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FX Hg Fogging Fixative Deployment for Mercury Vapor Suppression - 20410

Idaho National Laboratory's (INL) FX Hg fixative solution was deployed at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee to support disposal of mercury-contaminated metal debris. The fixative was dispensed via fogging. Fogging infiltrates non-line-of-sight areas improving fixative coating on complex geometries such as debris piles. FX Hg is the mercury vapor controlling derivative of INL's FX2 fixative. FX2 was jointly developed with the National Nuclear Laboratory of the United Kingdom, and INL developed the FX Hg derivative to suppress mercury vapor generation. The Y-12 deployment was performed in concert with UCOR (URS CH2M Oak Ridge), the cleanup contractor for Y-12. A dumpster filled with debris was fogged with FX Hg. The debris was acceptable as municipal landfill waste, save for the mercury vapor levels measured. If the mercury vapor generation rate could be sufficiently reduced, disposal costs for this waste would be dramatically reduced. FX Hg had previously proven effective at significantly reducing mercury vapor generation rates in bench scale testing at INL. This deployment was the first field-scale deployment of the method. Efficacy results were underwhelming, but interpretation of the outcome is complicated by a paucity of hard data. Methods for improving data capture and analysis are analyzed. Operational difficulties associated with scaling up the process and process improvements for future deployments are discussed. (authors)

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Accelerating Nuclear Facility Mission Completion Through an Improved Chemical Hazard Control Strategy - 20460

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management [1], explicitly identifies hazardous materials in addition to radioactive materials when establishing the scope of materials that must be evaluated in Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. This inclusion has led to a near decade-long progression of more and more rigorous application of chemical hazard controls in these facilities. The progressive addition of more rigorous chemical hazard controls has occurred across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex, having been driven by contractors and regulators alike. However, chemical hazards in other DOE facilities have been, and continue to be, controlled using traditional industrial safety centered strategies. Thus, identical chemical hazards are controlled using dramatically different approaches based solely on the facility type. Not only are the controls different, the analysis and derivation rigor and requirements are also significantly different. In particular, chemical control derivation and application in non-nuclear facilities are much less onerous than the comprehensive hazard analysis process used in nuclear facilities, even in circumstances in which chemicals are not initiators to, or do not exacerbate a nuclear event. While the derivation and control approaches used in these two types of facilities are disparate, the safety results are similarly effective based on a review of reported chemical events from 2014 through 2018. While both approaches achieve comparable safety outcomes, the approach used in nuclear facilities results in significantly greater preparation costs and implementation costs. Furthermore, the problem with the differing approach is not relegated to the control preparation and implementation burden. The operational impact of potentially unnecessary controls slows mission completion without a corresponding increase in safety, not to mention the dilution of the importance of Technical Safety Requirements. The proposed solution must first include a critical and thorough examination of DOE Complex and top-tier chemical industry chemical hazard control practices, coupled with a similar examination of the driving facility regulatory requirements. Results from the examination can then be used to fuel a bold departure from current chemical control practices in Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. Development of an improved and consistent chemical hazard control process would follow, one that continues to ensure safety while accelerating mission completion and significantly reducing the burden associated with chemical hazard control development and implementation. The improved process must establish a hierarchy where radiological hazards are addressed using safety class and safety significant controls and chemical hazards are addressed using overarching safety management programs (with limited unique exceptions). The improved Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy, while compliant with 10 CFR 830 [1], would be founded on the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program [2], and the complementary DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System [3]. In this way, the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy would, wherever appropriate, be the same process used at other DOE Complex facilities. Ultimately, the improved process will maintain safety and significantly reduce costs and life cycle risk through faster mission completion. (authors)

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D and D Research on KM-IT Platform - 20494

The Knowledge Management Information Tool (KM-IT) is a web-based system developed to maintain and preserve the Department of Energy's (DoE's) knowledge base. The system was developed by Florida International University's Applied Research Center (FIU-ARC) with the support of the D and D community including the DOE Office of Environmental Management, and with the collaboration and support of the DoE's Energy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG) and the former ALARA Centers at Hanford and Savannah. The KM-IT system is a community driven system tailored to serve the technical issues faced by the workforce across the DOE Complex. This KM-IT web-based interactive system is operational and available for use at www.dndkm.org and is currently comprised of the following modules: Web Crawler, Hotline, Technology, Hanford's ALARA Center Reports, Specialist Directory, Lessons Learned, Best Practices, Video/Picture Library, Vendors and Industry News. The Web Crawler dynamically searches through the KM-IT repository as well as the web and displays search results based on the search criteria. The Hotline allows registered users to post questions/problems related to D and D and to receive solutions from a subject-matter specialist. The Technology module serves as repository of D and D technologies and contains technology/ demonstration fact sheets and vendor information. D and D community members can add Lessons Learned, Best Practices, and Pictures/Videos to the D and D repository, after a formal approval process. The Vendor module provides a directory of commercial vendors who provide D and D related technologies, supplies, and services. KM-IT makes an excellent use of the knowledge that exists within the D and D community by allowing D and D project managers around the DOE complex to collaborate by sharing innovative ideas, past experiences, and practices and by maintaining a directory of subject matter specialists. FIU has developed the dedicated module on KM-IT platform to publish D and D research being performed at FIU. This module highlights current EM research efforts and activities in support of D and D being performed at FIU/SRNL associated with fixatives and intumescent products. FIU will expand this module to include the recent and current D and D research being performed across multiple DOE EM sites, national labs and universities. FIU will collaborate with SRNL, INL, ANL and other universities to explore and publish D and D research activities on KM-IT. As a result, the user community will have a centralized location to review new D and D related research across the DOE EM complex. (authors)

