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At least 361 records · Page 20

Cybersecurity Baselines for Electric Distribution Systems and DER

The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) has partnered with the Department of Energy (DOE) to develop a set of cybersecurity baselines for electric distribution systems and the distributed energy resources (DERs) that connect to them. Cybersecurity is an integral underpinning of power system resilience, and this initiative builds on work that states have undertaken over the last decade to mitigate cybersecurity risk across their critical infrastructures.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cybersecurity Standards for Distributed Energy Resources: Gaps and Harmonization Strategy

This report examines cybersecurity standards for Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) in light of their rapid growth and increasing integration into energy systems. It identifies critical gaps in existing frameworks, including inadequate coverage of DER-specific challenges, complexities in implementing comprehensive standards, integration issues with legacy systems, adoption hurdles for newer standards, and a lack of harmonization across regulatory landscapes. The analysis highlights vulnerabilities such as data integrity risks, unauthorized device control, and denial-of-service attacks across various DER technologies like solar PV, wind turbines, energy storage systems, and hydrogen fuel cells. The report proposes a harmonization strategy to address these deficiencies by developing unified cybersecurity requirements, certification programs, and training resources while fostering collaboration among stakeholders such as government agencies, industry groups, DER operators, manufacturers, and research institutions. A phased roadmap is outlined to refine and implement these measures through pilot testing and widespread adoption. Ultimately, the report underscores the urgent need for coordinated efforts to enhance DER cybersecurity and ensure the reliable operation of future energy systems.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Technical Guide for Implementing Cybersecurity Continuous Monitoring in the Nuclear Industry

A technical guide to assist the nuclear industry in implementing cybersecurity continuous monitoring program. The guide walks through the steps to develop a cybersecurity continuous monitoring program and provides details relative to the nuclear industry. It also includes a series of examples of optional metrics to be used, and technologies that can be useful when implementing a continuous monitoring program.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Interdisciplinary Approaches to Cyber-vulnerability Impact Assessment for Energy Critical Infrastructure

As energy infrastructure becomes more interconnected, understanding cybersecurity risks to production systems requires integrating operational and computer security knowledge. We interviewed 18 experts working in the field of energy critical infrastructure to compare what information they find necessary to assess the impact of computer vulnerabilities on energy operational technology. These experts came from two groups: 1) computer security experts and 2) energy sector operations experts. We find that both groups responded similarly for general categories of information and displayed knowledge about both domains, perhaps due to their interdisciplinary work at the same organization. Yet, we found notable differences in the details of their responses and in their stated perceptions of each group’s approaches to impact assessment. Their suggestions for collaboration across domains highlighted how these two groups can work together to help each other secure the energy grid. Our findings inform the development of interdisciplinary security approaches in critical-infrastructure contexts.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE Fffice of Nuclear Energy cybersecurity research, development and demonstration program plan

This document describes the Cybersecurity Research Development and Demonstration (RD&D) Program, established by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) to provide sciencebased methods and technologies necessary for cost-effective, cyber-secure digital instrumentation, control and communication in collaboration with nuclear energy stakeholders. It provides an overview of program goals, objectives, linkages to organizational strategies, management structure, and stakeholder and cross-program interfaces.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Pressurizer dynamic model and emulated programmable logic controllers for nuclear power plants cybersecurity investigations

This work demonstrates the functionality of the pressurizer using a fast-running three regions, non-equilibrium model and control programs of emulated PLCs. The state variables from an integrated model of primary loop in a representative PWR plant are communicated to the pressurizer’s emulated PLCs using a synchronized data transfer function. In turn, the PLCs communicate back instructions to the pressurizer model to adjust the pressure and water level to remain within preprogramed setpoints. Pressurizer model simultaneously solves the coupled mass and energy conservation equations in the saturated vapor and saturated and subcooled liquid regions using fixed step solver. Results demonstrate the response of the pressurizer model linked to an emulated pressure and water level PLCs in a simulated transient involving surge-in and surge-out events. The 50 ms response delay time for the emulated PLC insignificantly affects operation and predictions of the pressurizer model.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Critical Roles of Information, Analysis, Research, and Operations in the Cyber Realm

PNNL has developed an adaptive cyber integration framework (ACIF) to facilitate the timely sharing of cyber threat information along with the advancement of situational awareness tools to enhance protection against and respond to critical infrastructure cybersecurity threats. The ACIF comprises components implemented iteratively to achieve research and mission goals. The ACIF components include data generation technologies, analytic tools development and maturation, data enrichment and fusion, trust building with stakeholders, investigative research, analytic rigor, production, and dissemination. Each component, its importance to the ACIF, and how they can be adopted and applied across other information-sharing sectors and domains are discussed in this paper.

