recovery efforts described in this paper may provide beneficial insights to these operations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2019

Technical Basis and Implementation of Groundwater Pathway Models Used for INL’s RH LLW Disposal Facility Performance Assessment

The Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL’s) Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RH LLW) Disposal Facility has been designed and constructed to receive waste generated on INL in support of the Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and Naval Reactors (NR) missions. RH LLW is generated on the INL site from spent nuclear fuel handling and operations at the Naval Reactors Facility (NRF), the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), and at the Material and Fuels Complex (MFC) in addition to other miscellaneous research activities. The facility has been designed to receive RH LLW currently in storage at INL facilities and new waste generated by nuclear research programs. RH LLW received at the facility is solid waste consisting of surface contaminated debris, ion exchange resins used to purify cooling water, and activated metals generated during reactor core change outs, Naval spent fuel management, and nuclear R&D. The facility has been designed to meet the requirements of DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management [1] for all-pathways including groundwater and air, radon emissions limits, and inadvertent intrusion limits. The facility design includes a vault system incorporating robust concrete vaults oriented vertically in close-packed arrays, a hydraulic drainage system designed to limit water contact with the stainless steel waste canisters/liners and concrete vaults, and a robust monitoring system. Per the environmental assessment (EA) [2], all waste will be disposed of in stainless steel waste canisters/liners. During facility design and construction, site-specific data was collected to provide laboratory and field scale performance characteristics for the concrete vault and hydraulic drainage systems. Field-scale infiltration tests were conducted and monitored and the data was interpreted using numerical simulation. Based on interpretation of the observed laboratory and field test data, the facility performance assessment (PA) was developed. The PA groundwater pathway source release model differentially credits release from surface contaminated debris, ion exchange resins, and activated metals. It also credits failure of the steel waste canisters/liners with failure rates based on actual corrosion data. Once released, transport through the vadose zone and aquifer to downgradient receptor locations was simulated in the PA using a one-dimensional modeling approach based on historical three-dimensional modeling of historically-contaminated INL sites. This paper provides an overview of the groundwater pathway source release models and their technical implementation in the PA. It also describes the one-dimensional transport model used for the vadose zone and multi-dimensional model used for the aquifer.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2019

Nuclear Criticality Safety Lessons Learned in the Design of the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex

The Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) is being built by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to replace aging uranium processes at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12 NSC) in Oak Ridge Tennessee. Specifically, the processes housed in building 9212 are being replaced as this facility dates to the World War II Manhattan Project days of Y-12. When the UPF Project is completed it will consist of three main facilities along with several support facilities. The Main Processing Building (MPB) will house oxide production and metal casting operations. The Salvage and Accountability Building (SAB) will house wet chemistry operations (examples include recovery evaporation and calcination of solutions). The Personnel Support Building will be connected to both the SAB and the MPB and will serve as a transition facility for materials and personnel between the two. The MPB will also be connected to the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Storage Facility (HEUMF) via a connector (HCON) to permit transfers from storage into UPF directly. This paper will summarize some of the more important lessons learned for the NCS practitioner working in a design environment rather than in a production or experimental environment. As the Chief NCS Engineer for the UPF Project I have been responsible for ensuring the technical evaluations produced on the project are high quality, technically accurate, and conform to the Y-12 NCS Program expectations. Ensuring nuclear criticality safety for processes that do not yet exist in reality is a challenge very different than that of ensuring subcriticality for processes in an operating facility. The biggest difference being that in design space – everything is imaginary whereas in the operating facility you have the benefit of being able to go out and look at the equipment and interview the operators. Ensuring that Nuclear Criticality Safety is integrated into design is a process that requires constant communication between the NCS staff and the broader engineering design team. Until the facility is constructed – nothing is physically stable and so rigorous documentation of decisions – to include any assumptions – is necessary to minimize errors. Non-NCS engineers will not understand the hazard or the physics of nuclear criticality. It is up to the NCS staff to provide training and communication to the team. The NCS staff must be patient and prepared to explain themselves many times and be as flexible as possible.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2016

Development of the Licensing Procedure and Regulatory Framework for the Spent Fuel Storage facility in Korea - 16423