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Lessons Learned from Demolition of Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant - 20507

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC), a Jacobs owned company, is making significant progress demolishing the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), which has long been known as one of the most hazardous buildings in the DOE Environmental Management Complex (DOE Complex). The facility is located on the Hanford Site and produced plutonium metal during the Cold War. Production was stopped in 1989, the facility was formally shut down in 1996, and material processing was completed in 2004. After approximately 25 years of demolition preparations, open-air demolition of the main portions of the Hazard Category II nuclear facility began in November 2016. To prepare the PFP for demolition, CHPRC employees performed some of the most hazardous work across the DOE Complex. In addition to extensive demolition preparations, including a wide-reaching communication strategy across the Hanford Site, CHPRC implemented robust controls and monitoring during demolition, and when necessary, adjusted demolition practices and sequence to maintain employee safety and project efficiency. Demolition of the main PFP building began in November 2016. The technical complexity, high hazards and radiological concerns have all led to a difficult demolition environment. Following a spread of contamination at the project site beyond the radiological boundaries in December 2017, work was halted and a recovery plan was generated to allow the demolition work to continue. After the implementation of additional controls and concurrence from regulatory agencies and DOE, the demolition was ready to resume work and reinitiated in August 2018. There are a number of lessons learned from the demolition activities and recovery plan process. This paper allows CHPRC and DoE's Richland Operations Office (RL) to share lessons learned and progress to date with other challenging and hazardous projects across the DOE Complex. Understanding the risk acceptance level is critical to execution of any open-air demolition project and is unique to each facility. Four key lessons learned from this project include: 1) plan execution issues, 2) stakeholder communication issues, 3) watching for summit fever and 4) minimizing exposed contaminated surfaces during demolition. (authors)

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Lessons Learned from Hanford's Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project - 20509

In 2019, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) completed structurally stabilizing the Plutonium Uranium Extraction Plant (Purex) waste storage Tunnel 2 with engineered grout. This action significantly reduced risk to Hanford workers, the surrounding community and environment by preventing future collapse of the tunnel and possible release of radioactive materials. Decades of plutonium production at the Purex facility required construction of two large underground tunnels for storage of highly contaminated plutonium processing equipment that had failed during the operation of Purex and other facilities across the Hanford Site. Following the partial collapse of Purex Tunnel 1 on May 9, 2017, DOE and CHPRC took immediate action to safely stabilize the collapsed section of the tunnel. The hole in the tunnel was filled the next day as a temporary stabilization measure, and no contamination was detected as a result of the partial collapse of the tunnel. Workers then stabilized Tunnel 1 in its entirety by filling with engineered grout, which also encapsulated the radioactive equipment and railcars within the tunnel. Grouting eliminated the risk of further collapse and stabilized the tunnel contents, all while not precluding future remedial actions or final closure decisions. While conducting an integrity analysis of Tunnel 1 by using construction drawings, photos and other historical documents, project teams also analyzed the much larger Purex Tunnel 2. The analysis found Tunnel 2 did not meet current codes for structural integrity, and it may not be able to bear the weight of the soil above the tunnel. Therefore, it was determined that Tunnel 2 was also at risk of collapse. DoE's independent panel of experts determined grouting to be the best choice for stabilizing Tunnel 2 because it provides the highest level of stability and protection, and does not preclude future remedial actions. DOE authorized CHPRC to commence work and the Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project was launched in December of 2017. The paper will discuss the process of recognizing the following critical aspects and risks associated with stabilizing Tunnel 2, and the actions taken by the project team to mitigate these risks, including: - Tunnel investigation and data collection to assist with future remediation; - On-site batching and mock-ups to provide the large quantity of grout required for stabilizing the tunnel; - Workforce involvement and innovative actions that mitigated the project's most significant potential hazards, including traffic control; - Project team high level of execution translated into successful project execution. Sharing lessons learned from this critical risk-reduction effort can enhance the safety and efficiency of other complex and hazardous projects across the DOE complex. (authors)