Cyber Threat Intelligence, Cyber Security, Data En↗

PCAP Anonymizer

Explore the source record for details and available documents.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Assessment of Condition Monitoring Methods and Technologies for Inservice Inspection and Testing of Nuclear Power Plant Components

This report was prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to explore the application of advanced technologies toward meeting the current and future regulatory requirements for maintenance and condition monitoring of structures, systems, and components. The advanced technologies considered in this work are advanced sensors and instrumentation, data analytics, machine learning and artificial intelligence (ML/AI), physics-based models, and digital twins (DT). The interest in the application of advanced technologies for condition monitoring in nuclear power plants continues to grow, and current and future licensees are expected to implement advanced technologies as part of their inservice inspection (ISI) and inservice testing (IST) programs. This report delineates the outcomes of an exploratory investigation into the implementation of advanced condition monitoring technologies to address ISI and IST requirements. A thorough review was conducted of the existing regulatory requirements for ISI and IST, along with an analysis of associated industry practices. Additionally, a state-of-the-art assessment was performed on advanced condition monitoring technologies frequently employed in non-nuclear sectors. This research incorporated two nuclear-specific case studies to illustrate the application of these technologies within the current nuclear fleet. The report provides an exhaustive discussion on the technical challenges, considerations, and opportunities associated with the deployment of advanced condition monitoring technologies. The following are key considerations in the application of advanced technologies for the ISI and IST of nuclear power plant components: • Developing adequate verification and validation procedures to confirm the functional and non-functional requirements, • Developing technical capabilities to conduct real-time asset condition monitoring, • Establishing guidance and protocol for modeling and simulation tools to continuously meet regulatory requirements, • Addressing trustworthiness, explainability, and interpretability of ML/AI methods, • Evaluating maintenance activities to maintain an adequate safety margin and avoid undesirable conditions, • Establishing cybersecure condition monitoring programs associated with a computer-based software system, and • Establishing standardized evaluation metrics for advanced condition monitoring programs. Interest in the use of advanced technologies for condition monitoring in ISI and IST programs continues to grow, and the technology is expected to experience rapid and wide industry adoption in the near future. Adoption of advanced technologies for condition monitoring could have novel and unique impacts on regulatory activities associated with ISI and IST programs. The NRC is continuing to explore the regulatory aspects of advanced technologies as part of ISI and IST programs by pursuing additional research in this technical area.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Accelerating Next-Generation Cybersecurity R&D Using AI Workflows: BADGER Project Development

The Broadband Automation for Distributed Grid Efficiency and Resilience (BADGER) project aligns with national strategic priorities for integrating emerging wireless technologies and advancing AI-driven security. As critical infrastructure modernizes toward increasingly software-defined and interconnected systems, the ability to leverage 5G/NextG networks and AI-enabled control becomes essential. This report outlines work at the National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) to develop a NextG-native security architecture powered by AI-RAN concepts and evaluate workflows that enable efficient and reliable architectures. Together, these efforts position the laboratory to accelerate innovation while directly supporting national security and resilience objectives.

5G/6G↗

Energy Sector Position, Navigation, and Time Cybersecurity Profile

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has developed this positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) profile for the Energy Sector at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy. The Department of Energy is the sector-specific agency for the Energy Sector and is responsible for providing guidance in the form of this PNT Profile, per Executive Order 13905, Strengthening National Resilience Through Responsible Use of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Services (Executive Office of the President 2020) issued February 18, 2020. Executive Order 13905 directed the National Institute of Standards & Technology to develop a PNT Profile that is broadly applicable to all sectors and to serve as a foundation for sector-neutral guidance, NISTIR 8323 Foundational PNT Profile: Applying the Cybersecurity Framework for the Responsible Use of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Services. This document builds on NISTIR 8323 to identify and serve as the required Energy Sector specific guidance. For purposes of this PNT Profile, Energy Sector precise time is 0.5 µs (microseconds) to 1 µs accuracy. Currently, the electricity subsector has systems that use this level of precision time, but the oil and natural gas subsector currently does not. While the electricity subsector uses precision timing, it does not use positioning and/or navigation at this level of accuracy. For this reason, this PNT Profile will focus on only precise time for the electricity subsector.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Designing resilient IoT and Edge Computing with federated tinyML