The Public Engagement Commission on SNF management (PECOS) published the recommendation report on the spent fuel management of Korea in June, 2015. Based on this report, the future national policy for spent fuel management of Korea has been established, taking into consideration the national/international trends on policy and technology development. Regardless of the recommendation report of PECOS, Spent fuel storage casks are necessary in Korea. Therefore, various types of spent fuel storage casks are now being developed by Korea vendors. For example, Concrete storage casks and dual purpose metal casks are now under development by the KORAD (Korea Radioactive waste agency) for future use in the interim storage facility. Unfortunately, there is no independent licensing procedure for spent fuel storage casks in Nuclear Safety Act (NSA) because is the casks are considered an integral part of the interim storage facility safety equipment. Furthermore, the definition of radioactive waste in the NSA was changed recently. Now, spent fuel is separated from the definition of 'radioactive waste'. Spent fuel can only become radioactive waste by the decision through the meeting of the relative ministers of Korea government. For that reason, the licensing procedure for interim spent fuel storage facilities was separated from the current 'disposal facility, etc.' in accordance with the article 63 of NSA. The aim of this study is to develop the licensing procedure for the storage cask, and also to develop a revised draft of interim storage facility procedure within the NSA. Once this independent licensing procedure on the spent fuel storage cask is introduced to the NSA, it is expected that developers or operators can develop and commercialize the storage cask in Korea. In this study, an independent licensing procedure for the spent fuel storage facility was developed including the storage cask licensing procedure for the NSA. The procedure was composed of the permit for construction and operation of interim storage facility, criteria for permit, inspection criteria, periodic safety review, and decommissioning criteria, etc. The detailed contents of these requirements were also developed to introduce the regulatory framework for the interim storage facility. Particularly, periodic safety review and decommissioning criteria were developed in accordance with the recommendation of IRRS (International Regulatory Review Service) of IAEA. The developed licensing procedure for spent fuel storage facility will be introduced in NSA in response to the revised definition of NSA and the recommendation report of PECOS. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2018

Replacement of Melter 2 at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) - 18608

The original DWPF melter was replaced in 2002 with an identical unit, and radioactive operation of Melter 2 commenced in 2003. After nearly 14 years of service, a lower electrode failure of Melter 2 occurred in February 2017 which required its removal and replacement with Melter 3. The scope of the replacement outage involves several significant evolutions: - Shutdown of Melter 2 and placement into a safe state; - Remote external and internal inspection of Melter 2 to chronicle its condition prior to removal; - Disassembly and removal of Melter 2 from the process cell; - Placement of Melter 2 into a storage box and transport to a storage vault; - Preparation and initial testing of Melter 3 prior to transport to the DWPF; - Transport to the DWPF and installation of Melter 3 in the process cell; - Final startup testing and initiation of radioactive operation. Upon determination that repair of Melter 2 was not feasible, DWPF created an outage team to integrate schedules and resources needed to execute melter replacement as well as including maintenance scope for facility work that can only be performed when the melter is de-energized. The execution of this scope required integration with other mission critical outage activities already in progress, and planned to start, including initial facility tie-in scope for the new Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). This unplanned addition of the melter replacement scope to the existing outage scope resulted in the longest facility outage period since the initiation of radioactive operations at the DWPF in 1996. Successful completion of this scope across all Liquid Waste facilities would require balance - for schedules, resources, priority, funding, etc. To overcome the significant challenges created by this additional scope, a WAR Room was established to ensure adequate integration and coordination of critical resources, and daily progress. The execution of this scope has required the integration of nearly two dozen work groups across multiple facilities at Savannah River Site (SRS), in addition to support from nearly a dozen vendors. The melter replacement outage was executed with a high degree of disciplined operation to ensure the facility was ready to resume glass pouring operation in time to support restart of the Liquid Waste program at the Savannah River Site (SRS). This paper will provide a brief overview of Melter 2 operational history. The execution of the removal and replacement operations will be described with a specific focus on lessons learned and opportunities where the outage execution diverged from the original Melter 1 replacement outage. It is expected to be of interest to vitrification facilities, as well as facilities, which require remote maintenance and replacement of large process equipment. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2019