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A Decade of Innovative Approaches to Treating and Dispositioning Radioactive Waste at the Savannah River Site - 20620

This year marks the 70. anniversary of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS), located near Aiken, South Carolina. SRS is a key industrial complex responsible for environmental stewardship, environmental cleanup, waste management, and disposition of nuclear materials. SRS also continues to have a role in critical defense-related activities and the reprocessing of used reactor fuel. The SRS encompasses 803 square kilometers (310 square miles) in parts of Aiken, Barnwell, and Allendale counties. The Liquid Waste Mission starts with the safe receipt and storage of radioactive liquid waste in the waste tanks, which principally includes Cold War legacy waste, but also waste from support of National Aeronautics Space Administration missions, medical isotope production, and research activities. This 133,000 cubic meters (m{sup 3}) (35 million gallons [Mgal]) of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) is currently held in 43 large underground waste tanks. The capacity of each of these tanks range from 2,800 m{sup 3} to 5,000 m{sup 3} (0.75 to 1.33 Mgal) and were placed in operation between 1954 and 1986. In July 2009, the DOE awarded a stand-alone contract to execute the Liquid Waste Mission at SRS. The Liquid Waste Contractor selected was Savannah River Remediation LLC1 (SRR), which is responsible for receipt, storage, retrieval and treatment of all HLW, disposal of the decontaminated low-activity waste fraction, as well as operationally closing cleaned HLW tanks. Since July 2009, SRR has successfully grouted and operationally closed six large underground tanks, poured 1,476 canisters of vitrified HLW (a stable glass waste form), treated approximately 34,200 m{sup 3} (9.0 Mgal) of HLW, and dispositioned over 41,200 m{sup 3} (10.9 Mgal) of decontaminated salt solution as low-level waste (LLW) into the Saltstone Disposal Units (SDUs) being constructed by SRR on site. The innovative work performed by SRR in the LLW portion of its mission has earned it the Richard S. Hodes Award. The work conducted by SRR is the same work championed by the late Richard S. Hodes, a respected physician, statesmen, and Chairman of the Southeast Compact Commission for Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management. (authors)

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Panel Session 2: Hot Topics in US DOE Environmental Management

The well-attended Panel Session was chaired by Martin Schneider. The four panelists did not provide presentations. Rather the session was a discussion focusing on pressing issues facing US DOE Environmental Management (EM) sites and how the program is moving forward. The session began by momentarily reflecting on a success: the three Tank Waste Treatment Facilities will soon be coming online. These three facilities will treat as much waste in two years as was treated in the past 30 years. That is a significant milestone in progress. Also, safety enhancements at WIPP are a big success. The panelists noted that there will be challenges with the victories of the startup of the Waste Treatment Facilities. Treating tank waste is the last EM mission and will help with the relationships with the stakeholders, regulators and Congress. One of the biggest challenges will be moving back to full operation mode. Although the operation will increase productivity of reducing/managing the tank waste, it will decrease life cycle cost and lessen years of cleanup. The challenge will be having people understand that EM will be operating 24/7 and that maintenance will be key in keeping the operations. EM will be working together with the regulators to show tangible progress that will be effective and efficient. By working together, they can find opportunities/technologies for streamlining and accelerating cleanup. Recent changes to the regulatory framework between DOE-EM Los Alamos Field Office and New Mexico Environmental Department have helped cleanup in Los Alamos. Every year EM and the agencies review progress and come to agreements on the next work priorities. At Savannah River Site, the Federal Facility Agreement among EM, South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has developed a small core team that work are shared by together in resolving issues that come up. The discussion moved on to how progress can be made by sharing lessons learned among the contractors. An example of how these learned lessons can be shared is that key representatives from projects across the EM sites participate in various forums to review/contribute to the work planned. Other opportunities can be by temporary assignments of DOE staff to gain experience and by monthly EM Headquarters report that provide the lessons learned across the EM sites. The panelists discussed how skyline changes are the best examples of tangible progress. Decontamination and Demolition (D and D) of structures are the easiest tangible progress that can be seen. Whereas tank waste cleanup is the hardest to see. Disposal of waste onsite versus offsite is another challenge, and timely discussions are necessary to get to the best value to the government.