The rapid growth of the Internet of Things (IoT) and Edge Computing (EC) has brought significant conveniences to modern society but has also greatly expanded the cyber attack surfaces, particularly as these technologies are being increasingly integrated into critical systems such as power grids, healthcare, and smart homes. Here, to improve IoT/EC’s cybersecurity posture, we leveraged Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) by employing tinyML to monitor voluminous IoT data for cyber threats while addressing devices’ resource constraints, and utilizing Federated Learning (FL) to share local detection knowledge across the system while preserving privacy. Building on our three-layer architecture combining tinyML and FL to enhance autonomous cyber attack detection, this paper demonstrated that the architecture improves detection accuracy, reduces resource consumption, and enables lightweight, secure IoT device monitoring. These results were validated using the public N-BaIoT dataset as well as real IoT network traffic data collected under multiple attack scenarios from our testbeds. Additionally, we introduced an enhanced FL methodology with a novel preprocessing stage, including federated feature selection and global preprocessor construction, to address IoT/EC data heterogeneity. We developed a physical IoT testbed for attack simulations and data collection, implemented a tinyML-powered detector for realistic model validation, and also built a virtual testbed for scalable evaluations of FL models across diverse network environments.

Cognitive cyber↗

Networked Microgrid Cybersecurity Architecture Design Guide: A New Jersey TRANSITGRID Use Case

Microgrids require reliable communication systems for equipment control, power delivery optimization, and operational visibility. To maintain secure communications, Microgrid Operational Technology (OT) networks must be defensible and cyber-resilient. The communication network must be carefully architected with appropriate cyber-hardening technologies to provide security defenders the data, analytics, and response capabilities to quickly mitigate malicious and accidental cyberattacks. In this work, we outline several best practices and technologies that can support microgrid operations (e.g., intrusion detection and monitoring systems, response tools, etc.). Then we apply these recommendations to the New Jersey TRANSITGRID use case to demonstrate how they would be deployed in practice.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Autonomous Tools for Attack Surface Reduction (Final Report)

The electric power grid is a complex critical infrastructure that forms the lifeline of modern society, and its secure and reliable operation is of paramount importance to national security and economic wellbeing. However, recent findings documented in authoritative sources indicate the threat of cyber-based attacks growing in numbers and sophistication. However, securing the grid against stealthy cyberattacks is a challenging task due to legacy nature of the infrastructure coupled with dynamic nature of threat landscape and ever-growing sophistication of the adversaries. Additionally, the grid’s attack surface continues to grow with the increased dependence on digital communications and control that now extends to each consumer through smart meters and distributed energy resources. Unfortunately, this expansive surface increases the grid’s vulnerability and further exposes critical control systems in both substations and control centers. To respond to this emerging need, we had successfully assembled an interdisciplinary team with academic- industry partnership to successfully conduct research, development, evaluation, demonstration, and commercialization of attack surface reduction tools, whose goal was to significantly reduce the cyber attack surface in the North American power grid. Our proposed project was a synergistic collaborative effort leveraging the synergistic expertise of the team members across power systems, cyber security and CPS security, testbeds, field deployments and demonstration, and successful commercialization. The following are the specific tasks that have been successfully completed two phases (2016-2020). Phase I: Task 1: Developed and implemented a robust Project Management and Data Management Plan, coupled with a well thought out Risk Mitigation Plan. Task 2.1: Developed a comprehensive framework that continually assesses and autonomously reduces the attack surface for the power grid control environment spanning across substations, control center and the SCADA network to significantly reduce the risks of cyber attacks. Task 2.2: Developed attack surface analysis techniques, metrics, and tools that assess the attack surface at multiple levels including the control center, substations, and the SCADA network. Task 2.3: Developed attack surface reduction techniques and tools that dynamically reduce attack surface and hence increase attacker’s cost without interfering in the critical functions of the system. Task 2.4: Prototyped, implemented, and quantitatively evaluated/validated the techniques and tools on a realistic industrial CPS security testbed environment by leveraging the unique resources of the team. Task 3: Developed Commercialization plan to transition the developed tools into power system industry stakeholders for a broader adoption by leveraging the expertise of our industrial members. Phase II: Task 4: Successfully completed field demonstration, verification, and evaluation of the effectiveness of the attack surface analysis and reduction techniques on a realistic utility testbed environment. This also involved the development of realistic scenarios, sound metrics, data sets, evaluation criteria, and documentation. Technology integration & Field demonstration: The project had significantly advanced the state-of-the-art research and practice in improving the cybersecurity of our nation’s power grid infrastructure against cyber threats. In particular, the proposed, designed, and deployed attack surface analysis and reduction algorithms and tools have contributed to significantly reducing the exposure and risk of the devices, substations, and the integrated SCADA/EMS/ DMS grid environment to cyber threat. Strong demonstration and evaluation techniques have verified the feasibility of the developed techniques on realistic cyber-physical testbeds and utility partner's real grid environment, and collaborative research and evaluation of attack surface reduction techniques (for wide-are monitoring and control) within a vendor (GE) EMS platform. The Attack Host Analyzer (AHA) tool that was developed through this project was made available through GitHub.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Automation of Vulnerability and Patch Management: Information Extraction, Association, and Optimization