Decommissioning of obsolete Nuclear Facilities in the UJV Rez, a. s. - 19027

UJV Rez, a. s. (further also UJV) is a leading institution in all areas of nuclear R and D in the Czech Republic and has had a dominant position in the nuclear program since it was established in 1955 as the Nuclear Research Institute Rez. The activities of UJV encompass nuclear physics, chemistry, nuclear power and many other topics. The main issues addressed at UJV in past decades have included research, development and services for NPPs, the fuel cycle and irradiation services for research and development in the industrial sector and medicine. UJV also manages most institutional radioactive wastes (RAW) produced in the Czech Republic (approx. 90 %). After more than 60 years of activities of the UJV in the nuclear field, there were obsolete nuclear facilities to be decommissioned. Decommissioning of nuclear facilities UJV is the only ongoing decommissioning project in the Czech Republic. Preparations for decommissioning began in 1996. Safety analysis report (SAR) was performed comprising the identification and characterization of potential sources of risk, potentially exposed receptors and exposure pathways, potential chemical compounds, radionuclides and media of concern. The results of the SAR enabled to determine the priorities of the decommissioning, the decommissioning the expenses and as well as project implementation. The decommissioning project was revised on the base of information obtained during decommissioning. The decommissioning was divided into two phases according to the level of risk and the financing limitations. The Ministry of Finance significantly financially contributed the decommissioning, although the UJV also contributed a considerable amount. Overall cost is close to the amount of Eur 27 million. Decommissioning started in 2003 and will be finished in 2018. Almost all facilities have already been successfully decommissioned. In the following table, the status of decommissioning of facilities is described. 1) Reloading site for RAW storage (Building 211/6): last item in progress 2003 - 2018; 2) Special Sewage System: decommissioned 2004 - 2005, reused; 3) Liquid RAW storage tanks (Building 211/3): decontaminated 2004 - 2013, reused; 4) Technology for RAW treatment (Building 241): decommissioned 2003 - 2011; 5) Contaminated equipment (Building 250): decommissioned 2003 - 2016; 6) Systems for storage of sealed sources (Building 261); decommissioned 2003 - 2005; 7) Decay tanks (Building 211/5); decommissioned 2003 - 2014, reused; 8) Old bituminating unit (Building 211/3); decommissioned 2004 - 2008; 9) Surface RAW storage site; decommissioned 2009 - 2014. Later, other unused decommissioning facilities, which were not included in the decommissioning project financed by the state, were included. These facilities are continuously decommissioned and financed from own resources of UJV. These facilities are like facilities already decommissioned: radiochemical laboratories, (including glove boxes), liquid RW storage tanks (including sewage systems), liquid RW treatment technology, hot cells, accumulated RW, etc. Realization started 2016 and expected duration is till 2026. Estimated budget is approximately Eur 17 million. The decommissioning of nuclear facilities in UJV is being carried out on the high level of radiation protection and up to now there was no extraordinary event or accident, although some challenges we were forced to address. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2019

Technical Basis and Implementation of Groundwater Pathway Models Used for INL's RH LLW Disposal Facility Performance Assessment - 19440

The Idaho National Laboratory's (INL's) Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RH LLW) Disposal Facility has been designed and constructed to receive waste generated by INL in support of the Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and Naval Reactors (NR) missions. RH LLW is generated on the INL site from spent nuclear fuel handling and operations at the Naval Reactors Facility (NRF), the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), and at the Material and Fuels Complex (MFC) in addition to other miscellaneous research activities. The facility has been designed to receive RH LLW currently in storage at INL facilities and new waste generated by nuclear research programs. RH LLW received at the facility is solid waste consisting of surface contaminated materials, ion exchange resins used to purify cooling water, and activated metals generated during reactor core change outs, Naval spent fuel management, and nuclear R and D. The facility has been designed to meet the requirements of DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management for all-pathways including groundwater and air, radon emissions limits, and inadvertent intrusion limits. The facility design includes a vault system incorporating robust concrete vaults oriented vertically in close-packed arrays, a hydraulic drainage system designed to limit water contact with the stainless steel waste canisters and concrete vaults, and a robust monitoring system. Per the environmental assessment (EA), all waste will be disposed of in stainless steel waste canisters. During facility design and construction, site-specific data was collected to provide laboratory and field scale performance characteristics for the concrete vault and hydraulic drainage systems. Field-scale infiltration tests were conducted and monitoring data was interpreted using numerical simulation. Based on interpretation of the observed laboratory and field test data, the facility performance assessment (PA) was developed. The PA groundwater pathway source release model differentially credits release from surface contaminated waste, ion exchange resins, and activated metals. It also credits steel waste canisters with failure rates based on actual corrosion data. Once released, radionuclide transport through the vadose zone and aquifer to downgradient receptor locations was simulated in the PA using a one-dimensional modeling approach based on three-dimensional modeling of historically-contaminated INL sites. This paper provides an overview of the groundwater pathway source release models and their technical implementation in the PA. It also describes the one-dimensional transport model used for the vadose zone and multi-dimensional model used for the aquifer. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2016