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Panel Session 90: US DOE Mixed Waste: Proposals for Dealing with Problematic Waste Streams and Policy Changes

This panel focused on generation and management of low level and mixed low-level radioactive wastes, challenges for disposition, innovative solutions applied at DOE sites, and collaboration among sites to ensure that waste disposition pathways are understood. In addition, potential policy initiatives were discussed including depleted uranium, elemental mercury, and treatment of legacy mixed waste components. As part of the introduction, Theresa Kliczewski provided an overview of why this panel is relevant: problematic mixed waste streams still exist across the DOE cleanup complex. Theresa noted that the DOE EM Headquarters Office of Waste and Materials Management (EM-4.2), for which she is employed with, continues to work with the DOE cleanup sites on a path forward for these problematic mixed waste streams. As part of this effort, EM-4.2 requested that the Energy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG) perform a review of all the DOE sites problematic mixed waste streams. Panelists with presentations: Challenging Waste Streams: Disposition of Depleted Uranium Oxide Conversion Product (Douglas Tonkay); EFCOG WMWG Challenging Waste Subgroup (Tammy Monday); Mercury Waste Challenges (John Wrapp); Legacy Large Mixed Waste Components (Kalli Shupe)

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Session 097A - Panel: Accomplishments and Update of the East Tennessee Technology Park in Oak Ridge, TN (1/4) (R1.16a)

This panel was deferred until 2021. The session was designed to highlight and celebrate the accomplishment of Vision 2020 at US DoE's East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Vision 2020 is the overarching strategy and guidance that have formed the foundation of success in closing one of the largest cleanup site in the DOE Complex. The session was supposed to feature representatives from the DOE Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management (OREM) and its contractor, UCOR, in exploring the partnerships and performance excellence that have made the difference in achieving success. OREM's Vision 2020 is a collaboration with entities that have made a difference in its success: economic developers, workforce developers, the University of Tennessee, and community partners. The vigorous Oak Ridge small business contracting community has also been instrumental in helping achieve success. This session plans to celebrate the entire process, its numerous players, and the spirit of accomplishment as the Oak Ridge community comes to realize the promise of 30 years of continuous cleanup excellence. This session integrated with panel sessions 97B, 97C and 97D. Panelists with presentations: Beyond Cleanup: Achieving Risk Reduction through Partnerships and Performance Excellence (Kenneth Rueter); Strategic Approach to Achieve End States at the East Tennessee Technology Park (Jay Mullis)

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Hanford Immobilized Low-Activity Waste Transportation System Testing Results - 20043

The immobilized low-activity waste (ILAW) transportation system is a first-of-a-kind system that is being designed and tested to transport ILAW glass-filled containers from Hanford's Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Low-Activity Waste (LAW) Facility to the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) burial trench for permanent disposal. A prototype design and fabrication of one transport trailer and four engineered ILAW pallets was completed in mid-2018. Prototype qualification testing to verify adequacy of the design was completed in 2019 by Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) and affiliate ATKINS SNC-Lavalin Group. Prototype testing was completed to advance design maturation across all operational and facility interfaces, and under adverse environmental and operating conditions, including thermal assessment of the system at peak projected temperatures. Test design, observation, and feedback was well represented and supported by all ILAW Transportation System interfacing organizations: WTP constructor Bechtel National, Inc.; IDF operator CH2M (CHPRC); transportation contractor Mission Support Alliance (MSA); the U. S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office (DOE/RL) and Office of River Protection (DOE/ORP); and Washington State Department of Ecology. This paper presents the results of prototype qualification testing and opportunities for design improvements based on testing. Changes to the final design as a result of prototype testing include improvements in safety, ergonomics, operational flexibility, and As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA) applications. (authors)

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Use of Historical EM Practices and Policies for Management of Cleanup Program and Address GAO Concerns - 20222

As Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) program policies and management practices are revised over time, it might be useful to periodically reflect on the DOE EM program's past to identify practices that have worked and those that might be appropriate for possible reuse in the future. An added impetus to examine alternative approaches is the recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled 'Nuclear Waste Cleanup - DOE Could Improve Program and Project Management by Better Classifying Work and Following Leading Practices.' The February 2019 GAO report states that EM categorizes most of its work in a way that does not adequately involve independent experts and DOE senior leadership. It also noted that EM has not followed leading practices for program and project management that could help keep the cleanup efforts on schedule and control costs. The GAO report recommended that EM, working with DOE Office of Project Management (PM): - Establish requirements and then assess EM's ongoing operations activities to determine if some activities should be reclassified as capital asset projects based on these newly established requirements. - Review and revise EM's 2017 cleanup policy to include program management leading practices related to scope, cost, schedule performance, and independent reviews. - Update the cleanup policy to require that earned value management (EVM) systems be maintained and used in a way that follows EVM best practices. - Develop a policy to ensure that work is categorized as level of effort (LOE) only in appropriate, specified circumstances, such as when work is not measurable or when measurement is impractical. - Integrate EVM data into EM's performance metrics for operations activities. To assist with improving program performance and implementing audit recommendations, this paper reviewed past successful cleanups such as Weldon Springs, Rocky Flats, Fernald, Ashtabula, Battelle Columbus (abs, and other historical resources and people with experience during the early years of EM program. As such, there are several past practices which may well be suited for reuse today. Some of these practices include: - In 1990's, as the DOE EM cleanup program, known as Environmental Restoration came into effect, the known cleanup scope at each geographic location or site was organized into four levels ranging from overall site-wide cleanup effort to the individual 'release sites', providing high granularity to the program. - The cleanup program was organized by geography (Northwest, Southwest, Eastern Area Programs, etc.). These 'sub-program' managers provided a degree of Headquarters oversight and management allowing upper management (EM-1, 2, and 3) to focus on major decisions and issues. - Budget levels at selected cleanup sites were funded above 'minimum-safety' levels to accelerate actual cleanup work. - Past practice utilized EVM techniques and uniform EM oversight over all discrete project-like activities, providing for a coordinated cleanup effort. - EM managed LOE activities using benchmarking and best in class management practice techniques to help manage costs. - EM managed and reviewed entire site cleanup baselines, not only individual projects, focusing on a successful overall outcome. - Sites had a 'Road map' or 'Management Action Plan' that provided the overall strategy or plan for that site's cleanup - this helped with understanding and coordination of efforts. - EM had a robust lessons-learned program and database to capture and transmit worthy ideas. - EM had well-structured cleanup baseline change control policies to control cost and schedule changes, at the contractor and higher Headquarters levels. Finally, some of the GAO observations may be valid, however it is not clear as to their extent. For example, for some operation types of work, the use of the Level of Effort (LOE) earned value method to track progress may be appropriate. Also, to ensure independence of thought, and to obtain useful insight on past practices, it may be suitable to have former EM employees to assist with understanding past practices or to verify that activities have been properly identified. (authors)