Vulnerability and patch management is an integral part of a robust cybersecurity program, yet it grows increasingly complex due to the sheer amount of data that must be analyzed. Particularly in Operational Technology (OT) environments, analysis must be done manually because of the lack of automated solutions. Additionally, there are many steps in this process, from the initial discovery of the vulnerability to the implementation of its remediation, and each step in the process requires different data in order to be performed effectively. In this work, we provide approaches and strategies to assist operators in industrial or OT environments throughout the vulnerability management cycle. Security advisories provide key information about mitigation strategies, or actions that can be taken when a patch is unavailable or cannot be installed. Details of these strategies are not shared in public vulnerability databases and must be found manually. We approach this problem by designing a solution to automatically identify that information within vendor security advisories and retrieve it for operator use. We start with an approach that requires domain-specific knowledge of certain frequently-seen reference websites. Next, an approach that can work on an arbitrary website but relies on certain keywords. Finally, an approach that uses Natural Language Processing (NLP) methods and does not require specific knowledge or keywords. Each of these approaches is more general than its predecessor; we demonstrate high accuracy for all approaches Advisories also often contain details of affected products in non-standard or natural language formats. While this information can be easily understood when read by an operator, the non-standard format acts as a barrier to effective automation. We provide an approach for the first step in this process: identifying vendors in security advisories and mapping them to a standard framework for representing digital assets and software products. We evaluate five established string similarity algorithms, plus one of our own design that combines string similarity and information theory, on the task of mapping vendors to their corresponding entries in the Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) repository. Our results show that our proposed metric outperforms all others. Due to the constraints on time, finances, and personnel for organizations, Large Language Models (LLMs) may seem like attractive opportunities for security operators to speed up information gathering; however, it is still not clear whether LLMs can handle vulnerability management tasks well. To answer this question, we perform an empirical study of LLMs’ ability to provide consistent, accurate information about vulnerabilities in order to guide organizations in their adoption of LLMs. We observe poor performance for all models tested, suggesting that these models are not well-suited to the consistent retrieval of accurate vulnerability information. Finally, once vulnerabilities have been identified and any additional information has been obtained, operators must decide which remediation actions to implement based on their available resources. This already-complex problem becomes even more so when we consider that a vulnerability may have multiple avenues for remediation. We formulate this scenario as two knapsack problems and provide solutions, which we then compare against several existing strategies for vulnerability prioritization seen in real operational environments.

McClanahan, Kylie↗

ARIES Annual Report FY25

Advanced Research on Integrated Energy Systems (ARIES) at the National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) is the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) test bed for energy system demonstration and de-risking. ARIES comprises the largest collection of physical and digital assets in the DOE laboratory complex, supporting flexible configuration across a broad range of energy scenarios. In Fiscal Year 2025, ARIES provided a platform for system-level research to anticipate and address future energy needs in energy security, system reliability, and technology deployment.

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Developing a Cybersecurity Architecture for Extensible Traffic Management (xTM)

This paper explores the development of a cybersecurity architecture tailored for Extensible Traffic Management (xTM) to address emerging challenges in managing diverse aerial vehicles within the National Airspace System (NAS). Driven by technological advances and the rise of uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), urban air mobility (UAM), and high-altitude traffic (ETM), the NAS is undergoing a paradigm shift. Traditional air traffic management, reliant on traditional Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) control, will give way to decentralized coordination among autonomous and semi-autonomous systems. The proposed xTM Security Architecture, designed as a high-level framework, focuses on ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data and operations in this evolving ecosystem. Utilizing threat modeling, the research identifies potential risks across key flight phases, operations and use cases to offer security control recommendations. Key objectives include analyzing interactions between novel airspace entrants and existing NAS traffic, cataloging vulnerabilities, and developing mitigative strategies to ensure safety, operational stability, and secure data exchanges. This research lays the groundwork for regulatory and industry adaptation, providing critical insights into managing cybersecurity risks in this complex, multi-domain environment.

UAM↗