Clemson University Wind Turbine Drivetrain Test Facility

In November of 2009, Clemson University was awarded a competitive grant from the U.S. Department of Energy to design, build and operate a facility for full-scale, highly accelerated mechanical testing of next-generation wind turbine drivetrain technologies. The primary goal of the project was to design, construct, commission, and operate a state-of-the-art sustainable facility that permits full-scale highly accelerated testing of advanced drivetrain systems for large wind turbines. The secondary goal was to meet the objectives of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, especially in job creation, and provide a positive impact on economically distressed areas in the United States, and preservation and economic recovery in an expeditious manner. The project was executed according to a managed cooperative agreement with the Department of Energy and was an extraordinary success. The resultant new facility is located in North Charleston, SC, providing easy transportation access by rail, road or ship and operates on an open access model such that it is available to the U.S. Wind Industry for research, analysis, and evaluation activities. The 72 m by 97 m facility features two mechanical dynamometer test bays for evaluating the torque and blade dynamic forces experienced by the rotors of wind turbine drivetrains. The dynamometers are rated at 7.5 MW and 15 MW of low speed shaft power and are configured as independent test areas capable of simultaneous operation. All six degrees of freedom, three linear and three rotational, for blade and rotor dynamics are replicated through the combination of a drive motor, speed reduction gearbox and a controllable hydraulic load application unit (LAU). This new LAU setup readily supports accelerated lifetime mechanical testing and load analysis for the entire drivetrain system of the nacelle and easily simulates a wide variety of realistic operating scenarios in a controlled laboratory environment. The development of these two dynamometer test rigs is the first significant achievement for the project. These test rigs embody a new manner of test due to the system configuration and completely new design with a free floating loading hub in the LAU. This project provided the catalyst for the advancement to this new test rig configuration that has been adopted by every significant wind turbine test rig constructed since the inception of this project. There are currently two different vendors supplying these new systems. Catalyzing this new design is the second major success of the project. With the increased market penetration of wind energy over the past decade, many regions and countries have developed specific electrical grid specifications and performance codes for large wind farms to ensure operational reliability and stability. These grid codes provide requirements for interconnection with the grid during low or high voltage phenomena, typically encountered during and after system fault events. Given the installed infrastructure of the Wind Turbine Drivetrain Testing Facility (WTDTF), a natural expansion of facility capability was to include the necessary equipment for performing fault ride-through evaluations of wind turbines to the Low Voltage Ride Through (LVRT) codes. Once the decision was made to expand the scope of the original grant into fault ride-through testing, it was clear that there are several markets, not just wind, which could benefit from this type of test and that simple fault ride-through testing could be extended into a broader scope of electrical testing capabilities. It was at this point that Clemson University was awarded a second grant to build a 15 MW Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) Grid Simulator in order to establish world class electrical testing capabilities to compliment the mechanical testing at the WTDTF. This third significant achievement resulted in the 15 MW HIL Grid Simulator as the corner stone of the Duke Energy eGRID Center and is collocated with the WTDTF in the SCE&G Energy Innovation Center at the new Facility in North Charleston, SC, USA. Before the eGRID was completed, it was recognized that the ability to test solar farm equipment was but a small step away thru the addition of enhanced equipment to provide for DC testing. In yet another expansion/success, a 2.5 MW rectifier system was designed and implemented by Clemson staff to enhance the Center’s capabilities. The program required over 250,000 man-hours of on-site construction labor reworking the brownfield facility on the former Navy Base, clearly satisfying one of the major goals of the Reinvestment Act. This was done while winning numerous awards for design and construction of the facility, including the Top US Project for 2014 from the Trade Journal Engineering News Record. The project was a major collaborative developmental activity managed by Clemson University staff that involved the DOE and many partners and organizations.

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