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MH-1A Sturgis Decommissioning and Dismantlement - 20281

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) with its prime contractor, Aptim Federal Services, LLC (APTIM), recycled 5,260 metric tons (11.6 million pounds) of material from Sturgis Barge (Sturgis) during the Decommissioning and Dismantlement of the MH-1A nuclear power reactor. The overall objective of the project was to reduce residual radioactivity associated with MH-1A to levels that permitted release of Sturgis for dismantlement and termination of the Army Reactor Office permit. By effectively applying waste hierarchy's three Rs - reduce, reuse and recycle - the Sturgis project not only minimized the amount of waste that required disposal at landfills, but also reduced the potential for long-term environmental liability emanating from these landfills. The project team completed the physical decommissioning efforts in June 2018 in Galveston, TX. In September 2018, radiological surveys were completed to demonstrate the vessel could be released for shipbreaking. Sturgis was towed from Galveston, TX to Brownsville, TX in late September 2018. Shipbreaking, dismantlement and recycling efforts began in early October 2018 and were completed on 15 March 2019. As part of the decommissioning effort in Galveston, the team shipped 69 shipments (860 metric tons) of low-level radioactive waste and radioactive components to the Waste Control Specialist (WCS) facility in Andrews TX for disposal. Certain radioactive components had to be transferred to the Department of Energy prior to placing the materials into the Federal Waste Facility located within WCS. However, most of the radioactive waste was characterized, profiled, approved and managed under the WCS permitted radioactive waste exemption process authorized and implemented by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) and the Radioactive Materials Division. This allows LLRW and LLMW to be shipped as regulated waste and then upon receipt at WCS through satisfying the relevant waste acceptance criteria the waste is exempted and placed into the WCS RCRA permitted cell. An additional 35 shipments (544 metric ton) of contaminated hazardous waste water were transported to U.S. Ecology in Robstown, TX for treatment/disposal. An additional 36 shipments (500 metric tons) of non-hazardous wastewater was sent to Republic Waste Services' facility in Fresno, TX. The disposal of these materials required close coordination with State of Texas regulators. During decommissioning, the project team recycled approximately 270 metric tons (600,000 pounds) of lead and steel. As part of the dismantlement in Brownsville, TX the team recycled approximately 5,000 metric tons (11 million pounds) of ferrous and non-ferrous material, limiting our disposal requirements to about 180 metric tons (400,000 pounds) of material (<4% from entire shipbreaking activity). Although the primary hazard being mitigated by this project was radiological, recycling was always a priority for the project. The team strived to achieve sustainability goals as we implemented this one of a kind project. Scrap metal recycling has a large positive impact on the environment and can also favorably impact project disposal costs. Steel is among the most recycled material in the world. Nearly 40% of the world's steel production is made from scrap. Recycling steel also requires 75% less energy than producing it from raw materials. By using recycled steel rather than virgin materials, 2.33 kg of carbon emissions are eliminated per kg of steel [1]. The project recycled more than 4,500 metric tons (10 million pounds) of steel, which eliminated about 10,400 metric tons (23 million pounds) of CO{sub 2}. By implementing a recycling initiative for the Sturgis project, the team was able to realize cost avoidance for disposal of scrap, cost savings from the metals recycled, plus the project provided benefits to the environment through our recycling efforts. Once the dismantlement was complete, the team prepared a detailed decommissioning closure report, which allowed for the termination of the Army Reactor Decommissioning Permit. While it not only reduced any potential long-term environmental liability, this project to decommission and dismantle a floating nuclear power plant is truly unprecedented - it is a prime example of the USACE mission which is: 'Engineering solutions for the Nation's toughest challenges'. This unique, one of a kind, historical power plant was never designed to be taken apart, and the available information about its construction was lacking in many details. The hazards that required mitigation dictated a painstaking and deliberate process in order to avoid any release to the environment and the community, and to protect the health and safety of the workers involved while keeping the waste hierarchy's three R's - reduce, reuse and recycle at the forefront. (authors)

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DOE Hanford Tank Side Cesium Removal System (TSCR) Update: Fabrication and Factory Acceptance Testing - 20300

The Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) System is a modular, quickly-deployable, and passively safe system for efficiently removing solids and cesium from alkaline liquid waste raffinate created by fuel processing on the Hanford site. This paper provides an overview of the project with particular emphasis on completion of fabrication and factory acceptance testing (FAT). All TSCR System components are inside three enclosures known as the Process Enclosure, Ancillary Enclosure, and Control Enclosure. The Process Enclosure is seismic design category II (SDC-II) and built to withstand the rigors of transportation and lifting, high winds, volcanic ash fall, and heavy precipitation (snow) over a temperature range of -25 to 115 deg. F. The Process Enclosure and Control Enclosure were fabricated in AVANTech's Columbia, SC facility, while the Ancillary Enclosure was fabricated in AVANTech's Richland, WA facility. The design and preliminary documented safety analysis were completed in December 2019, with all work being performed in accordance with ASME NQA-1 quality assurance requirements. The Process Enclosure, Ion Exchange Columns (IXCs), and several other TSCR components have a nuclear safety function and are designated as safety significant structures, systems, and components (SS-SSCs). The NQA-1 Commercial Grade Dedication (CGD) process was used to identify critical characteristics in order to accept materials and items used for fabrication of several safety significant TSCR components. This paper also addresses unique aspects and challenges of implementing CGD in DOE facilities and systems. After fabrication and preliminary testing, the Process and Control Enclosures were shipped to AVANTech's Richland facility where the complete TSCR System was setup and connected in a represented layout and configuration that will be used on the Hanford site. Test tanks and pumps were put in place and connected to the TSCR Process Enclosure in a manner that mimicked interfacing Double Shell Tanks in the 241-AP Tank Farm. The TSCR System was then tested/operated under conditions equivalent to those planned for onsite operation. Testing was separated into five separate phases as defined below: - Phase 1: Confirmation of TSCR System readiness for the FAT; - Phase 2: Verification of TSCR System operation under standard conditions; - Phase 3: Demonstration of TSCR System operation under non-standard conditions; - Phase 4: Demonstration of ion exchange media removal from an IXC; and - Phase 5: Completion of TSCR System lift plans and site mobilization. The Hanford Tank Operations Contractor, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), participated in all phases of testing. Testing at AVANTech's Richland Facility allowed WRPS personnel to familiarize themselves with TSCR operations in a radiologically clean facility prior to onsite mobilization. Engineering and operations personnel gained valuable experience that allowed them to better refine onsite operational protocols and procedures - including handling and movement of IXCs with a forklift. This paper describes the technologies used by the TSCR System as well as how these technologies are deployed and operated to advance the Hanford mission of safely, efficiently, and effectively treating tank waste. It also provides detailed information on fabrication and FAT, including operational data from simulated tank waste runs. A project schedule for WRPS' planned construction acceptance testing, operational acceptance testing, and actual tank waste treatment is provided. This presentation should be of great interest to parties responsible for the design, testing, and mobilization of modular NQA-1 technologies for the treatment of raffinate and similar liquid wastes containing high concentrations of radioactive cesium. (authors)

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The Incorporation of Pump-and-Treat Data in the New Tracking Restoration and Closure (TRAC)Web-Based Mapping Tool - 20339

Groundwater pump-and-treat (P and T) systems are a common remediation strategy for sites with contaminated groundwater within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM). Currently, there are six DOE-EM sites with active P and T systems, but integrated information on individual systems is only primarily available in separate annual reports. To provide a broad view of both current and historical P and T operations, data has been collected on all of the P and T systems. This summary information not only includes capital and average annual costs, but also identifies contaminants treated and forecasted P and T closure dates. Principal contaminants of concern treated with P and T systems include trichloroethylene, chromium (VI), strontium-90, technetium-99, and uranium. DOE-EM is continuing to create a web-based mapping tool that compiles information on groundwater contaminants, remediation strategies and, current data related to plumes and cleanup progress within all DOE-EM sites. The information collected on P and T systems will be added to the TRAC (Tracking Restoration and Closure) tool using interactive maps to quickly access and share information. This information sharing supports the transition from active to passive remediation methods and long-term monitoring approaches. TRAC can ensure that managers, stakeholders, regulators, and contractors remain up to date on cleanup progress for all sites within the complex. The information on P and T systems expands the use of TRAC and can assist in project monitoring and budget planning and support potential shifts in management plans based on plume data. (authors)

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Respirator Cartridge Performance on Mixed Vapors from Hanford Tank Headspaces and Exhausters - 20427

Between 2016 and 2018, the Hanford Tank Operations Contractor - Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) - conducted a series of tests of air-purifying respirator (APR) chemical cartridges commonly used at Hanford tank farms to determine the period of time for which the cartridges would provide adequate performance when used in APRs and powered-air-purifying respirators (PAPRs) to protect workers when exposed to a mixture of vapors exiting tank headspaces. Although cartridge manufacturers provide service life estimating tools for individual chemical compounds, the projected performance of these cartridges on complex vapor mixtures is not available, and the adequacy of APRs for tank farm applications represents an important workforce concern. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration identifies cartridge testing as a valid approach for establishing cartridge service life. The primary function of the WRPS Cartridge Test Program was to obtain objective data to determine service lives for the APR and PAPR cartridges used at Hanford tank farms. WRPS contracted with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to analyze the test data and offer an independent analysis of and recommendations based on respirator cartridge performance. A total of 28 APR and 10 PAPR cartridge tests were conducted between 2016 and 2018 on 12 different tank headspaces and tank farm exhauster slipstreams. Two APR cartridges from SCOTT (now 3M) and two PAPR cartridges from MSA Safety, Inc. and 3M were evaluated using a cartridge testing system specifically designed to measure and monitor test conditions and sample cartridge inlet and outlet vapor streams for important chemical compounds. Testing focused on analysis of approximately 61 tank vapor chemicals of potential concern (COPCs) that have been previously detected in tank vapors at levels above 10% of their occupational exposure limits (OELs). Each test was conducted over 16 hours of run time. Evidence of chemical breakthrough was assessed by comparing inlet and outlet COPC concentrations over the duration of each test. The breakthrough threshold was normally defined as exceeding 10% of the compounds OEL at the cartridge outlet. Ammonia breakthrough was observed in a majority of the cartridge tests and occurred earlier than breakthrough of any other chemical compound. Several other COPCs did exhibit breakthrough behavior, including mercury, 1,3-butadiene, furan, 2,5 dihydrofuran, and N-nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA), but only in a very limited number of cartridge tests and only after ammonia breakthrough had occurred. In addition, tests results suggest that breakthrough of some of these COPCs may have been affected by competition with and breakthrough of other non-COPC organics, such as ethanol and acetone, with substantially lower toxicological hazard. Comparison of cartridge manufacturers' service life estimates with the experimentally derived breakthrough times indicates that manufacturers' estimates are generally conservative, even in the presence of the complex mixed vapor streams experienced in these tests. With consideration of appropriate safety margins, these results provide valuable insights on cartridge performance to inform industrial hygiene professionals in establishing appropriate cartridge change-out schedules for APR and PAPR use in the Hanford tank farms. (authors)

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Use of the Manuela 3D/Radiation Scanning Tool at Nuclear Facilities - 20437

Licensees, facility operators and decommissioning contractors have a need for comprehensive, accurate and precise radiological and topographical data to plan and execute safe and efficient Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D) projects. Traditional approaches rely greatly upon labor and administratively intensive data collection methods that require considerable time and effort to glean the relevant data to plan and perform work in a radiological work area. Orano Decommissioning Services has developed and utilized at French nuclear facilities a lightweight portable scanning instrument called MANUELA (Mobile Apparatus for Nuclear Expertise Localization Assistance). Recently Orano conducted demonstrations at two United States nuclear facilities using MANUELA that may prove useful in areas of the fuel cycle including: - ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) planning during facility operations; - Scoping and site characterization during the D and D planning phase; - Remedial action support during active decommissioning work; - Radiation and modeling planning for plant modifications; - Support Final Status Survey and demonstration of 'end state' compliance for license termination. MANUELA is currently being evaluated for use during decommissioning of nuclear facilities and could aide in demonstrating compliance with end state criteria after decommissioning. Of particular interest are decommissioning projects planned for various sites across the United States. Most of these sites present unique challenges and opportunities to safely and efficiently decommission in a regulatory compliant manner. The two demonstration site's current conditions of relatively low radiation levels inside containment proved to be ideal platforms to deploy the MANUELA instrument for evaluation of the complex geometries typically found in a nuclear facility. The MANUELA instrument was able to precisely identify local hot spots of the reactor system's primary equipment and was able to simultaneously overlay the dose information onto the scanned 3D images. Using data like this, a licensee would be able to make informed technical and personnel decisions on methods to remediate, shield or properly dispose of the radioactive source term. MANUELA can be used throughout the decommissioning process to validate progress and continue to refine the work activities to optimize the efforts of the crew which reduces downtime waiting for survey results, whereas traditional survey methodology relies on a physical survey to be performed and the data transcribed onto survey maps that are only two dimensional. The traditional format tends to be inaccurate and difficult to interpret the precise location(s) of hot spots or generalized dose rates. The resultant scan also allows the user to know the exact extent of the survey versus transposing information onto a map with only a portion of the map area scanned. MANUELA also compiles all of the relevant survey data into a downloadable table format which includes the measurement identification number, time stamp, point space location on the XYZ plane, and the dose rate value. (authors)

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Results of a Soil Flushing Treatability Test for Hanford Site Hexavalent Chromium Removal - 20446

U.S. Department of Energy contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company has made significant progress remediating hexavalent chromium in groundwater near the Columbia River through the operation of pump and treat facilities and source removal activities. To mitigate risks associated with hexavalent chromium contamination, which was identified in a CERCLA interim action record of decision as the primary groundwater contaminant of concern for the 100-KR-4 Operable Unit from discharging to the Columbia River, three ion-exchange pump and treat systems were installed between 1997 and 2009. Between 2010 and 2016, operation of the K West pump and treat system, located near the former 105K West plutonium production reactor, reduced concentrations below the groundwater remediation target for hexavalent chromium. In 2016, a rebound study was performed to evaluate the effectiveness of the pump and treat remedy and assess the potential for any residual hexavalent chromium sources continuing to contribute to groundwater contamination. As a result of the rebound study, a source of continued groundwater contamination was identified. To address this condition, a soil flushing treatability test was written and approved by the U.S. Department of Energy and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The test included saturating about a 1-acre area of soil with treated water with the goal of forcing the residual hexavalent chromium to groundwater where existing extraction wells could remove it for treatment, accelerating the cleanup process. In spring and summer 2019, CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company installed and began operating a shallow underground leach system to support the treatability test. Preliminary sampling data show the test was effective in removing the residual contamination. Following further evaluation and analysis from the initial test, the process will be considered for implementation elsewhere on the Hanford Site, particularly at locations where there is a known or suspected continuing contamination source in the soil column. The paper will cover the goals of the study, as well as more details about the following: - Overview of pump and treat exit strategy (using U.S. Environmental Protection Agency guidance); - The design and installation of the soil flushing technology in the 100-K Area; - The testing process and results of sampling data; - Post-study evaluation and potential for implementation in other locations at the Hanford Site. Innovative solutions for cleanup, such as the soil flushing technology, have resulted in substantial progress in the removal of groundwater contaminants at the Hanford Site, potentially shortening the time frame required to meet cleanup goals and resulting in significant cost savings. (authors)

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System Health and Status Reporting is Used to Improve Infrastructure Systems at the Hanford Site - 20449

Reliable physical infrastructure systems are vital to completing the clean-up mission and the start-up and commissioning of new nuclear waste processing facilities at the Hanford Site. Key infrastructure systems at Hanford include water, sewer, and electrical utilities, roads, telecommunications/network systems, and fire systems. All of the infrastructure systems are non-nuclear, General Service systems that are being maintained under formal engineering configuration control and none are specifically credited in any documented safety analysis (DSA). Starting in calendar year 2017, the Hanford Site's infrastructure and services contractor started producing system health and status reports for a total of 15 critical infrastructure systems as means to get a better understanding of each system's health and how it could be improved to ensure better and more reliable service delivery. As the reporting, tracking, and use of the metrics has matured, the number of systems for which reports are being developed has been expanded to a total of 23. Each of the critical infrastructure systems are assigned primary and alternate design authorities that complete qualifications on each assigned system. The design authorities actively manage and maintain configuration control on each of their systems and track metrics associated with availability, maintenance (corrective and preventive), and configuration of the technical baseline. The metrics are based on the principles established in Chapter V of DOE O 420.1C, Facility Safety, [1] and have been tailored as appropriate to each of the key infrastructure systems. An overall assessment of system health is performed and documented on a routine basis (e.g., quarterly). Included in this documentation is a quantitative score for each of the metrics (i.e., availability, maintenance, configuration management) along with results of system walk-downs, description of any permanent design modifications, identification of new or emerging issues and vulnerabilities affecting the system, and an assessment by the design authority of actions necessary to improve the system health score. The overall status scores are calculated using a formula and based on a pre-determined grading scale, a color is assigned for simple presentation. The information gained from developing the reports is being used to (1) assist with making timely and better informed decisions through the use of solid technical bases that are increasing the overall reliability and capabilities of the Site's infrastructure systems as new expense and capital projects in the Reliability Projects Investment Portfolio (RPIP) are prioritized and executed; (2) feed the risk management program, and (3) integrate the technical content of Master Plans that describe the Site's needs for the system and the system's capabilities to meet those future needs. (authors)

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